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PREPARATION OF THIS book by Paul Barrett, Mark Rose, and Bruce Seely
rested on congenial and productive relationships developed over the course
of more than a quarter century. In 1979, Bruce was starting his dissertation
at the University of Delaware, and Mark was working as a research associ-
ate at the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia. Because of their interest in
American highway politics, one morning they met at the Temple University
Library. In 1981, Paul and Mark met in Milwaukee at the Annual Meeting
of the Society for the History of Technology. Paul had recently completed
his dissertation focused on automobile and transit politics in Chicago
between 1890 and 1930; and Mark had become general editor of a mono-
graphic series published by Temple University Press titled “Technology and
Urban Growth.” Mark persuaded Paul to submit his manuscript to the
series at Temple, where it was subsequently published in 1983. Bruce also
published his book, Building the American Highway System (1987), in the
“Technology and Urban Growth Series.”
Since that time, the three of us worked together on a number of schol-
arly projects. As part of Paul’s interest in aviation and airports, he and Mark
coauthored an essay for the Journal of Urban History focused on the politics
of transportation statistics. From 1986 until 1990, Bruce and Mark were
colleagues at Michigan Technological University (located on Michigan’s
Upper Peninsula, where snow fell almost daily from November to May). In
our frequent conversations about social, political, and urban history and
about the history of transportation and technology, we often focused on the
gloomy economic times of the 1970s and 1980s. We also talked about the
xi
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politics of industrial and population decline in the Upper Middle West; and
in less doleful moments, we discussed the “politics” of collegiate hockey.
In the late 1980s, Bruce and Mark also conducted research for the Pub-
lic Works Historical Society on the politics of getting the Interstate High-
way System constructed, a portion of which was published in the Journal of
Policy History. In the course of research for that article, no event or docu-
ment impressed us more than an unforgettable conversation with several
demoralized Ohio state highway engineers who had suffered years of organ-
ization downsizing, a loss of professional autonomy, diminished budgets,
and public castigations at the hands of politicians, environmentalists, and
local citizens’ groups. Later, we recognized that those senior highway
builders were experiencing a process we described as the devolution of
authority from engineering experts to local politicians and ordinary citi-
zens.1 During that same period and extending almost to the present day,
Bruce and Paul opened their own conversation about engineering educa-
tion. All in all, Paul, Bruce, and Mark had spent years writing and talking
about politics, whether that politics was connected to roads, cities, social
networks, or engineers and technologists.
By the mid-1990s, as the three of us commenced research on this book,
we took for granted several ideas about government and transportation. We
began by studying technological questions, but soon found that stories of
invention and innovation were in fact subordinate to another narrative con-
cerning how each new technology required changes in public policy in order
to be widely adopted. The situation is somewhat analogous to historian
David A. Kirsch’s explanation of the fate of the short-lived electric automo-
bile of the early twentieth century, for in both situations a range of factors
shaped the development of new technologies.2 In the cases of the truck, rail,
and airline industries that we have studied, government rather than tech-
nology framed the range of choices available to transportation executives
and their counterparts in labor unions. In other words, the introduction and
operation after 1920 of technical means of delivering transportation ser-
vices—railroads, trucks, and airlines alike—rested on distinctly political
decisions made in political arenas. In virtually every discussion of trans-
portation innovation, regulation, and deregulation, we find that politics was
in the driver’s seat.
That government was and remained important in the American econ-
omy and in the organization and operation of American transportation dur-
ing the past century is a concept that historians do not doubt. Antitrust and
subsidies, for example, comprise two often-contentious areas in which gov-
ernment has played a central and well-recognized role in the transportation
field. During both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, government sub-
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sidies such as land grants, highway construction funds, and appropriations in
support of airway improvements were important in development of rail-
roads, auto and truck transport, and then airlines. Even in the mid-1990s,
more than a decade after the disappearance of extensive federal regulation of
railroad, airline, and truck rates and service, government officials at every
level still subsidized construction and maintenance of roadways and airways,
sometimes in lavish fashion. Similarly, antitrust policy always loomed large
in the development and organization of American transportation. Before
and after the period of federal regulation of price and service, which ended
for airlines in 1978 and for trucking and railroads in 1980, government offi-
cials continued to determine whether executives of an airline, truck, or rail-
road corporation could purchase a competitor, thereby perhaps achieving a
commanding position in local or regional markets. Again, the centrality of
government subsidies and antitrust have been long studied among historians.
Whether in the form of subsidies or antitrust policies, moreover, all or most
historians recognize the value of studying in some detail the precise conse-
quences of implementing those policies for the workings of corporations,
industries, and institutions over extended periods of time.
Curiously, the important role played by direct government action in
structuring industries and markets has sometimes been neglected. One rea-
son perhaps for this oversight in the realm of transportation is the paradox
of American individualism in a nation built around large-scale organiza-
tions. As one example, truck operators perceived themselves as self-made
men (and during most of the twentieth century, trucking was virtually an
all-male domain). Right through the 1970s, writers for trucking organiza-
tion publications reminded readers of their storied beginnings as lonely dri-
vers battling poor roads with rickety equipment. Often, these writers for
trucking publications reported on equally tough battles fought and won
against the dreaded, fly-by-night “gypsy” truckers of the 1920s and 1930s.
Still other reports in truckers’ publications narrated the legal and legislative
fights of the past and others to come against the lurking executives of rail-
road corporations, who were always described as possessing formidable
resources. Whether in their own publications or in testimony before com-
mittees of the U.S. Congress, between the 1930s and 1980, trucking execu-
tives and publicists never grew tired of representing themselves as isolated
operators fighting only for reasonable treatment at the hands of gypsy
truckers, insular government officials, and haughty railroad executives. This
attitude persisted even after executives of a large segment of the trucking
industry had organized state and national associations during the 1930s to
fight legal and legislative battles against “gypsy” truckers and railroad exec-
utives still regularly described as dangerous or “lurking.”
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Railroad and aviation executives recounted similar stories of heroic lead-
ers who had developed their firms and industries against great odds. In these
retellings, rail and airline officials represented themselves as persons com-
mitted to preservation of individual choice and initiative no matter how
large the organizations they came to direct. Ironies abounded. For example,
like their counterparts in trucking, during the 1930s, railroad and airline
executives organized to fight in courts and Congress against truckers and
one another with a view toward protecting their share of freight and pas-
senger traffic. Those would-be individualists working at railroad and airline
firms (again, virtually an all-male group and virtually all preferring to think
of themselves as self-made) never grew fatigued of repeating historical nar-
ratives that highlighted the problems of unfair competition. Most impor-
tantly, by the mid-1930s, leaders of airline firms had joined their counter-
parts in the trucking field to conclude that government regulation
represented the best and only answer to competitive pressure and especially
to the real threat that railroad leaders would enter or “invade” trucking and
airline operations with their own trucks and aircraft. In reality, government
at every level had subsidized the railroad, trucking, and airline businesses;
and in fact, those businesses and most of the actions of the men who oper-
ated them were and remained creatures of federal law and regulatory pro-
nouncement. Even so, right up to the late 1970s and the final days of the
regulatory regime, transportation leaders routinely affirmed their individu-
alism and regularly recounted to one another their monumental struggles to
survive and grow.
This book is not focused exclusively or even directly on the paradox of
individualism in a political economy built around regional and national
institutions. Nor is our specific focus on government subsidies of roadways
or airways; and antitrust enters our work only insofar as transportation exec-
utives and federal officials occasionally brought it to bear as part of an effort
to shape the competitive environment. Instead, these three sets of ideas
about subsidies, antitrust, and the paradox of individualism in a collective
age weave their way through portions of this book at a background level. In
briefest form, however, our book focuses directly on the centrality of gov-
ernment in organizing the nation’s transportation industries, including the
organization of transportation markets. (Often, we describe government
with terms such as the “state,” or “state actors,” but always we mean federal
officials working as judges, as senators and representatives, as regulators at
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board, or
as president of the United States.)
We conceive each portion of this book around the idea that government
officials organized rail, truck, and airline firms into three separate and dis-
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tinct industries and three separate and distinct markets. At the outset of our
research, we had no reason to doubt the idea that the historical and con-
temporary presence of railroad, trucking, and airline industries rested on the
natural distinctions of technological systems. Railroads such as the Penn-
sylvania and New York Central used great coal and diesel locomotives to
pull lengthy, steel-wheeled trains on steel rails owned by those companies.
Gasoline and diesel-fueled tractors owned by the largest and smallest truck-
ers still pulled only one or two trailers. Those trailers and tractors, it was
obvious, used rubber tires on publicly constructed roads made of concrete
and asphalt. Although air carriers such as United Airlines made use of pub-
lic space, they, too, were privately owned. Even after World War II, when
airline travel on United and the other “trunk” carriers acquired a routine
quality, surely, we assumed, those high-tech airplanes piloted by once-
daring aviators had made the airline business different than that of slower-
moving trucks and that of old-fashioned, smoky, money-losing railroads.
Prior to starting this project, then, we accepted the language of transporta-
tion officials, academic experts, and government officials who defined rail-
road, truck, and airline firms as members of distinct and impermeable trans-
portation modes. Indeed, as early as the 1910s, members of Congress and
officials at the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had already deter-
mined that railroad firms could not simultaneously own and operate
steamships. We soon came to understand that whether in 1920 or in the
mid-1990s, railroads, airlines, and trucking firms were and remained crea-
tures of public policy. Put another way, distinct transportation industries
emerged from a political setting rather than from some “fact” embedded in
rail, air, or truck technology.
This conception of each form of transportation as an independent and
separate mode of service also affected the way federal officials set up regu-
latory agencies. Once having identified rail, truck, and air as distinct and
impermeable forms of transportation, members of Congress chose to regu-
late each of them through separate agencies whose officials bore no respon-
sibility to foster connections between, say, truck and train. Again, there was
nothing natural about this structure of regulation. Starting in the 1920s, we
learned, many in and out of government began to envision an alternative
transportation regime, one that would permit railroads to own truck and
airline firms, leading to formation of transportation companies. ICC com-
missioner Joseph B. Eastman and other advocates of creating transportation
firms (rather than railroad, airline, and trucking companies) urged that
operators of those intermodal transportation firms would fall under the
purview of a single federal regulatory agency, not several of them. In short,
during the 1920s and 1930s, when fundamental definitions of transporta-
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tion remained fluid, we learned the importance of politics and public policy
rather than technology in setting air and ground transportation on a course
of multiple regulators, multiple industries, and multiple markets.
With government officials as the principal authors of the transportation
industries, we discovered by contrast that academic experts played only mar-
ginal roles in creating these industries and later in dismantling the regula-
tory regime. In earlier publications, each of the three of us had devoted sub-
stantial attention to the role of experts in the development of policy, and we
had expected to find engineers and later academic economists deeply
involved and at least partially determinative in framing transportation poli-
cies.3 In the often disjointed fields of transportation, however, experts rarely
dominated policy debates. Instead, despite their high visibility and their
ability to assert a professional disinterest in any particular outcome, econo-
mists such as William Z. Ripley, Emory R. Johnson, and Harold G. Moul-
ton in the 1920s and Paul W. MacAvoy and Alfred E. Kahn in the 1970s
often played only limited roles in the outcome of legislative debates about
transportation policy.
The main reason that appeals to apolitical experts gained even limited
authority in setting transportation policy was the deep and inherently polit-
ical nature of that process. That insight soon led us to reconsider the role of
presidents in the policy process. Only at a few key moments, we originally
thought, had presidents exercised their growing clout to articulate trans-
portation policy for air, road, and rail. For example, Woodrow Wilson played
no role in preparation of the Transportation Act of 1920, which framed rail-
road policy for decades to come. After 1922, Presidents Warren G. Harding
and Calvin Coolidge met only reluctantly with railroad officials to discuss
whether freight rates on agricultural commodities might be reduced in order
to help economically struggling farmers. Early in the Great Depression,
President Herbert Hoover proposed creation of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation in large part to bolster the railroads. In 1933, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt launched major studies of transportation designed to
shape policies to assist truckers, railroaders, and aviators coping with the
effects of hard-depression days. Then in 1935, Roosevelt signed the Motor
Carrier Act, permitting truckers to organize with an eye toward fixing rates
and routes. And in 1938, President Roosevelt approved the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act, directing members of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (later,
the Civil Aeronautics Board) to regulate and promote the aviation industry
in concert with executives of major airlines such as Delta and American. We
also knew that decades later, in 1962, President John F. Kennedy sought to
bring about a partial deregulation of transportation firms. We realized as
well that between 1978 and 1980, President Jimmy Carter presided over
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deregulation of the airline, railroad, and trucking industries. Other than
these and a few other initiatives in the transportation field, we assumed that
between 1920 and the mid-1990s, presidential interest in transportation
legislation had been intermittent in nature.
Rather than confirming these important but sporadic presidential ini-
tiatives in transportation, our research led us to identify the presence of a
long-term and persistent presidential hand in efforts to structure trans-
portation industries and transportation markets. In brief, presidents of the
United States and their senior advisers emerged over time as the primary
architects of transportation policy. We learned, for example, that President
Roosevelt had considered legislation to permit rail and truck firms to merge
into transportation companies. We also discovered that each president of
the United States starting with Dwight D. Eisenhower and ending with
William J. “Bill” Clinton attempted to diminish or eliminate federal trans-
portation regulations. Indeed, proclaiming his interest in protecting the
consumer, as early as 1955, President Eisenhower and his Secretary of
Commerce Sinclair Weeks made a short-lived effort to change ICC rules
and permit rail and truck executives to set rates within a predetermined
“zone of reasonableness.” (During the 1950s, at the height of the cold war,
only the scheduled airlines were to remain the protected wards of govern-
ment.)
Presidents also took a great interest in the agencies that directly regu-
lated transportation rates and service. We had assumed, inaccurately it
turned out, that each president starting with Woodrow Wilson and con-
cluding with Bill Clinton had simply appointed members of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). In
turn, we believed, those appointees at the ICC and CAB along with trans-
portation experts and attorneys for shippers and receivers had determined
shipping rates and shipping rules outside the purview of presidents. Noth-
ing in our prior research had induced us to consider the prospect that pres-
idents of the United States would take an active interest in such presumably
boring details as the exact rates that rail, air, and truck executives charged
for shipping automobiles, corn, rocking chairs, steel, passengers, roasted
peanuts, coal, and frozen or fresh chicken.
Starting with Calvin Coolidge and extending into Bill Clinton’s first
term, however, American presidents judged ICC and CAB rulings on trans-
portation rates and routes not only in terms of the immediate significance
of a proposed freight rate hike for farmers or urban consumers, but as part
of their overall stewardship of the American political economy. Again, Pres-
ident Roosevelt considered the impact of regulation on the railroads and for
a time entertained the possibility of a different approach to transportation
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regulation, even the possibility of an entirely new regulatory regime focused
on transportation companies rather than on railroad, truck, and airline
firms. Eisenhower and Weeks talked about deregulation as a device for pro-
tecting consumers from rising prices. The more immediate problem, as
Eisenhower and Weeks judged it, was to rescue economically declining rail-
roads by forcing ICC officials to permit “zone of reasonableness” pricing.
During the 1960s, moreover, President Lyndon B. Johnson fostered creation
of the U.S. Department of Transportation whose officials, he expected,
would soon turn their attention to securing deregulation of freight rates. In
the prosperous 1960s, deregulation comprised another element of presiden-
tial “fine-tuning” of the American economy. During the 1970s and the
period of economic “stagflation,” however, Presidents Richard M. Nixon,
Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter sought deregulation both to rescue the
many, now bankrupt railroads and to foster an overall reduction in fast-
rising inflationary pressures. Although the goals of presidential deregulation
varied from one decade to the next, the effort to bring about deregulation
started in the 1950s as a presidential initiative and ended in 1980 as a pres-
idential initiative. Nonetheless, deregulation lacked a constituency until
Presidents Ford and Carter’s staffs organized one. Once implemented at the
ICC and CAB by Carter’s appointees such as Alfred Kahn and later
approved by members of Congress, deregulation represented not a return to
some primordial market, but an effort, again principally directed by Ameri-
can presidents, to restructure transportation industries and to alter and pre-
sumably reduce prices charged in transportation markets. In the realm of
transportation, American presidents during the twentieth century served as
the nation’s Chief Economic Officers. Under presidential direction, the idea
that markets rather than regulators would guide the formation of trans-
portation industries and the determination of transportation prices emerged
as the essence of federal policy.
Nor did we appreciate at the beginning of work on this book what had
taken place in the transportation industries following deregulation in 1978
and 1980. Originally, we intended to begin our story with the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920 (the Esch-Cummins Act) and conclude it with the pack-
age of legislation that accompanied deregulation of air, truck, and rail in
1978 and 1980. We found it essential, however, to extend our analysis to
consider not only the creation of policy, but also its implementation. At first
we had in hand only a few pages by historians regarding the postderegula-
tion era, leading us simply and even naively to assume that after 1980, mar-
ket factors began to determine the price and service levels of transportation
firms. Indeed, before starting research, the concept of deregulation followed
by a restoration of markets, as the favored expression went, seemed to
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describe the inevitable and perhaps the natural order of persons and organi-
zations in the transportation industries once freed of government. Actually,
starting in 1978 with airlines and in 1980 with railroads and trucking, trans-
portation firms entered a period in which authority for rates, routes, and ser-
vice devolved from the hands of government regulators at the CAB and ICC
to the hands of transportation executives. In turn, leaders in the transporta-
tion industries and especially the trucking industry quit organizations such
as the Regular Common Carrier Conference and reshaped other organ-
izations such as their rate bureaus. In the period between 1980 and the mid-
1990s, executives at railroads, trucking firms, and airlines modified ways of
conducting business constructed over the course of the previous half century
and longer. We characterize these processes of change as those of devolution
and deinstitutionalization. These processes involved much more than a
return to “free” markets.
After 1980 as before, government remained central to the organization
of transportation industries and firms. For instance, government officials
permitted airline executives such as Robert L. Crandall of American Air-
lines to construct “fortress hubs” at key airports; and government leaders
permitted railroad executives such as John W. Snow at CSX, originally a
railroad company, to create intermodal companies owning barges and
ocean-going container ships. During the 1990s, federal officials even abol-
ished the Interstate Commerce Commission as well as remaining state laws
regulating truckers’ rates and service. In the 1990s, federal abolition of state
law was called preemption. After the 1980s, then, government still framed
the transportation industries, and government was and also remained the
principal author of transportation markets. Stated once again, in the realm
of framing these three main transportation industries, their firms, and their
markets, leaders of the American state always sat squarely in the driver’s
seat.
Consequently, we structure this study around long-term periods of
transportation governance and long-term periods of government-con-
structed markets during the twentieth century. For all the litigating and lob-
bying that surrounded the business of transporting freight and passengers
over that lengthy period of time, we identify three main periods in the polit-
ical economy of American transportation. In the first period, between 1920
and 1940, leaders in the federal government, who had before considered the
railroads as the nation’s primary form of transportation, struggled to deal
with new means of moving people and goods. In the 1920s, however, mem-
bers of Congress as well as leaders at the ICC advocated consolidation of the
railroads as the answer to the nation’s transportation problems. Only during
the Great Depression did members of a new group of federal officials begin
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to shape specialized policies for trucks and airlines, including for a moment
the option of allowing coordination of services among different forms of
transportation. Yet after nearly two decades of hearings, studies, and
speeches, and after a decade of depression, neither policy proved sufficiently
attractive to reshape the now ingrained patterns of competition between
rail, air, and truck. Instead, by 1940, leaders of the American state and espe-
cially key members of Congress such as Senator Patrick A. McCarran had
joined with truckers and airline executives to construct three transportation
industries and three nearly impermeable transportation markets, one for
railroads, yet a second for truckers, and then a third for airlines.
We describe the years between 1946 and 1980 as the period of the reg-
ulatory regime. Now, three sets of regulators oversaw prices and service lev-
els in three now distinct industries, including the airline industry. After
World War II, moreover, airlines emerged as vital components of the cold
war. Equally, officials at the CAB took seriously their responsibility to nur-
ture and protect the main trunk carriers. Even so, CAB officials starting
with James M. Landis in 1946–1947 helped launch a process of converting
air travel from service for a privileged few to a mass service. In broad prin-
ciple and in precise detail, officials at the CAB framed airline markets.
The regulatory regime worked differently in the realms of trucking and
railroading. Much of the lobbying and litigating of this period revolved
around efforts by rail or truck executives to create new operating authority
for themselves, always at the expense of a competitor who already possessed
that authority. At the same time, regulators at the ICC issued precise and
exacting rules regarding rates and service, in many cases opening new
opportunities to litigate and lobby before those regulators, before Congress,
and even with presidents. Not even presidents of the United States starting
with Eisenhower and extending through Nixon were able to dislodge this
regime; and given the perceived savvy and clout of truckers, presidents were
often loath to make the attempt.
We characterize the period after 1980 as one of devolution and deinsti-
tutionalization. With the devolution of price and service authority to trans-
portation executives, prices fluctuated and bankruptcies and layoffs fol-
lowed, especially among truckers. At the same time, railroad executives such
as John W. Snow at CSX purchased barge and steamship lines, at last creat-
ing intermodal firms. As well, many of Snow’s contemporaries in trucking
quit trade associations and rate bureaus that during the earlier period of the
regulatory regime had protected trucking firms in particular against railroad
ownership. In the course of leaving their trade associations and rate bureaus,
members of this generation of truckers diminished institutions and dis-
solved relationships constructed over the course of the last century. During
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the period between 1980 and 1995 or so, however, we do not identify a
“restoration” of markets. Instead, deregulation, we find, represented only a
new strategy by which leaders of the American state organized transporta-
tion industries and markets.
Finally, as we wrote this book, we came to see yet another way in which
ideas about historical events were put to use in shaping those transporta-
tion industries and markets. Between 1880 and 1920, reports historian K.
Austin Kerr, the vehemence of public resentment at the abuses of power
exercised by railroad executives before 1900 rested on the image of rail car-
riers as predatory monopolists whose power threatened both economic and
political liberty.4 Survival of this outlook into the decades after World War
II, long after railroads had ceased to dominate transportation, is intriguing
and important. Even in the 1970s, inflammatory rhetoric gave railroad
opponents, especially truckers and politicians speaking for “isolated indus-
tries,” a powerful voice in transportation policy debates. In all, references to
history comprised another part of the institutional fabric of the regulatory
regime.
Ultimately, in writing this book we had in mind a different kind of his-
torical account of the development of transportation policy in the United
States. We did not envision a formal history of transportation in the United
States, nor did we envision a history that emphasized individual transporta-
tion systems and related policy developments. Instead, we set out to iden-
tify and examine several overarching factors that formed common elements
in the development of public policy governing transportation. Ultimately,
we identify six themes in the development of American transportation
industries and their markets. The first and most obvious theme was the fact
that leaders of the nation’s legislative and executive institutions never suc-
ceeded in developing a single or overarching transportation policy. In place
of an often-discussed vision of American transport built around transporta-
tion companies, members of Congress and President Roosevelt produced a
fractured system that included a rail network as well as systems of roads,
cars, and trucks, barges and waterways, and airways and airlines that were
and remained unconnected to one another. A second basic theme of this
study follows closely from the first. The inability of the numerous actors in
the public policy process to adopt overarching formulations for transporta-
tion never diminished the preeminence of federal officials and public policy
in structuring those transportation systems. Indeed, even after deregulation
of airlines in 1978 and deregulation of rail and trucking in 1980, we deter-
mine that federal officials continued to frame transportation industries and
markets.Yet another theme, our third, is that of the centrality of politics in
the determination of transportation policy, for in virtually every discussion
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of transportation innovation, regulation, and deregulation, we find that pol-
itics was preeminent. In the more arcane language of political science, we
find that the entire transportation field, whether at the level of great indus-
tries or down at the level of calculating delivery charges, rested on political
constructions. As a fourth and more surprising theme, we also discovered
that the history of dislike for the railroads—fairly or not—comprised an
important element around which politicians and especially truck operators
constructed American transportation policies. Still a fifth theme running
through this book is that of experts and their apparent lack of influence in
shaping fundamental transportation outcomes. Our sixth and final theme is
that of the ascendance of presidents of the United States in the prosaic busi-
ness of shaping transportation industries and markets. By the late 1970s,
experts such as Paul MacAvoy and Alfred Kahn and members of Congress
alike took most of their cues about transportation policy from Presidents
Ford and Carter. All in all, we seek to explain long-term, durable changes in
the locus of authority and in the political construction of rail, truck, and air-
line industries and their markets
Participants in American transportation never viewed their political and
business dealings in the semiorderly fashion suggested here. Instead, rail-
roaders, truckers, and airline executives relied on exhaustive litigation and
tireless lobbying to preserve or extend the legal scope of their industry and
the right to sole possession of a particular market. Truckers and railroaders
scrapped endlessly about who “owned” the over-the-road market. For all the
uncertainty and expense of this lobbying and litigating, still regulators and
truckers and nearly everyone else between about 1946 and 1980 routinely
affirmed the contention (demonstrated, it was said, by history) that through
regulation the United States had produced “the best transportation system
in the world.”
In developing our main themes and in periodizing them, we rely in part
on the work of distinguished colleagues. Professional historians will recog-
nize the degree to which books and articles by Christopher Armstrong,
Mansel G. Blackford, John C. Burnham, Alfred D. Chandler Jr., William R.
Childs, Louis Galambos, Ellis W. Hawley, Samuel P. Hays, Joan Hoff,
Thomas P. Hughes, K. Austin Kerr, Pamela W. Laird, Thomas K. McCraw,
Albro Martin, Martin V. Melosi, H.Viv Nelles, Philip Scranton, Joel A.
Tarr, and Richard H. K. Vietor informed our preliminary approach to the
study of transportation history and to the history of the American state and
surrounding society as a whole. Although our research encouraged us to
challenge a number of findings and assumptions developed by these distin-
guished historians, the vast body of scholarship they produced and the
cogency of their ideas nonetheless informs this book in ways no longer iden-
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tifiable. Our research led us nonetheless to place state actors and political
institutions at the center of our narrative. Again, historians will recognize
the historical institutionalism of Brian Balogh, Richard F. Bensel, Colleen
A. Dunlavy, Richard R. John, William J. Novak, Gail Radford, Theda
Skocpol, Stephen Skowronek, and Olivier Zunz.
Every academic person realizes the degree to which scholarly publication
rests on the support of deans, chairs, colleagues, and funding agencies. At
Florida Atlantic University, we are pleased to recognize a sabbatical as well
as travel and duplication funds provided by former dean Manley Boss and
by history department chair Stephen D. Engle. No one could have a better
chair than Stephen. A grant provided by the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars permitted Mark to conduct research at
the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. Support at Michigan Tech
came from the Social Sciences Department and from a sabbatical leave.
Bruce is also grateful to have enjoyed a fellowship at the Dibner Institute
for the History of Science and Technology at MIT, which permitted him
to spend weeks in Baker Library of the Harvard Business School and in the
various libraries at MIT immersed in transportation journals and books.
Many of the items in those magnificent collections had not been checked
out since Alfred D. Chandler Jr. signed them out in the 1950s!
Professional historians also recognize the degree to which each book
and article rests on the careful and underremunerated work of librarians and
archivists. At the Florida Atlantic University Libraries, we benefited from
the wonderful services of Bruce Barron, Ken Frankel, Magdalynne Ghan-
noum, Holly Hargette, Rita Hollingsworth, Stacey Mihm, Darlene Ann
Parrish, Dawn Smith, and Teresa VanDyke. Their helpful and talented
counterparts at Michigan Technological University include Cathy Greer,
Barbara Kosky, and Stephanie Reed. During Bruce’s sojourn at the National
Science Foundation, reference librarians offered equally invaluable aide as
they cheerfully located obscure items. At the presidential libraries, we
enjoyed the useful advice of hardworking archivists including Debbie
Griggs Carter, Barbara Constable, Gary Foulk, David Haight, Karen B.
Holzhausen, David Horrocks, Mary Knill, Nancy Mirshah, Herbert
Pankratz, E. Philip Scott, Keith J. Shuler, Jennifer A. Sternaman, Dwight
Strandberg, and members of the team at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
At the University of Washington Archives, Nicolette A. Bromberg, Gary
Lundell, Shannon Lynch, and Carla T. Rickerson helped us identify valu-
able items in their first-rate photo and print collections. At the Harvard
Law School Library Special Collections, Lesley Schoenfeld was kind
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enough to locate terrific photos for our review. Similar assistance came from
the staff of the Harvard University Archives, from the Special Collections
staff at Baker Library in the Harvard Business School, and from Daria
D’Arenzio, Archivist of the College, Robert Frost Library, Amherst Col-
lege.
During the course of more than a decade in writing this book, we
enjoyed conversations with scholars whose comments and concerns pointed
us in important directions. At the outset, Kenneth J. Lipartito suggested
that we write a book on the history of American transportation. Thereafter,
our research and writing benefited in countless ways following conversations
and e-mail correspondence with Michael A. Bernstein, W. Roger Biles,
Christopher J. Castaneda, William R. Childs, Amy Louise Nelson Dyble,
Michael R. Fein, Mark V. Frezzo, Joseph Heathcott, George W. Hilton,
Clifton Hood, Richard R. John, Richard R. John Sr., Pamela W. Laird, Ray-
mond A. Mohl, David A. Moss, Gail Radford, Richard Saunders, Joel A.
Tarr, Helmut Trischler, Rudi Volti, James A. Wooten, and with many par-
ticipants at the biennial meetings of the Policy History Conference.
Others were kind enough to provide us with valuable comments on early
versions of this book presented in papers at professional meetings. We appre-
ciate having the thoughtful and useful comments of Deborah G. Douglas,
Colleen A. Dunlavy, and David M. Welborn. At a later stage in the book’s
development, we appreciated the valuable ideas provided by Janet R. Daly-
Bednarek, Michael A. Bernstein, Bill Childs, Eric Prier, and Judith Stein.
Each corrected errors of fact and commented in detail on interpretive
themes. When Paul Barrett became ill, Mary Carroll, a friend of Paul’s, very
kindly and carefully rewrote the airline chapter several times, and Mark took
responsibility for bringing most (but not all) of Paul’s footnotes into standard
form. Still others provided equally thoughtful and careful readings of the
entire manuscript. We are in the debt of our editors, Mansel G. Blackford
and K. Austin Kerr, for several timely and perceptive markups, wise advice,
and remarkable patience. As an anonymous reader for The Ohio State Uni-
versity Press, William H. Becker prepared a useful set of comments that
guided portions of our revisions. Our great thanks also to Albert J. Churella,
Richard R. John, and Maggie Walsh for thorough and penetrating com-
ments on the next-to-the-last draft. Professor Churella also responded to
many inquiries regarding the important details of railroad operations. In the
course of dealing with three industries across nearly a century of time, we
had committed mistakes of fact and failed to conceptualize fully and pre-
cisely. Altogether, the manuscript is immeasurably stronger for the counsel
of the many persons with whom we spoke and the efforts of these and other
scholars who took valuable time to reply to our many questions and to mark
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up draft after draft. We alone are responsible for remaining errors (few, we
fervently hope) and for interpretive stances found wanting.
Almost by virtue of preparing a book over such a lengthy period of time,
each of the three of us accepted new responsibilities. Originally, we divided
research and writing for this book into three parts based on periods of time.
Bruce concentrated on developments up to 1940; Paul undertook work on
the period after World War II up to about 1960; and Mark, we assumed,
could focus on the period of the 1960s and 1970s. Not long after we began
this project, however, Paul accepted an appointment as chair of his depart-
ment; and Bruce accepted an appointment first as a program officer at the
National Science Foundation and then as chair of his department. In the
course of reshuffling our research and writing assignments, Bruce prepared
the first two chapters, ending, as planned, in 1940. Paul produced the next
chapter on the postwar airline industry. Mark pushed his research back into
the mid-1950s and extended it up to the mid-1990s. Mark wrote an early
draft of the preface and all of chapters 4 through 9. Following Mary Car-
roll, Mark also provided several rewritings of Paul’s airline chapter. Given
Paul’s and Bruce’s greater administrative responsibilities, Mark served de
facto as the book’s senior author. Yet this book remains a distinctly collabo-
rative undertaking, thanks in some measure to the emergence of electronic
communications and thanks in greater measure to a desire among the three
of us starting a quarter century ago to share ideas about transportation and
public policy.
Because research and writing this book stretched over such a lengthy
period of time, we also entered new stages in the life cycle. On October 15,
2004, our friend, colleague, and coauthor Paul Barrett died following a
lengthy battle with metastasized prostate cancer. Paul was sixty years of age
and a longtime member of the Department of Humanities at Illinois Insti-
tute of Technology (IIT) in Chicago. With a personal style that was usually
diffident and always playful, Paul was an original thinker, a committed
scholar, and a delightful force for the scholarly life. Paul had hoped to live
long enough to vote for John Kerry and John Edwards; and he had also
hoped to live long enough to witness publication of this book. Paul’s quick
wit and intellectual power will be missed by students and colleagues at IIT;
and we will always miss Paul’s warmth, intelligence, and our many collabo-
rations. We are especially sorry that Paul did not live to see the publication
of this book, to which he contributed so much in its final form.
Yet a final debt is owed to members of our families. Bruce’s wife, Nancy,
son Michael, and daughter Karen endured vacation stops at archives and
libraries as well as the protracted absence of a sabbatical. Mark’s wife, Mar-
sha Lynn, endured as well absences to distant archives. During the prepa-
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ration of this book, Marsha Lynn and Mark welcomed Liana’s husband,
Josh, Amy’s husband, Wally, and grandchildren Andrew and Sierra into
their extended family. Hopefully, members of this next generation will share
the authors’ enthusiasm for the study of history. Together, Bruce and Mark
are grateful for the love and support of family members on still another pro-
ject about roads and transportation.
Mark H. Rose, Bruce E. Seely,
Coral Springs, Florida Houghton, Michigan
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UNTIL 1920, railroads were the unrivaled backbone of the American trans-
portation system. As historian Albro Martin explained, “In its day, which
lasted almost a century, the train was as totally in command of national
mobility as the car has been since.”2 That transition to the automobile came
quickly between 1920 and 1940, and railroad leaders and workers soon
found themselves part of a mixed transportation system that included cars
and trucks, as well as airlines and pipelines. The technological symbols of
this more complex transportation landscape, such as Model Ts, parkways
and multilane express highways, Greyhound buses, tow boats and dams on
the Mississippi River system, and Ford Trimotors or DC-3s, attracted both
public and scholarly attention. Yet the adoption of new transportation tech-
nologies was far more a political than a technical accomplishment, because
the widespread use of trucks, buses, and airplanes depended on politics and
public policy choices.
State actors, particularly at the federal level, shaped the basic parameters
within which these transportation systems operated. This connection
between federal policy and rapid transportation change exemplifies why his-
torians and scholars interested in political economy recently have called for
bringing the state back into American historical accounts of the various
transformations that marked the turn of the twentieth century.3 Federal
authorities, most notably commissioners of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC), assumed responsibility for establishing both an overarching
framework and many of the day-to-day decisions governing the parameters
within which railroad executives and shippers operated. In addition,
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Seeking a New Regulatory Regime in 
Transportation: Railroad Consolidation in
the 1920s
There has always been a railroad problem.
—Harold G. Moulton, 19331
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members of both houses of Congress and, on occasion, the justices of the
Supreme Court and even presidents of the United States also had voices in
working out the details of the regulatory regime for transportation with
shippers and railroad executives. In other words, the nature and shape of
transportation in this country was constituted by leaders of the state as
much as by corporate managers, private investors, or technical possibilities.
At the same time, American political leaders never developed an over-
arching transportation policy, despite occasional claims to the contrary.
Instead, the best that the political system could accomplish during the 1920s
and 1930s were policy initiatives governing individual forms of transport,
worked out in isolation from other transport technologies.4 Ironically, this
situation reflected the inherently political (as opposed to economic or tech-
nocratic) nature of American decision making regarding transport.5 Thus
the 1920s witnessed a contest among transportation providers in which rail-
road executives, truckers, waterway users, shippers, aviation executives, and
public officials worked to adjust both policy and the rail-based transporta-
tion system it was intended to regulate to a world of multiple technical pos-
sibilities. After 1920, activities as diverse as determining the valuation of
railroad investment, setting freight rates, appointing ICC commissioners,
and planning to consolidate the nation’s rail lines into regional systems
demonstrated the preeminence of politics in setting railroad policy. The net
result of these many activities was a significant federal structuring of trans-
portation industries. These efforts to shape transportation policy are com-
prehensible only in light of several decades of history related to railroad-
government relations.
Background: The Impact of History
Even as Americans after 1920 began to explore the use of automobiles,
trucks, and airplanes for transportation, anger and frustration at railroad
executives still informed the making and implementation of federal railroad
policy. After 1870, ordinary Americans and political leaders, responding to
the history and politics of the development of large railroad corporations,
had grown to resent the enormous economic and political influence wield-
ed by railroad executives. One result was a popular view of rail carriers as
dangerous monopolies threatening American democracy. Numerous schol-
arly studies suggest the danger of accepting this formulation at face value,
for the economic grievances of shippers and of commercial and business
interests may have been more powerful factors in promoting antirailroad
attitudes.6 But we should not dismiss the popular outlook on monopoly as
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a factor in congressional actions that made railroad corporations the first
regulated industry in the country. Such rhetoric was much in evidence in
1887 when Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
with five commissioners appointed by the president, and directed the com-
missioners to review railroad rates and protect shippers.7
The first commissioners struggled for more than a decade against both
the courts and rail executives to carry out their charge to monitor railroads.
Then in 1906 and 1910, Congress extended the ICC’s authority over rates
and operations in the Hepburn Act and Mann-Elkins Act. Again in 1912,
authors of the Panama Canal Act prohibited railroads from owning any
shipping lines that might compete with railroads and outlawed any railroad-
owned vessel from using the Panama Canal.8 This legislation rested on the
continued public perception of rail carriers as monopolists, which steamship
lines deftly used to forestall potential competitors. More importantly, by
separating different transportation technologies into industries walled off
from each other, this legislation was a crucial step in the federal constitution
of transportation markets. Similar attitudes could be discerned in the body
of state legislation that also controlled and defined the activities of the
nation’s rail carriers.9 Judged a political and economic danger, the net result
was that railroads were both regulated and isolated from other types of
transportation.
During the 1910s, however, the nation’s “Railroad Problem” began to
change. Although strong and profitable railroads such as the Pennsylvania,
New York Central, Union Pacific, and the Burlington dominated the indus-
try, other rail carriers were in financial straits. In 1910–11 and again in
1913–14, attorneys for the railroad industry unsuccessfully petitioned the
ICC for permission to increase rates to offset steadily rising costs. ICC
commissioners refused, however, stymied in part by the “weak line/strong
line problem.” Any effort to provide smaller and weaker lines with the
increased revenues that might attract much-needed additional capital, crit-
ics argued, would translate into windfall profits for well-off carriers. The
financial bind of rising costs and fixed rates forced executives of several weak
rail lines, including the Rock Island and Missouri Pacific, to declare bank-
ruptcy.The outbreak of World War I in Europe in August 1914 brought bet-
ter times (i.e., more traffic), but troubled rail carriers with limited financial
resources were ill-equipped to respond to the new conditions. By the winter
of 1917, the flood of freight bound for Europe swamped eastern carriers, as
inefficiencies at East Coast ports—especially New York—stalled trains car-
rying war supplies and coal for home heating. Freight cars clogged railyards
nearly one hundred miles from New York City. When rail executives failed
to eliminate the congestion, in late December 1917 Congress passed
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emergency legislation turning the nation’s rail system over to a new govern-
ment agency, the U.S. Railroad Administration (USRA).10 Run by railroad
officials and managers, the USRA solved the traffic problems but convinced
almost no one of the desirability of government operation of the railroads.
By 1919, observers within and without the industry agreed that rail carriers
needed to be returned to private control. In April 1920, the Transportation
Act of 1920 (Esch-Cummins Act) accomplished this task, and much more
besides.11
The legislation was guided through Congress by two Republicans, Iowa
senator Albert B. Cummins and Wisconsin representative John J. Esch.
Trained as an engineer, Cummins was widely respected as the Senate’s
expert on railroad policy. He had worked for the Cincinnati, Richmond, and
Fort Wayne Railroad before studying law and moving to Des Moines, Iowa,
to practice law as a railroad attorney. In 1908, he entered Republican Party
politics and won election to Congress, and later to the Senate. Representa-
tive John Esch entered Congress in 1899 after practicing law in La Crosse,
and the legislation that bore his name was his crowning achievement.12 The
1920 bill emerged from highly contentious debates about the future of
American railroads between railroad supporters and those who feared the
economic and political influence of railroad corporations. The discussions
began as soon as World War I ended in November 1918 and after many
compromises led to the decision in Congress to award unprecedented regu-
latory authority over the operation of the nation’s private railroads to the
ICC commissioners. Esch and Cummins’s bill directed the commissioners
to set minimum as well as maximum railroad rates, approve the issuance of
railroad securities, and review and approve both new construction and line
abandonments. These and other elements reflected the depth of political
animosity toward the railroads in some quarters, a powerful and continuing
motive behind regulation. At the same time, authors of the Transportation
Act of 1920 also enforced constructive steps designed to remove obstacles to
better railroad transportation, especially the structural difficulties posed by
the unequal profitability of rail carriers. Congress ordered ICC commis-
sioners to set rates that allowed rail corporations to earn at least 6 percent on
investment, but also directed the ICC to “recapture” half of profits above
this figure to support “weak lines.” Most significantly, the Congress required
ICC commissioners to develop a plan to consolidate the nation’s railroads
into profitable, parallel, regional systems and eliminate the weak/strong
dichotomy.13
While the 1920 legislation retained substantial antirailroad language, it
sought to accomplish quite different purposes. Some transportation econo-
mists had argued that the industry’s problem was wasteful and inefficient
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competition, and while not everyone accepted this prognosis, one historian
noted that the intent of the new legislation was “a more rationally conceived,
stable, and profitable railroad industry.”14 This new version of railroad regu-
lation mandated that ICC commissioners take account not only of the con-
cerns of shippers and the public, but also of the financial health of the
nation’s rail carriers. This change engendered hopes among some railroad
leaders about less stringent regulatory control, but the ICC, considered by
most observers the preeminent independent regulatory agency, rarely failed
to exercise the increased authority it enjoyed after 1920.15 The ICC com-
missioners and an array of government agencies and actors, in concert with
railroad executives, sought to accomplish the lofty ideal of insuring “ade-
quate transportation service” as mandated by the 1920 legislation. Whether
they succeeded is problematic.
The Politics of Railroad Regulation in the 1920s
The Transportation Act of 1920 led almost everyone connected with rail-
roads to anticipate that the era of restrictive, negative railroad regulation
had ended. ICC commissioners asserted “that adequate transportation
should be a guiding feature, and that Government should take the respon-
sibility of seeing that adequate transportation was supplied.”16 Because the
legislation identified the financial health of the railroads as a significant fac-
tor guiding railroad regulatory policy, Alfred P. Thom, vice chairman and
general counsel of the Association of Railroad Executives, concluded the
law abandoned “the old and mistaken view that the responsibility of gov-
ernment is fully performed when it punishes misdeeds.”17 The question of
the hour was whether this vision would become reality, for such an outcome
required overcoming the burden of past regulatory history and significant
political opposition. As it turned out, political considerations triumphed in
the process of shaping railroad regulation at the ICC, in the halls of
Congress, and inside the office of the president.
Almost immediately, ICC commissioners had an opportunity to act
upon the new regulatory changes. Before the war, commissioners had hesi-
tated to raise rates and acted only after holding lengthy deliberative pro-
ceedings, thanks to heavy pressures from shippers and Congress. In 1920,
however, postwar inflation put railroads under enormous financial pressure,
and rail executives sought increased freight rates ranging from 24 percent to
31 percent in order for companies to earn the “reasonable” rate of 6 percent
allowed by the 1920 legislation. Commissioners not only agreed with these
corporate officials, but also allowed another increase when the new Railway
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Labor Board ordered wage increases for unionized railway employees in
1920. This time ICC commissioners had acted in only nine days!18 Shippers
complained and state regulators who controlled intrastate rail rates
expressed outrage at being undercut by their counterparts at the ICC. Sev-
eral state officials took the commission to court, one example of the contin-
uing skirmishes over the centralization of authority by federal officials.19
ICC commissioners eventually prevailed in a court battle in which the jus-
tices affirmed their authority over interstate commerce, and thus their cen-
trality in railroad policy matters.20 Railroad executives grumbled about rate
cuts later ordered during the depression of 1921 and 1922, but a significant
change in the regulatory regime apparently had occurred.21 Now ICC offi-
cials framed the discussions about transportation rates.
Other actions taken by ICC commissioners reinforced the signs of reg-
ulatory change during the early 1920s. The shortages of freight cars and
delivery delays that had prompted government’s operation of the railroads
in 1917 continued to plague railroad managers, despite the availability of
one hundred thousand new freight cars built by the USRA. In 1920, neither
eastern coal mines nor western grain farmers could secure a sufficient num-
ber of cars. When labor unrest left many cars undelivered or sitting idle,
ICC officials invoked emergency powers to shift cars to areas of need. Sim-
ilarly in 1922, ICC staffers resolved freight car shortages occasioned by
striking eastern coal miners and railway shop workers.22 Yet full implemen-
tation of the goal of prosperous railroad systems proved elusive, for many
ICC officials did not abandon the traditional image of railroads as economic
predators. In this way, politics remained central to rail regulation, for con-
cerns about the growth and stability of rail carriers comprised only a small
part of regulatory politics.
The Valuation Project
More important than concern for railroad finances in the deliberations of
ICC officials was a massive and costly project that embodied continuity
with older ways of thinking, namely, the effort launched before World War
I to establish a valuation of the physical properties of the nation’s railroads.
The idea for this study could be traced to the ICC’s chief statistician in the
late 1880s, who envisioned using a precise determination of the “fair value”
of the physical property of the railroads as the first step in developing an
objective method of setting rates. The intent was to insure a just rate of
return for the rail carriers without gouging shippers and consumers. To find
this balance, some reformers argued, accountants and regulators needed to
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know the value of railroad property. In an era of speculation and financial
manipulation personified by Jay Gould and other rail executives, few
observers assumed that the stated capitalization or debt of railroad corpora-
tions provided a useful measure from which to compute a rate of return. The
ICC statistician’s calls for a valuation study made little headway for two
decades, but reformers and railroad critics eventually embraced the idea that
a detailed statistical analysis of railroad property could prove once and for all
that overvalued or “watered” stock had produced inflated rates that hurt
shippers, especially farmers. Not until 1913, however, could Wisconsin sen-
ator Robert LaFollette persuade Congress to direct the ICC to determine
the “real” value of the railroads. Such a “scientific” study typified turn-of-the-
century faith in reforms that sought to remove politics from government
administration by utilizing objective data and nonpolitical experts.23
Whatever railroad critics such as LaFollette said about scientific study,
railroad officials distrusted former ICC commissioner Charles Prouty, who
led the valuation project. Railroad executives therefore launched a parallel
study of their own. Starting in 1914, two teams of engineers, accountants,
and lawyers counted every rail, spike, building, acre of land, and machine, a
task that remained incomplete in 1920. ICC officials struggled to make sense
of the mountain of statistical data for each railroad, and final valuations were
not ready in many cases until 1927, as the process limped through lengthy
hearings and appeals.24 ICC commissioners also faced two court challenges
to the project. Although each case involved esoteric legal issues, the out-
comes highlighted the dominant position of the commissioners in railroad
policy, even when the Supreme Court rebuked the commissioners for arro-
gantly ignoring earlier rulings on the definition of valuation.25
The final complication in finishing the valuation project in a timely
fashion came from a change in the purpose of valuation. After passage of
the Transportation Act of 1920, the project’s valuation findings were to
guide the ICC’s enforcement of the “reasonable” rate of return set by Con-
gress (6 percent the first year), and the so-called “recapture clause,” by which
the government would recover half of any profits above that level. To do so,
commissioners needed to update the data continuously to meet a new and
different assignment from that originally envisioned in 1913. The initial
purpose of this data collection effort had been to assess the static question
of past railroad financial behavior in terms of securities., Representative
Esch, Senator Cummins, and others, however, expected the valuation find-
ings to guide rate setting. The original assignment called for taking a snap-
shot of railroad property holdings in 1913, while the rate-setting process
inaugurated in 1920 demanded continuously current valuation data—a
huge and expensive task. Commissioners resisted, for Congress provided no
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new funds, but Congress also ignored the ICC commissioners’ requests to
drop the entire exercise.26
The valuation project began to wind down when the Supreme Court
rebuked the commissioners in 1928 for a unilateral attempt to redefine val-
uation, even though Congress kept the project alive until 1933.27 The final
product produced forty-seven massive volumes listing every item of railroad
property, prepared at a cost of about $45 million—perhaps half of the ICC
budget since 1913. Rail carriers spent approximately $138 million more on
their parallel study.28 Even as the commissioners attempted to harness valu-
ation data to the demands of the 1920 legislation, the project could not tran-
scend the original intentions of its supporters, namely, to demonstrate the
allegedly illegal financial manipulations of railroad executives. The ICC
reports concluded that watered stock and other manipulations were not evi-
dent, seeming to confirm the claims of railroad management that they had
abandoned the abusive financial practices of the 1880s. The hope of reform-
ers such as LaFollette that objective statistics would resolve the political and
economic questions about rates ultimately was misplaced.29 Even so, the val-
uation exercise—especially the court battles over the definition of valua-
tion—not only demonstrated that the older, punitive regulatory mind-set
remained firmly in place in many quarters of the government, but also indi-
cated how agencies beyond the ICC helped shape the efforts to establish
new approaches to transportation regulation during the 1920s.
Rate Setting and Railroad Accounting
The inability of would-be reformers and ICC officials to use objective data
to resolve the valuation problem was matched by similar difficulties in har-
nessing accounting standards as a nonpolitical guide to the setting of rail-
road rates.30 As far back as the 1880s, ICC officials had advocated the appli-
cation of uniform accounting principles to railroads as a device for gauging
railroad rates and profits in an objective fashion. The ICC’s statistician
argued that shippers, consumers, and the railroads themselves would bene-
fit from lower rates while the companies earned a fair profit.31 After the
Hepburn Act granted the ICC authority to prescribe a uniform accounting
structure for all carriers in 1906, officers of the Association of American
Railway Accounting Officers worked cooperatively with ICC officials on
this task. In 1907, the ICC issued guidelines for calculating railroad oper-
ating expenses, revenues, and expenditures; the complete rules became
effective July 1, 1909.32 Here was yet another way in which the ICC com-
missioners helped shape the railroad industry.
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Yet turning railroad accounting practices and data into regulatory tools
proved more complicated than ICC statisticians expected, primarily because
of the nature of railroad operations. Railroad tracks, right-of-way, bridges,
stations, and shops were utilized both for the carriage of passengers and the
movement of freight. Following the logic proposed by Harvard economics
professor F. W. Taussig in the 1880s, accountants generally agreed that it
was not possible to separate the “joint costs” of these two different services.
These same accountants assumed that the fixed costs of railroad operation
were so high that it made little sense to worry about the specific costs of
individual freight or passenger services.33 Moreover, another economic real-
ity conspired to force the attention of railroad executives away from detailed
cost evaluations: freight rates largely determined how far mine operators
and farmers could ship their low-value bulk commodities such as coal and
grain. Therefore, the railways, if they wished to move these commodities
(and the assumptions both about railway economics and national prosperity
led them to believe they should), could not charge the same price for mov-
ing grain as for moving industrial machinery.34
The railroads had learned this lesson about freight rates decades earlier.
As historian Albro Martin explains, as soon as American railroads provided
long-distance service in the 1830s, they discovered they could not set rates
just by multiplying local rates to cover distance. The rates that the B&O
charged for service in Baltimore “might well produce an exorbitant rate if
applied to Harpers Ferry, a confiscatory rate to Cumberland, and a bad joke
to Wheeling.”35 This economic logic led the railroads, and later the ICC, to
the political decision to set rates on the basis of “value-of-service.”36 Bulk
commodities that had the least value per ton enjoyed the lowest rates, while
higher-valued manufactured goods commanded higher freight rates. The
actual cost of shipping the goods, whether grain or machinery, was not cen-
tral to the determination of each particular freight rate. In practice, this rate
system discriminated against manufactured goods and subsidized shipment
of bulk products, especially grain. This was especially true of western carri-
ers that served as economic development agencies, opening unsettled terri-
tory rather than serving existing traffic. Once the rate pattern was estab-
lished, it became difficult to alter. The viability of communities, firms, and
basic patterns of the American economy were inextricably linked to these
early decisions about railroad rates.37
Once established, no one benefited more from this system of rate mak-
ing than farmers and mining companies whose grain and other bulk com-
modities were shipped to distant markets. Yet those same customers of the
railroads were the most vocal opponents of another form of discriminatory
rates, the so-called long-haul/short-haul controversy, an issue that had
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created more enemies for railroads than any other topic. Railroads argued
that long hauls often cost less than moving goods a shorter distance. Yet it
seemed unfair to a merchant in Harrisburg to pay more for goods shipped
from Philadelphia than his counterpart in Pittsburgh did, despite a shorter
haul. Railroad critics viewed such rate discrimination as additional evidence
of the monopolistic tendencies of railroad management. Moreover, the ICC
was charged by law with determining if railroad rates were “just and reason-
able.” Yet the “value-of-service” principle of rate setting left both ICC offi-
cials and railroad executives poorly equipped to refute claims that specific
discriminations were unjust and unreasonable. Generally, railroad leaders’
cost data were not detailed enough to show the cost of moving a single car
of a given commodity. Clearly, the railroads were on the horns of a dilemma,
as became apparent in the highly publicized rate hearings of the 1910s,
when lawyer Louis D. Brandeis used this lack of statistical information to
portray the carriers as inefficient. Unable to counter Brandeis’s arguments
with definitive data, the carriers twice failed to win requested increases.38
Political scientist Gerald Berk argues that “the regulatory predicament”
facing both the ICC commissioners and the rail carriers stemmed from the
flawed assumption that cost accounting, rigorously applied, was “a measure
beyond politics” that could yield unambiguous, objective answers regarding
exact railroad rates.39 Berk’s point is that objective accounting data, even in
the hands of presumably fair-minded regulators, could not by itself guide
such complex and contentious matters as rate setting. Yet neither the ICC
nor rail executives could simply replace the underlying value-of-service basis
for determining freight rates. Industries and communities had institutional-
ized value-of-service rates into every economic relationship. Given the lim-
its before them, ICC officials slowly increased their reliance upon cost data
in their decisions about railroad rates, especially after 1920, when by law the
commission had to consider the impact of its decisions upon the railroads.
Writing in the 1930s, economist I. L. Sharfman argued that the commission
came to view costs as establishing the floor for rates, while value of service
calculation provided a ceiling.40 Somehow, railroad managers had to navigate
between the ICC’s value-of-service accounting philosophy focused on over-
all rates of return while shippers, farmers, and the public embraced an alter-
native philosophy that considered only the specific costs linked to specific
shipments. This situation guaranteed conflict. The federal government had
helped constitute the railroad industry and its markets, but in moments of
economic distress, no one, including members of Congress or presidents,
liked the outcome.
As if this uncertainty about the determination of equitable freight rates
was not difficult enough for both regulators and the regulated railroads, dur-
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ing the 1920s members of Congress sought to influence railroad rates
directly. Even though they had authorized the ICC commissioners to gov-
ern such matters, during the 1920s Senator LaFollette and many colleagues
frequently talked about railroad rates. To the arcane debate about costs ver-
sus value of service, midwestern senators added the question of the effect of
railroad rates on farmers then experiencing an agricultural depression.
These senators’ stances suggested that many in Congress retained the older
view of the railroad executives as dangerous monopolists who connived to
increase the costs of transportation essential for farmers and small business
owners. This outlook justified continued political intervention by Congress
into the ICC’s regulatory sphere of transportation policy even after 1920,
especially in the form of legislation ordering the ICC to adjust freight rates
to promote economic recovery. An editorial writer in Railway Age causti-
cally observed in 1922, “It having become the custom to regulate freight
rates more in accordance with the needs or wishes of shippers than of the
railroads . . . Congress and the commission began to be flooded with
demands for action to reduce rates in order to revive business.”41 Even the
editors of Railway Age agreed that “farmers as a class have suffered the
greatest reductions in the prices of their products within the last year and a
half.”42 Although several members of the Senate introduced bills to that pur-
pose, railroad managers resisted cutting freight rates.43
Beginning in the early 1920s, presidents of the United States and their
top appointees could no longer deny themselves a voice in the politics of
railroads, until then a province of Congress and the ICC.44 During the post-
war debates about railroads in 1919–20, President Woodrow Wilson delib-
erately rejected requests to propose legislation. In April 1921, however, new
president Warren G. Harding and members of his cabinet talked at length
about economic recovery in agriculture, industry, and transportation. As the
editors of Railway Age put it, “The President and his advisers appear to have
been persuaded that the railroad question is the key to the whole problem,
but they have as yet found no ‘plan’ or ‘solution.’”45 At a time when the exec-
utive branch possessed only a limited capacity to foster an economic recov-
ery, the adjustment of railroad freight rates was one of the few weapons in
their arsenal.
Secretary of Commerce Herbert C. Hoover became deeply involved in
discussions about the broader economic significance of railroad rates. The
most famous engineer of the era, Hoover enjoyed an aura of objective exper-
tise so dear to the hearts of earlier reformers. In nearly every major eco-
nomic issue of the day, from coal strikes and radio regulation to the 1927
floods on the Mississippi and transportation, one could find Hoover’s ideas
as he became known as the leading problem solver in Washington.46 The
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commerce secretary sympathized with farmers, but realized that under the
new rules of the Transportation Act of 1920, ICC commissioners needed to
consider the economic impact of rate decisions on rail corporations. Hoover
concluded that rate cuts on agricultural commodities would damage rail car-
riers and proposed instead that ICC commissioners undertake a “systematic
overhaul” of railroad rates, with the aim of lowering rates generally without
sacrificing railroad income. “I am convinced that lower rates would recover
lost traffic,” Hoover argued. In May 1922, President Harding joined the
conversation, prompted by Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace’s vocal
concerns about the negative effects of high freight rates on farmers. Hard-
ing invited railroad executives to dinner at the White House and asked them
to consider voluntary rate reductions on basic commodities, after business
conditions improved. A committee of railroad presidents met the next day
with ICC staffers, but nothing came from this initiative.47
Such direct involvement by the president in railroad issues marked a new
departure for members of the executive branch. Adopting Hoover’s per-
spective, Harding met with railroad presidents and remained “in close
touch” with ICC commissioners, especially chairman Charles McChord.48
Harding also recognized the novelty of his efforts, and his staff issued a clar-
ifying statement to the effect that “ . . . he was attempting none of the duties
of rate-making nor recommendations,” and that Harding only sought to
encourage the cooperation of the railroad leaders with the ICC.49 Harding’s
successor, Calvin Coolidge, a man normally inclined to leave well enough
alone, continued this approach and remained involved in discussions of agri-
cultural freight rates. In mid-1923, Coolidge asked the president of the
Pennsylvania Railroad to offset lower freight rates on exported wheat with
increased rates on coal for export. Editorial reactions were mixed, but
Coolidge had recognized that any cuts in agricultural freight rates required
trade-offs elsewhere. By 1923, Presidents Harding and Coolidge and Com-
merce Secretary Hoover had become involved in efforts to maintain ade-
quate railroad service, foster railroad profits, and boost overall levels of eco-
nomic activity. The politics of transportation were becoming more
complex.50
At first, ICC officials refused to respond either to executive pressures or
to economic conditions they judged to be temporary in nature. After reduc-
ing all freight rates in 1921, the commissioners ignored equally calls from
farm-states residents for further reductions in agricultural commodity rates
and Hoover’s suggestion of a general review of rates.51 Former representative
John Esch, who had coauthored the Transportation Act of 1920, was
appointed to the ICC in 1921 after losing his seat in Congress. He spoke for
the commission in the mid-1920s, recommending that the ICC review rate
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structures only if Congress funded a major investigation. But the deepening
agricultural depression brought insistent demands for changes in freight
rates.52 By May 1924, both houses of Congress conducted hearings on bills
to repeal the two linked clauses in the Transportation Act of 1920 that spec-
ified a reasonable rate of return for railroad corporations and the “recapture”
by the ICC of “excess” rail carrier profits. Leaders of farm groups apparently
had concluded they could more easily secure rate reductions if the ICC
commissioners could, as before 1920, ignore railroad finances.53
Farm groups initially won little support for such an approach to reduc-
ing freight rates. The issue gained momentum only after Senator E. D.
Smith of South Carolina introduced a nonbinding resolution calling “agri-
culture a basic industry of the country.” Smith’s resolution ordered ICC
commissioners to “‘promote the freedom of movement of the products of
agriculture at the lowest possible rates.’” Representative Homer Hoch had
proposed a similar nonbinding resolution directing ICC commissioners to
consider the market values of commodities in setting freight rates and to
begin a large-scale investigation of railroad rates. In early 1925, the Hoch-
Smith resolution emerged from Congress, declaring that “the true policy in
rate making” was to adjust freight rates to fit the economic circumstances.54
Only five years after giving the ICC authority to set railroad rates that
would lead to healthy rail corporations, a majority of Congress now urged
that rates be regulated to serve organized constituents, in this case farmers.
Railroad executives complained that the Hoch-Smith resolution vio-
lated key elements of the Transportation Act of 1920. ICC officials had a
legal responsibility not to cut freight rates on agricultural commodities
without first considering the financial consequences such a move would
have on rail corporations; they also lacked enthusiasm—and the necessary
budget—for a major review of rates. Railroad rates had become an incredi-
bly convoluted subject, thanks to long-established patterns which included
charging the highest rates for the most valuable commodities. But ICC
commissioners more than most realized that the traditional policy of
encouraging the long-distance shipment of bulky, low-value materials such
as coal and grain at low rates had shaped the geography of the American
economy. Altering this practice, which some economists even then were
arguing promoted enormous inefficiency within the nation’s economy,
would have had far-reaching consequences for established industries and
commercial relationships.The ICC commissioners had no stomach for such
a Sisyphean task.55 Yet they were not eager to defy Congress, even though
the Hoch-Smith resolution did not have the force of law. Instead, the com-
missioners launched a study labeled docket No. 17000, Rate Structure
Investigation. This examination of agricultural commodity rates continued
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through 1926, at which time the commissioners issued yet another report
that satisfied no one. They denied rail carriers a rate increase, a move that
rail executives denounced as proof the ICC was ignoring the legal require-
ment that railroads be allowed to earn a reasonable rate of return. Commis-
sioners also refused to reduce freight rates for agricultural commodities,
complaining that “None of the parties [favoring rate reductions] presented
any definite plan for compensating increases in rates on other traffic.”56
Caught between growing political demands to help farmers and the legal
requirements of the new regulatory structure that required consideration of
the health of the transportation system, the commissioners decided to take
no action.
The problem facing the ICC commissioners was more political than
economic. They were opposed, Commissioner Balthasar H. Meyer
explained later, to using railroad rates as a “shock absorber and balance wheel
for the entire economic life of industry.” Doing so, he said, required “the
wisdom of a hundred Solomons.”57 As they launched the rate study in 1926,
ICC officials sought to reaffirm the special legitimacy of scientifically based,
apolitical decision making. Some saw this approach as the basic reason the
commission existed, as the president of the National Industrial Traffic
League (NITL), R. C. Fulbright of Houston, Texas, told the Senate in
1924. The ICC, he argued, was supposed to be “a non-partisan and non-
political body and provided with a corps of experts who are spending their
lives working out the complex problems of the rates, fares, and practices of
the railroads, and that it should be left free and untrammeled to pursue its
duties under such rules and regulations as it should find to be in the public
interest.” He added that the NITL “would like to see the railroads out of
politics.”58 To that end, ICC examiners asked the railroads for huge volumes
of information on the origin, destination, and trends of movement of cattle,
gasoline, automobiles, bar iron, wheat, potatoes, hay, and lumber (hardwood
and others)—the controlling commodities in terms of rates. (Wheat con-
trolled all other grains, for example.) Just to study grain rates, ICC staffers
convened meetings in Dallas, Wichita, Minneapolis, Chicago, Seattle, Port-
land, and Los Angeles, generating fifty-five thousand pages of transcript
and 2,106 exhibits by 1928. The investigation of cottonseed rates involved
hearings at a similar range of sites, producing another 13,133 pages of tran-
script and 1,588 additional exhibits.59
The ICC commissioners failed, however, to silence political concerns
over the reams of statistical data developed by experts and economists. Bow-
ing to political pressure, in 1927 commissioners finally adopted the princi-
ples of the Hoch-Smith resolution, which called for rates to be adjusted to
fit the economic circumstances of particular industries. In three cases, the
14 / CHAPTER 1
RSB_chap1_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:27 PM  Page 14
commissioners lowered rates on a limited range of agricultural commodi-
ties.60 Railroad executives protested bitterly. “This may have been good pol-
itics, but it is bad economics,” claimed a Railway Age editorial writer, who
asked whether it would be fair to discriminate in favor of automobiles
against farmers.61 In the end, the Supreme Court agreed with the carriers,
who took the issue to court. The justices ruled that a nonbinding resolution
like Hoch-Smith had not changed “the basic law. . . . We are of the opinion
that the commission’s construction cannot be supported.”62 For the moment,
one branch of the federal government had overridden another, but the case
hardly validated the ICC’s preference for expert-based, as opposed to polit-
ically motivated, decisions. As editorial writers at Railway Age complained,
millions of dollars had been wasted in challenging a politically driven con-
gressional dictate.
Nor was this the only instance of attempted congressional intervention
in transportation regulation. Politicians seized several opportunities in
attempts to legislate specific ICC actions. In 1923, Senator Smith W.
Brookhart of Iowa authored a bill that proposed a dramatic reduction in the
stated value of the railroads. Brookhart wanted Congress to repeal the rea-
sonable rate of return clause in the Transportation Act of 1920. Railway Age
editors claimed that proposal was “designed to let the Interstate Commerce
Commission reduce rates to any desired level without consideration of the
effect on railroad finances.”63
Brookhart’s proposal was not the only effort to inject Congress directly
into the details of transportation policymaking. In 1924, congressional rep-
resentatives introduced more than 170 bills dealing with the railroads, 59
concerned with rates and 27 with labor issues. Nine others would have
strengthened the legal authority of state regulatory commissions in contests
with the ICC.64 A bill by Senator Frank R. Gooding of Idaho directed the
ICC to gather information about railroad support for speakers, advertising,
public opinion surveys, and information distribution “for the purpose of cre-
ating public sentiment favorable to the railroad interests.”65
Gooding also hoped to prohibit ICC-granted exceptions to the rule
requiring that railroads charge more for long hauls than short hauls. This
old issue had been a primary cause of the anger shippers and business inter-
ests directed at railroads during the nineteenth century and it continued to
haunt railroad officials even though the Transportation Act of 1920 allowed
for exceptions. Basically, the ICC could approve such a rate for railroads
hauling goods in competition with water-born shipments between the
coasts. The traditional rhetoric of predatory railroad behavior had not dis-
appeared, as Gooding claimed “the majority of [ICC commissioners] are
just tools for the railroad corporations.”66 Despite strenuous objections from
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the commissioners that Gooding’s bill “disregards the commercial and
industrial conditions which have led to the establishment of [specialized
industrial centers]” and was “absolutely unworkable,” the proposal passed
the Senate in 1924. Predictably, a writer for Railway Age labeled it “one of
the most dangerous bills for the regulation of rates ever introduced in Con-
gress,” and it never came to a vote in the House.67 The Gooding Bill resur-
faced in the Senate in 1925 and 1926, but not even the defeat of this mea-
sure ended the enthusiasm of politicians for lowering their constituents’
transportation costs.68
The economic downturn in agriculture and the continuing hostility
toward the railroads animated these efforts to reduce freight rates. The ani-
mosity had not diminished much since Pennsylvania Railroad vice president
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FIGURE 1. “Mischief Still to Do”
This political cartoon originally from the New York Evening Post appeared in
Railway Age in 1924. It conveys a widely held perception among railway man-
agers concerning the nature of congressional efforts in regard to railroads. Source:
Railway Age 76 (April 26, 1924): 1044. Used with permission.
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A. M. Schoyer had reported in 1914 that “the railways are not yet popular”
with the citizens, politicians, or regulators.69 Herbert Hoover judged this
deep-rooted animus a “veritable witches cauldron being fed constantly with
hates distilled from the misdeeds of railway promoters in the past.” Hoover
believed it was time to “call off the witches.”70 Few embroiled in the politics
of transportation were inclined to act on Hoover’s recommendation.
ICC Appointments
Hostility toward the railroads and conflicts over freight rates spilled over
into Senate confirmation hearings for ICC commissioners. Railroad exec-
utives had long complained that presidents and Congress considered few
persons with railroad experience for appointment to the ICC. Indeed, most
commissioners were lawyers who had served on state regulatory commis-
sions. Moreover, rail leaders perceived most appointees to be hostile to rail-
road interests.71 In 1925, for example, two appointees of President Coolidge,
railway economist Thomas F. Woodlock and former railroad vice president
Richard V. Taylor, encountered significant opposition at Senate hearings.
Senators grilled Woodlock and Taylor, according to Railway Age, because
of their corporate backgrounds. Both men, but especially Taylor, had to
explain their views on key issues such as rates and management preroga-
tives, while the editor of Railway Age alleged that appointees perceived as
railroad opponents never were called to appear before the committee. “The
obvious purpose was to try to make sure that no man would get on the
Commission who would begin his work without some bias against the rail-
ways.”72 For all the debate about appointments, apparently no one in or out
of government doubted that the locus of authority regarding the railroad
industry rested with the commissioners of the ICC.
In 1928, the reconfirmation hearings of ICC commissioner John Esch
provided another opportunity for senators to influence freight rates and
ICC actions. Only seven years earlier Representative Esch had helped craft
the Transportation Act of 1920. After losing his seat, President Harding
appointed him to the ICC in 1921, and hearings on his reappointment took
place in 1928. Several senators used the occasion to attack an ICC ruling on
a relatively minor case regarding rates for coal shipped from Appalachian
mines to the Great Lakes. They accused Esch of changing his position dur-
ing deliberations on that case to curry favor with Pennsylvania’s senior sen-
ator and secure reappointment, a charge Esch vehemently denied.73 In fact,
few doubted Esch’s personal integrity, but as Senator Matthew M. Neely of
West Virginia explained, “We are not fighting his confirmation as a man,
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but because the decision he and the commission have rendered has crucified
the coal industry of the State I represent.”74 Despite strong support for Esch
from leaders of the Coolidge administration and warnings that members of
Congress were placing the supposed independence of commissioners at risk
for holding views that angered Congress, the committee and the Senate as
a body rejected Esch’s reappointment.75
So central were the railroads to American politics that freight rates and
policy questions emerged as part of presidential campaigns. In 1924, Pro-
gressive Party candidate Robert LaFollette made freight rates the central
issue in his presidential campaign. That decision prompted the editors of
Railway Age to comment that “Never has the railroad question been so fully
discussed in any national campaign.” Four years later, in 1928, candidates
paid less attention to railroads. Nonetheless, a group of securities holders
asked both presidential contenders about their plans for increasing the prof-
itability of railroads in the western states. Railway Age editorial writers
expressed frustration when both Herbert Hoover and Alfred E. Smith sup-
ported the development of inland waterways. Following Hoover’s election,
another editorial writer concluded that his overwhelming victory “cannot be
construed otherwise than as an endorsement by the public of his general
views regarding the proper relations between government and business.”
The election mattered, argued Railway Age, because Congress passed regu-
lations and the Senate confirmed ICC commissioners, but “the president
usually has a strong influence on legislation, and he has the initiative in
determining the membership of the commission. . . . It seems reasonable to
assume, therefore, that under his administration, the influence of the presi-
dential office will be exerted in favor of fair and constructive regulation.”76
Perhaps without realizing the full significance of this comment, the editor-
ial writer highlighted the slow appearance of a fundamental change during
the 1920s, namely, the emergence of the president and his staff as active par-
ticipants in the development of transportation policy.
This renewed political interest in railroads suggested that the authors of
the Transportation Act of 1920 had not succeeded in convincing regulators
and members of Congress alike to accept rate regulation that considered the
financial health of rail carriers and the new policy goal of securing a strong
transportation system. Congressmen, senators, and presidents were regular
participants in the politics of railroad regulation, in part because public dis-
trust of the railroads remained so strong that no one was willing to leave to
the ICC commissioners the task of interpreting the mandate to oversee cre-
ation of an adequate transportation system. The resulting atmosphere of
uncertainty was only strengthened by disagreements among the commis-
sioners themselves, especially visible during the lengthy debate and discus-
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sions about implementing the one really radical element of the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920—the requirement that the ICC develop a plan to consol-
idate the nation’s railroad system.
Railroad Consolidation in the 1920s
Railroad consolidation—combining the nation’s private rail corporations
into a smaller number of larger regional rail carriers—was in some ways the
new and essential element around which Congress sought to create a
national transportation policy in 1920. In line with many reform programs
of the early twentieth century, several framers of the 1920 bill presented
consolidation as a mechanism for allowing scientific expertise, supposedly
removed from politics, to shape public policy. In this case, the goal was to
eliminate what those experts considered wasteful and inefficient competi-
tion by the removal of inappropriate political interference. In fact, politics
always was part of the creation of the new regulatory regime.
The concept of government-directed consolidation at first appears out
of place in a nation that espoused the centrality of private enterprise and
competition.77 Yet the general application of the principle of consolidation
to railroads had a long history. During the 1910s, economists such as Emory
R. Johnson, dean of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of
Business, and Harvard economics professor William Z. Ripley had advo-
cated restructuring the nation’s railroads, in part to achieve operating effi-
ciencies.78 As early as 1918, others close to the railroads asserted the public
would soon recognize that “the five competitive trains leaving Chicago for
the Twin Cities or Omaha at about the same hour is just as expensive . . . as
two sets of gas pipes in the same streets.”79 By 1920, Johnson, Ripley, and
other professors had gained a legitimate place for themselves in national
transportation policy debates.
Executives of a handful of railroad corporations, such as the Pennsylva-
nia, the Southern, and several western rail lines had pursued their own strat-
egy of railroad consolidation for a couple of decades. As early as 1891, Col-
lis P. Huntington of the Southern Pacific argued, “I am satisfied that the
best results will not be reached until all the transportation business in the
country is done by one company. . . . What is wanted is not more than two
or three—and one would be better—great carrying companies.” In 1915, a
study by Wharton School’s Johnson concluded that railroad leaders had
been pursuing this vision, as ten investment groups controlled 70 percent of
the country’s rail mileage (174,000 miles); and five corporate/banking
empires controlled half the total.80
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During the debates leading up to the Transportation Act of 1920, Rip-
ley, Johnson, and other railroad economists took pains to answer the com-
plaints of critics who saw consolidation plans as new evidence of the
monopolistic and predatory instincts of railroad executives. Under the direc-
tion of the ICC, Johnson and Ripley asserted, consolidation could provide a
potential remedy for regulatory difficulties, notably the weak line/strong line
problem that had hamstrung railroad rate setting. By properly arranging
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FIGURE 2. Emory R. Johnson, transportation economist
and dean of the Wharton School of Business. Johnson was a
frequent participant in discussions concerning transporta-
tion policy during the period 1910–1940. Source: The Col-
lections of the University of Pennsylvania Archives. Used
with permission.
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companies into parallel regional systems, consolidation might produce uni-
formly strong carriers and eliminate wasteful duplications, all while pre-
serving competition. Such logic explained the inclusion of the consolidation
concept in the Transportation Act of 1920, especially after ICC commis-
sioners endorsed the idea.81 ICC officials assumed they could more easily
regulate a few large companies than 170 Class I railroads and almost 750
smaller carriers. Thus ICC commissioners supported the legislative clause
directing them to prepare plans to consolidate the nation’s railroads into
twenty to thirty competing regional systems.82
Only months after Congress passed the Transportation Act of 1920, the
Interstate Commerce Commission hired William Ripley as a special expert to
craft this consolidation plan. Ripley, who earned his doctorate in economics
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FIGURE 3. William Z. Ripley, transportation economist,
Harvard University. After 1921, Ripley served as consultant
to the Interstate Commerce Commission and prepared the
original ICC consolidation plan for the nation’s railroads,
pursuant to the Transportation Act of 1920. Source: The
Collection of the University Archives, Harvard University.
Used with permission.
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at Columbia after finishing a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from
MIT in 1890, had won a reputation at Harvard as an expert on trusts, rail-
way finances, and railroad regulation.83 In keeping with the ideals of expert
service pioneered by such university economists as Richard T. Ely of Johns
Hopkins and Frank W.Taussig of Harvard, Ripley offered practical solutions
to the complex utility and transportation problems of their day.84 As early as
1915, Ripley had argued that “some affirmative action be taken . . . to encour-
age co-operation among carriers as shall tend to eliminate the economic
wastes of competition, without endangering its manifest advantages to the
public at large.”85 Ripley had an opportunity rarely afforded academic
experts—to bring expertise and theory to the center of the policy arena.
Ripley and the ICC commissioners faced one important limitation as
they began work on a consolidation plan in 1920: they could not compel car-
riers to accept it. After much debate, the authors of the Transportation Act
of 1920 had limited the ICC’s authority so that commissioners could only
withhold approval of nonconforming consolidation proposals. This require-
ment meant that Ripley had to consider the preferences and gain the trust of
railroad managers and stockholders. After eighteen months of data gather-
ing, he unveiled a plan with twenty-one regional systems; the commissioners
reworked it to include nineteen systems and then adopted it as their tentative
plan in late 1921.86 ICC commissioner Mark W. Potter wrote Ripley, “The
merit of your work in the consolidation matter grows upon me every time I
pick up your report. I continue to wonder how it was possible for you to
evolve such a product. . . . We could not have functioned without you.”87
Such laudatory comments continued until April 24, 1922, when ICC
commissioners opened hearings that extended up to December 4, 1923.
Ripley and the commissioners had inserted their own regional perspective in
assembling the plan. ICC commissioners often ignored existing corporate
relationships or traditional connections, emphasizing instead formation of
working, competitive, parallel systems. In effect, the ICC plan disassembled
the nation’s railroad map and put it back together with only nineteen com-
panies. Ripley and ICC officials asked railroad executives and others to help
fine-tune their map. Instead, most witnesses at the hearings strongly resisted
that idea, determined to maintain existing identities and connections
between carriers. From the first day rail executives refused to offer alterna-
tive schemes, apparently believing that debating the details would imply
acceptance of the ICC’s parameters for consolidation. Almost every rail
executive looked at what the plan meant for his existing company.88 As a
writer in the New Republic noted after the testimony of the New York Cen-
tral’s president A. H. Smith, “Mr. Smith’s ideas, boiled down, show a maxi-
mum of thought about the New York Central and a minimum, and a very
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small one at that, about the consolidation scheme—whether it is sound or
unsound, right or wrong.”89 Even those leaders whose companies formed
the cores of regional consolidations failed to support the ICC plan. At one
point, a frustrated William Ripley asked Hale Holden of the Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy why western lines would not help the commission
develop a practicable plan. “We are breaking our hearts in the commission,”
Ripley observed, “trying to develop such a plan and not merely an academic
one.” Holden answered that he also had been thinking about it for eighteen
months, “and although he did not want to get ahead of the other western
railroad executives, he thought they should all get around a table and try to
develop something that will help the commission.” Asked by Ripley about
specific routes that would link to his line or others, however, Holden refused
to express an opinion.90
By the end of the hearings, Ripley’s consolidation plan had many critics
and few supporters. Some had attacked the premise that consolidation
would produce substantial operating savings. For example, John Worley,
professor of transportation at the University of Michigan, worried that effi-
ciency benefits could not offset other, intangible losses. “No industry, rail-
road or other,” he argued, “can expect success which has none or has lost its
traditions.”91 Even the leading voice for large shippers, the National Indus-
trial Traffic League, asked ICC commissioners to “recognize the impossi-
bility of adopting a plan of the character prescribed by Congress at this time
and under present conditions.”92 In this negative environment ICC com-
missioners pulled back from their initial enthusiasm for consolidation.
Commissioner Mark Potter, once Ripley’s admiring supporter, wrote in Jan-
uary 1924 that he doubted consensus could be reached, yet he opposed
compulsory consolidations.93 With the railroads increasingly identified as a
key factor in the nation’s economic health, however, first President Harding
and then President Coolidge endorsed the importance of railroad consoli-
dation.94
Early in 1924, Senator Albert Cummins sought to break the impasse by
introducing a consolidation bill widely credited to Commerce Secretary
Herbert Hoover. As a principal author of the Transportation Act of 1920,
Cummins was highly regarded in Congress for his knowledge of railroad
finance, rates, and operations. This time he sought to salvage the consolida-
tion idea, a key element of the 1920 bill to which his name was attached.
Cummins suggested amending the requirement that the ICC prepare a sin-
gle master plan. Instead, Cummins proposed that railroad managers could
pursue initiatives on their own for two years, after which time a commis-
sion-appointed committee would broker additional consolidations for five
more years. After seven years, the ICC would round out regional systems
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using condemnation proceedings. As a final inducement to the railroads,
Cummins’s bill proposed federal incorporation of railroads, an older idea
designed to limit the authority of state utility commissioners over many
facets of rail operations.95 But the bill stalled in committee and Cummins
could not revive it in later sessions, despite the addition of a plan to use the
recapture of excess profits to punish railroads that thwarted consolidation
plans. In the mid-1920s, few members of Congress were prepared to revisit
the consolidation issue, and Cummins’s death in 1926 largely ended pres-
sure for action.96
Yet if politicians such as Cummins, experts such as Ripley, and the ICC
commissioners could not deliver a consolidation plan, leaders of several rail-
roads pursued independent consolidation schemes in the tradition of Collis
Huntington. The primary impetus after 1925 came from Oris P. and Man-
tis J. Van Sweringen, brothers developing a railroad empire from their cor-
porate base in Cleveland. In 1916, their holding companies acquired control
of the Nickel Plate Road and they added the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad
in 1923. The holding company mechanism afforded the brothers a means of
avoiding ICC restrictions on stock issues and appointments of boards of
directors, for ICC commissioners concluded they lacked legal authority to
regulate state-chartered holding companies. The Van Sweringens’ efforts
prompted other rail executives, notably W. W. Atterbury of the Pennsylva-
nia, to consider using holding companies to control the consolidation
process. In late 1924, the leaders of the largest eastern railroads met to dis-
cuss creation of four large railroad systems in the eastern United States,
where the ICC plan had called for seven systems. These railroad leaders
built a plan around the New York Central, the Pennsylvania, the B&O rail-
roads, and the Van Sweringen holdings. But these discussions fell apart
because of jealousy and disagreements between the messengers about the
specific lines each large carrier would control.97
Ignoring the ICC consolidation plan, the Van Sweringens continued
building a railroad empire through leveraged stock purchases. They took
control of the Erie, the Hocking Valley, and the Pere Marquette railroads,
which the ICC commissioners and Ripley had tentatively assigned to three
different systems. ICC commissioners, especially Joseph Eastman, were
piqued by this end run using the legal loophole of holding companies and
feared their consolidation program would collapse. Ripley forcefully
denounced the Van Sweringens’ financial manipulations, predicated upon a
holding company structure and the issuance of nonvoting stock that allowed
them to leverage very small investments into controlling corporate interests.
In 1926, the ICC denied the brothers permission to consolidate their
newest acquisitions with the original holdings of the Nickel Plate and
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Chesapeake & Ohio railroads. The brothers responded by forming a second
holding company to connect their railroad holdings, a pyramid structure
typical of the speculative financial climate of the 1920s. By 1928 the Van
Sweringens were buying the stock of western railroads, beginning with the
Missouri Pacific.98
The Van Sweringens were relatively unique in their speculative approach
to rail carriers, but were far from the only rail executives to pursue consoli-
dations and larger systems during the 1920s. Executives at several eastern
carriers continued to lease and purchase (albeit under ICC supervision)
smaller lines that provided important connections, and by the end of the
decade, W. W. Atterbury of the Pennsylvania had adopted a holding com-
pany strategy for certain acquisitions. In 1925, the B&O leased the Cincin-
nati, Indianapolis & Western; in 1928, the Pennsylvania bought a control-
ling interest in the Norfolk and Western and the New York Central acquired
additional shares in the Lehigh Valley. The New York Central and B&O in
concert expanded their joint holdings of the Reading. Similarly, in 1927
officials at the Northern Pacific and Great Northern proposed a combina-
tion, while the managers of the Kansas City Southern set out to acquire the
stock of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad. ICC commissioners
rejected the latter proposal strictly on financial grounds, claiming its struc-
ture copied the Van Sweringens’ holding company strategy in order to
bypass ICC regulatory oversight.99
Faced with emerging rail systems that did not conform to their tentative
plan, ICC commissioners concluded they could no longer delay approving a
formal consolidation scheme. In 1929, they reluctantly issued a final plan
that differed only in minor details from the map Ripley had proposed in
1921. As before, industry leaders showed little enthusiasm.100 In 1930, Con-
gress launched another round of hearings on several consolidation bills first
introduced in 1928. One impetus for renewed congressional action was the
lack of railroad efforts to implement the ICC’s program; another was anger
at the way Van Sweringen holding companies circumvented ICC oversight
of the appointments of boards of directors and requirements for financial
reporting.The spectacular collapse of several utility holding companies early
in the Depression also spotlighted the financial and speculative abuses
underpinning some holding companies, and the obvious financial weakness
of the Van Sweringen empire attracted sustained congressional scrutiny. In
April 1930, Senator James C. Couzens of Michigan launched hearings on a
resolution to halt all railroad consolidations until the ICC issued its final
plan. Couzens’s proposal attracted attention in the press, but failed to win
congressional approval.101
Montana Senator Burton K. Wheeler joined Couzens in criticizing rail-
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road management and ICC consolidation plans alike. Wheeler was furious
that ICC commissioners had approved a tentative combination of the
Northern Pacific and Great Northern, accusing them of undoing one of the
most famous antitrust decisions of Theodore Roosevelt’s administration. In
the Northern Securities case of 1904, the Supreme Court had blocked rail-
road magnate E. H. Harriman’s efforts to dominate the nation’s railroads,
ruling that his Northern Securities holding company acted to restrain trade
by controlling the parallel lines of the Great Northern, the Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy, and the Northern Pacific. Reflecting the decades-
long distrust that railroads could still engender, Wheeler judged consolida-
tion activities in the 1920s by the standards of 1904, and wanted the ICC
to punish monopolistic railroads, not consolidate them.102
Perhaps the only person retaining enthusiasm for the ICC consolidation
plan was William Ripley, its architect. Engaging in debates with academic
economists and writing a number of articles for the popular press, Ripley
kept the idea of railroad consolidation in front of politicians and ordinary
Americans. Many observers credited Ripley for the ICC commissioners’
rejection of the first Van Sweringen proposal in 1926.103 In 1930, Ripley
launched a final effort to bring his plan into reality. On his own, Ripley
brought together the presidents of the B&O, the Pennsylvania, the New
York Central, and the Chesapeake & Ohio. He cajoled, praised, and threat-
ened; he invoked the authority of President Hoover; and Ripley even threat-
ened to go to the ICC as a railroad stockholder. Eventually, he persuaded
rail officials to accept a four-trunk line consolidation plan for the East
Coast. In October 1931, rail officials sent their proposal to the ICC com-
missioners, who approved it in July 1932 after lengthy hearings.
Yet as had been true of other activities of the ICC, such as the valuation
project, little came of this apparent breakthrough. At the low point of the
decade-long economic depression, no rail corporation could afford to buy
anything in 1932. Finally, in 1940 Congress repealed the section of the
Transportation Act of 1920 that required the consolidation of rail corpora-
tions. Thereafter the concept of consolidation found no official support
until the start of a period of renewed interest in mergers appeared during
the mid-1950s.104
Contemporary observers of the ICC, such as academic economist and
author of the classic history of the Interstate Commerce Commission I. L.
Scharfman, as well as later analysts and historians, have judged the com-
missioners’ handling of railroad consolidation one of the ICC’s low points.105
And it may be that this episode began the process of eroding the ICC’s rep-
utation as the nation’s model regulatory agency because of the superior
expertise in the public service. Yet given the realities of the regulatory system
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over which the commissioners presided, few options were available to them.
Whether it was the effort to determine rates, consolidate railroad firms, fos-
ter accounting standards, or judge the value of railroad investments, federal
regulation was and remained an inherently political process that numerous
economic and engineering experts influenced only at the margins. Despite
the shift in focus supposedly mandated by the Transportation Act of 1920 to
balancing the health of rail corporations and the needs of the shippers, in
practice the guiding regulatory principle for many in Congress and elsewhere
remained the continued distrust of railroad executives and their corporations.
The valuation project perfectly reflected this situation, for it never separated
the rate-setting goals of the 1920s from the program’s origins as an investi-
gation into railroad wrongdoing. Similarly, when none of the parties involved
supported consolidation, political gridlock ensued because the commission-
ers lacked coercive authority (or the will) to order compliance with their
unpopular (or perhaps unrealistic) plans.
Focusing on the ICC’s inability to consolidate the railroads into a
smaller number of regional systems obscures, however, a much more signif-
icant yet sometimes little remarked component of the transportation and
regulatory environment during the 1920s—the emergence of serious com-
petitors to the railroads. The framers of the new railroad policy in 1920 had
assumed that railroads were natural monopolies and shaped their directions
to the ICC commissioners accordingly. Yet even as commissioners pursued
valuation, consolidation, and other programs designed to control or limit the
actions of railroad executives, the emergence of real transporation alterna-
tives to railroads “undermined,” in the word of legal historian James W. Ely
Jr., the very reason for those actions. In other words, a disconnect existed
between the basic premise of the Transportation Act of 1920 and the every-
day realities of American transportation. After 1920, truckers began to take
freight away from rail carriers, and even more quickly bus services and per-
sonal automobiles had started to siphon off rail passengers. At the same
time, inland water transport gained renewed strength, even as airplanes
appeared on the scene. As Ely observes, “In this new and more competitive
world, the restrictive feature of the Transportation Act badly hurt the very
industry it was intended to assist.” According to historian Ely, then, what
took place during the railroad regulation of the 1920s was that “legislators
and regulators were preoccupied with yesterday’s issues, and displayed no
clairvoyant grasp of the future.”106 Put another way, during the 1920s federal
officials, including Esch and Cummins and their congressional colleagues
as well as ICC commissioners, had structured the railroad industry and
attempted to set the terms of the railroad marketplace down to the last
detail.
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No similar organization and oversight had been imposed on operators
of emerging transportation firms such as trucking companies and airlines.
Indeed, with presidents, members of Congress, ICC commissioners, and
professors such as Ripley and Johnson focused on railroads, few officials
took notice as new technical possibilities in transportation began to alter
profoundly every aspect of the nation’s transport system, including public
policy. New technologies such as trucks and airplanes, however, did not sim-
ply appear. To thrive, owners and managers of each of them required the
adjustment of the boundaries between themselves and competitors, and also
between themselves, shippers, and government. Such adjustments took the
form of new public policies created to govern such matters as highway con-
struction, airmail subsidies and air navigation aids, waterways improve-
ments, and still more legislation in 1935 and 1938 to regulate the organiza-
tion and markets of the emerging truck and airline industries. Thus the new
transportation options remained as inextricably tied to the state as the rail-
roads. In other words, the technical possibilities in transportation expanded
enormously after 1920, in large part because of the manner in which the
state helped constitute those possibilities.
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BETWEEN 1920 AND 1940, federal officials, managers of trucking and bus
firms and airlines, and ordinary Americans carried out another transporta-
tion revolution that ended the railroad monopoly over transportation. In
1920, railroads still served as the backbone of the nation’s transport system,
carrying nearly all traffic—almost 2.5 billion tons of freight and 1.2 billion
passengers. During the next twenty years, however, federal, state, and local
engineers expended $1.7 billion on inland waterways and harbors and
improved and surfaced almost a million miles of highways. Just between
1920 and 1929, the number of registered motor vehicles increased from
10.5 million to 26.7 million.1 The federal government also financed the
development of an air navigation system and paid early airlines to carry the
mail as a means of encouraging creation of a private airline system.
These alternative forms of transportation such as trucks offered various
combinations of greater efficiency, better service, and lower costs. With star-
tling quickness, shippers and travelers began to abandon the railroads that
had carried them and their freight for nearly a century. By 1929, automo-
biles already carried 81 percent of intercity passenger miles, compared to 15
percent by rail and 3.3 percent by motor bus, numbers that reflect an aston-
ishingly rapid change in the nation’s travel and shipping patterns.2 During
the 1930s with its harsh depression, the railroad’s share of freight deliveries
continued to decline, accounting for only 64.4 percent of the freight
between cities (370 billion ton-miles), while inland waterways carried 16.7
percent (96 billion ton-miles), oil pipelines 9.7 percent (56 billion ton-
miles), and trucks 9.2 percent (53 billion ton-miles).3 These statistics found
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C H A P T E R  2
The New Transportation Problem: The 
Politics of Transportation Coordination,
1925–1940
We are no longer railroads alone; we are transportation companies.
—W. W. Atterbury, Pennsylvania Railroad, 1929
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direct meaning in the experiences of American consumers, say, those living
in Chicago. By the early 1930s, the milk they drank for breakfast, the toma-
toes from Tennessee and Kentucky on their dinner table, and even the table
itself and other furniture increasingly moved by truck rather than by train.4
It is tempting to consider this transportation revolution as a story of
newer and better technologies developed through the hard work and pro-
motion of truckers and airline executives, and the wise choices of private
investors. Innovations such as the motor truck and paved highways brought
lower transport costs, greater ease and convenience, and faster service to
millions of consumers. Entrepreneurship and technological innovation
comprised a part of the story, but certainly not all, or even most, of it.
Instead, public policy choices made in Congress, the executive branch of the
federal government, and sometimes in the states proved integral to the abil-
ity of operators of these newer transport systems to compete with the rail-
roads after World War I. To be sure, the arrival of trucks and airplanes vastly
complicated the development and implementation of public policy in the
field of transportation. In some respects, federal officials approached trans-
portation after 1920 just as municipal officials in Chicago approached the
competing demands of transit companies and auto motorists during those
same years. Chicago’s elected officials made choices that in effect penalized
street railway franchises, which they judged corrupt, old-fashioned, and
undemocratic, while celebrating automobiles as individualistic, modern, and
democratic.5 On the national scene, politicians similarly encouraged truck,
bus, and airline operators—or at least left them alone—while the generally
distrusted railroads were tightly controlled by the ICC. Truckers, for exam-
ple, enjoyed use of an emerging road network and generally favorable rul-
ings in the courts; airlines and water transport operators received outright
subsidies. That the regulation of railroad competitors differed in form and
style represented a public policy choice that defined the boundaries of what
came to be called the transportation industries or modes.
Railroad managers, such as the top executives at the Pennsylvania or the
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, bitterly complained about an inequitable
double standard, especially in light of the changed attitude toward the
health of rail carriers supposedly mandated by the Transportation Act of
1920. They occasionally invoked the specter of government ownership and
claimed that state and federal regulators sought such a goal. This was a
“straw man,” for nationalization found no demonstrable public support. Rail
executives also sought (without success) higher freight rates and the applica-
tion of a similar regulatory structure to truck and bus operators. Eventually,
rail carriers explored the use of buses and trucks as extensions of their rail
networks. Only the crisis of the Depression forced ICC officials, members of
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Congress, and transportation executives alike to consider new approaches to
regulating and delivering American transportation.
The policy option that attracted the most attention emerged from trans-
portation economists and outside experts who had for some time advocated
coordinated control over the nation’s increasingly complex transportation
system. Coordination required adopting a different philosophy of trans-
portation. Rather than a vision of walled-off and separated technologies,
advocates of coordination evaluated transportation as a whole, urging coop-
eration and even collaboration between operators of different transport
technologies, as for instance between truckers and railroads. In other words,
supporters of coordination accepted reconfiguring an array of hitherto inde-
pendent technological and business choices (trains, trucks, pipelines, canals,
etc.) into an effective national transport system. As had been the case in
1920, when Congress approved the Transportation Act of 1920, indepen-
dent analysts and academic experts played pivotal roles in formulating con-
ceptions of coordinated transportation. Economists predominated in these
deliberations, men whom economist and historian Michael A. Bernstein
describes as being committed to service as architects of strong government
programs. Reformers in the mold of William Z. Ripley gave way to institu-
tional analysts such as Harold G. Moulton of the Brookings Institution.
Nonetheless, these experts, including ICC commissioner and later Federal
Transportation Coordinator Joseph B. Eastman, retained the Progressive-
era rhetoric of rationality and interest-free, nonpolitical decision making.6
By the end of the 1930s, however, transportation experts such as Moul-
ton and Eastman had not significantly altered the shape of American trans-
portation policy. Opponents of transportation coordination, such as truck
operators, continually called forth the specter of the supposedly predatory
economic power of the railroads. More important was the undeniable pref-
erence of truck operators, airline executives, and politicians such as Senator
Patrick A. “Pat” McCarran for maintaining transportation technologies as
independent modes. Supporters of this concept not only held that each form
of transport was different, but also that the public was better off if each
mode, such as trucks or trains, remained a freestanding enterprise in compe-
tition with one another. Thus as noted in chapter 1, congressional authors
had specifically prohibited railroads from owning shipping lines that com-
peted with rail services, in effect mandating that each type of transportation
should operate independently.
Executives of trucking firms, bus lines, barges on inland waterways, and
later airlines adamantly favored walling off the railroads. In this way, lead-
ers of the new types of transportation wanted to reduce competition, even
while painting railroads as dangerous monopolies despite the emergence of
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competitors during the 1920s. In the end, proponents of distinct and sepa-
rate transportation modes triumphed over those who had articulated a
vision of transportation coordination. In particular, expert opinion such as
the views of academic economists or the positions of the ICC’s Joseph B.
Eastman exercised limited influence in the milestone transportation legisla-
tion passed by Congress in 1935, 1938, and 1940. Although couched in the
new language of coordination, these bills embraced the bedrock assumption
that transportation was a series of modes. The result was a “national” system
composed of separate transportation industries and separate transportation
markets, each now defined variously as technology or mode and governed
by several equally disconnected policies and regulatory agencies.
Transportation Alternatives to Railroads
The concept of transportation coordination only made sense to policymak-
ers and transportation executives when motor vehicles, airplanes, and
barges existed as viable competitors to the railroads after 1920. Freight car-
riage on inland waterways, for example, had largely disappeared after 1860
as rail carriers displaced traffic from canals and inland rivers. Yet efforts to
improve waterways never ceased and occasional legislative initiatives to
increase federal funding for projects directed by the Army Corps of
Engineers grew more frequent during the late nineteenth century. The
National Rivers and Harbors Congress of 1902 and formation of the
Lakes-to-Gulf Deep Waterway Association in 1906 signaled the strength-
ening of efforts to win congressional support. In 1907, President Theodore
Roosevelt appointed a Waterways Commission to study federal support for
waterways, but the commissioner’s report did not translate into new feder-
al programs. Instead, the Army Corps of Engineers steadily worked on the
Mississippi River and the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway. All told, between
1890 and 1931 the federal government expended about $1.369 billion on
waterways; by 1920, the states had spent another $300 million.7
Several factors explained this revival of interest in waterways, including
hostility toward the railroads, classic booster sentiment, and the support of
two powerful presidents. Public antagonism toward the railroads among
midwestern farmers remained a powerful motivation, for even in 1935 Rep-
resentative Charles J. Colden of California characterized railroads as dan-
gerous monopolies.This “tame the railroads” logic held that waterways were
by definition cheaper than railroads for bulk shipments; therefore, asserted
proponents, transportation on waterways automatically forced reductions in
monopolistic railway rates. In the 1920s, such attitudes partially undergirded
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President Herbert Hoover’s promotion of a massive navigation and power
project for the St. Lawrence River in the 1920s. Most boosters of water
transportation, however, overlooked the costs of transshipping cargoes from
waterways to railroad cars (or motor trucks), expenses that eliminated most
economic advantages. Others argued that waterways were vital safety valves
for meeting occasional shortages of railcars for hauling grain at harvest time.
Additionally, members of self-interested chambers of commerce and civic
groups assumed that communities had little to lose and much to gain from
federally funded waterways projects.8 Finally, according to transportation
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FIGURE 5. This map shows the status of improved inland waterways ca. 1930.
Source: Sidney L. Miller, Inland Transportation Principles and Policies (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933), 648.
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expert Sidney L. Miller writing in the early 1930s, Presidents Theodore
Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover played important roles in shaping public
thinking and policy choices concerning inland waterways. Roosevelt’s effi-
ciency-based conservation program included many inland waterways and
irrigation projects, while Hoover, both as secretary of commerce and presi-
dent, “let pass no opportunity to lend the support of his personality and
office to the formulation and approval of an inland waterway plan of broad
scope.”9
The clearest sign of the federal government’s commitment to inland
waterways was the federal operation of a barge line on the Mississippi River
for more than forty years after World War I. Initially justified by the
wartime freight backups on eastern railroads, Congress chartered the Inland
Waterways Corporation in 1924 with the mandate to demonstrate the fea-
sibility of commercial barge service. The secretary of war oversaw this pro-
ject, which eventually spread from the Lower Mississippi and Warrior
Rivers to the Upper Mississippi and later to the Illinois and Missouri
Rivers. The operation grew to include a number of terminals and a fleet of
equipment, but its profitability was always contested, especially if the fixed
costs of equipments and improvements were included. Even so, the Inland
Waterways Corporation survived numerous investigations until it ceased
operation in 1963.10
Railway leaders, transportation economists, and a few congressional
representatives criticized federal waterways activities, especially the barge
corporation. The editor of Engineering News-Record, Charles Whiting
Baker, pointed to uncertain reliability, high costs, and lack of demand, argu-
ing that navigation improvements made sense only on the Great Lakes and
perhaps on the Mississippi and Ohio River systems.11 Harold G. Moulton,
the first head of the Brookings Institution, was one of several transportation
economists who criticized federal subsidies to inland waterways develop-
ment, both in general and specifically in the case of Hoover’s proposed St.
Lawrence River project. Government policy, Moulton contended, was
unfair to the railroads. Yet by 1963, the total investment on waterways since
1824 stood at about $5.5 billion, with 57 percent spent on inland waterways
and 11 percent on the Great Lakes. In a system built by public policy, pro-
ponents of waterway development had reemerged as actors in American
transportation politics after 1900.12
As with waterways, government officials played pivotal roles in guiding
the formation of commercial airline service. Aviation was the glamorous
newcomer to transportation. Fragile planes had proven themselves over the
battlefields of France, and a generation of pilots trained at government
expense (typified by the future hero Charles A. Lindbergh) came home
TRANSPORTATION COORDINATION, 1925–1940 / 35
RSB_chap2_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:28 PM  Page 35
eager to develop commercial air transportation. Their progress was slow;
even in 1940, airplanes presented no serious challenges to long-distance
railroads or even buses. While Lindbergh and Amelia Earhart embodied
popular enthusiasm for aviation and the image of men and women chal-
lenging both the business odds and the laws of gravity, airmail subsidies and
other government assistance were more important.13
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FIGURE 6. This cartoon from the New York Herald Tribune (1932), reproduced
in Railway Age, shows the attitudes of railroad executives toward inland water-
way projects. This and other political cartoons reproduced in this chapter illus-
trate the political tensions that existed between railroad managers and the oper-
ators of the newer transportation competitors that had emerged during the
1920s. These tensions also reflected the definition of transportation as separate
industries and markets governed by separate rules. Source: Railway Age 93
(December 3, 1932): 817. Used with permission.
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Historians of aviation have chronicled a number of pioneering attempts
to launch air transport companies. After halting starts in the 1910s, a sur-
vey conducted in 1921 found 88 airline operators in existence, while a sim-
ilar investigation in 1923 reported 129 companies. Only seventeen enter-
prises appeared on both lists.14 This struggle for existence helps explain the
scholarly and popular tendency to celebrate indomitable entrepreneurs such
as Juan T. Trippe, the founder of Pan American Airways, who developed
aviation connections between the United States, Mexico, and South Amer-
ica. More was involved than Trippe’s indomitable spirit, however. Historian
Nick Kommons observes that “The airplane’s potential would not—in fact,
could not—be realized by a community of businessmen acting alone. The
Federal Government would stand at their side, becoming, in effect, civil avi-
ation’s indispensable partner.”15
This partnership had two formal elements. The first involved assistance
to airplane builders. During the 1920s, the National Advisory Committee
on Aeronautics (NACA) undertook an extensive research and development
effort that produced incremental technical improvements such as engine
cowlings. Such innovations translated, in turn, into greater speed, altitude,
and operating efficiency for new airplanes into the 1930s. At the same time,
direct military purchases of aircraft largely determined the profitability of
individual plane manufacturers. The second and perhaps more important
aspect of government support of commercial aviation involved less direct
encouragements. The most significant, without doubt, were subsidies for
airmail service. Experiments in the 1910s eventually culminated in a post
office airmail program in 1918 that allowed a generation of war-time pilots
to continue flying in often risky service. Service across the continent, ini-
tially established in 1919 and 1920, was supported by the development of a
system of navigational beacons and emergency landing fields with lights,
completed in 1925.16 Government support for airmail service proved essen-
tial to demonstrating the concept of mail deliveries by airplanes.
Government activities also set the parameters for the eventual operation
of private aviation firms, especially in passenger service. The crucial uncer-
tainties facing entrepreneurs and a few intrepid investors extended to
finances, insurance, and operational rules. At first, state regulators tried to
secure basic stability, with Connecticut requiring aviation licensing and reg-
istration in 1911. Massachusetts followed suit two years later, and by 1926,
five other states had introduced regulations, all quite dissimilar. Many
observers, such as Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, assumed that the
direct subsidies from the federal government were needed. Aviation, Hoover
reported, was “the only industry that favors having itself regulated by Gov-
ernment.”17 Hoover, in fact, again led efforts to develop a viable commercial
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aviation sector. He contended that, given government assistance to water
transport, federal agencies had an equal responsibility to aviation. “We can
no more expect the individual aviator or the individual shipping company to
provide [basic services such as lights and channels] on the sea.”18
At first even Hoover could not find a way to configure a federal policy
for aviation. From 1918 through 1924, members of Congress endlessly
debated the matter, at which point President Calvin Coolidge tipped the
scales by forming a presidential investigative board. From that committee
emerged the Air Mail (or Kelly) Act of 1925, which determined that the
federal government would contract with private carriers to carry the mail.
By 1926, steady payments for mail delivery had created a stable financial
base for the twelve private air carriers that received mail contracts; indeed,
up to the end of the twentieth century, the successors of these first carriers
(American, Delta, Northwest, United, etc.) continued to form the core of
American aviation.
Government officials also helped create an infrastructure that supported
private carriers.19 A central figure was William P. McCracken, who became
the first head of the new Bureau of Aeronautics in the Commerce Depart-
ment in 1925, where he tackled basic regulations, licenses for pilots, and cer-
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FIGURE 7. The railroad view of airline subsidies from the federal government can be seen in
this cartoon from Railway Age (1932). Source: Railway Age 93 (December 3, 1932): 822.
Used with permission.
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tification of mechanics, planes, and engines. He also expanded the post
office’s system for marking air routes with rotating beacons and soon added
radio as well. By 1933, one historian noted, “A typical 1,000 mile segment
of airway had 30 intermediate fields, 60 electric light beacons, 230 gas bea-
cons, 5 radio stations, 5 radio range beacons, and a number of strategically
placed radio marker beacons.” About all the bureau could not do was build
airports, which remained a municipal activity.20 Still, this government-built
structure turned independent barnstormers into regular paid employees fly-
ing prescribed paths for private delivery services.
As president, Herbert Hoover and his administration continued to
develop other forms of assistance to the young industry. For example, the
leaders of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Aeronautics worked to
replace inconsistent state regulations with uniform federal rules.21 An even
more important aspect of government efforts to structure aviation began
when Postmaster General Walter Folger Brown attempted to use airmail
contracts to stabilize private commercial aviation. The post office had
played a consistently supportive role in developing airmail, but Brown, an
Ohio lawyer prominent in Republican politics, carried that support to new
heights. He concluded that open bidding for mail contracts would under-
mine efforts to expand and develop a rational commercial air network. He
persuaded Congress to amend the existing airmail legislation (the McNary
-Watres Act of 1930) to set payments to airmail carriers by the size of the
plane, not the weight carried, a move that favored larger, more stable carri-
ers. Brown then manipulated the renewal of contracts in May and June
1930 by ruling that many new routes were extensions of older contracts, a
decision that allowed him to assign, rather than bid, contracts for these
extensions. He achieved his goal of stability for contract holders, as only ten
firms received contracts and four airlines (Eastern, TWA, United, and
American) carried 89 percent of the mail.22 In other words, Brown had
moved beyond the use of federal resources to support mail delivery by air to
a program of using mail contracts to subsidize private commercial carriers
struggling to develop passenger and freight service. Because of Brown’s
activities, the structure of the early aviation industry was essentially a crea-
ture of the state.
Between 1930 and 1932, the air system doubled in mileage with the
addition of 5,700 miles of transcontinental routes and 8,900 miles in exten-
sions. Meanwhile, passenger miles flown increased from 84 million in 1930
to 127 million in 1932 despite the Depression, while the number of passen-
gers carried rose from 160,000 in 1929 to 474,000. The introduction of new
aircraft contributed to this rapid growth.The Boeing 247 and Douglas DC-
2 adopted aluminum stressed skin construction, single cantilever wings,
retractable landing gears, variable pitch propellers, and NACA cowlings
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that reduced wind resistance over engines.23 While faster and more efficient,
the greater cost of these planes posed financial demands on early aviation
managers that explained Brown’s desire for stable, controlled growth in the
industry.
Members of Congress, however, expressed concern about the growing
subsidy to air carriers—almost $14 million in 1932. Shortly after the inau-
guration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, new postmaster general James
A. Farley accused his predecessor of manipulating airmail contracts. The
charge set off a protracted investigation by Senator Hugo L. Black. When
Black’s hearings in 1934 detailed Brown’s activities, the public outcry caused
Roosevelt to cancel the airmail contracts. Assured by his generals that army
pilots could handle the job, in February 1934 Roosevelt ordered the army to
deliver the mail until airline executives could submit new bids. War Depart-
ment officials had vastly underestimated the magnitude of the task, how-
ever, and army pilots, who flew only 11,000 miles of the 27,000-mile sys-
tem, suffered several highly publicized fatal crashes. In April, post office
officials finally opened new bids and quickly returned airmail service to pri-
vate carriers. Just as Brown had feared in 1930, most air carriers struggled to
break even on the lower bids they had submitted in order to maintain con-
trol of contracts. More important, the president launched a review of avia-
tion policy in 1934, from which eventually emerged new federal aviation
legislation.24 Thus while Postmaster General Brown was discredited, the
efforts of the executive branch and the Congress to structure the commer-
cial aviation industry had not ended. From their earliest days, private civil
aviation firms were and remained inextricably linked to public policy deci-
sions, if not actually dependent upon the government.
Federal and state officials also promoted development of a highway sys-
tem for motorists and truckers. The resulting highway/motor vehicle system
became the most serious challenge to the railroads during the interwar
period as motor vehicles took more business from railroads faster than any
other form of transportation. As early as 1911, a survey by the Union Pacific
Railroad found declines in their short-haul freight and passenger business.
By 1916, automobiles already accounted for 54 billion passenger miles, sur-
passing the railroads, which delivered only 35 billion.25 Central to these
developments was another government program, the federal-aid highway
system.
As had been true with waterways, government funding of roads was not
new, but during the nineteenth century federal support had disappeared as
canals and then railroads provided long-distance transportation. Popular
fascination with the bicycle in the 1880s convinced Congress to establish
the Office of Road Inquiry in the Agriculture Department in 1893. This
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office, renamed the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) in 1918, became the
leading source of technical information and guidance on all matters related
to highway policy and construction. In 1916, technical leaders of the BPR
helped persuade Congress to inaugurate the federal-aid highway program,
with federal and state officials sharing authority and funding responsibility.
Engineers working in state highway departments planned, constructed, and
then maintained roads used for mail delivery outside of cities and towns,
while federal engineers certified the competence of all state highway depart-
ments and inspected and approved all plans. Costs initially were split 50/50,
with the federal share capped at $10,000 per mile.26 In practice, federal
engineers dominated both policy and technical discussions with their state
counterparts, thanks to superior expertise. Federal officials, however, care-
fully instilled a sense of “partnership” with state officials, employing a coop-
erative style that slowly built up not only a national road system but also
produced competent state road-building agencies. Even so, the public’s
acceptance of the claim of federal highway engineers to be apolitical experts
enabled them to act as arbiters of the nation’s technical, administrative,
financial, and legislative highway policies from the early 1900s into the
1960s. Nowhere in the realm of transportation was expertise so respected
and such a powerful political tool.27
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FIGURE 8. This map indicates the extent of commercial aviation routes used for airmail in
1933. Source: Sidney L. Miller, Inland Transportation: Principles and Policies (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933), 703.
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After 1921, the initial federal emphasis upon roads for rural mail deliv-
ery gave way to attention to a limited system comprising 7 percent of each
state’s total mileage. These most important roads generally connected cities
and towns and constituted the first national highway system, which grew
from 169,000 miles in 1921 to 194,000 miles in 1930. Both the railroad and
aviation systems had grown in this way, initially focusing on local links
before developing national systems. The most obvious outcome of the fed-
eral-aid highway program was the construction of more miles of surfaced
roads for motorists, including the early pioneers of commercial trucking
businesses. Once again, federal policy supported the development of a new
form of transportation.28
The federal-aid highway program provided only the core funding for
this work. During the 1920s, federal appropriations for highways accounted
for only $839 million of total construction expenditures of $7.9 billion.
Finding this vast sum challenged many local and state officials, who resorted
to a variety of mechanisms (bonds, labor taxes, registration fees, property
taxes) until financial salvation came from the gasoline tax. Oregon intro-
duced the first gasoline levy in 1919, and by 1936, every state collected what
historian John C. Burnham labeled the only popular tax in American his-
tory. In other words, during the first three decades of the twentieth century,
road construction had become a central activity of government at every
level. Indeed, roads had assumed such priority within the government that
the Depression-era relief programs of Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt
emphasized road construction. Harold Ickes, who directed work relief
expenditures through the Public Works Administration, observed that
“Dollar for dollar, more money was spent for direct labor in road building
than in any other kind of work.”29 Whether at the federal or state levels,
moreover, highway policy developed with a single-minded blindness to all
but the users of roads.30
Why was the motor vehicle favored in this way? A crucial reason was the
early ability of carmakers to persuade consumers that the cars they drove
conveyed social status and personal identity. Equally important, government
officials and many ordinary Americans perceived motor vehicles as inher-
ently democratic. The ability of motorists to go where they wanted when
they wanted has symbolized American freedom of choice—a very positive
image compared to the public reputation of railroads. Like streetcars, rail-
roads carried significant political and moral baggage of corruption and
abuse, even as they appeared to be old, dirty, inconvenient, uncomfortable,
and slow. Officials at every level of government found it easy and popular to
justify public policy choices that fostered highways and enabled motor vehi-
cle transportation. In this basic fashion, policy decisions effectively decou-
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pled highways, waterways, and aviation from railroads, erasing the prospect
of developing an integrated vision of transportation.31
Motor vehicle competition with the railroads rapidly unfolded against
this backdrop of public and policy support. As noted above, railroad move-
ment of passengers first felt the effect of cars, and earlier than many might
suppose. Between 1921 and 1930, automobiles decimated railroad passen-
ger traffic by delivering 80 to 90 percent of all intercity passenger miles. The
decline in rail travel amounted to 20 billion passenger miles, with individ-
ual railroads reporting enormous changes. The Cotton Belt Railway deliv-
ered only 29 million passenger miles in 1929, compared to 137 million pas-
senger miles in 1920, while executives at the Missouri Pacific watched
passenger revenue decline from $21 million in 1920 to $10 million in 1930.
During the interwar period, trains still carried most people on long trips,
but even for this purpose, automobiles challenged train service.32 Under-
written by governmental spending on highways, travel preferences were
changing, launching railroad passenger service on a long, painful, and slow
downward spiral. As passenger miles contracted, railroad executives began
asking state and federal regulators for permission to abandon passenger ser-
vice on many lines that had long sustained communities and businesses.33
Meanwhile, truck drivers and bus operators joined motorists as factors
in this changing American transportation picture. In 1920, few transporta-
tion experts believed that trucks posed a competitive threat to the long-haul
freight service of railroads; indeed from 1921–1930 the ton-miles of freight
moved by rail increased 23 percent. As railroad historian Herbert H. Har-
wood commented, “Nobody thought much about intercity trucking.”34 If
observers considered motor trucks at all, it was as an auxiliary to railroads,
since they offered the crucial advantage of door-to-door delivery that could
ease congestion at busy railroad terminals. Early truck operators, however,
perceived a business opportunity in local delivery services, often using mod-
ified automobiles. In Louisville in 1914, for example, Henry C. Kelting
removed the seats from a Ford so he could haul light freight. After going
bankrupt in the postwar depression, Kelting’s second business venture pros-
pered during the 1920s as small manufacturers found trucks cut delivery
times from four days to one. Similarly, John Ernsthausen of Norwalk, Ohio,
modified a 1909 Overland to haul eggs. By 1921, his produce-hauling oper-
ation included a regular run to Cleveland; three years later, his Norwalk
Truck Line used three vehicles for general freight hauling.35 Years later, the
retelling of these early narratives of individual initiative in the face of giant
railroads and poor highways served as a staple element in trucker politics.
Farmers acted first when these early truckers provided the opportu-
nity to move produce, milk, and livestock from farm to town; furniture
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manufacturers also adopted truck shipments early on. Truck owners next
focused on the most valuable freight carried by the railroads, less-than-car-
load lots (LCL). Railroads charged a premium to move freight that did not
fill a boxcar, in part because of the cost of picking up, loading, carrying,
transshipping, and then delivering such freight through often crowded
urban freight terminals. Trucks bypassed much of the confusion by picking
up and delivering directly to front doors, often with little transshipping. By
1931, their greater speed and convenience, and their lower prices, allowed
truckers to move 90 percent of LCL freight shipped less than 50 miles, 75
percent of the LCL shipments of 50–100 miles, and about half of the ship-
ments within a radius of 100–150 miles. Longer truck hauls emerged more
slowly as the highway system improved, often spurred by truck owner-oper-
ators who took advantage of the low barriers to entry—all they needed was
their truck. By the late 1920s, the resulting cutthroat competition from so-
called gypsy truckers who did not post regular rates made trucking a disor-
derly enterprise. Yet truckers aggressively resisted any hint of regulation as
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TABLE 1. American Bus Usage
Year Electric Steam Motor School Interstate
Railways Railways Carriers Buses Carriers
1922 355
1923 1,200
1924 2,915
1925 5,150 375 24,634 27,000 659
1926 7,284 522 26,878 32,800 2,468
1927 8,492 994 27,106 35,900 3,012
1928 10,062 1,256 28,332 40,875 3,667
1929 11,256 1,454 29,940 45,067 4,269
1930 11,827 1,759 31,064 48,775 4,543
1931 12,050 1,500 31,850 51,500 5,558
1932 11,541 1,246 32,123 59,000 na
1933 11,000 720 33,280 60,300 na
1934 11,600 1,410 29,990 64,130 na
1935 12,600 1,750 30,650 71,850 na
1936 12,850 1,750 34,400 73,900 na
1937 13,700 1,800 36,000 78,100 na
1938 18,000 1,800 29,400 81,100 na
1939 18,000 1,700 29,249 85,700 na
1940 18,000 1,775 30,525 87,300 na
Source: “Salient Facts and Figures on the Transportation Industry,” Bus Transportation 6 (February 1927): 62,
64; “Expansion Continues at Steady Rate,” Bus Transportation 9 (February 1930): 84-87; "Basic Facts about the
Bus Industry," Bus Transportation 11 (February 1932): 54, 60; “Ibid.,” 14 (February 1935): 40; “Bus Output
Spills Over the Top,” Bus Transportation 11 ( January 1938): 52-53; Carl W. Stocks, “How Big Is the Bus Indus-
try?” Bus Transportation 18 ( January 1939): 49-50; Carl W. Stocks, “The Size and Growth of the Bus Industry,”
Bus Transportation 20 ( January 1941): 48-49.
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they began to take business away from railroads.36
Motor bus transportation developed less chaotically, following two dif-
ferent business strategies, that of providing either local urban or intercity ser-
vice.37 Unlike some truckers, bus owners could not succeed with a single
vehicle. And fleets of buses required maintenance garages and terminals with
ticket booths, waiting rooms, and in many instances, restaurants. In turn,
starting as early as the mid-1920s, these capital-intensive services encour-
aged the steady consolidation of the industry. Intercity bus operators, in par-
ticular, coalesced into regional enterprises. In 1923, only five firms had fleets
with as many as one hundred buses, but in 1925 there were twenty-one fleets
of this size. Only a year later twenty-nine fleets of one hundred buses were
in service, while there were forty-one large fleets by 1928. (See table 1.)
Two factors shaped this rapid growth of larger enterprises. First, railroad
executives played a part in the emerging regional configuration of intercity
bus service. As early as 1922, operators of a few electric interurban railways
experimented with motor vehicles, and by December 1923, 121 electric rail-
ways operated 1,000 buses; by 1924, 204 interurban lines owned 2,915
buses.38 Executives of mainline steam railroads exhibited more caution, but
a few large rail carriers (notably the Great Northern, Pennsylvania, Union
Pacific, and Southern Pacific railroads) eventually launched motor bus sub-
sidiaries. The number of railroad-operated bus lines rose from ten in 1925
to seventy-eight in 1929.39 The second factor in bus consolidation was the
introduction of improved vehicles that allowed buses to carry thirty persons
at highway speeds. Soon, streamlined bodies, rear-mounted engines, and
luggage storage under elevated seats offered quieter and more comfortable
rides. In 1929, Pickwick Stages, a large California bus operator, even intro-
duced a sleeper bus for overnight runs.40
By the late 1920s, executives at such large regional networks developed
grander plans.The managers of Pickwick Stages, for example, contemplated
a national bus system built off their Pacific coast backbone, but the large
midwest carrier, Northlands Transportation Co., provided the base from
which Greyhound Bus Lines emerged in 1929. Determined to offer
national service, managers at Greyhound acquired West Coast bus lines
Pickwick Stages and Pioneer Yelloway, as well as bus subsidiaries from the
Southern Pacific, Great Northern, and Pennsylvania Railroads (more about
this below). Structured as a holding company similar to the Van Sweringen
railroad empire, Greyhound loosely controlled a web of regional sub-
sidiaries, meaning that long-distance bus activities were firmly in the hands
of large corporate enterprises. Many independent bus operators remained in
business, but Greyhound dominated the long-haul industry as its managers
continued to acquire rail-owned bus subsidiaries through the 1930s. Indeed,
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Greyhound was so strong that in 1936 the ICC encouraged the formation
of a competitor—National Trailways.41 As one observer commented in
1928, “Long-distance travel by bus is the transportation demand of the
hour.” The favorable public response to buses showed in the 1934 Holly-
wood film It Happened One Night, where a long-distance bus figured promi-
nently in the romance between Clark Gable and Claudette Colbert.
Bus operators differed noticeably from early truckers in their acceptance
of government review of prices and operating conditions. Generally, execu-
tives of bus firms such as Pickwick Stages embraced state regulation of rates
and safety requirements, which spread quickly. In 1922, nineteen states had
enacted regulatory legislation; by 1929, every state but Delaware regulated
commercial buses.42 The safety issues associated with carrying people
instead of freight help explain this outcome, although another pivotal factor
was the desire of operators and the public for order and regularity in pas-
senger fares. A final reason bus regulation found favor was the desire of early
providers of transportation services for protection from latecomers. Most
state regulators assumed that intercity bus companies were natural monop-
olies, so that regulatory programs rested on the possession of certificates of
convenience and necessity to prevent development of duplicate services.
Managers of both steam railroads and electric interurban railways urged
state regulators to apply this rule to motor buses, and public utility commis-
sions, including the first such body established in Pennsylvania in 1914, ini-
tially considered the impact of bus service on existing railroad lines in their
decisions. By the mid-1920s, however, many state commissions proved less
willing to preserve railroad monopolies and it became easier to win approval
for bus routes that paralleled railroad lines. Under the guise of regulatory
protection for buses, state agencies helped shape the motor bus industry.43
Actions not taken in the federal arena also structured motor vehicle
transportation. Significantly, neither buses nor trucks faced federal over-
sight. One historian characterizes the Interstate Commerce Commission’s
response to the rapid growth of truck and bus operators after World War I
as one of “indifference.”44 In 1926, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that state
regulation of bus companies in interstate commerce was unconstitutional,
signaling the beginning of greater federal attention. Importantly, most
interstate bus operators favored regulation as a way to limit “predatory” com-
petitors who resorted to rate-cutting and low service standards. Even so,
debate, not action, marked early efforts.45 In 1926, Senator Albert Cummins
of Iowa (coauthor of the Transportation Act of 1920) introduced the first
bill to regulate commercial motor vehicles operating as common carriers,
but a more important event that year was the decision of ICC to investigate
motor transport. Based on hearings in thirteen cities, ICC commissioners
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urged a limited extension of federal regulation to trucks and buses in service
on posted routes (common carriers), and called for the issuance of certifi-
cates of public convenience only after regulators considered the impact of
new service providers on existing transportation operators. The report also
endorsed an idea broached by Cummins’s in his 1926 legislation, delegating
authority for regulating interstate motor commerce to the forty-eight state
public utility commissions, with rights of appeal to the ICC. Over the next
several years, members of Congress debated several bills incorporating these
principles, but consensus on federal policy failed to emerge. With truck and
bus operators fearful of a cumbersome regulatory process, during the late
1920s every bill stalled. A second round of ICC studies from 1930–32 did
not alter the situation, and regulation of motor vehicles waited until the
New Deal.46 Buses and trucks therefore operated under entirely different
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FIGURE 9. A continuing complaint of railroad managers was the unfair sub-
sidies received by commercial motor vehicles, as seen in this cartoon from the
Chicago Tribune (1932). Source: Railway Age 93 (December 3, 1932): 811.
Used with permission.
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rules and expectations than the railroads. As had been true for water trans-
port and aviation, public policy choices, including the choice not to regulate,
facilitated the development of buses and trucking as alternatives uncon-
nected to the railroads.
The Politics of Transportation Coordination,
1925–1940
The rapid appearance of alternatives to railroads, especially trucks and
buses, confounded the existing transportation policy spelled out in the
Transportation Act of 1920. Framers of that legislation, including Senator
Cummins and Representative Esch, had assumed that transportation in
America meant railroads. Within five years, however, this basic assumption
and the policy it supported—tight ICC regulation of all aspects of railroad
operations without regulatory attention to operators of buses, trucks, and
barges—was mismatched to a much more complex transport situation.
After 1925, a handful of railroad officials and transportation experts began
calling for a unified transportation policy. Often they advocated transporta-
tion coordination, a term with more than one meaning. Most proponents
agreed on the desirability of allowing operators of railroads, buses, trucks,
barges, and even airplanes to cooperate in providing passenger service and
cargo deliveries. Some defined the concept of coordination to include uni-
form federal regulation for all commercial carriers (railroads, motor vehi-
cles, and barges alike) and elimination of federal subsidies to nonrail trans-
port systems. A few academic and transportation economists went further
still and envisioned a coordinated transport system in which private carri-
ers operated several types of transportation, such as allowing railroads to
operate motor trucks and buses.
Certain federal officials, most notably Joseph Eastman (a long-serving
ICC commissioner and later an important figure in New Deal efforts to
define transportation policy), played central roles in the attempt to structure
American transportation by using some form of these ideas. Ultimately,
however, Eastman and other like-minded transportation leaders failed to
establish coordination as the foundational concept for transportation policy.
The net result was that transportation policy and the American transport
system continued to be defined by individual modes—with executives of
railroad, truck, bus, barge, and airline firms acting independently with little
ability or desire to cooperate.
The concept of coordinated transportation did not come naturally to
either American transportation executives or government officials. Then
TRANSPORTATION COORDINATION, 1925–1940 / 49
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again, neither railroad executives nor anyone else anticipated the declining
passenger volumes and the loss of short-haul and less-than-carload freight
traffic that followed the appearance of automobiles, commercial trucks, and
buses after 1920. At first, most railroad managers responded slowly to these
profound changes. Many carriers answered with traditional measures such
as improvements to facilities, locomotives, and rolling stock. Executives
with the Pennsylvania, Great Northern, and Virginian railroads experi-
mented with electric locomotives after 1920, while many carriers and loco-
motive builders explored diesel-powered switching locomotives.47 A hand-
ful of railroad managers, however, launched experiments with motor
vehicles, such as the bus subsidiaries noted above. Decades later, economists
described such an approach as intermodal transportation.
Traffic snarls at East Coast rail freight yards during World War I were
one factor behind the first attention by transportation managers to coordi-
nation. Specifically, the complex transport challenges at the port of New
York prompted transportation officials to examine the articulation between
ships and railroads, as well as port connections to inland waterways and
highways. Such interest in transport efficiency also took the form of a short-
lived postwar effort by a few reformers to establish a cabinet-level depart-
ment of transportation, although few in government showed any enthusi-
asm for that proposal. Similarly, leaders of the Port of New York Authority
determined to prepare a Comprehensive Plan for Transportation in New
York Harbor in the early 1920s, but this plan also found few adherents
among politicians or transport executives.48 Another early instance of plan-
ning based on transport coordination was the Regional Plan for metropoli-
tan New York, developed during the 1920s with a million-dollar grant from
the Russell Sage Foundation. The Regional Plan’s transportation section
adopted civil engineer William Wilgus’s proposal for a concentric network
of rail lines, linked by underground narrow-gauge electric railroads dis-
charging freight into combined truck and rail depots. Other elements of the
plan included highway belt lines, and major transit and waterways improve-
ments. The onset of the Depression largely ended planning for transporta-
tion around the port of New York.49
Legal coordination among transportation companies, if not complete
integration of different transportation technologies, actually had a lengthy
history. The desire to connect modes of transportation during the 1920s
motivated such developments as the Cleveland Union Terminal, which the
Van Sweringen brothers designed to connect mainline and interurban rail-
roads with local transit. In Detroit and Los Angeles during the 1920s,
elected officials developed transportation master plans that linked improved
highways and streetcars on the same right-of-way.50
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In similar fashion, railroad officials had long attempted to cooperate
among themselves in areas where antitrust legislation did not apply.51 Rate
bureaus or traffic associations were perhaps the best examples of joint
action. Using these voluntary organizations, railroad managers jointly set
rates in given geographic areas for all member carriers. These bureaus later
assumed much greater importance in the motor trucking industry after the
mid-1930s, but the railroads first developed the concept, which required
approval of ICC commissioners because of their antitrust implications. The
rate-setting process at a bureau began when a carrier announced a proposed
change; bureau officials then contacted all other railroads and affected ship-
pers. Such a process worked slowly, but provided an important communica-
tion mechanism that forestalled the main concern of many shippers at the
turn of the century—secret manipulation of rates. Rate bureaus achieved
stable rates, since good information flows removed many of the incentives
for rate cuts. Regulators and shippers deemed these benefits important
enough to accept the trade-off of slightly higher rates, since the process was
not subject to full public scrutiny.52
Against this backdrop of interfirm cooperation, several transportation
leaders began to judge the prospect of achieving enhanced coordination
among railroads, motor vehicles, and other transportation modes desirable
rather than far-fetched, despite the predominant American ethos of compe-
tition.53 In 1923, for example, leaders of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
examined the concept of coordination at the instigation of Commerce Sec-
retary Herbert Hoover, who was involved in every aspect of transportation
policy during the 1920s. G. D. Ogden, an executive of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road, later concluded that the concept of “coordinated transport” entered the
conversation of transportation executives following publication of the Cham-
ber’s report, The Relation of Highways and Motor Transport to Other Trans-
portation Agencies. Members of the blue-ribbon committee included vehicle
manufacturers and users, general manufacturers, railroad executives, barge
operators, and the press, while Emory Johnson, dean of the University of
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and another fixture within the transporta-
tion policy community, served as technical adviser and likely author of the
report. The committee acknowledged the rapid appearance of new transport
technologies and advocated coordination instead of wasteful competition,
consistent regulation of all forms of transportation, and acceptance of rail-
road use of motor vehicles to replace trains in certain situations.54
Even before the chamber’s report, however, a few railroad executives had
begun to experiment with motor vehicles.55 These tests took place in urban
areas facing special operating problems and terminal congestion. In 1922,
for example, executives of the Erie Railway first tested motor trucks for
52 / CHAPTER 2
RSB_chap2_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:28 PM  Page 52
moving freight containers into Manhattan from its New Jersey freight ter-
minals. Several carriers tried motor buses, including the Spokane, Portland,
and Seattle, which launched perhaps the first railroad-owned bus service
during 1924 on a forty-eight-mile run between Portland and Rainier. The
Great Northern followed suit in Minnesota, while the B&O bused passen-
gers from its Jersey City terminal into Manhattan via the newly opened
Holland Tunnel. In 1922, executives of the Pennsylvania Railroad designed
extended tests to compare the costs and utility of rail and motor vehicle
operations. In 1926, they reported that motor vehicles possessed superior
flexibility for short hauls of light loads and announced plans to launch a
trucking operation. After Governor Gifford Pinchot and members of the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission challenged the legality of railroad
operation of motor vehicles on routes paralleling its tracks, the railroad’s
executives could only create a motor vehicle subsidiary.56
During the mid-1920s, railroad executives moved beyond experiment-
ing with trucks and buses. By December 1925, thirty-one mainline railroads
had acquired 379 buses and fifteen operated trucks; by 1929, sixty-two
Class I railroads owned more than 1,200 buses and fifty-five had trucks.
Reflecting this growing interest, in 1926 rail executives from most of the
large carriers formed a Motor Transport organization, the same year that
editors of the Railway Age, the leading trade journal for the industry, began
to publish a regular “Motor Transport Section.” As a Railway Age editorial
noted, “It is important that no obstacle stand in the way of railway opera-
tion of motor vehicles.”57 Moreover, other forms of coordination emerged,
as the Pennsylvania launched a partnership with the Santa Fe Railroad and
Transcontinental Air Transport (TAT) in 1929 to provide combined air-rail
service that carried passengers from New York to Los Angeles in forty-eight
hours. Intrepid travelers rode the night train from New York’s Pennsylvania
Station to Columbus, Ohio, where they boarded a plane that flew to Indi-
anapolis, St. Louis, Kansas City, Wichita, and Waynoka, Oklahoma. Here
passengers rode the Santa Fe overnight to Clovis, New Mexico, before
catching a plane for the final leg into Los Angeles. In 1929, W. W. Atter-
bury, president of the Pennsylvania, announced, “We are no longer railroads
alone; we are transportation companies.”58
The primary question was whether regulators, legislators, and ordinary
shippers and passengers would accept Atterbury’s vision of coordination in
which transportation firms replaced individual truck, bus, rail, and airline
companies. Pinchot’s resistance to the Pennsylvania Railroad’s bus-and-
truck plans in 1926 indicated that those holding traditional antirailroad
views opposed such transport organizations. Similarly, congressional
debates on railroad regulation, valuation, and rate setting during the 1920s
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demonstrated that many national political leaders had not altered their view
of the railroads as dangerous monopolies. Consequently, efforts to change
public policy to reflect that new reality of multiple forms of transportation
encountered many obstacles. As early as 1922, editors of Railway Age had
predicted that, “The professional railroad baiters will probably contest a pro-
vision [to allow railroads to operate steamships] just as they would any pro-
posal to allow the railroads to engage in highway transportation on any con-
siderable scale.”59 It mattered little that Emory Johnson and other experts
reported that railroads no longer exercised monopoly power. As before, his-
tory mattered in the shaping of transportation policy.
Transportation economists, however, continued to promote transporta-
tion coordination. In 1930, G. Lloyd Wilson, another Wharton School pro-
fessor, offered what became the standard definition of transportation coor-
dination. His main point was that “each unit occupies its proper place,” as
determined by some measure of relative efficiency. Any contest between the
use of motor vehicles or railroads, contended Wilson, should be decided by
economic performance. Responding to continued concern about the sup-
posedly predatory habits of railroad executives, Wilson claimed regulatory
controls could address fears that railroads sought to drive independent bus
and truck competitors out of business. Legal restrictions on railroad owner-
ship of new, competing technologies, went the reasoning, would prevent
predatory practices.60
In the early 1930s, Wilson’s suggestion that each transportation tech-
nology, such as trucks or railroads, had its proper economic place in the
overall transport system found increasing acceptance among transportation
observers. Throughout the Depression years, many in and out of govern-
ment sought improved coordination among business firms, hoping to
achieve greater economies and boost employment. Efforts of transportation
officials and politicians comprised another part of that interest in fostering
coordination. Thus Samuel Dunn, editor of Railway Age, asked, “If we are
to have a co-ordinated system of transportation . . . are the railways or other
companies, or both, to operate carriers by highway and waterway?” Dunn
argued that railroads needed to enjoy the same unrestricted choices available
to companies engaged in water and highway transportation.61 Silas H.
Strawn, chairman of the large department store and mail-order chain
Montgomery Ward, agreed, as did Sidney Miller, one of many academic
experts who endorsed the concept of coordination. Miller added that cost
calculations should include not just operating expenses, but social consider-
ations as well. The challenge before regulatory bodies, he argued, was “to
devise an appropriate system of transportation to which each agency con-
tributes in an appropriate and prescribed manner.”62
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Others joined the growing chorus seeking a coordinated approach to
transportation regulation. In 1932, the Wharton School’s Emory Johnson
chaired another U.S. Chamber of Commerce committee whose report
urged that rail carriers be allowed to engage in water and highway trans-
port and that all transport be treated the same under federal policy.63 Also
in late 1932, a committee of truck and rail executives convened by the
National Highway Users Conference agreed in principle to the concept of
coordination. William J. Cunningham, a former railroad manager who
joined the Harvard Business School faculty in 1916 as the first James J.
Hill Professor of Transportation, shaped the committee’s report. Commit-
tee members could not agree on regulating freight rates, suggesting that
truckers and railroad managers defined coordination in different and self-
serving ways.64
Perhaps the most important advocate of coordination was Harold
Moulton of the Brookings Institution. A graduate of the University of
Chicago, Moulton earned a Ph.D. in economics for his dissertation that
argued waterways were almost always a product of politics, not rational
decision making. In 1929, he repeated that argument in his study of the
hydropower and navigation project proposed for the St. Lawrence River.
Moulton’s most important report on this theme was a review of American
transportation launched in 1932.65 He assembled a committee and shaped
the structure and content of a national study, which he presented as driven
by the concerns of institutional investors about the financial health of rail-
roads. Moulton persuaded former president Calvin Coolidge to chair the
committee, which included as members financier Bernard Baruch, former
Democratic presidential nominee Alfred E. Smith, publisher of the Atlanta
Constitution Clark Howell, and International Harvester president Alexan-
der Legge. Brookings transportation economist Charles L. Dearing assem-
bled the book-length document, which concluded that “the United States
has no unified national transportation policy.” Moreover, the committee
concluded that American transportation agencies worked “at cross pur-
poses,” adding, “instead of a unified program of regulation designed to pro-
mote a common objective, we have a series of unrelated and often antago-
nistic policies carried out by a variety of government agencies.” The
committee’s solution sounded very familiar—let those forms of transporta-
tion best suited in terms of cost do the job. Their report also pressed for an
end to government subsidies and unequal regulation.66
By 1933, in the depth of the Depression, the weight of expert opinion
favored this approach to the problems facing American transportation,
although the actual definition of coordination (intermodal firms vs. com-
mon regulation, for example) varied widely. Even ICC commissioners
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endorsed the basic concept of coordination. In 1930, they had launched a
second study of motor vehicles and federal regulation, conducting hearings
in seventeen cities. Many railroad officials pressed the ICC for specific
authority to utilize motor transport. As an editorial writer for Railway Age
summarized the testimony of an executive of the St. Louis Southwestern
Lines in 1930, “The modern railroad must offer a co-ordinated rail, bus, and
truck service.” By establishing a bus subsidiary, his line had “stopped a pas-
senger revenue leak so great that revenues threatened to reach the vanishing
point in 1933.” This official concluded that rail, bus, and truck service “must
be consolidated as one system.”67 The ICC’s attorney-examiner agreed, con-
cluding that “the national transportation machine cannot function with pro-
gressive efficiency, part regulated, part unregulated.” Railroads no longer
exercised a monopoly in transportation, he argued; indeed, shippers should
remember that they had a stake in maintaining financially healthy rail car-
riers. Many witnesses considered equal regulatory treatment essential to
achieving this end, but the ICC report concluded that legislation governing
motor vehicles need not stifle new modes of competition. The ICC exam-
iner offered no detailed answers, proposing instead a period of “wide lati-
tude for experiment, trial, and test.”68
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FIGURE 12. Harold G. Moulton, first president of
the Brookings Institution (1928–1956), was deeply
involved in transportation policy debates during
the 1920s and 1930s as an advocate of the policy of
transportation coordination. Source: The Brook-
ings Institution Archives. Used with permission.
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The economic plight of transportation firms of all types in the early
1930s added real urgency to conversations about transportation regulation
and policy. As the Depression worsened, railroads faced staggering losses.
Equally, trucking executives complained about the unfettered competition
from independent truckers—the detested “gypsy” truckers—with a single
vehicle who undercut posted prices in order to secure a load. Against this
backdrop, the venue for conversations about transportation coordination
shifted from academic publications and ICC hearing rooms to the Congress
and, increasingly, to the office of the president. For example, members of
Congress convened hearings on railroad holding companies, a tempting
arena for politicians seeking to explain to constituents the causes of the deep-
ening depression.69 During the early 1930s, congressional distrust of the rail-
roads still foreclosed consideration of genuine changes in regulatory policy.
Those members interested in transportation were preoccupied by the frame-
work and features of the Transportation Act of 1920, as seen by the pro-
longed debates over the repeal of the recapture clause (the section setting the
maximum profit a railroad could earn) and the seemingly endless valuation
project. Not even the economic disaster facing the railroads, including wide-
spread bankruptcies, could free Congress from the grip of railroad history.
Less bound by history, President Hoover carved out a greater role for the
executive branch in shaping transportation policy. He continued a pattern he
had begun as commerce secretary for Presidents Harding and Coolidge,
involving presidents in shaping the structure of American transportation.
The dire economic straits of transportation firms prompted even greater lev-
els of federal involvement, including direct assistance to rail carriers. In late
1931, Hoover pressed Congress to create the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration (RFC) primarily to stabilize railroad finances. In January 1932, the
RFC became the lender of last resort for the railroads and other industrial
corporations. By November 1934, RFC officials had loaned $512 million.70
Starting in early 1932, Hoover also supported negotiations between railroad
managers and union leaders that reduced wage rates by 10 percent for a year.
Although never passive in the face of the Depression, Hoover only modestly
extended his style of using voluntary direction from the federal government
by embracing RFC loans and negotiated wage reductions.71
President Franklin D. Roosevelt further shifted the locus of transporta-
tion discussions toward the executive branch and toward coordination. In a
campaign speech delivered in Salt Lake City in September 1932, Roosevelt
announced that railroads comprised a vital part of “our national economic
life,” and given the importance of railroad securities to banks, insurance
companies, and citizens alike, they could not be allowed to collapse. One
source of railroad distress, Roosevelt asserted, was wasteful competition
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between rail carriers that led to needless duplication of facilities. Individual
firms worked at cross-purposes, Roosevelt believed, rather than as parts of a
national transport system. As part of a program to “to do what it takes to get
things moving,” Roosevelt promised to conduct a national transportation
survey for the purpose of developing new national policies. The RFC loans
then available were only a stopgap, he noted, so Roosevelt mentioned sev-
eral possible actions. He proposed a government promise to stand behind
railroad securities, ICC regulation of competing motor carriers, simplifica-
tion of the process for abandoning railroad mileage, consolidations of rail
systems, regulation of railroad holding companies, and “a freer hand for rail-
road management and labor.”72
In the fall of 1932, “getting things moving” was a political metaphor that
applied to the entire nation and conjured up images of restored prosperity.
Rail executives reacted positively to Roosevelt’s speech, but action came
more slowly. During the remainder of the campaign, candidate Roosevelt
never returned to the subject of transportation and offered no additional
ideas for revising the regulatory regime. After his election, he held private
conversations with ICC commissioner Joseph Eastman and several railroad
executives. Roosevelt apparently promoted the idea of moving the ICC into
the Commerce Department—a pet idea he returned to several times during
the 1930s—until Eastman vigorously defended the independence of the
commission. In the end, Eastman and W. M. W. Splawn, counsel for the
House committee on interstate and foreign commerce and after 1934 an
ICC commissioner, drafted a bill that Congress passed quickly in May
1933.73
The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act was a modest proposal. It
could hardly have been otherwise. Conversations with railroad labor leaders
such as Donald Richberg, counsel for the Railway Labor Executives Asso-
ciation, and railroad presidents Carl Gray (Union Pacific), J. J. Pelley (New
Haven), and F. R. Williamson (New York Central), had highlighted for the
president the deeply rooted labor-management antagonism that compli-
cated the task of proposing any measure designed to restore profitability to
the transportation industries. The emergency bill overturned a couple of
minor elements of the Transportation Act of 1920, authorized the ICC to
regulate railroad holding companies, and, most importantly, established the
Office of the Federal Transportation Coordinator to study the transport sit-
uation and propose detailed solutions and reforms. Roosevelt’s top officials
emphasized that the coordinator was not a dictator who would possess over-
riding authority; and just as important in winning congressional approval,
railroad union leaders had secured a clause prohibiting any actions that cost
the jobs of railroad workers.74 In less than two months in office, Roosevelt
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had moved transportation policy from the domain of Congress to the
White House.
In June 1933, FDR appointed Joseph Eastman, until then his informal
adviser on rail matters, to the new post of Federal Coordinator of Trans-
portation. An ICC commissioner since 1919, Eastman had been appointed
by Woodrow Wilson after a career as a reformer involved in municipal util-
ity regulation in Boston. He was a protégé of Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis, and during the 1920s enjoyed a sometimes stormy relationship
with railroad executives and fellow ICC commissioners because of his will-
ingness to consider nationalization of the railroads. By 1933, however, the
diligent reformer from Boston had won the respect of almost all parties,
railroad executives included, and Eastman was the obvious choice for the
coordinator’s position. Eastman never entered Roosevelt’s inner circle of
advisers, however, no doubt because of his uncompromising defense of the
ICC’s independence from the chief executive.75
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FIGURE 13. Joseph B. Eastman served as a member and
leader of the Interstate Commerce Commission from 1919
to 1944. He not only served as Federal Coordinator for
Transportation from 1933 to 1936 and as director of the
Office for Defense Transportation, but was a leading advo-
cate of the policy of transportation coordination. Source:
The Collection of the University Archives, Amherst Col-
lege. Used with permission.
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Coordinator Eastman assembled a staff for three regional offices, in the
process irritating Postmaster General James Farley by failing to consult
leaders of the Democratic Party about appointments. Eastman hired several
railroad executives to study the nation’s transportation system and identify
opportunities for greater efficiency. Lacking authority to reorganize the rail-
road industry, Eastman instead emphasized his desire to accomplish coop-
eratively changes already suggested by others. As he phrased it, “[A] more
descriptive title for the position might, therefore, be Federal Co-ordinator
of Railroads and Doctor of Transportation.”76 Echoing the position of
transportation economists such as Sidney Miller, Harold Moulton, and
Emory Johnson, Eastman argued that transportation should be conceived as
a coordinated system, not as separate technologies embedded in individual
industries. “The ideal to be achieved,” he wrote, is “a transportation system
which will utilize each agency in the field for which it is best fitted and dis-
courage its use where it is uneconomical or inefficient.”77 In particular, East-
man hoped to encourage coordinated rail/truck interactions, especially at rail
terminal operations. He added “[T]his work is by no means a mere attempt
to bolster up the railroads at the expense of the trucks,” but an attempt to
develop better transportation. For the same reason, Eastman favored regula-
tion of transportation by a single federal agency as the best way to foster
coordination and avoid partisan and competitive struggles between railroads,
motor vehicles, and other forms of transport. Like the old Progressive-era
reformer that he was, Eastman believed objective cost data, not political
considerations, should determine technical choices. The echoes of Harold
Moulton’s ideas here are not surprising, for the two men were close friends
who played squash and occasionally went bird watching together.78
To coordinate an efficient transportation system based on real cost data,
Eastman relied heavily on surveys distributed to shippers, travelers, the pub-
lic, and transportation executives, earning the nickname “Questionnaire
Joe.” For instance, Eastman’s staff distributed a Merchandise Survey asking
about one hundred shippers and receivers of freight about less-than-carload
freight services and express agencies. A freight survey went to railroad offi-
cials, while additional surveys gathered data on railroad passengers and mar-
keting. Later surveys examined railroad research activities and explored the
possibility of pooling freight. Yet another questionnaire asked state regula-
tory commissioners what they were doing about motor transport regulation,
the problems they faced, and the need for federal regulation. Still others
asked for views on the pivotal issue of governmental subsidies for transport,
and on the regulation of highway transport. Altogether, from 1933 through
1936, the coordinator’s staff conducted some five thousand studies.79
Eastman’s staff made slower progress turning the mountain of data into
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policy recommendations. In his first annual report to Congress in January
1934, Eastman asked for and received a second year to prepare recommen-
dations. Eastman had learned that special protection granted railroad work-
ers in the 1933 emergency legislation created a thorny obstacle, for effi-
ciency improvements almost by definition affected the jobs of railroad
workers. Even though as an ICC commissioner he had usually supported
labor’s views on many issues (such as company unions), Eastman now
expressed occasional frustration at the active resistance to his office by union
leaders. He hoped to encourage rail managers to try new approaches, but
union leaders blocked most technical changes. In fact, railway labor leaders
sought unsuccessfully to place railroads under the jurisdiction of the
National Recovery Administration and noisily advocated a six-hour work-
day with no wage cut. Eastman supported unions where possible, but in one
private letter he contended that “Labor executives are drunk with power!”
More damaging to Eastman’s relations with labor leaders were his public
comments that shorter workweeks were the “counsel of despair.”80
By the spring of 1934, Eastman had concluded that transportation
problems grew from “a policy of encouraging an oversupply of transporta-
tion service.” Shippers might save money, but the resulting social costs were
high. Repeating a position economists had first adopted in the late 1910s,
Eastman wrote, “Unregulated competition may be quite as much of a pub-
lic evil as unregulated monopoly.” He continued to endorse coordination
and to urge uniform regulation by the ICC of all forms of transport. In May
1934, he told members of the National Association of Mutual Savings
Banks that it was time to abandon wasteful competition between railroads,
trucks, and barges. Coordinating the efforts of all forms of transportation
would “make the national railroad system more efficient and economical.”81
Historian William R. Childs observes that “numerous political causes
prevented serious consideration” of Eastman’s plans during 1934, including
resistance from railroad labor leaders and growing impatience among rail-
road executives for regulation of commercial motor vehicles. Representative
Sam Rayburn attempted to use hearings on a motor vehicle regulation bill
to set the stage for Eastman’s legislation, but leaders of the American Truck-
ing Associations attacked the bill as a trick to put truckers out of business.
Roosevelt renewed the coordinator’s appointment a second time, but East-
man offered no plans during the remainder of 1934. President Roosevelt
spoke little about transportation policy, and his occasional offhand remarks
on the possibility of nationalizing the railroads offered no help. Compared
to Hoover’s active intervention Roosevelt exhibited much less interest in
transportation, apparently content to allow Eastman time to prepare ideas
for improving transportation.82
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Eastman was, in fact, diligently building support for transportation
coordination plans that included the regulation of commercial motor vehi-
cles and water transportation by the ICC. In November 1934, a writer in
Railway Age explained, “Mr. Eastman has added to and perfected his legisla-
tive program and in numerous public addresses he had done much to pave
the way for a sympathetic consideration of the program for co-ordinated
regulation of all forms of transportation.”83 Finally, in his 1935 state of the
union address, Roosevelt mentioned permanent transportation regulation,
and Eastman sent the president nine bills that proposed extensive alter-
ations in the regulation and organization of American transportation. The
most important measures extended federal regulation to commercial motor
vehicles and water transportation, reorganized the ICC (an issue that the
commissioners themselves had grappled with since the 1920 legislation),
established a permanent transportation coordinator, provided benefits to
employees affected by changes in the railroads, and altered federal trans-
portation subsidies. Eastman rejected the idea of creating a Department of
Transportation, falling back on an old Progressive reformers’ argument.
“Transportation is essentially a technical subject and should be dealt with
accordingly. It is vital that it be kept out of politics, so far as possible.”84
In February 1935, the president transmitted Eastman’s legislative pro-
gram to Congress, where it quickly ran into opposition. Individual repre-
sentatives and senators singled out many items for criticism, including a
clause allowing railroads to charge less for long hauls than for short trips
(the old long haul/short haul bugaboo). In mid-April 1935, members of the
Senate interstate commerce committee voted to send to the entire Senate
Eastman’s proposal to regulate commercial motor vehicle rates and routes,
but only after Eastman and others persuaded Senator Burton K. Wheeler
that the bill was not a railroad plot to weaken motor competitors. As before,
the deep-seated distrust of railroads had snagged plans for this pivotal fea-
ture of transportation coordination. In response, Eastman had scaled back
his vision of coordination from the original goal of genuine intermodal
cooperation. Instead, he accepted language that directed ICC regulators to
“recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each” mode of trans-
portation. With this clause in place, motor vehicle regulation passed the
Senate easily, but the bill took longer to work its way through the House.
Not until August 9, 1935, could President Roosevelt sign into law the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935.
Commentators at the time gave Eastman substantial credit for the bill’s
passage, although historian Childs concludes that the American Trucking
Associations’ acceptance of regulation and significant role in working for the
bill was as important.85 The principle of coordination appeared most promi-
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nently in the decision to place regulatory authority over both railroads and
commercial motor vehicles in the hands of ICC commissioners. Even so,
inclusion of the clause directing the ICC to protect different forms of trans-
portation reflected the lobbying efforts of the truckers, as well as the prac-
tical limits of the principle of transportation coordination.
If the Motor Carrier Act had fallen short of Eastman’s original goals, he
still hoped that passage of the remaining bills would advance the purpose of
creating a coordinated transportation system. For that reason, Eastman
urged Congress to consider the most important bills as a package. In the end,
however, members of Congress passed only one other proposal drafted by
Eastman—a bill on railroad reorganization that simplified cumbersome rail-
road receiverships. The president himself may have damaged prospects for
the other bills by not sending a message of support to Congress until five
months after his state of the union address. Without Roosevelt’s specific
arguments about the merits of the bills, supporters of alternatives to East-
man’s plans and vision took advantage of the void in the debate. At Senate
committee hearings on water transportation, for example, supporters of
inland waterways offered testimony full of traditional antirailroad vitriol.
And Eastman’s ICC colleagues opposed the coordinator’s plan to reorganize
the commission. In the end, Eastman failed to overcome the opposition to
his package of legislation. By the mid-1930s, not even a modest level of pres-
idential leadership could bring harmony to the realm of transportation.86
Coordinator Eastman sought additional time to continue working for
the package of bills, but President Roosevelt denied the opportunity to him.
By mid-1935, support for Eastman had waned among railroad executives
and railroad labor leaders alike. The following year, Roosevelt chose not to
reappoint Eastman as Federal Coordinator for Transportation, allowing
him to return to the ICC. The move marked a diminishing commitment
by the administration to the guiding principle of coordination. Even
though the federal government financed highways and waterways, and
already regulated railroads, Roosevelt succumbed to the orthodox convic-
tion that trains, trucks, barges, and airplanes were independent industries
rather than interconnected parts of a coordinated and unified transporta-
tion system.87
The Unraveling of Transportation Coordination
No sooner had President Roosevelt endorsed regulation of trucking by the
ICC in his 1935 state of the union address than he began to favor inde-
pendent regulation of airlines. Like many such changes, this shift in
Roosevelt’s position had its origins in another government committee, this
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one operating outside Eastman’s direct charge.88 In the wake of the airmail
scandal of 1933–34, the president had appointed Clark Howell, editor of the
Atlanta Constitution, to chair a committee to investigate aviation policy. As
had Eastman’s staff, members of Howell’s aviation committee gathered exten-
sive information, traveled widely in the United States and Europe, and in the
end issued a report at almost the same time as Eastman. The aviation report
in effect challenged the core principle of Eastman’s plans for coordination, for
Howell’s primary recommendation was to establish an independent Civil
Aeronautics Commission to oversee aviation regulation. The aviation com-
mittee explicitly rejected assigning such duties to the ICC, claiming the ICC
was too busy and too inclined to compare airlines to railroads. Only after air-
lines rested on a sound financial footing, members of the group asserted,
could aviation be integrated into the larger transportation system.89
Chairman Howell expressed surprise when Roosevelt initially rejected
the aviation report’s proposal of an independent regulatory agency.
Although he forwarded the report to Congress, the president echoed East-
man’s views, adding, “We should avoid the multiplication of separate regu-
latory agencies in the field of transportation.”90 This stance led the primary
Senate booster of aviation, Patrick A. “Pat” McCarran, to introduce a bill
assigning aviation regulation to the ICC. At hearings in July 1935, Eastman
testified in support, but officials from the Post Office and Commerce
Department long responsible for aviation policy opposed the bill. In turn,
McCarran amended the committee’s version to include a separate aviation
commission. The modified bill stalled in committee.
With Roosevelt’s cabinet officials in obvious disagreement about the
virtues of a single regulatory agency for transportation, administration sup-
port for coordination soon faded. An important signal was the president’s
decision not to fight the mounting opposition to continuing Joseph East-
man as Federal Coordinator of Transportation. In spite of Eastman’s efforts
on their behalf, reports historian Ellis W. Hawley, railroad managers lost
enthusiasm for Eastman and his energetic office when the emergency con-
ditions of 1933 began to ease. Moreover, the formation of the Association
of American Railroads in 1934 provided the industry with its own coordi-
nating mechanism, and rail executives increasingly viewed the coordinator’s
office as an intrusion upon managerial rights. Once union leaders secured
job security provisions from the railroads, ironically negotiated by Eastman,
they also abandoned support for the coordinator’s office. Additionally, East-
man’s unwillingness to bend the ICC or his office to the president’s will was
a final factor in Roosevelt’s decision in June 1936 to send Eastman back to
the ICC as a regular commissioner. Finally, Hawley determined that Roo-
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sevelt’s decision reflected the general ambivalence of many Americans to
national planning during the New Deal.91
Without Eastman, coordination had no champion within the adminis-
tration, and advocates of separate modes increasingly dominated the policy
deliberations. Thus in 1936, the president signed the Merchant Marine Act
that created an independent agency to govern coastal and ocean shipping.92
The real litmus test of Roosevelt’s commitment to transportation coordina-
tion and regulation by a single agency came in the area of aviation policy. In
1937, congressional debate over aviation regulation and federal support
resumed. Members of both houses considered a flurry of proposals that dif-
fered mainly in where they located regulatory authority for the young air-
line companies, with the ICC or in an independent commission. At the out-
set, the leading congressional figures on transportation, Senator Pat
McCarran and Representative Clarence F. Lea, favored a bill originally pre-
pared by Eastman and members of the Air Transport Association and
endorsed by the president that would have given the ICC regulatory over-
sight for aviation. Kenneth D. McKellar, the powerful senator from Ten-
nessee, however, advocated an independent regulatory agency, but debates
were inconclusive. With commercial airlines still struggling financially,
Roosevelt decided to create an Interdepartmental Committee on Aviation
Policy to draft a new administration bill. The committee included assistant
secretaries from the U.S. Post Office, the Commerce, State, Treasury, and
War Departments, and the ICC.93 A key figure was the director of the Com-
merce Department’s Bureau of Air Commerce, Fred Fagg, who persuaded
the committee to support an independent regulatory agency for aviation.
FDR still preferred regulating airlines through the ICC, but according to the
author of one account, his son persuaded him to accept the new bill. Another
account credited Fagg with persuading Roosevelt to change his mind, while
a third has it that the president was simply weary of this issue. It may have
helped that the new bill directed the president to appoint not only the
members of this Civil Aeronautics Authority, but also the chair, in effect
giving the president greater control over the new agency than he had over
the ICC, where commissioners elected their own chair. Whatever the pre-
cise circumstances, in January 1938 the president called Senator McCarran
to the White House for a discussion of an independent regulatory agency
for aviation. By May, members of the House and Senate had passed similar
bills along that line, and differences were resolved in a conference commit-
tee. On June 23, 1938, the president signed the McCarran-Lea Civil Aero-
nautics Act.94
Clearly, the formation of the Civil Aeronautics Authority undermined
fundamentally the vision of coordinated transportation supported by Eastman
TRANSPORTATION COORDINATION, 1925–1940 / 65
RSB_chap2_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:29 PM  Page 65
and academic economists such as the Brooking Institution’s Harold Moul-
ton. Pat McCarran later noted that his bill rejected coordination on the
grounds that an agency devoted solely to aviation would bring “wholesome,
progressive regulation” that better served the industry and the nation. East-
man’s plan of regulating air from the ICC was undone by the claim that a
Civil Aeronautics Authority could develop “a more intimate touch and
knowledge of the needs” of aviation.95
The passage of the final transportation policy measure of the 1930s—
the Transportation Act of 1940—confirmed that lawmakers, regulators, and
transportation executives had stepped back from their earlier support for the
concept of coordination as the foundation on which to build American
transportation policy. Yet in another way, approval of the Transportation Act
of 1940 proved to be a significant departure from previous efforts to enact
transportation legislation, mainly because of President Roosevelt’s extensive
involvement in its development. A shift in the locus of authority was under-
way, one in which the president emerged as an equal to the members of
Congress in shaping transportation legislation. Perhaps accidentally, in
December 1937 Roosevelt launched the push for major transportation leg-
islation at a press conference. A reporter, prompted by a meeting between
Roosevelt and banker Jesse Jones, who chaired the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, asked about problems facing the railroads. Roosevelt at first
deflected the query by asserting that the ICC was responsible for railroads,
adding that he had no plans to reinstate the coordinator. Then Roosevelt
noted that while government ownership was not an option, the railroads
could not operate forever under receivership. They were not earning enough
to pay for their capitalization, they suffered from unnecessary duplication of
facilities, and they confronted “competition for the sake of competition.”
Where traffic now moved by highway, suggested the president, it made
sense to consolidate rail carriers and allow abandonments of unprofitable
lines. Federal subsidies to railroads were not the answer, Roosevelt observed;
such a development would persuade leaders of every other troubled indus-
try to seek federal assistance.96
When the recession of 1937 dragged into the next year, the president
could no longer avoid the problems facing the nation’s transportation firms,
especially the beleaguered railroads. As another sign of his increasing
engagement with efforts to structure American transportation, during 1938,
President Roosevelt directed members of two different advisory committees
to develop proposals for a national transportation policy. In mid-March,
Roosevelt assembled the first committee, a blue-ribbon group of distin-
guished individuals from government and industry, at the White House to
discuss the troubled situation of the nation’s railroads. The debate, lively at
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times, extended over the course of three days. Banker Henry Bruere, for
example, told committee members that they failed to appreciate the depth
of the crisis; he advocated direct federal action, not more studies. Future
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, then an attorney at the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission, proposed an $800 million rehabilitation
plan, with funds distributed to those railroads by a three-person examining
board appointed to insure development of a sound, coordinated transport
system.97
Following this lengthy discussion, Roosevelt asked three members of the
full committee (ICC chairman W. M. Splawn, Eastman, and ICC financial
expert Charles Mahafie) to turn the deliberations into a report containing
“complete, definite, and factual recommendations for immediate action by
Congress in regard to the whole railroad situation, which is critical.” Roo-
sevelt gave the three men a week to produce the report, prompting hasty
meetings with railway executives and shippers. Splawn reviewed the com-
mittee’s progress directly with the president. Jesse Jones, who had partici-
pated in the initial conference, commented, “There has to be a correction of
the competitive situation—not only between railroads, but between all trans-
port agencies.” Private industry, Jones had concluded, could not make the
necessary adjustments on its own. The so-called Splawn committee’s sixty-
page report adopted a similar position. Members proposed immediate relief
for the railroads, perhaps in the form of a $300 million loan for railroad
equipment purchases. They recommended ending government discounts for
shipping on railroads—so-called land-grant rates—and proposed reducing
railroad wages, as in 1932. For the long term, the committee proposed the
appointment of a Federal Transportation Authority, whose three members
could recommend steps aimed at eliminating wasteful competition, includ-
ing consolidation. The committee also recommended that Congress finally
repeal the 1920 requirement that the ICC shape railroad consolidations, and
instead allow the ICC to approve any consolidation deemed to be in the pub-
lic interest. Finally, Splawn’s committee called for investigations of the rela-
tive economy of trucks, buses, and water carriers in order to restrict destruc-
tive competition and to learn the extent of government subsidies. The report
proposed additional studies to focus on railroad financial abuses. All told, the
committee’s prescriptions resembled ideas that Eastman had started to
develop in 1933, so much so that some observers judged the proposed three-
person board a substitute for the abandoned coordinator’s office. Eastman’s
legacy of support for coordination was most apparent in the suggestion con-
cerning “[t]he desirability of subjecting all important forms of transportation
to equal and impartial regulation by a single agency of the government.” On
April 11, Roosevelt sent the report and a draft bill to Congress.98
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By April 1938, however, the administration’s commitment to this core
element in transportation coordination—regulation within one agency—
was wavering. First, members of Congress and the administration were
already shaping civil aeronautics legislation resting upon independent regu-
lation. Equally, other parties to the transportation debates now voiced objec-
tions to transportation policy resting on coordination—or at least to its
implementation. George Harrison, a railway union leader, contended that
railroad employees wanted nothing more to do with coordinators, although
they would not oppose a three-person board with a limited mandate. Har-
rison favored legislation to guarantee the operating income of rail carriers.
Expressing disappointment in what he called overly cautious measures, Sec-
retary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. advocated formation of a fed-
eral department of transportation with immediate authority to order coor-
dination.
President Roosevelt himself proceeded indecisively. In mid-April, edi-
tors of Railway Age complained that, “The President [had] dumped the rail-
road problem and his gleaning thereon into the lap of Congress with a ‘do-
with-these-as-thou-will’ message.” Indeed, Roosevelt offered guidance to
Congress on only three issues—he opposed government ownership; rejected
direct subsidies to the railroads; and claimed (dubiously) that the ICC’s
“purely” executive powers were unconstitutional. This last point renewed
FDR’s long-standing effort to reign in independent agencies, but in June
1938 Congress adjourned without acting on the president’s report.99
Beginning later that year, Roosevelt undertook a more direct role in
preparing transportation legislation. In September 1938, he convened a sec-
ond, smaller advisory committee labeled the Committee of Six to distin-
guish this group from the earlier Splawn committee. Composed of three
railroad executives and three railway labor leaders, members of the Com-
mittee of Six worked in surprising harmony. In December, all six men unan-
imously presented recommendations to the president that reflected a much
narrower view of the transportation problem. Joseph Eastman later observed
that the Committee of Six had emphasized competitive conditions facing
the railroads, while the Splawn committee had considered the internal effi-
ciency of all carriers. The two reports had many similarities, including calls
for ICC regulation of waterway transportation, repeal of the 1920 consoli-
dation clause, an end to land-grant freight rates, and several ideas about
short-term aid to rail carriers. The Committee of Six report differed pri-
marily in asking for a statement of national transportation policy and a
clause giving the ICC final authority over the rates charged by all providers
of interstate transportation.100 Like many federal transportation reports
before and for decades to come, the Committee of Six document sought
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improvements in the financial conditions of the nation’s rail carriers.
Intriguingly, committee members embraced a core idea of supporters of
transportation coordination who hoped to strengthen the railroads—cen-
tralize regulatory authority over all types of transportation firms in one
agency.
Because of the president’s continued involvement, the Committee of Six
report provided the initial basis for congressional action on transportation
in 1939.101 In the Senate, Burton Wheeler, who had been so critical of the
Van Sweringens earlier in the decade and skeptical of Eastman’s plans in
1935, prepared a package of legislation, relying heavily upon the Commit-
tee of Six document. In January 1939, members of the House interstate
commerce committee held hearings on an Omnibus Transportation Bill
that chairperson Clarence Lea assembled by combining elements from the
reports submitted by both presidential committees. Senate hearings began
after the House committee finished work in April. The usual transportation
leaders testified at both hearings, voicing predictable concerns couched in
familiar terms. Waterways supporters from midwestern and Great Plains
farm states stridently charged that the ICC would never regulate inland
water transportation fairly. With equal urgency, railroad executives
demanded such regulation. Air transport officials opposed a provision
returning authority to set air rates to the ICC and found several senators
who agreed. Eastman appeared on behalf of his fellow ICC commissioners,
testifying that none of them favored a reorganization of the commission.
For at least fifteen years, such divergent opinion usually had stymied
efforts to adjust the nation’s transportation policy. Now, however, President
Roosevelt’s consistent participation made a noticeable difference in the
development and passage of legislation. Not only had Senator Wheeler and
Representative Lea developed bills using the recommendations of the pres-
ident’s two advisory committees, each also reported that Roosevelt had
directly requested and supported their efforts. Once hearings began, the
president invited the chairpersons and members of those committees to
meet at the White House at least three times during the spring of 1939.
These expressions of presidential interest may have helped both houses of
Congress pass transportation bills—the Senate in May and the House in
July. Members of Congress had amended both measures significantly, yet
they retained basic similarities. The rhetoric of transportation coordination
seemed to influence the assignment of regulatory authority, for both mea-
sures directed the ICC to regulate water transportation. In addition, both
bills created three-person study boards to examine various transportation
problems. The two measures repealed the old consolidation plan called for
by the Transportation Act of 1920, and proposed yet another study of
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freight rates; both opened with a statement of national transportation pol-
icy. The conference committee had many specific details to reconcile, but
members of Congress adjourned in late 1939 before completing their work.
When Congress reconvened in January 1940, transportation problems
seemed overshadowed by the war in Europe. With Joseph Eastman press-
ing the conference committee to complete its work, the conferees at first
made reasonable progress. Then several typical congressional difficulties
delayed final action on the transportation bills. First came the release of a
letter from Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.Wallace, Secretary of War
Harry Woodring, and Chairman Emory S. Land of the U.S. Maritime
Commission, announcing their opposition to ICC regulation of waterways.
Unlike the practice adopted in later presidential administrations, Roosevelt’s
appointees still publicly exercised independent judgment. This situation
forced Roosevelt to intervene quickly, and he used a press conference to
undo the damage by making clear his support for anointing the ICC as the
single transportation regulatory agency. Next a handful of representatives
criticized House conference committee members for abandoning several
elements of the House’s original legislation. Disgruntled members won a
vote to recommit the bill to the conference committee, throwing the
prospect of passage into question. Finally, a disagreement regarding the
operation of freight forwarders (also known as consolidators) threatened to
disrupt the bill’s progress through Congress. Forwarders served as shipping
middlemen, accepting small batches of packages which they consolidated
into larger lots for shipment. These agencies made their profit by charging
more than the railroads for carload shipments, but less than shippers would
have paid the railroads directly at less-than-carload rates. Developing poli-
cies that applied to the operations of freight forwarders proved enormously
contentious. Carriers and regulators were not always happy about the exis-
tence of the forwarders, but many shippers enjoyed these services, which
definitely operated at a crack in the ICC rate regulatory structure. Indeed,
questions about freight forwarders remained an object of constant and
intense lobbying and litigation into the 1970s. Not surprisingly, in 1940,
members of Congress could not resolve this complicated issue and adopted
instead the temporary expedient of creating another commission to study
this issue along with the equally divisive question of the extent and impact
of government subsidies for transportation.102 With these issues set aside, in
August Congress passed the Transportation Act of 1940 and Roosevelt
signed the bill into law.103
This newest transportation legislation contained only one substantial
innovation—placement of regulatory control of water transportation under
the ICC. ICC commissioners now regulated rail, truck, and water transport,
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apparently accomplishing one of Eastman’s primary aims as coordinator. A
number of observers, including members of the Committee of Six, judged
the preamble of the act at least as significant as unification of regulation
under the ICC. This preamble stated that Congress “declared to be the
national transportation policy” that all forms of transportation shall be fairly
and impartially regulated “to the end of developing, coordinating, and pre-
serving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail. . . .”
This language also seemed to represent a victory for Eastman and others,
including many economists who had long supported transportation coordi-
nation. In fact, the Transportation Act of 1940 ended attempts for five
decades to define coordination as one of the aims of American transporta-
tion regulation.
When the rhetoric is stripped away, this legislation offered only lip-
service to the concept of transportation coordination. Thus included in the
bill was language similar to that in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, which
required ICC regulators to “recognize and preserve the inherent advantages
of each” form of transportation. That this mandate was repeated in 1940 in
regard to water carriers affirmed an approach to regulation incompatible
with genuine coordination, by which the actions of the commissioners, not
economic efficiency or some other form of expert judgment, decided the
fate of each form of transportation. Thus after 1935, ICC officials devel-
oped a Motor Carrier Bureau that soon became a largely autonomous office
regulating trucking without regard for the railroads or any other form of
transportation. After 1940, ICC regulation of water transportation
unfolded in a similar fashion. In other words, regulators and legislators, as
well as truckers, barge operators, and airline executives, still envisioned the
technology they operated as defining separate industries, or modes. The
idea that these technologies formed potentially complementary forms of
transportation gave way to the weight of railroad history, more traditional
images of competition, and the weight and momentum of business and
political leaders’ increasing interest in fostering development of indepen-
dent (as opposed to integrated) transportation industries.
Ironically, however, this style of regulation defined by separate modes
did not operate reciprocally for the railroads. ICC staffers and commission-
ers eventually interpreted the clause requiring attention to the “inherent
advantages” of each mode differently when it came to the railroads. Since
the mid-1920s and in the absence of specific prohibitions from the ICC
commissioners, railroad executives had developed motor vehicle divisions or
wholly owned subsidiary firms. Many transportation economists endorsed
such steps and urged regulators to allow rail carriers such latitude. Railroad-
owned truck and bus subsidiaries expanded steadily through the late 1930s,
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and Brookings Institution economist Harold Moulton continued to argue
that effective coordination meant corporate managers should be allowed to
choose which “mode” delivered the most efficient transportation service.
The new law did not prohibit outright the development of motor vehicle
enterprises by railroad corporations, as some in the Senate had proposed in
1930.104 Even so, after 1940 ICC commissioners steadily restricted railroad
utilization or ownership of motor vehicles in commercial service. Eventually
they denied rail carriers permission to acquire existing bus and trucking
companies, a major blow since this was often the only way to acquire the
certificates of convenience and necessity that were the basic requirement for
operating regulated transportation services. First come, first served, pre-
vailed here, and many railroads were blocked by the slowness with which
they had recognized the utility of motor vehicles in the early 1920s.105 Con-
sistently, ICC commissioners ruled against railroad operation of motor
vehicles in competition with independent operators already in business.
These rulings effectively foreclosed not only the possibility of intermodal
transportation firms, but eventually the operation of motor vehicle sub-
sidiaries by railroads. As economist Emory Johnson observed in 1947, the
1940 legislation kept “railroad participation in motor transportation, and the
co-ordination of rail and motor transportation, within narrow limits.”106
Ultimately, the continuation and reinforcement of the separation of
transportation into modes was the primary accomplishment of New Deal
administrators during the Depression era. Despite extended discussion of an
integrated conception of transportation by experts such as Eastman, Moul-
ton, and Johnson, the legislative efforts of the 1930s failed to embrace reg-
ulatory coordination, much less operational cooperation. Officials of the
new Civil Aeronautics Administration showed no interest in the railroads,
its founders having won the battle to remove the ICC from aviation policy-
making. The Motor Carrier Act also circumscribed the activities of rail-
roads, and especially their motor vehicle subsidiaries. The authors of the
1940 legislation thus ended for decades any possibility of transforming rail-
roads into full-scale transportation companies. Transportation coordination
survived largely as a rhetorical exercise that took the form of the bill’s pre-
amble. In reality, the traditional political calculus of one mode at a time
remained firmly in place after 1940. The strength of the standard view of
transportation modes was quite evident whenever the politically charged
subject of transportation subsidies arose. For example, many executives in
various transport industries criticized Eastman’s last report as coordinator, a
four-volume study on “Public Aids to Transportation” released between
1938 to 1940, for suggesting that subsidies were not only deeply rooted in
transportation, but served to skew transportation economics. The nation’s
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policies in transportation had caught up to the transportation innovations
such as long-distance trucking that had disrupted transportation policy set
in place in 1920, but coordinated federal actions on highways, airways, and
waterways were not part of the adjusted regulatory regime. Put another way,
federal policy rested on a preference for distinct transportation industries
and distinct transport markets rather than the ideal of cooperation and
coordination.107
The Transportation Act of 1940 also marked the final rejection of the
Progressive-era emphasis on neutral expert authority in the realm of trans-
portation policy. In the years between the wars, experts had proposed two
conceptual foundations to guide American transportation policy—railroad
consolidation and transportation coordination. Backed by academic trans-
portation economists of note, each idea attracted substantial support within
the transportation community for a time, as ways of addressing serious dif-
ficulties facing the nation’s transportation system. Harvard’s William Rip-
ley and the Wharton School’s Emory Johnson, among others, conceived of
consolidation of the nation’s rail carriers into a smaller number of larger
regional firms as the policy solution for the 1920s. During the 1930s, John-
son along with the Brookings Institution’s Harold Moulton, Harvard’s
William Cunningham, and the ICC’s own Joseph Eastman promoted a
unified transportation—and regulatory—system that encompassed multi-
ple modes of service, a conception of transport not necessarily defined by
single-technology industries or firms. Both approaches rested on the
assumption that railroads no longer exercised a monopoly over transporta-
tion and that regulation should address the unhealthy structure of competi-
tion between rail carriers, or between railroads and buses, trucks, and inland
waterways. By 1940, however, both seemingly neutral expert policy visions
lost out to a combination of older visions of predatory railroad behavior and
now-traditional political considerations in which leaders of interest groups
such as truckers, airline executives, and barge operators and their political
allies such as Senator McCarran worried about themselves alone.108 Writing
decades later, transportation economist James C. Nelson argued that the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and the Transportation Act of 1940 demon-
strated that “economics was largely disregarded by the congress and the
ICC.”109 Despite substantial and intimate involvement in the policy process,
Eastman, President Roosevelt, and transportation economists failed to
reshape the basic structure of American transportation between 1920 and
1940. Rather than redefining the foundations of transportation policy, the
legislation adopted during the 1930s served instead to reify the positions of
the four main and independent modes of transportation delivered via rails,
roads, air, and inland waterways.
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By 1940, the segmentation of transportation activities into distinct
truck, bus, air, and waterway industries had been granted the weight and
authority of the government of the United States. Moreover, operators of
barges, airlines, and commercial motor vehicles had joined rail executives,
shippers, labor leaders, and regulators as participants in the legislative scene.
In fact, transportation executives in each area had determined it better to
gain official standing as a mode and official protection of rates and routes,
even if it meant accepting federal regulation as part of the bargain. For many
transport executives, federal regulation also included the likelihood of a nur-
turing state prepared to spend lavishly on waterways, roads, and air service.
Unlike transportation policy in earlier decades, however, American pres-
idents during the interwar years had taken a direct hand in framing indus-
tries and markets. In 1922, Warren Harding had almost apologized when he
had entered transportation policy debates. Herbert Hoover’s involvement in
a range of transportation issues as Commerce Secretary and then as presi-
dent marked the beginning of greater levels of engagement. Hoover
nonetheless had remained one step removed from railroad policy except for
the formation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Although the
pattern was far from consistent, Franklin Roosevelt was the first president
who sought to mold transportation policy in detail. While Roosevelt often
exhibited only limited intervention during Joseph Eastman’s tenure as fed-
eral transportation coordinator to recast the structure of transportation dur-
ing the mid-1930s, he played a much more direct and active role in the pas-
sage of the act of 1940 than earlier presidents had taken in transportation
legislation. Through such devices as the formation of advisory committees,
contact with congressional committee chairs, press conferences in which he
detailed aspects of his proposals for the press, Roosevelt presided over the
movement of key transportation legislation through Congress. He had
launched a fundamental shift in the locus of authority over transportation
policy.110
Between 1920 and the 1940s, then, federal officials, including the pres-
ident of the United States, had determined to regulate waterways, airways,
and trucks and buses as distinct entities separate from railroads, each with
their own sets of regulators, interested congressional committees, and self-
centered professional and lobbying groups like the energetic American
Trucking Associations. Now there were four main modes of transportation,
known popularly as transportation industries. After 1945, members of each
of these industries emerged as full-blown actors on the political scene. By
that point, no one, including the truckers or any of the others, wanted to
remember their own births at the hands of the state. Nor did they wish to
be reminded that, as economist Nelson observed in 1987, transportation
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markets as well as transportation industries were distinctly and solely polit-
ical creatures.
Over the next three decades and more, the basic policy features of the
Transportation Act of 1940 remained relatively unchanged, even as the spe-
cific policies for individual modes changed enormously. World War II
proved to be only a temporary interlude in which railroads were restored for
a time to positions of dominance within the American transportation sys-
tem because of the demands of war. Joseph Eastman actually came close to
realizing elements of his policy of coordination as he once again directed the
nation’s transportation systems as director of Defense Transportation from
1941 until his death in 1944. Once the war ended, however, concern for the
coordination of railroads, motor carriers, and inland waterways again faded
from the scene.111 Up to the 1970s, the politics of transportation in the
United States focused around the efforts of leaders in sharply defined rail,
truck, and airline industries to defend and expand the boundaries created
for them by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, and theTransportation Act of 1940. At the same time, every president
of the United States beginning with Dwight D. Eisenhower and conclud-
ing with Jimmy Carter sought to bring about deregulation of transportation
prices and services. Following a chapter on airline politics after World War
II, we turn to the unceasing efforts of leaders of rail and truck corporations
starting in the mid-1950s to protect and expand their prerogatives. In this
struggle, all assumed, lobbying and litigating would deliver what a politi-
cally constructed marketplace could not. Thereafter, we turn to the politics
of presidential deregulation.
Curiously, the cold war exempted the airline industry from the daily give
and take of transportation politics. For three decades following World War
II, members of no transportation industry prospered more under federal
tutelage than leaders of the nation’s certificated airline firms. With soon-
storied names such as Trans World Airlines and Pan American World Air-
ways capturing popular and political imaginations, officials at the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated airline rates and routes, simultaneously
protecting these firms from competition at the hands of upstarts such as
nonscheduled carriers. At the same time, however, CAB officials also
induced executives of the great firms such as American Airlines to lower
fares, fostering creation of a “mass” market for air travel. By the early 1970s,
with popular consumerism reaching a high point, the clamor among politi-
cians was for still-cheaper fares. Once a protected industry structured largely
by politicians and immune from earlier deregulatory efforts, by the mid-
1970s even the airlines political mentors were demanding deregulation.
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DURING THE THREE DECADES following the end of World War II, feder-
al officials yoked the airline industry to national defense. It was essential,
contended members of the U.S. Congress and every president of the United
States, for the nation to maintain a substantial fleet of airliners capable of
ferrying troops and other passengers to trouble spots around the world.
Commercial airlines, all judged, occupied a pivotal position in planning for
the nation’s defense. Airline executives as well as their regulators functioned
within this larger policy objective, which did not dissipate until the conclu-
sion of the Vietnam War. Up to that point, the crises of the airline industry
comprised another phase of the many crises of the cold war era.1
Starting in 1938, when Congress and President Roosevelt approved the
Civil Aeronautics Act, federal officials regulated and promoted aviation sep-
arately from truck, rail, and waterways transportation. Officials at the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) also protected routes from competitors and
determined the rates charged by “certificated” airlines; doing so, it was
thought, protected America. In their well-secured position, policy contro-
versies such as the effort by federal officials during the mid-1950s to bring
about limited deregulation of trucking and railroading did not touch execu-
tives of the airline carriers such as United and Eastern Airlines. In the mid-
1960s, when President Lyndon B. Johnson and members of his senior staff
planned transportation deregulation alongside efforts to create a department
of transportation, airlines still held positions of indispensability that kept
them outside the purview of would-be deregulators. As the glamorous child
of war and cold war, airlines occupied a privileged position in federal policy
and in the imaginations of politicians, regulators, and ordinary Americans.
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Constructing Commercial Aviation,
1944–1973
In the [postwar] regulatory environment . . . there was no room for
nonscheduled carriers.
—Historian Roger D. Launius, 2000
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Beginning in the early 1970s, however, air travel and the airlines lost part of
their luster. In turn, political leaders chose airlines as the first target for
deregulation.
Officials of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board fostered the growing pop-
ularity of air travel. Soon after World War II, CAB officials such as James
M. Landis approved development of inexpensive service by nonscheduled
airlines. A decade later, during the early days of the “jet” age, another group
of officials at the board aggressively pursued popularization of air travel with
rules about lower fares and more competition, even when leaders of a reluc-
tant industry objected—until 1969, when recession struck. By the late 1960s,
many Americans were flying on “cheap” fares and had grown accustomed to
the prospect of additional fare “discounts.” After 1970, politicians and pop-
ular writers increasingly judged airlines as simply another transportation
business, like the railroads and trucking, whose prices appeared unreasonably
high. In addition, political and business leaders began to emphasize the idea
of fighting economic decline by eliminating regulation. By that point, few
remembered (or cared) that federal officials had sought to develop air travel
as an industry servicing a “mass” market. From beginning to end, the Amer-
ican airline industry was a child of an American state that promoted national
defense, a consumer society, and a growing economy.
Perfection of Entry Control: The Aviation
Oligopoly, 1944–1958
In 1938, at the insistence of hard-pressed airline executives, Congress had
enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act, which created the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA). Members of Congress had rejected the vision of
Joseph Eastman and other transportation experts that airlines were simply
another form of transportation that the ICC should oversee. Instead,
Congress treated aviation as a unique form of transport requiring special
attention. CAA officials regulated airlines without regard to railroad and
trucking firms or their passengers and freight. Under this legislation, more-
over, the CAA controlled air navigation and the pricing of airline services.
Equally important, only the CAA could authorize an airline company to
carry passengers through the award of a certificate of convenience and
necessity. In the language of the regulatory regime, airlines holding those
permits were said to be “certificated.” At the outset, such certificates were
granted to only sixteen airlines. In 1942, as a wartime measure, the Civil
Aeronautics Board was split off from the CAA. Appointed by the presi-
dent, members of the new CAB still controlled the prices airlines charged,
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the number of certificated airlines, and the routes they flew.2 In a nation
rhetorically committed to price and service competition, federal officials
and their counterparts in the executive offices of the nation’s airlines had
called an oligopoly into existence.
Airline executives and their well-to-do customers shared the fruits of
oligopoly. Between 1945 and 1957, airline service developed mostly (but not
entirely) as an elite institution. Airline executives modeled their service
along lines offered first-class patrons on the nation’s best railroads. Between
1949 and the latter 1950s, passengers wealthy enough to fly on a Boeing-
377 Stratocruiser (based on the C-97 Stratofreighter and the B-29 Super-
fortress, both aircraft built for the Army Air Corps during World War II)
descended a spiral staircase from the upper to the lower deck, which
included a beverage lounge seating up to fourteen persons. In this era,
almost all passengers were businessmen (family travel, though much pro-
moted, took off only in the mid-1950s). After 1949, certificated airlines
launched coach service; until 1953, however, coach passengers always flew
on all-coach aircraft. Only rarely did first-class passengers encounter their
lowly fellow travelers. Instead, first-class ticket holders ate meals from china
plates with silverware and linen napkins. Airline publicists added to the
glamour of air travel with images of luxury, modernity, and pampering for
the special few.3
Regardless of equipment and images, however, officials of the Civil
Aeronautics Board mostly protected air carriers from the vicissitudes of
price and service competition. After the war, as before, those same sixteen
“certificated” airlines still carried most of the passengers. Even on major
routes such as New York to Chicago, moreover, passengers rarely had more
than two or three carriers from which to choose—and their choices almost
always included American Airlines, United Airlines, Eastern Airlines, Delta
Airlines, or TWA. Airlines flew current or former “airmail routes” (complete
with federal subsidy until 1954). Airline executives could fly new routes only
after securing a “certificate of convenience and necessity” from the CAB, a
difficult task. On certificated lines, passengers completed 12 million trips in
1946 and 45 million in 1957. As early as 1951, however, economist Lucile
Sheppard Keyes had pointed out that entry foreclosure (a CAB rule that
prohibited other airline firms from serving main routes) served as the key-
stone of federal aviation policy.4
Between 1940 and 1948, airline officials had latitude to experiment with
expanded service. As World War II ended and the cold war began, many in
the industry felt free—or even obligated—to indulge in extravagant expan-
sion dreams. These dreams found expression in equipment purchases. By
1947, however, airlines were foundering. During the first sixteen months
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after the war, executives of the certificated carriers spent more than $235
million on new planes and equipment, but lost $4,340,000 in 1946 and well
over $20 million in 1947. CAB chair James Landis blamed a “spirit of spec-
ulation.” Certificated airlines blamed everything else. With the single
exception of Eastern, certificated carriers could not survive in the 1940s
without the “air-mail subsidy.”5
Airline officials bewailed most loudly competition from unregulated
carriers, known popularly as nonscheduled airlines and more idiomatically
as the “nonskeds.” (Technically, CAB officials characterized these nonskeds
as Large Irregular Carriers, or LICs.) Never able to join the Air Transport
Association of America (ATAA), a trade association composed of the six-
teen certificated carriers, executives of the nonskeds formed their own trade
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FIGURE 14. James M. Landis, dean of the Harvard University Law
School, served during 1946–47 as chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board,
creating regulations that fostered the first steps in converting the indus-
try from service for a comparative few to a “mass” transportation.
Source: Art & Visual Materials, Special Collections Department, Har-
vard Law School Library. Used with permission.
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association. Within a few years of war’s end, regulation had fostered creation
of an “in” and an “out” group in airline transportation. Writing in 2000, his-
torian Roger D. Launius characterized exclusion of the nonskeds from the
meetings of the Air Transport Association of America as “a subtle form of
aviation apartheid that permeated the minds of those in control of commer-
cial aviation . . . during the first two decades following World War II.”6
A “loophole” in the 1938 act had permitted entry for nonscheduled air-
lines (by exempting from regulation “unscheduled” flights). During World
War II, GIs learned to fly and, after the war, the government began to sell
off planes. According to an estimate made by CAB officials, before 1949,
some 3,600 airline firms started or announced operations. Few actually flew
passengers, and far fewer survived any period of time. In 1951, the nonskeds’
best year, Korean War military contracts helped them boost their market
share to 7.5 percent of air passengers and 21 percent of air freight. With
war-surplus planes and ex-GI pilots, owners and managers of nonsked air-
lines exploited markets the certificated airlines largely ignored, including
coach service and air freight, and made inroads into both regional markets
and profitable transcontinental service.7
Wary of a flood of postwar “GI carriers” that would imperil the certifi-
cated carriers, CAB officials tried to niche the nonskeds where they would
have least impact. Remembering the financial chaos air carriers had experi-
enced during the early 1930s, in May 1946, the board issued a ruling that
required full reports of nonscheduled carrier activities and submission of
minimum rates. As part of these new rules, CAB officials attempted to
restrict the nonskeds to ten or fewer trips per month between any two points.
Irregular service, the board wrote, was “that which neither directly nor indi-
rectly leads the public to believe that between given points a reasonably cer-
tain number of flights . . . may be anticipated.” This CAB dictum would
eventually prove to be a death sentence for the nonskeds. The standard DC-
3 aircraft, purchased in large numbers by scheduled and nonscheduled air-
lines alike, was too costly to be kept ready for service and yet used only a few
times a month. “In the [postwar] regulatory environment . . . ,” reports histo-
rian Launius, “there was no room for nonscheduled carriers.”8
Former GIs and other entrepreneurs were not so easily discouraged. In
1946, these ex-military pilots claimed an organization five thousand strong.
During those heady days, leaders among the nonskeds even explored poten-
tial collaborations with executives of ocean shipping interests and the Amer-
ican Trucking Associations. (Not subject to rules of certificated carriers that
kept them apart from other types of transportation, nonsked executives once
again raised the promise and threat of creating transportation companies.)
By autumn 1946, CAA Act coauthor Senator Pat McCarran was denounc-
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ing restrictions on nonscheduled carriers as contrary to the intent of Con-
gress.9 The image of the daring GI pilot was of great value in the early polit-
ical battles surrounding nonsked air carriers, just as it had been for Charles
A.Lindbergh and others during the 1920s.
Enthusiastic veterans had not established the major nonsked carriers.
The president of Transair, one of the early giants, was a banker and railroad
director who had served in the war as special assistant to Army Air Corps
General Henry (“Hap”) Arnold. Yet another nonsked, the all-cargo Slick
Airways, was founded when twenty-five-year-old Earl F. Slick, heir to an
oil fortune, bought seventeen C-46s in a fifteen-minute transaction in mid-
1945; his airline prospered.10 Nonskeds also had powerful political allies.
Until 1947, the administration of President Harry S. Truman did little to
discourage them.
In 1947, however, the certificated airlines such as United and American
Airlines suffered large financial losses. Lobbyists for the Air Transport
Association, the trade association of the certificated carriers, blamed CAB
chair Landis, and continued to do so long after President Truman declined
to renew his appointment that December. With his professed interest in
unsubsidized competition, Landis had irritated and frightened executives of
the certificated carriers.11
During the late 1940s, however, CAB officials were still willing to
entertain applications for additional service submitted by cargo operators.
In July 1949, the CAB granted five-year certificates to executives of four
cargo carriers, permitting them to carry freight among points linking four
territorial clusters. The authorization, said the CAB, was “primarily promo-
tional in character and relates to developmental rather than to purely regu-
latory processes.” These authorizations represented the CAB’s first and final
flirtation with permissive entry, one urged by defense department officials
to expand the reserve fleet.12
At the same time, CAB officials launched a process of shutting down
the nonscheduled passenger carriers. After August 6, 1948, the CAB
accepted no new applications for exemption from the rule against passenger
flights by noncertificated carriers. On May 20, 1949, past exemptions were
effectively revoked. Now, CAB rules required nonsked operators to apply
for certificates of convenience and necessity and to become “certificated.” In
mid-1951, moreover, the Civil Aeronautics Authority began applying strict
new safety rules to nonscheduled carriers. That autumn, CAB officials
denied a final set of “new” applications made by transcontinental coach
operators.13 With their often-dismal safety records, including accidents
bunched together at Newark Airport, safety was one reason to shut down
the nonskeds.
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CAB officials also wanted to rescue certificated carriers from their own
postwar extravagance and simultaneously to rationalize the airline indus-
try—arguments first advanced during the 1920s and 1930s. In 1950, non-
scheduled carriers ranked fifth in passenger-mile production, and captured
a significant share of the long-haul market. “By the early 1950s,” reports one
scholar, “approximately 63 so-called large irregulars routinely transported
passengers, some of them duplicating air-line routes at drastically reduced
fares.” In the CAB system that prevailed between 1945 and 1978, however,
long-haul runs granted to major carriers were expected to “cross-subsidize”
unprofitable short trips imposed on the same carriers. So the nonscheduled
“cream skimmers” had to go. As part of their emphasis on rationalization of
carrier services, CAB officials also pressured certificate holders to merge
complementary route systems—an idea that Congress and the ICC had
attempted to impose on railroads during the 1920s. At the same time, the
CAB asked carriers to expand coach service.14 Thus, in the airline business,
government again appeared as both patron and quasi-manager—reprising
in some respects the apparently discredited industry-stabilization efforts of
Postmaster General Brown twenty years earlier.
Entry foreclosure was not accomplished easily. Several nonskeds had
built impressive records. In California, where long distances and major cities
made unregulated intrastate service practical, nonskeds like California Cen-
tral showed up regulated service by offering Los Angeles–San Francisco
rates half those of the certificated carriers. Executives of the nonskeds such
as S. J. Solomon of Atlantic Airlines also produced innovations such as pas-
senger luggage carry-ons in 1946.15 In the consumerist decade of the 1970s,
low fares offered by California- and Texas-only airlines served as a key argu-
ment for deregulation.
Although they shook up airline business practices with their innovations
during the 1950s, the nonskeds also engaged in self-destructive behavior,
especially with regard to safety. Pilot and flight-attendant experience varied
widely and maintenance was sometimes marginal. In the winter of
1951–1952, four crashes in rapid succession near Newark Airport caused
the temporary closing of that facility. Although two crashes involved certifi-
cated craft, “nonskeds” received much of the public blame. President Tru-
man quickly created an Airport Commission under James H. “Jimmy”
Doolittle. During World War II, Doolittle, who was awarded the Congres-
sional Medal of Honor, had served as a bomber pilot and then as comman-
der of the Eighth Air Force during the period of the Normandy invasion.
Doolittle and members of his commission effectively sealed off debate and
contained the public outcry over airport safety.16
Truman also demanded a final drive against the nonskeds. In January
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1952, he wrote CAB chair Donald Nyrop: “I’d like very much to have some
concrete action . . . more for the safety and for saving lives than for any other
reason.” In April 1952, the CAB and CAA together imposed new safety
rules on the remaining uncertificated carriers, requiring them to meet the
operational standards of certificated lines.17 By the time Truman left office,
courts had given the CAB all the power it needed to end the nonscheduled
experiment. Yet Landis and his successors had hesitated.
Like Roosevelt and Truman, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his
senior administrators continued to treat commercial aviation as an industry
apart from other transportation industries. In 1953, its first year, the Eisen-
hower administration created the President’s Advisory Committee on Gov-
ernment Organization (PACGO), headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller—a
“liberal Republican” and former adviser to Truman. The PACGO recom-
mended presidential appointment of the ICC chair and centralization of
the ICC’s administrative (but not regulatory) functions—ideas earlier
voiced by Franklin Roosevelt. But members of the PACGO did not address
aviation. Neither did Eisenhower’s commerce secretary, Sinclair Weeks,
who headed a drive during 1955–1956 to deregulate railroads and trucks.
As had been true in transport policy debates in the 1930s, aviation was a
separate matter. In this case, aviation was left to members of the Air Coor-
dinating Committee, Eisenhower’s continuation of a Truman-era body.
During 1953 and 1954, members of this committee merely froze in place
the policies developed in the 1951–1952 crackdown on nonscheduled air
carriers.18 Throughout the 1940–1958 period, commercial aviation
remained part of the foundation of America’s defense. Only members of the
executive branch of government could act effectively on air policy, and even
they could act only where the demands of new jet technology and the needs
of defense and commerce intersected.
The Early Jet Age and the Debacle of Regulation,
1958–1971
The arrival of commercial jets challenged traditional concepts of airline
economics. Using “old style” thinking, airlines continued to purchase pro-
peller-driven planes until 1956, shortly before placing their first jet orders.
Fast “write-off,” encouraged by the Office of Defense Mobilization with
the aim of keeping the Civil Air Reserve fleet at a desired minimum of six
hundred aircraft, enabled this rapid construction and then destruction of
millions of tons of aluminum and steel. Another reason for rapid equipment
turnover was airline competition on the basis of minimal differences in
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speed. Finally, in October 1955, Juan T. Trippe’s Pan American World
Airways broke the prop-or-jet equipment logjam with an order for twenty
Boeing 707s and twenty-five Douglas DC-8 jetliners. The new planes were
157 percent faster than the fastest long-range nonjet; in coach configura-
tion, they carried 147 percent as many passengers. Transcontinental air-
times were expected to fall by at least 40 percent and—an implicit recogni-
tion of the meaning of this massive new capacity—virtually all jetliners were
ordered with mixed first-class and coach seating, a layout first used with
propeller-driven planes only in 1955.19 Jets could complete three trips for
every two made by a DC-7, carrying 363 persons in the time the fastest
“prop plane” moved 204. “Overcapacity” inevitably returned with the jet
age.
Once airline officials put their first jets into service, operational effi-
ciency improved. The first jets were a “wonder.” Once everyone had jets,
however, they offered no competitive advantage—only increasing efficiency.
Introduction of subsequent generations of jets put additional pressure on
airline executives to keep up with competitors. In the year 2000, a thirty-
five-year-old DC-9 was still a viable (if not very attractive) aircraft, but the
idea of a major airline competing in 1970 with planes constructed in 1935—
essentially DC-2s—was absurd on the face of it. During the 1960s, entire
fleets were scrapped or sold within five to fifteen years of purchase. And
then came “jumbo jets.” Never again would capital pressures of such enor-
mity be exerted on the aviation industry—and all of this pressure took place
in a period of rapidly rising consumer militancy, cynicism, and growing dis-
trust of protective regulation. Airlines’ preparation for the jet age in the
1950s necessarily focused on finance, facilities, and technology: it did noth-
ing to ready the airlines for the rapid transition of their industry from elite
to mass transportation. Short of cash, “front-end” financing was a problem
in the early jet age. American Airlines, with one of the industry’s most
advantageous cash positions, bought its first twenty jets with a loan that
would mature in 1996.20
Meanwhile, airline executives and their regulators faced more immedi-
ate questions—business questions. In summer 1958, Harvard economist
Paul W. Cherrington reported to the White House that the CAB’s target
profit rate of 8 to 9.5 percent appeared far too low to attract the necessary
investment. And the situation worsened. Between 1955–1958, a drive by
CAB officials for regulated competition generated more service and lower
profits. In 1954, 60 percent of the nation’s top four hundred airline markets
were served by only one airline; by 1958, competition existed in 87 percent
of them. Three or four airlines competed in the top dozen nonstop mar-
kets—more than in 2003 following twenty-five years of deregulation.21 Air-
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line executives entered the jet age prepared for some of the technological
challenges of 500-mile-per-hour aircraft; for their economic consequences,
however, they were scarcely prepared at all. In the meantime, CAB officials
pressed airline executives to broaden markets and introduce a degree of
price competition.
The jet transformed air transport. Starting in 1958, the sale of coach
seats zoomed. As early as 1960, coach seating accounted for more than 50
percent of scheduled airline capacity. Equally evident by 1960, commercial
aviation faced real, not imagined, overcapacity and capital crunches. In
1955, debt service consumed one-tenth of 1 percent of certificated carriers’
revenues; in 1960, 2.5 cents per dollar went to debt service. Profits collapsed
from a 9.4 percent return on investment in 1956 to 2.9 percent in 1960—a
profit margin similar to that which would terrify railroad executives in the
1950s. Members of the aviation community also (mistakenly) came to
believe that perennial rounds of reequipment were inevitable.22 Less visible
but still determinative amid all the buzz surrounding profit margins and
exciting jet aircraft were members of the Civil Aeronautics Board and their
decisions regarding routes, subsidies, and fares.
In 1960, CAB members reacted to jet-induced overcapacity by applying
a utility-like “rate of return” criterion, seeking to maintain the desired return
by pressuring airlines to adjust supply to demand. The rate specified was
10.5 percent for the “big four” (American, Eastern, TWA, and United), and
11.25 percent for the remaining eight “trunkline” carriers. Under this for-
mula, as the transition to jets drove debt to record highs, fare increases of 10
percent (1958) and then, in 1960, 5 percent were implemented.23
The “jet age” intersected with a new CAB drive for more competition in
airline service. Between 1961–1969, CAB officials tried to lower fares and
broaden the air travel market, and do so over airline protests that the mar-
ket had a natural limit. Under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson, CAB chairs Alan S. Boyd and, later, Charles S. Murphy led the
market-broadening movement. Crucially, the CAB’s democratizing role
was not evident to the public. CAB procedures were cumbersome and
resulted in ever-longer rate-case delays.24 The market-broadening, fare-
shrinking policies of the 1960s CAB anticipated the demands of the con-
sumer movement a decade later. Although these policies earned the agency
little public credit, they set a norm that led consumer advocates to react
strongly when CAB commissioners returned to a protective mode in the
early 1970s.
Simultaneously, CAB commissioners under Kennedy and Johnson
moved to abolish direct subsidies. For big airlines, subsidies declined from
6.2 percent of revenue in 1950 to 0.1 percent in 1965. Even for local service
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carriers, subsidies dropped from 49.9 percent of revenue in 1959 to 6.5 per-
cent in 1970. Airlines responded to these disappearing subsidies and to
overcapacity with authentic price and service competition.25 Indeed, in “real
dollars”—measured against inflation—airfares declined. In current
(1960–1969) dollars, fares rose by 12.8 percent between January 1960 and
September 1969, with 4.3 percent of this increase in 1969. Meanwhile, the
consumer price index rose by 21.4 percent. Real fares could fall because of
jet productivity: between 1960 and 1968, airlines’ net savings (productivity
savings minus labor, fuel, equipment, and other operations cost increases)
totaled $1.5 billion, with $215 million in savings in 1968 alone.26
Throughout this period, CAB officials pressed for more coach service
and lower fares to broaden the market. In 1961, President Kennedy had
appointed CAB member and longtime state regulator Alan Boyd as CAB
chair. Boyd worked to expand the air travel market within the framework of
regulation. He encouraged youth standby and other promotional fares and a
range of market expansion and (arguably) price-lowering ploys. In these
actions, Boyd’s CAB followed—or paralleled—the work of Kennedy’s pres-
idential task force on aviation goals (“Project Horizon”), which issued its
first report on June 27, 1961. Also in keeping with this report, Boyd urged
marketing of air travel to the 90 percent of the U.S. population who, in
1960, had never flown.27
With few exceptions, however, airline executives held that air travel was
not price-elastic. Coach and special discount fares, airline managers contin-
ued to argue, merely diverted traffic—six airline presidents told Boyd as
much in October 1961. But major airlines filed the first youth standby fares
and major coach reductions, and only a few refused to join the fracas.28 As
in the postderegulation days a generation later, a fare reduction by one line
meant a reduction by all. The jet had introduced a level of overcapacity that
challenged the cold war ideal of stability, just as nonskeds and overoptimistic
trunkline route expansions had challenged that ideal after World War II.
Then there was Continental Airlines, whose practices haunted the
industry until the end of regulation. As historian Michael H. Gorn notes,
Continental began with just the sort of route system major airlines found
unprofitable in the1930s, when earnings had come from airmail subsidies
and long-haul runs. Continental first flew between Colorado Springs and
El Paso. In the jet age, President Robert F. Six made a major success of this
unlikely airline. Continental’s compact, regional route system permitted an
early version of “hub” scheduling: Continental executives kept their aircraft
aloft almost two more hours per day than the industry average and econo-
mized on everything but service frills. In the autumn of 1961, Continental’s
managers flew in the face of “overcapacity” by applying to offer
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Chicago–Los Angeles service with bottom prices 25 percent below others’
regular coach rates. Continental carried just 3 percent of scheduled airline
traffic in 1960, but fare competition was real, and had to be met where it
arose.29
Yet airline executives often failed to appreciate the vast changes in air-
line pricing and use that both CAB officials and executives like Robert Six
were introducing. In the early 1960s, the airlines’ own “scientific marketing”
studies “showed” that airline travel was linked to the general economy (and
thus to the fate of the cold war boom), and was not directly competitive with
the automobile. Most major airline executives still agreed with United’s
William A. Patterson, who contended that air travel was “naturally” first-
class travel. Coach as well as discount fares, Patterson contended, simply
diverted traffic.30
Pressured by the CAB and by occasional bouts of real price competition,
throughout the 1960s airfares trended downward. Airlines filed “excursion”
fares for long-haul flights, seasonal cuts, and shuttle rates in a variety of
markets. By 1970, nearly half of all coach passengers traveled at a discount,
and bargain fares accounted for up to 44.8 percent of all revenue air-
passenger miles. As Boyd pointed out, when the CAB resisted lower fares,
it was combating a chaotic rate structure—de facto price deregulation—not
market expansion: “We are not seeking stability of fares,” he advised in early
1964, “[we simply want to keep] the chaos under control.” 31
Jet economics had made profits possible with a smaller proportion of
seats filled than in the piston-engine era. Still, airline officials realized that
in the long run, they needed to fill most of the seats they flew. Between 1962
and 1968, they raced to do this, while insisting that low fares and promo-
tions did not increase ridership. In the amazing mid-1960s, airlines profited
while fares and load factors fell. Despite what airline executives asserted,
they acted as though the market was elastic. In turn, airline passengers
became accustomed to the fare gimmicks and began to take these special
fares as a matter of course when thinking of air travel.
In 1962, airline executives knew that, within two years, a second wave of
jets would cause capacity to increase again. Douglas DC-9s and Boeing
727s would replace almost all piston and turboprop aircraft, creating new
efficiencies—and a new seat surplus. But immediate prosperity blinded all.
Trunk airline earnings averaged over 10 percent in 1964, and moved higher
in 1965. CAB chair Boyd warned early that year that, should earnings con-
tinue above the “appropriate” level established by a 1956–1960 investigation
conducted by the CAB [GPFI-1960], “we would have to take some action.”
The board recommended a range of special fares and simple fare cuts that
made sense only in terms of a price-sensitive market.32
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Airline officials responded to Boyd’s jawboning, and airline traffic rose
14 percent in 1964 and 1965. This boom gave weak carriers access to credit,
and raised profits—and hopes. Eastern Airlines rejoined the ranks of signif-
icantly profitable carriers, and TWA paid its first stock dividend since
1936.33 Intensified competition reflected the CAB’s goals for the 1960s—
that more persons could fly more frequently at more affordable prices. In
July 1965, Boyd left the CAB to join the Department of Commerce, where
he worked with President Johnson’s top officials to create a new cabinet-
level Department of Transportation.
Charles S. Murphy, another advocate of lower fares and market expan-
sion, succeeded Boyd. More fare cuts ensued as the CAB acted on its Gen-
eral Passenger Fare Investigation (1960), which suggested a “reasonable
profit” figure of 10.5 percent. Studies conducted by the CAB, much dis-
puted by economists working for the airlines, suggested that still lower fares
would expand the air travel market.34 This crucial position was thus staked
out by regulators themselves, well before the deregulation drive that started
in the 1970s.
Airlines complied with CAB directives via a range of what National Air-
lines’ president Louis B. Maytag called “gimmick” fares. In December 1965,
American and then United inaugurated the “youth standby fares” that
would bedevil the industry for five years. By 1966, youth, “Discover Amer-
ica,” and other standby and advance-purchase fares were everywhere, and
full-fare coach passengers made up just over half of all coach travelers.
“Gimmicks” were the airlines’ preferred response to CAB calls for general
fare cuts—at least a traditional fare structure remained alongside the many
special fares.35 By 1967, however, reequipment costs and wage and price
inflation had begun, and the air travel boom was about to end.
The Debacle of Regulation, 1967–1971
By 1971, airline prosperity was but a memory. Although the market for air
travel had greatly expanded, the companies in existence were the same old
set, operating under a version of the same old rules. During the early 1970s,
moreover, when airlines raised fares, charter carriers reemerged as the con-
sumer’s friend. Much of this period’s chaos developed in arenas where the
airlines had real choices. The airlines’ equipment-purchase and labor-con-
tract decisions during the golden years of 1966 and 1967 had led them by
the 1970s to behavior that consumer-oriented politicians and journalists
increasingly judged absurd.
As before, new equipment promised both greater savings and greater
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capacity. From 1958 to 1963, piston-engine planes were replaced on long
flights by large, four-engine craft like the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8.
Between 1964 and 1973, two- and three-engine DC-9s and Boeing 727s
and 737s displaced the remaining propeller-driven planes on flights under
one thousand miles. Such planes added capacity through speed as well as
size. Then, in mid-April 1966, Juan Trippe’s Pan American contracted for
twenty-five Boeing 747 aircraft, each capable of carrying 490 passengers
and priced at just under $20,000,000. Even in 1966, some competitors fore-
saw a dangerous equipment race (the 747 was defined as a luxury craft, not
a producer of economies of scale). Critics had long urged that “overcapac-
ity” arose largely from management error, not competition.36 Forced by
competitive pressures, airline managers had purchased airplanes that pro-
vided more “seats” than could be sold. Once the premier international air-
line had opted for the 747, the others (Northwest and TWA) had to do the
same. Both carriers had many domestic routes, leading to another equip-
ment race involving every major airline.
For a time, new aircraft created new inefficiencies. Both wide-body craft
(like the European Airbus, the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10, and the Lock-
heed 1011), and the earlier, narrow-body craft (specifically the Boeing 737)
relied for their attraction on lower seat-mile costs. Airline executives
expected such planes to usher in another era of rising productivity. New air-
craft, however, entered a scheduling and planning world left over from the
pre-jet age. Before 1968, airline officials had quite literally worked out
schedules and equipment purchases and allocations with pencil and paper.37
In this context, faster and larger aircraft only added to expenses, not to
income. In fact, both airline and CAB officials had introduced overequip-
ment and route duplication—classic noneconomic forms of competition.
The CAB did nothing to discourage massive equipment orders. (For exam-
ple, in 1968 alone, 474 new aircraft were delivered to scheduled airlines.)
Between July 1966 and the end of 1970, the CAB also awarded 241 new
“route segments.” Existing carriers won all these routes. Although the CAB
had not awarded certificates to additional carriers, it had met its own aim of
creating more competition.38 Only a continuing aviation boom could have
justified airlines flying more routes with larger planes.
In order to keep flying during the boom of the mid-1960s, airline offi-
cials also accepted costly labor agreements. In summer 1966, five major air-
lines ended prolonged negotiations with the International Association of
Machinists (IAM), representing mechanics and some other ground crew
workers. The affected airlines together supplied over 60 percent of domes-
tic passenger service; thus, their settlement set the pattern for the industry.
Fully alert to the “wage-price spiral,” IAM officials called for a one-way
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inflation escalator clause. After five months of negotiations, nothing could
persuade the IAM or its members to give up the escalator clause. The union
struck the five airlines, imperiling not only the summer travel season but
also Lyndon Johnson’s war effort in Vietnam.39
IAM workers settled for a 4.9 percent raise, with a cost-of-living adjust-
ment provision that would force raises to meet expected inflation. The agree-
ment did not permit wage cuts if the cost of living fell. Over three years, the
base wage increase was 6.76 percent. Between 1962–1966, the overall urban
cost-of-living increase amounted to 6.6 percent; and it would rise another 7
percent over the life of the contract (1966 through 1969). Thus the contract’s
one-way cost-of-living provision was a time bomb that would subject airlines
to major wage increases in the later 1960s and (by contract extensions) the
early 1970s—at a time when business fell and overcapacity and fuel costs
peaked. The 1966 settlement’s real impact hit as the contracts expired in the
midst of early 1970s inflation and recession. Labor costs increased 15 percent
between 1968 and 1970—substantially faster than capacity or employment.
After declining to 42.6 percent of total costs in 1963, labor costs resumed
their piston-age proportion (about 46 percent of all costs) by 1970.40
After 1966, CAB officials moved slowly back toward protection. Air-
lines pressed for and, by the end of 1967, received increases in “excursion
fares.” By 1970, many airlines were losing money. Losses proved especially
devastating for large, railroad-like carriers such as United and TWA, whose
routes were mostly located outside the newly developing South and West.
CAB officials were also strikingly ineffective in “selling” protection of large
airlines in an era of consumerism that idealized “small” entrepreneurial busi-
nesses. Executives such as George Spater at American Airlines reacted to
spreading pools of red ink with service innovations such as piano bars,
including crooners. In 1971, moreover, airline officials made the same plea
voiced by railroad executives, seeking rate freedom via a “zone of reason-
ableness” in fares. They failed to use the power when they got it. But the
major theme of 1968–1971 was a regulatory system that increasingly
appeared “anticonsumer” in a period of rising public expectations and a
foundering economy.41
Indeed, outdated airline ideas of competition exacerbated the situation.
Faced with losses, airlines scheduled more flights to steal each others’ pas-
sengers. Regulated carriers’ domestic passenger miles flown rose 15.9 per-
cent from 1967 to 1968, but capacity grew nearly 25 percent. By 1969, the
four largest lines’ load factors fell to 49.4 percent from 53 percent the pre-
ceding year—before the arrival of jumbo jets. In 1970, only three midsized
regional carriers (Northwest, Continental, and Delta) reported a profit.42 In
battling recession and overcapacity, old tools did not work.
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Airlines saturated long, dense routes with service. In early 1971, Amer-
ican, United, and TWA offered thirty-five one-way flights per day between
New York and San Francisco; fewer than in 1970. Yet jumbo jets had
increased the number of seats by 38 percent. During 1970, major airlines
offered 153 one-way flights each day between New York and Chicago.
Among the few areas of discretion available to airline managers under terms
of CAB regulations, however, overcapacity and the purchase of still more
equipment were built into the thinking of airline executives.43
“Amenities” competition in this period also reached a zenith. Battle-
grounds included seat width, fold-down “middle” seats that created tables or
“a seat and a half,” five-across seating in coach, and floor-level carry-on bag-
gage compartments for last-minute check-ins. Food, too, was a point of
competition; exotic and expensive cuisines were featured. In 1971, Ameri-
can Airlines introduced a “Coach Lounge,” which was basically a stand-up
bar. In all, airline executives continued to “sell” service elements that had lit-
tle to do with transportation. None of these efforts did more than shift pas-
sengers from one line to another. Nor could amenities competition reduce
airline costs, which between 1967 and 1970 rose faster than consumer
prices—8.6 percent faster in 1970 alone. Meanwhile, real gross national
product growth slowed to a mere 2.4 percent. In this context, the plea of air-
lines executives for a fare hike produced two unintended results.44
The first result was a study by CAB staff published in 1968 showing
that fares in competitive markets were “frequently lower” than fares in
uncontested markets. This report coincided with an onslaught of congres-
sional consumerism. California representative John E. Moss and nineteen
of his colleagues in the U.S. House opposed any airfare increase, demand-
ing better service as a condition of higher fares. For the first time, airline
consumer issues had moved into the political arena.45
As a second consequence, the CAB report also provided a telling argu-
ment against fare increases. Authors noted that “a fare level set well above
cost, based on a reasonable load factor, may contribute to the operation of
excessive capacity . . . [and] long haul jet coach fares are quite high in rela-
tion to cost of service even at the relatively low load factors prevailing.”46 If
high-priced, long-haul fares encouraged overcapacity, which created a need
for higher fares, airlines had a difficult case to make for fare hikes.
In the summer of 1969, airline officials filed for a round of fare
increases. The new chair of the CAB, Secor Browne, inherited the down-
side of the 1961–1968 CAB legacy of cutting fares. An MIT aerospace
engineering professor who believed airline profitability should be high on
the CAB priority list, Browne came to the CAB from the new Department
of Transportation, where he had served as assistant secretary since March
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1969. On September 12, 1969, the CAB approved a major fare increase,
with the largest increases applying to shorter hauls. The new fare schedule
immediately made Browne the focus of Congressman Moss’s outrage.47
Opposition from Moss, followed shortly by that of consumer advocate
Ralph Nader, then at peak popularity, presented CAB officials with a truly
serious problem.
Supported eventually by thirty-one House members, Representative
Moss argued that fares should be directly related to cost of service, and that
minimum load-factor standards should be imposed as a test of any fare
increase. Echoing the opponents of the railroad’s “value of service” rates dur-
ing the 1920s, Moss took his case to court. The District of Columbia fed-
eral district court overruled the CAB on procedural grounds and rolled back
airfares. During the hearings, however, Ralph Nader joined the battle, call-
ing the CAB a “shill for the airlines.” Regulation’s credibility had begun to
dissolve.48
CAB officials reacted belatedly and clumsily to the rise of consumerism.
Early in 1972, the board created a “Consumer Advisory Commission” and
announced an attack on overbooking, a process by which airlines sold more
tickets than seats, figuring that many passengers would fail to appear. Core
consumer concerns, however, were price and service; and on both fronts, the
CAB did not—and indeed could not—meet the expectations of early 1970s’
consumerism. CAB opposition to wide coach seats and five-across seating
inevitably seemed “anticonsumer.” So did CAB efforts to limit charter
flights (a drive that led to a congressional investigation of the agency).When
the board ended Discover America, youth standby, and family fares, its
action could easily be interpreted by members of the 1970s generation as a
revocation of consumer entitlements.49
While the airline industry passed through its most severe crisis since the
1930s, the CAB conducted a new “Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation.”
This study covered almost all aspects of regulation from general fare levels
and fare structure through depreciation, valuation, and return. Meanwhile,
in 1970, domestic scheduled passenger traffic actually declined at the same
time that capacity continued to increase, and certificated airlines lost
$168,700,000. The industry was capitalized at roughly $5.5 billion. At the
beginning of 1970, however, outstanding contracts for flight equipment
totaled $4.7 billion.50
Seemingly oblivious to consumerism in their panic over rising levels of
debt and massive losses, airline executives sought remedies in measures sure
to alienate politicians and ordinary Americans even more. By 1970, it was
clear to airline officials that the CAB would act to link fare increases to cost
of service and load factors. Perhaps in order to meet anticipated CAB fare
hike criteria, in late August 1970, executives of American, United, and
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TWA agreed, without CAB authorization, to cut capacity on fifteen routes
they largely controlled.51 By 1972, CAB officials had approved these “capac-
ity control agreements.” Thus again the board might seem to exist only to
support greedy airlines.
In early 1971, airline officials urged their own version of “deregulation.”
Leaders of the Air Transport Association of America, the industry’s trade
association, sought legislation removing the power of the CAB to suspend
rates except in extraordinary circumstances. Although disagreements were
evident within the airline community, a solid front was expected at Senate
hearings in February. “Some of the most vital decisions affecting the air-
lines’ economic health are beyond the control of airline management,”
ATAA president Stuart G. Tipton told the Senate Commerce Aviation
Subcommittee on February 2.52
Tipton and a parade of airline presidents recounted the usual ATAA
terror tale. Like railroad managers complaining about bus lines, or trucking
firms lamenting “gypsy” truckers in the early 1930s, airline executives com-
plained that supplemental air carriers were a major cause of regulated carri-
ers’ losses. Equally, ran the argument of airline officials, second-generation
jet purchases would cost $5.9 billion in 1970–1972 alone. Sounding like a
railroad executive from the 1920s, Tipton asked for legislation to prevent
CAB suspension of any rate that would result in returns under the 10.5 per-
cent recommended by the CAB’s “General Passenger Fare Investigation,”
issued in 1960. He also asked for restrictions on airline labor’s right to
strike, tougher restrictions on charter carriers, and an assortment of other
measures. For the most part, members of President Richard M. Nixon’s
administration backed the ATAA.53 Everything the airlines and their regu-
lators said and did appeared contrary to the image of consumer-friendly
expansion and fare cutting.
As in the 1960s, Continental Airlines and its president, Robert Six,
helped nail shut the coffin lid on airline regulation as a public good. Repre-
senting perennially profitable Continental, Six told the story the public
wanted to hear. “Most of the statements being made about the ills [of ] the
industry,” he told members of a Senate committee, “go beyond gloom. They
approach hysteria.” The “real worry,” Six contended, was that government
might adopt some of the measures advocated by frightened carriers. Merg-
ers and capacity controls, for example, could demolish the good effects of
competition. Even the sickest carriers might profit if they used their aircraft
as efficiently as Continental and employed fewer persons. There was no
need for less competition. The press delighted in Six’s remarks, as industry
leaders cringed.54
Robert Six and Continental Airlines did not bring about airline dereg-
ulation. Indeed, the argument that transcontinental systems could easily be
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made profitable was not self-evidently true. With certain other carriers, like
Pacific Southwest (PSA) and Delta, that challenged the ATAA’s conven-
tional wisdom, however, Continental became a symbol for what could be
achieved with more efficient management and more entrepreneurial out-
looks. In retrospect, Six’s remarks highlighted the poor timing of the
ATAA’s initiative.55
In 1971, Congress produced nothing new. CAB officials issued a series
of rulings that upheld most of their own traditions, yet offered one remark-
able new opportunity for the survival of regulation. First, the CAB fol-
lowed the advice of officials at the new Department of Transportation
(DOT) and voted to set load-factor standards to be met by any carrier
seeking a fare increase. The CAB endorsed DOT’s conclusion (also drawn
in its own 1968 study) that “the higher the fare level in relation to cost, the
more capacity carriers will offer.” The board now required an overall 52.5
percent load factor of any carrier seeking the increase granted in the same
proceeding, while future increases would require load factors ranging up to
55 percent. The CAB’s standard was a rough average of trunk airline load
factors in the middle 1960s.56 CAB officials thus put in place a policy that
encouraged more crowded aircraft just as consumer expectations and organ-
ization were on the rise.
Critically, the CAB action placed part of the fare-making process in the
carriers’ hands. After lengthy discussion of market elasticity, the board ten-
tatively accepted American Airlines’ proposal that fare levels be stated as
maximums. Despite its concern that fares would sink to the lowest eco-
nomic level, since “a carrier generally cannot afford to have a higher fare
than that of his competitor,” CAB fare orders thereafter were stated as max-
imums, not exact fares.57
Contemporaries observed that this CAB action was revolutionary, open-
ing the door to at least a degree of price competition. But no one went
through the door. All carriers, including Continental, filed at once for the
maximum rate. “Rate wars” via special fares continued, but the CAB could
not create price competition in 1971. It is not simply obvious, however, that
the CAB in 1971 prevented price competition. Air profits rebounded
between mid-1971 and the end of 1973; regulation itself, however, received
no more real chances to prove its effectiveness.58
Conclusion
Having set out in the 1930s to popularize air travel and create a stable air-
line system that served defense and supported itself from fares rather than
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subsidies, by 1971 several generations of CAB officials had actually
achieved most of their goals. Right after World War II, limited service
nonsked operators had created the first generation of “mass” airline passen-
gers. Equally, CAB officials had fostered “youth” and other fares that added
to that growing market for cheap airfares. Only a generation later, howev-
er, the board, whoever the members, gained a reputation as protector of a
monopolistic big business and an enemy of consumers and of price compe-
tition. Failing to identify earlier and contemporary efforts to expand airline
travel, critics of the day and scholars of regulation described the CAB as a
captive of airline executives. Although they had forced some competition,
officials of the CAB had also helped air transport develop as an industry
afraid of the winds of competition—so much so that when the CAB
opened the door to price competition—at the request of at least American
Airlines’ executives—leaders of the remaining carriers ran in the opposite
direction, with executives of American and the maverick Continental keep-
ing pace with their rivals. Protective regulation had failed—not because it
always prevented competition, but because the public of the 1970s identi-
fied the CAB with higher airline ticket prices, and because the CAB and
federal policy in general had produced a sheltered, insecure industry, afraid
of the vast changes it had wrought. Airline executives of the 1960s liked to
compare themselves to the bold aviators of the past. In truth, the industry
that they and CAB officials had created was an oligopoly; and the leaders
of that industry were programmatically opposed to providing low-cost air-
fares demanded by consumers and their congressional representatives. In
some respects a more apt comparison for those postwar airline managers
might have been to the experiences of railroad executives during the 1920s
and 1930s. The contexts of airline and railroad regulation were certainly
different, yet both the CAB’s independent regulation of aviation and the
ICC’s oversight of the railroads meant that the basic shape and operation
of transportation firms and the nature of transportation markets were crea-
tures of politics and public policy. 59
Airlines and the Civil Aeronautics Board comprised only one segment
of the American transportation system. Following World War II, railroads
remained large and well-capitalized, but faced financial challenges as well as
the challenge brought by aggressive truckers seeking to take away railroad
traffic. In turn, rail executives were adept at bringing their messages of
financial decline and unfair competition with truckers to the attention of
consumers as well as the nation’s political leaders. Just as important, how-
ever, members of no group proved as energetic as truck operators in defend-
ing the regulatory regime. In 1955, Secretary of Commerce Sinclair
Weeks—with the support of President Dwight D. Eisenhower—introduced
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the idea of limited deregulation of truck and railroad rates based on the idea
of rate minimums and maximums. Also, Weeks was willing to contemplate
route competition between truckers. Not an ideologue but a practical politi-
cian, Weeks sought above all to rescue the nation’s declining railroads.
In the mid-1950s, neither members of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission nor members of Congress were prepared for anything as risky for
constituents and themselves as rate and route deregulation of surface trans-
portation. Among truckers, Weeks’s proposals for partial deregulation set off
a period of frantic organizing and lobbying that extended up to termination
of the regulatory regime in 1980. Weeks’s proposals pushed truckers to freeze
in place a defensive strategy and rhetoric that also extended up to 1980. Why
deregulate, truckers asked themselves and politicians for the next thirty-four
years, when the United States already possessed “the best transportation sys-
tem in the world”? Among railroad officials, failure to adopt Weeks’s pro-
posals encouraged another round of mergers, which this time went by the
name of merger “mania.”
In 1970, following bankruptcy of Penn Central, the largest merger, Pres-
ident Nixon made deregulation the centerpiece of presidential transporta-
tion policy. A few years later, President Gerald R. Ford added airlines to the
growing list of industries that would be subjected to “regulatory reform.”
Between 1978 and 1980, President Jimmy Carter presided over deregulation
of airlines, trucking, and railroads. In bringing deregulation to the center of
American politics, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter relied on ideas that
had their origin with rail officials and with politicians such as Weeks and
Eisenhower who had sought to thwart the postwar decline of the railroads.
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WITH APPROVAL OF the Transportation Act of 1940, members of Congress
and President Roosevelt had put in place a system for regulating the nation’s
surface transportation systems. Henceforth, federal judges and officials at
the Interstate Commerce Commission ruled on politically charged matters
such as disputed rates, mergers, and even railroad efforts to own trucking
firms or launch piggyback service. Equally, leaders of rail and trucking firms
would rely on their own rate bureaus to determine rates charged customers.
In principle and in law, trucking, rail, barge, and air carriers were members
of distinct industries. In all, political leaders and industrial executives com-
mitted in the abstract to the idea of competition had instead embraced cre-
ation of a complex regulatory regime.
Within a few years of approving this regime, however, federal officials
launched an effort to dismantle parts of it. Motivated by concerns about
profitability and ultimate survival of the railroads similar to those voiced
during the 1930s by Joseph Eastman, the emphasis among several officials
was on eliminating regulation. In 1949, for example, Charles Sawyer, secre-
tary of commerce under President Harry S. Truman, recommended partial
deregulation of freight rates. Again in 1955 and 1956, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower supported Sinclair Weeks, his secretary of commerce, in calling
for modified deregulation, starting with limited price competition between
truckers and railroaders. Eisenhower worried about consumer prices; and
nearly every federal official worried about the declining financial condition
of the railroads. In 1956, however, the notion of restoring competition to
truckers and railroaders enjoyed few friends in or out of Congress. In the
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The report of Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks was “piously in
favor of good sound competition.”
—Neil J. Curry, president, American Trucking Associations, 1955
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context of the transportation regulatory regime established in 1940, partial
restoration of price competition was a peculiar and unpopular idea.
Nonetheless, the earlier efforts of Sawyer and then of Weeks and Eisen-
hower marked a key moment. Once endorsed by such top officials, espe-
cially Eisenhower, a limited version of “free markets” in transportation
became politically “thinkable.”
In 1956, failure to achieve limited deregulation encouraged rail and
trucking executives to take distinct courses of action that also had their ori-
gins in the transportation debates of the 1930s. Facing rising costs and
declining revenues, rail leaders launched service and legal innovations. Still
not finished with the dieselization of their locomotive fleets, in 1954 rail
executives started piggyback service (haulage of truck trailers on railroad flat
cars) aimed at winning back freight business from aggressive truckers. As
part of an effort to reduce costs, moreover, those same rail executives created
a period of merger “mania,” returning to a version of the idea of consolida-
tion that had been part of railroad legislation and expert discussion during
the 1920s. In 1968, rail executives including Alfred E. Perlman and Stuart
T. Saunders even merged the great Pennsylvania and New York Central Sys-
tems, creating the Penn Central.
Unlike their railroad counterparts, who embraced the idea of a modest
level of rate-making freedom, truckers judged deregulation an especially
frightening prospect. Authors of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, which
framed the regulation of trucking, had created specialized operating rights
and other advantages for truckers. Two decades later, many who had partic-
ipated in the effort to secure those advantages stood as influential figures in
trucking politics. Those longtime activists and their younger counterparts
remained committed to protecting and even extending those advantages. In
1955 and 1956, Neil J. Curry and other leaders of the American Trucking
Associations (ATA) took the fight for the status quo to Congress and to
President Eisenhower. Particularly important to those truckers was protec-
tion of operating rights, which limited competition with railroads and other
truckers to certain types of commodities, and protection of rate bureaus,
which minimized price competition. Truckers characterized rate bureau
activities as a process of collective rate making.
Starting in 1956, success in blocking implementation of Weeks’s dereg-
ulation initiative reinforced the determination of trucking attorneys such as
Peter T. Beardsley and trucking leaders such as Vee Helen Kennedy and
Robert J. McBride to maintain aggressive political and legal action as a stan-
dard way of conducting business. During the 1950s and 1960s, lawsuits and
political action under the direction of leaders such as Beardsley, Kennedy,
and McBride proved successful in protecting both rate bureaus and operat-
ing rights against marauding rail executives and detested freight forwarders.
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Success in the short run, however, also encouraged those same truckers and
their ATA attorneys to continue time-tested legal and political strategies
that later proved brittle, and easily cracked, when President Richard M.
Nixon and his successors revived the deregulation battle. As frequently as
rail officials litigated with truckers about the boundaries of their respective
industries, and as much and as often as truck executives brought lawsuits
against rail executives and one another regarding rates and routes, up to the
end of the 1970s, each and all of them operated within markets and within
industries determined by federal rules and federal regulators. Not even
appearances before congressional committees by leaders of the mightiest
railroad corporations or their big budget for lobbying could introduce sub-
stantial changes in transportation markets or in the structure of the trans-
portation industries. This was the period of the regulatory regime.
Report of the Weeks Committee
President Eisenhower’s endorsement of rate freedom had its origin in the
efforts of railroad officials and political leaders during the administration of
President Harry S. Truman to formulate a policy solution to railroad
decline. Since the 1920s, truckers had been taking high-value and prof-
itable freight from railroads. Between 1940 and 1953 alone, rail’s share of
domestic freight tonnage fell from 61 to 51 percent, a whopping loss
despite the temporary revival of rail traffic during World War II. Part of the
problem was that truckers served retailers and manufacturers who were
themselves moving to the suburbs, and to the southern and western parts
of the country. With little new rail mileage constructed after 1920, railroads
were unable to serve those businesses. During the late 1940s, as truckers
plied the vast highway network that federal and state officials had financed
and were still constructing, rail track maps still had a 1920s look. At the
same time, rail passengers continued the flight to automobiles that had
started in the 1910s, accelerated during the 1920s, and revived after World
War II. For the rail industry as a whole, general passenger deficits topped
$500,000,000 in every year after 1946.1
Rail leaders had long blamed truckers for their many woes, but after
World War II railroads proposed a new remedy. The calls of rail executives
during the 1930s for equivalent regulation had failed to produce the desired
results, achieving instead only price regulation that favored truckers for their
many woes. As early as 1949, Henry F. McCarthy, vice president of the New
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, adopted a different solution when
he called for “deregulation.” Many will object to deregulation on the ground
that it will bring “chaos,” McCarthy added, “but for twenty-five years we
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have been going through chaos in one form or another.” In reality, rail lead-
ers never wanted a measure as drastic, threatening, or difficult to achieve as
total deregulation of rates. Instead, rail leaders such as McCarthy began to
advocate the idea that ICC officials set minimum and maximum rates for
rail and truck operators, allowing for real price competition. The area
between the minimum and maximum was the “zone of reasonableness,” in
which, argued one rail official, “the free market rather than regulation
should govern.”2 With this approach, then, federal officials would construct
a market, but this market, such as it was, would operate only within a yet-
to-be-determined zone or range of price minimums and maximums. By the
late 1940s, no rail executive doubted the central role of federal officials in
shaping that market, or the centrality of those officials in securing the prof-
itability of rail, both ideas first embraced in the Transportation Act of 1920.
In 1949, Charles Sawyer, President Truman’s secretary of commerce,
fused the concerns of rail and political leaders about the declining position
of the nation’s railroads. Sawyer issued a report advocating significant
reliance on competition. “If another type of carrier or another carrier of the
same type can perform the service at a profit,” Sawyer contended, “it is enti-
tled to the business.” Still locked in the language of the 1930s with its
emphasis on carrier “types” (and the idea that each transportation “mode”
should perform the services for which it was “best” suited in terms of eco-
nomic efficiency), Sawyer nonetheless had suggested that price competition
might not be a bad thing. Reflecting the growing interest among political
and rail leaders in achieving a modicum of deregulation, in June 1949, edi-
tors of Fortune Magazine published an article titled “The Coming Crisis in
Transportation,” in which the author urged that “railroads must be deregu-
lated and allowed to compete.”3 No later than 1950, then, the idea of dereg-
ulation had entered the conversation of business writers, senior federal offi-
cials, and railroad executives. What deregulation lacked, however, was
presidential, congressional, and ICC leadership.
In January 1953, Dwight Eisenhower took office as president. Not until
1954, however, did Eisenhower’s administrators turn their attention to
deregulation of surface transportation. On March 1, Eisenhower learned
from advisers that railroads were “now getting close to collapse, unable to
withstand the competition of subsidized airplanes, trucks, busses, and
ships.” As one response, Eisenhower created the Presidential Advisory
Committee on Transportation Policy and Organization. Secretary of Com-
merce Sinclair Weeks headed the committee, which journalists, politicians,
and many critics soon called by his last name.4 Although the Weeks com-
mittee had its origins in the immediate rail crisis of 1954, the ideas put for-
ward emphasizing partial creation of a “free market” resonated back to the
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late 1940s with the recognition by Secretary Sawyer and business writers of
rail’s rapid decline, and further echoed the debates about transportation
coordination of the 1930s.
In April 1955, Secretary Weeks issued his report. Weeks and members
of his committee determined that widespread use of trucks and airplanes
during the preceding generation had produced a “transportation revolution”
resulting in genuine competition between rail and truck. Regulations cre-
ated in an earlier period to protect consumers against unfair rail practices
were not simply obsolete, but, so it was argued, actually prevented the most
efficient allocation of traffic. Weeks urged creation of a process he called
“dynamic competition.” Not some arcane idea of an economist, dynamic
competition was Weeks’s formulation for rescuing the railroads. “Recom-
mendations [of the committee],” a journalist reported in the New York Times
on April 19, “were interpreted as giving railroads a better chance to compete
in the growing and varied rivalry of trucks, airplanes and water carriers.” In
short, regulation was now bad for the railroads and for all of American busi-
ness. In practice, Weeks advocated limiting ICC regulation of rail and truck
rates to minimums and maximums, preventing predatory practices on the
one side or price gouging on the other.5
Weeks’s call for price deregulation was a stopgap, not a long-term trans-
portation policy. Unlike Harold Moulton and Joseph Eastman, who had
surveyed a similar terrain in the 1930s, nowhere did Weeks and members of
his committee link their remedy—modest price deregulation—with limita-
tions on federal funding of waterways and highways. Ironically, at the same
time federal officials were then preparing budget projections and legislation
to fund construction of the costly Interstate Highway System that would
certainly open the way for rapid, coast-to-coast trucking service.6 With one
report, however, Weeks had elevated the railroad idea of partial deregulation
(through creation of the awkward-sounding zone of reasonableness) from
the obscure discussions of political leaders, business writers, and transporta-
tion and policy experts to the center of American politics.
At a press conference in early May, President Eisenhower proclaimed the
Weeks report “a brilliant piece of work.” Rather than take up details of the
report, Eisenhower focused his remarks on its potential benefits for the econ-
omy as a whole. Journalists learned that “the purpose . . . [of the Weeks report]
is to make competitive influences more governing in our . . . transportation
system.” Eisenhower perceived rate deregulation as a step toward lower prices
throughout the economy. “The person to remember,” Eisenhower added, “is
the general consuming public.” No doubt recognizing that organized truck-
ers would object to any plan promising fiercer competition with one another
and with railroads, Eisenhower expected “heated discussion” of the Weeks
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report.7 Consistent with earlier presidential efforts extending as far back as
Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Eisenhower treated transportation as
a topic of strategic importance for the economy as a whole.8
No single factor did more to galvanize truckers’ commitment to protect-
ing the boundaries of their regulatory victory of the 1930s than the report of
the Weeks committee. In 1955, Neil J. Curry inherited the task of defend-
ing the interests of organized truckers against Weeks and others who sup-
ported destruction of what Curry and his counterparts regularly character-
ized as “the best transportation system in the world.”9 A trucking company
executive, Curry was serving his term as president of the American Truck-
ing Associations, a nationwide trade association headquartered in Washing-
ton, D.C., that included several types of truckers. Like his predecessors,
Curry’s responsibilities as ATA president included representation of mem-
bers in countless appearances before congressional committees, state and
federal regulators, and at meetings of truck operators. More than any other
responsibility, the president of the ATA mobilized members for political
battles that seemed never to end.
Curry took the lead in converting economic ideas about regulation into
preparation for action against the Weeks report. Late in April 1955, Curry
called members of the ATA’s executive committee into special session to
hear presentations on the significance of the Weeks report from the ATA’s
managing director John Lawrence and members of ATA’s legal team.Truck-
ing executives spoke of the centrality of “transportation costs” in determin-
ing “the difference between success and bankruptcy for the farmer, mer-
chant, and manufacturer.” Under threat, normally hard-edged truckers
reimagined themselves as consumer advocates. Given what they called “this
basic reason,” members of the executive committee concluded that “strong
federal regulation to protect the public is imperative.” Even more, a member
of the ATA’s legal staff seemed to revive fears of tranportation coordination,
warning that implementation of the Weeks report could serve as a “wedge
for rail entry into trucking.”10
During early May, ATA president Curry brought these messages of con-
sumer protection and of rate and rail competition to meetings of business and
transportation executives in Detroit and Washington, D.C., where he met
with two governors one day and with President Eisenhower on another day.
As part of what an ATA publicist described as an “unending mission,” Curry
made speeches to a luncheon meeting of the Georgia Motor Truck Associa-
tion and to the Traffic Club of New Orleans. Labeling arguments in favor of
deregulation “as phony as a three dollar bill,’” Curry adopted 1930s-style
rhetoric to warn listeners in Savannah that Cabinet Secretary Weeks had
proposed giving the railroads “the right to conduct an all-out rate war on
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trucks.” Members of Curry’s audience in New Orleans learned that Weeks
had based his report on the “fictitious and unrealistic” assertion that railroads
were suffering financially. The Weeks report, Curry added, was well written
and “piously in favor of good sound competition,” raising the troubling
prospect that “a good many worthy people are going to be taken in by it.”11
By April 1956, long-awaited hearings before a House subcommittee
only created an opportunity for truckers, railroad executives, Secretary
Weeks, and others to say in public what they had been telling one another
at meetings and conferences for the past year. “The whole premise of our
proposal,” declared Secretary Weeks, the first witness, “is that if a given seg-
ment of the transportation industry can give a better rate, then shippers are
entitled to that rate.” In brief, Secretary Weeks affirmed the perceived rea-
sonableness of competition. Yet an attorney for the ATA declared that com-
petitive rate making actually represented “the complete antithesis of both
free enterprise and dynamic competition.” On the other side, Jervis Lang-
don Jr., chair of the Association of Southeastern Railroads, once again
“emphatically endorse[d]” the report of the Weeks committee seeking
greater reliance on competitive rates. A headline writer for Transport Topics,
the ATA’s weekly newspaper, characterized pending legislation as “rail
tinted.” According to Anthony F. Arpaia, chair of the ICC, transportation
leaders were taking a “snail’s eye approach” by which each “urged a selfish
and narrow solution of their own particular competitive problem regardless
of how temporary or illusory such a benefit could be.”12 Given this lack of
agreement among transportation officials and the unwillingness of Presi-
dent Eisenhower to take a more active and visible role in seeking partial
deregulation, during 1956 legislation supporting Weeks’s proposals stood
no chance of winning approval in Congress. Just as in the 1930s, rail lead-
ers could not overcome traditional anti-railroad rhetoric and build support
for actions that appeared to help their industry. Rules and processes estab-
lished fifteen and twenty years earlier now seemed immutable.
Few besides Secretary Weeks and several railroad executives supported
his deregulation proposals. Nearly everyone (not including railroaders) for
whom transportation represented a livelihood or an important service per-
ceived the idea of deregulation as a personal attack. Members of the ICC
and of the U.S. Senate and House shared those now-traditional fears; and
with senators and congressmen and ICC officials as featured speakers at
truckers’ meetings and as celebrants of regulation, the system of rail and
truck regulation as a whole was probably never in real danger. Still, truck-
ing executives remained cautious. “We have a breathing spell,” a top offi-
cial told delegates at the ATA’s annual meeting held in New York City late
in October 1956, “on . . . the determined attempt of our railroad brethren
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to hamstring the trucking industry’s competition by changing the funda-
mental rules.”13
Characterized as a breathing spell rather than as the victory that it was,
publication of the Weeks report and the subsequent scare it brought ATA
members encouraged a formalization of trucker politics. First, the already
overheated rhetoric of truckers congealed into a couple of memorable, bat-
tle-tested, and repeatable phrases. Whether at luncheons, banquets, confer-
ences, congressional hearings, or in their own publications, leaders of the
trucking industry repeated identical phrases about the political economy of
trucking, phrases that would have been familiar to Joseph Eastman. Regu-
lation was prerequisite to competition, they maintained. In language that
retained the predatory images of the nineteenth century, moreover, trucking
executives still asserted that railroad leaders were planning to use rate com-
petition to force truckers to “bleed themselves to death,” after which prices
would increase to monopoly levels. Equally, arrival of the Weeks report
reminded ATA leaders and their members that politics offered the best and
only protection for the growth and profitability of trucking operations. “Pre-
sentation of our interests in any given situation,” the new ATA president
announced in October 1956, “is our responsibility.” Accordingly, he added,
“we need political strength.”14
Even before arrival of the temporary “breathing spell,” Curry and his
associates had already convinced themselves that only larger doses of pas-
sionate rhetoric and “political strength” could offer truckers the protection
they needed and deserved as operators of the “best transportation system in
the world.” The purpose of political strength was to protect the regulatory
regime and the highly nuanced position of truckers within that regime. In
particular, Curry and every ATA leader before and after him worked ener-
getically to protect their government-created authority to determine rates
charged customers through their own rate bureaus and to keep one another
and potential “outsiders” such as railroad executives and freight forwarders
from invading the protected zones of regulated trucking. Starting in the late
1930s and extending up to deregulation in 1980, the conference system
served as among the most important of the bureaucratic and political insti-
tutions that surrounded and protected truckers’ operating rights.
Protecting Operating Rights through the
Conference System
Clearly, truckers thought only about their activities, and not transportation
as a whole. Truckers’ strong desire to draw hard boundaries around their
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firms and industry started with their system of operating rights. Under
terms of the Motor Carrier Act, which had thwarted Eastman’s effort to
achieve coordinated transportation in 1935, truckers held certificates issued
by the ICC to provide specific and very limited types of service. Like their
counterparts in the airline industry, truckers were also “certificated.” In
1937, two years after passage of the Motor Carrier Act, the ICC published
a classification of operating rights. The ICC’s list followed a system long
understood and practiced among truckers, including categories based upon
whether the firm held common, contract, or private carrier rights, and
whether service took place along regular or irregular routes. In addition,
ICC officials further categorized truckers according to seventeen types of
commodities carried, as for instance household goods, heavy machinery,
refrigerated solid products, and so forth. Each classification, moreover, car-
ried with it a letter and numerical code such as common carrier, class C-2,
which stood for truckers holding operating rights to haul household mer-
chandise over irregular routes in radial service.15
Beginning in 1937, distinctions among truckers that had been informal
carried the force of law and the supervisory support of the ICC. Complex
on the surface, this classification scheme allowed trucking executives, their
watchful attorneys, and ICC officials to protect, say, a firm carrying heavy
machinery from competition by more aggressive heavy-machinery carriers,
or by members of other trucking groups. Uniform classification also allowed
ICC officials to promise uniform treatment to each type of shipper. As had
been true of railroad rates since before 1900, the classification scheme facil-
itated the bureaucratization of regulation in the hands of ICC officials.
Throughout the period of truck regulation extending up to 1980, the type
or types of operating right(s) held defined a firm’s position in the trucking
system and consequently the ability of that firm’s executives and sales teams
to solicit traffic.
In turn, truckers created specialized organizations to protect holders of
each type of operating authority. In the language of the day and industry,
truckers labeled these organizations conferences, as for instance the com-
mon carrier conference. In practice, the history and contemporary workings
of these trucking conferences and the operating rights that they protected
were closely tied to the decisions made by founders such as Robert J.
McBride. Between 1939 and the mid-1950s, McBride dominated the poli-
tics of the Regular Common Carrier Conference (RCCC). In 1939,
founders of the regulated trucking industry, including Walter Mullady, Mau-
rice Tucker, and others, asked McBride to serve as director of their newly cre-
ated Common Carrier Division, which was also a constituent group of the
American Trucking Associations. The Common Carrier Division (later
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Regular Common Carrier Conference) included truckers holding operating
rights as common carriers—as opposed to the contract and private carriers,
whose operating authorities were more limited in scope. Like the truckers
he now represented, McBride’s background included experience with rail-
roads, railroad regulation, fierce competition with other truckers including
contract carriers, and a reputation as a transportation expert in an industry
in which expertise could be converted into political influence.16 The govern-
ing idea, all realized, was to prevent potential competitors such as railroads,
contract carriers, freight forwarders, and private truckers from seeking busi-
ness inside of the potentially lucrative region set aside under the regulatory
regime for holders of common carrier operating rights.
During the mid-1950s, Robert McBride was still fighting these battles.
In January 1955, for example, he met with members of his board of gover-
nors at a hotel in Miami. Two cases were at hand, both of which reflected
the continuing efforts of railroad leaders to develop services in line with the
1930s vision of coordinated transportation. In one, McBride reported that
an ICC examiner had recommended authorizing executives of the Southern
Pacific Railroad to extend their trucking service from an auxiliary to railroad
operations to regular trucking service that would compete head to head with
members of the Regular Common Carrier Conference. McBride promised
to file exceptions to the official’s report with the ICC. The second case that
concerned McBride also focused on perceived railroad invasion of territory
set aside for truck common carriers. Attorneys for the Kansas City South-
ern and the Louisville & Nashville railroads were asking the ICC to remove
what were known as “key points” restrictions from their trucking operations.
As McBride’s listeners well understood, key points restrictions limited rail
operation of trucks to service that was supplementary to rail operations. Up
to that point, ICC regulations had prohibited railroads like Kansas City
Southern from offering truck service between larger cities, the now-
contested key points. McBride asked members of his board whether they
perceived any “compromise in these two areas of rail attempts at unrestricted
rate competition and unrestricted right to enter the trucking business.” He
answered himself with the observation that “we have only one alternative,”
which was to “mobilize our collective strength and to fight tooth and nail to
maintain our right to serve the people.”17
McBride had to remain vigilant against potential encroachments not only
by railroad executives, but by another group of truckers, the contract carriers.
Substantial differences separated the two types of truckers. Briefly, common
carriers represented by McBride picked up merchandise and carried it to
recipients, often unloading and reloading smaller shipments at their own ter-
minals. Contract carriers, however, moved merchandise directly between a
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shipper and a recipient. Direct service and lower overhead allowed contract
carriers to charge shippers a lower rate for each delivery. During the mid-
1950s, McBride responded to contract carriers’ attempts to invade the com-
mon carrier field with lawsuits, ICC filings, and lobbying members of Con-
gress, the same tactics he used to resist aggressive railroaders. Even the
efforts of contract carriers to convert to common carrier authority merited
resistance. By June 1955, according to McBride’s top assistant, one case had
already cost the common carriers “a great deal of time and money in oppos-
ing it.” Yet these major investments in lobbying and legal services never
guaranteed favorable outcomes. “If we hope to protect our operating
authorities,” McBride’s assistant reported to truck operators, “we must make
a record on which the Commission can justify a denial.”18
Early in 1956, attorney Albert B. Rosenbaum succeeded Robert
McBride as general manager of the Regular Common Carrier Conference.
(McBride, then sixty-eight years of age, continued his legal and political
work for the RCCC, using a more elevated title.) Like McBride, Rosen-
baum defined the work of the common carrier conference as essentially
defensive in nature. For example, at a meeting of the Board of Governors of
the common carrier conference held in Palm Springs, California, early in
1956, Rosenbaum warned that only two of eleven members of the ICC had
served more than four years in office, creating the possibility that what he
characterized as a “new” idea could materialize.19 Like McBride, Rosen-
baum’s job was to prepare for the arrival of new and old ideas that might
threaten his members’ operating rights.
In August 1957, Rosenbaum and McBride gained an important legisla-
tive advantage against the contract carriers. Always fearful that contract car-
riers would increase the number of customers served to the disadvantage of
members of his regular common carriers, Rosenbaum and McBride per-
suaded Congress to modify the Motor Carrier Act. In the future, holders of
contract carrier authority could serve no more than eight shippers. Known
in the industry as “the rule of 8,” in principle, McBride and Rosenbaum had
finally erected a barrier that would secure existing common carrier loadings
for their members. No wonder that in October 1958 a writer for Transport
Topics named Robert McBride “Mr. Common Carrier.”20
Vee Helen Kennedy represented contract carriers in these deliberations.
Since 1943, Kennedy had served as executive secretary of the Contract Car-
rier Conference, the counterpart position to that held by McBride and later
Rosenbaum. Unlike McBride and Rosenbaum, who were both attorneys
and men long immersed in the rituals and competitive strivings of unregu-
lated and regulated trucking, Kennedy secured her position by following the
narrower path that during the 1940s and 1950s was available only to a few
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION, 1949–1970 / 107
RSB_chap4_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:29 PM  Page 107
women in the transportation field. Born around 1900 in Washington, D.C.,
Kennedy attended a local high school, where her courses included typing
and shorthand. For two years during the early 1920s, she studied English at
George Washington University, and then accepted a full-time position at
the American Automobile Association. By the mid-1930s, Kennedy worked
as secretary and administrative assistant to the auto association’s executive
vice president. In 1943, the first executive secretary of the Contract Carrier
Conference resigned to devote more time to his prospering law firm. In
turn, Charles P. Clark, one of the founders of the contract carrier group and
a former executive at the auto club, recommended Vee Kennedy as its sec-
ond executive secretary. Chance and talent had converged. By the mid-
1950s, Kennedy was known among industry leaders as the “‘first lady’ of
trucking.”21
By October 1958, more than a year after McBride prevailed upon mem-
bers of Congress to limit the number of customers a contract carrier could
serve, Kennedy asserted that the contract carrier industry had reached “a
state of transition.” Approximately six hundred contract carriers, she
reported, “are in litigation . . . for conversion to common carriage.” Kennedy
predicted that “many cases will be carried to the courts, [with] the confer-
ence participating in all lead cases in these fields which may establish prece-
dent to protect the rights of contract carriers.” Kennedy also promised to
intervene before the ICC on behalf of contract carriers “to see that . . . the
amendatory language is followed.”22 Even if Congress had redrawn the legal
barriers separating contract and common carriers, Kennedy intended to
bring her members to the edge of those barriers, and perhaps breach them.
Longtime participants in the transportation industry such as Vee Kennedy
and Robert McBride understood that few protections for their members’
operating rights were permanent, or impermeable. Because ownership of
operating rights guaranteed the right to solicit a particular type of trucking
business in a particular territory, ownership of those rights also governed the
merger and growth of trucking firms.
Operating Rights and Protected Growth
through Merger
Whether working as a common or contract carrier, possession of ICC-
awarded operating rights offered a method for truck operators to enlarge
the scale of their operations inside boundaries guarded by legal and politi-
cal watchdogs like McBride, Rosenbaum, and Kennedy. Truckers had long
experience with consolidation. Between 1940 and 1955, the number of
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trucking firms had declined from more than twenty-six thousand to around
eighteen thousand. In 1956, one observer determined that “the great major-
ity of this decrease was due to motor carrier unification proceedings.”23
Examination of two mergers highlights the central and expected role of
operating rights and ICC decisions in guiding the way in which executives
undertook mergers. During the mid-1950s, the six Bonacci brothers owned
and operated the AAA Trucking Corporation. Founded in 1931, the firm
had remained limited in fleet size and operating rights for more than two
decades. The brothers drove the trucks and handled freight at their only
depot in Trenton, New Jersey. Not even the firm’s common carrier rights into
New York, New Jersey, and as far south as Philadelphia guaranteed growth
in hauls and revenue. According to a writer for Transport Topics, who most
likely relied upon the Bonacci brothers for information, AAA “grew slowly,
nurtured by enthusiasm, hard work and long hours of truck driving.”24
ICC examiners had no obligation to encourage growth. In 1953, the
Bonacci brothers asked the ICC for permission to transport syrup in tankers
between Kearny, New Jersey, and plants in Pennsylvania and New York. At
that point, the Bonacci brothers held operating rights to transport syrup in
containers over those routes, but not in tank cars; this was the authority
requested. According to a report in Transport Topics, commissioners deter-
mined that “necessity did not require common carrier operation between
the points.” Fortunately for the Bonacci brothers, executives of Coca-Cola
created that sense of necessity, which led the ICC to authorize the Bonac-
cis to carry flavoring syrups in tanks from Kearny to New York City and liq-
uid syrup from Brooklyn to Kearny.25
In 1957, when the Bonaccis purchased the operating rights of Garford
Trucking, the brothers expanded their operating authority as far north as
Boston and south to Baltimore and Washington, D.C. As part of the
approval process, the Bonaccis showed ICC examiners that their merger
would lead to more economical operations, especially by eliminating the
costs of interlining freight with competitors such as Garford. In addition to
the potential for cost reductions, ICC officials also evaluated whether com-
bining these firms would create new operating rights for the Bonaccis. Evi-
dence of an earlier period of interlining with Garford was required to show
the potential for economy rather than creation of a new service. In October
1958, the Bonaccis placed an advertisement in Transport Topics that featured
a sketch of their expanded routes and a photo of a young man whose pants
and jacket appeared too short. The caption for the advertisement read
“AAA Trucking is . . . Really Growing.”26 Under rules of the regulatory
regime, ownership of operating rights offered protection against interlopers.
Given the dependence of truck executives on the ICC for prior approval of
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each modification of operations, including mergers, those same operating
rights could also place limits on growth.
The same ICC rules that limited growth also offered truck executives
one of the few paths toward achieving a substantial increase in fleet size,
tonnage carried, and revenues earned. This process of merging operating
authority—the term within the industry was “tacking”—meant that truck-
ers purchased operating rights from another firm and aligned or “tacked”
them together, extending their service territories and providing single-line
service over a longer distance. By the mid-1950s, executives at Pacific Inter-
mountain Express (PIE) had built one of the nation’s largest trucking firms
through the process of tacking operating rights.27 Unnoticed by most truck-
ers was the extent to which the rules of the regulatory regime had perme-
ated to each detail of company ownership, organization, operations, and
proposed avenues of growth.
In 1926, founders of the company that later took form as PIE launched
service in Pocatello, Idaho. By 1937, they had merged several trucking firms
and extended service to such major points as Salt Lake City, Denver, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco. Just as importantly, as writer Harry D. Wohl
later pointed out in an adulatory article in Transport Topics, by 1937,
founders had “established the grandfather rights of the present PIE.”28 From
the outset, operating rights bestowed by the ICC added value to the PIE
franchise.
In 1939, a new group of executives took charge of operations at Pacific
Intermountain Express. Again according to Harry Wohl, a senior writer for
the ATA’s weekly Transport Topics, these executives “saw many small lines
working under financial handicaps and dependent upon each other for ton-
nage to balance their hauls.” One of those executives, Abner S. Glikbarg, an
attorney who had worked for several years in private practice before joining
PIE, took principal responsibility for handling the company’s business
before the ICC.29 In the trucking business, where the ICC was necessarily a
close associate in any effort to achieve growth through merger, those who
spoke the language of ICC examiners and commissioners stood to prosper.
During World War II, a boom in truck transportation brought an
immense increase in tonnage and a regular flow of cash to the new company.
Beginning in 1944, officers of PIE leased the equipment and operating
rights of another firm. In 1946, they purchased those rights and equipment,
opening the way for regular service between Chicago and St. Louis and
major cities on the Pacific Coast including San Francisco and Los Angeles.30
War and public policy had created favorable conditions for Glikbarg and his
associates to expand PIE’s operations.
In the late 1940s, the growth-minded Glikbarg offered to purchase
Keeshin Motor Express. At that point, the Keeshin firm owned more equip-
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ment than Glikbarg’s PIE. Keeshin was also operating in bankruptcy.
(Unlike the CAB stewardship of the young airline industry, ICC regulators
never attempted to guarantee the profitability or service continuity of any
one trucking firm.) The real advantage of purchasing Keeshin lay in acqui-
sition of its route system. Keeshin held operating rights for regular, common
carrier service between Boston and Washington, D.C., in the east and Min-
neapolis, Des Moines, and St. Louis in the west. By tacking their operating
rights, PIE executives would preside over coast-to-coast service of more
than twenty-six thousand miles.31
ICC officials and pesky railroad attorneys got in the way of Glikbarg’s
planned expansion. In November 1950, ICC officials disapproved the
merger with Keeshin. At hearings held by the ICC, attorneys for the rail-
roads argued that authorizing PIE officials to create a transcontinental firm
would lead to a loss of rail’s highest value traffic. Approval of the PIE-
Keeshin merger, asserted railroad attorneys, would weaken the railroads,
undermine the economy, and pose a threat to the nation’s military strength.
On grounds that echoed the transportation coordination supporters of the
1930s, namely “preserv[ing] the inherent advantages of each” type of trans-
portation, ICC commissioners endorsed the railroads’ arguments, even
asserting that rail executives could not meet the needs of economy and
nation “unless . . . [they] continue to receive a sufficient traffic volume to
maintain their plants and services.” As late as 1950, ICC commissioners
charged with maintenance of the regulatory regime had determined that
protection of the railroads’ boundaries took precedence.32
In the mid-1950s, Glikbarg launched another program of acquisitions.
In September 1955, PIE took control of West Coast Fast Freight, which
operated from Spokane and Seattle, Washington, and Missoula, Montana,
to Los Angeles. PIE officials also purchased Orange Transportation Com-
pany. The idea in making this purchase, Wohl reported, was to “bridge the
gap for PIE between intermountain and eastern points and the Pacific
Northwest.” In the absence of opponents such as railroad attorneys or com-
peting truckers, ICC officials permitted Glikbarg to expand from regional
to national operations. For the second quarter of 1956, Pacific Intermoun-
tain ranked third in the trucking industry in gross revenues and first in net
income.33 Under terms of the regulatory regime, a sharp increase in revenue
had to start with the ICC-approved tacking of operating certificates.
By the early 1960s, Glikbarg and his associates at Pacific Intermountain
Express had built a large and profitable firm based on their operating rights,
a growing economy, savvy management, and ICC rules and rulings. ICC
rulings had also kept Keeshin Motor Express outside of Glikbarg’s domain
and had limited the growth of the Bonacci brothers’ firm. Yet in an indus-
try in which lawsuits were only another element of conducting business,
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neither the fabulously successful Glikbarg nor the more modest Bonacci
brothers brought lawsuits to limit or abolish regulation. Equally, truck oper-
ators had a long and successful history of political action, but not one of
them appeared at hearings to demand the reduced regulation that Sinclair
Weeks had sought in 1955 and 1956. Instead, truckers such as the Bonaccis
and Glikbarg paid dues to the ATA, subscribed to Transport Topics, and pre-
sumably invoked phrases such as the “best transportation system in the
world” at appropriate moments. In reality, right up to the end of the 1970s,
truckers with backgrounds like the well-known Abner Glikbarg at PIE and
the little-known Bonacci brothers at AAA Trucking participated in the
ATA’s political action committees aimed at protecting operating rights.
Away from the hustle-bustle of getting freight delivered and frequent hud-
dles with attorneys, the Bonacci brothers and Abner Glikbarg and his asso-
ciates had no reason to doubt the centrality of federal law and ICC rulings
for undergirding their operating rights and for creating the ability of lawyers
such as Robert McBride to mount aggressive defenses against railroaders.
Truckers such as the Bonacci brothers and Abner Glikbarg were equally
energetic in defending the right of their rate bureaus to determine shippers’
charges.
Rate Bureaus
Rate bureaus protected the truckers’ system of collective rate making. In
brief, rate bureaus allowed truckers to gather in one place and determine the
rates charged to shippers, avoiding some of the vicissitudes of unconstrained
markets with their occasional bouts of wild price and profit fluctuations. In
spring 1948, Congress passed over President Truman’s veto the curiously
named Reed-Bulwinkle Act. Authors of the act had exempted rate bureaus
from antitrust legislation. Starting that year, federal law shielded truck and
railroad operators from daily price competition. As with virtually every
institutional fixture of the nation’s transportation system, truckers’ rate
bureaus (and railroaders’) were firmly grounded in public policy.
Like the conference system built by Robert McBride and Vee Kennedy,
those rate bureaus had their origins and early development in the actions of
specific persons; Lewis A. Raulerson was one of those persons. In 1930,
Raulerson and a partner organized a trucking company and began hauling
automobiles and parts for the Ford Motor Company out of Charlotte,
North Carolina. In 1933, they started another firm, Atlanta-Florida Motor
Lines, a common carrier between Atlanta and Jacksonville. Through a series
of purchases and consolidations, by the early 1950s, Raulerson’s Great
112 / CHAPTER 4
RSB_chap4_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:29 PM  Page 112
Southern Trucking Company emerged as the largest common carrier in the
Southeast.34
Raulerson harbored apparently contradictory views about relationships
between government agencies and business firms. According to the author of
a nonscholarly account of Raulerson’s early days in the trucking industry,
Raulerson “and his colleagues deplored the unions and railroads with equal
vigor.” Following World War II, moreover, Raulerson joined that group of
Americans who expressed concern about “statism, socialism and commu-
nism.” Nevertheless, Raulerson supported the growth of a network of organ-
izations that brought federal legitimacy and legal protection to the business
practices of truck operators. He was a founding member of the Florida and
American Trucking Associations, organizations whose leaders from the
outset were dedicated to the maintenance of the regulatory regime. Rauler-
son was also a founding member of the Southern Motor Carriers Rate Con-
ference; for eleven years he served as its president and treasurer.35
Starting in 1948 with the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, congressional protection
against antitrust litigation allowed truck operators such as Lewis Raulerson.
Abner Glikbarg, and the Bonaccis to impose routine on the activities of
their rate bureaus. Depending upon the extent of their operating authori-
ties, truckers paid an admission fee plus a percentage of their gross revenues
to join a rate bureau. Around 1951, monthly fees paid by truckers ranged
between $3.50 and $325.00 at one rate bureau. Fees for the sale of published
rates augmented bureau revenues. In turn, rate bureaus employed full-time
managers and clerical personnel who among other tasks provided uniform
rate information to members. Raulerson’s Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, with headquarters in Atlanta, served truckers located between
eastern Louisiana, Florida, and portions of Virginia and West Virginia. In
one peculiar arrangement, the Central States Motor Freight Bureau pub-
lished rates for a vast territory across the Midwest, but had no direct mem-
bers. Instead, truckers joined local bureaus in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
adjoining states. Never a precise activity, a few of the territorial rate bureaus
also published rates for shipments outside their territory.36 The rate bureau
system offered members the advantage of considerable flexibility in deter-
mining prices to charge shippers; those rate bureaus also served as another
legal and institutional layer bringing stability and predictability to rates,
regulations, and trucking operations.
On the surface, the work of trucking rate bureaus assumed a straightfor-
ward, bureaucratic quality. In 1951, transportation professor Charles A. Taff
was able to describe “typical” procedures in “representative motor carrier rate
bureaus.” Much of the work at a rate bureau, Taff reported, revolved around
the filing, adjustment, and publication of freight rates. Each proposed rate
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change, he reported, “is placed on a monthly public docket and also pub-
lished and distributed to members.” Still wider dissemination of proposed
rates took place through industry-wide newspapers such as Transport Topics.
As one example, on January 3, 1955, managers of the Central States Motor
Freight Bureau published a list of proposed rate changes in Transport Topics,
including a proposal submitted by operators of a trucking firm carrying
candy or confectionary from Chicago to New Castle, Pennsylvania, and
seeking a revised rate on a minimum shipment of twenty thousand pounds.
By the mid-1950s, large rate bureaus such as the Central States and Rauler-
son’s Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference handled around one hun-
dred such rate proposals each week.37
Supported by federal law, several rate bureaus achieved considerable size
and legal weight. In June 1955, the Middle Atlantic Conference—a rate
bureau—employed ninety-five persons and paid annual expenses amount-
ing to nearly $300,000. At hearings on rates, the peripatetic writer Harry
Wohl observed that “all concerned have the right to say their say.” Yet the
reality of the matter was that members of the standing rate committee—the
regular staff—settled most rate disputes. “In the absence of an appeal,”
noted Wohl, “the recommendation of the standing rate committee is final.”
Thereafter, bureau employees filed the recommended rate with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, which bolstered the legitimacy of the rate
committee’s decision. “Unless someone complains,” Wohl observed, “the
rate seldom is suspended by the Commission.”38 The achievement of
bureaucratic regularity in rate bureau operations meant that senior employ-
ees exercised considerable authority in determining prices charged to ship-
pers.
Managers of the Middle Atlantic Conference also brought top-notch
legal talent to their negotiations with the staff at the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Members of the Middle Atlantic’s senior staff each enjoyed
between thirty and forty years’ experience in the transportation field. Most
senior staffers were also attorneys or practitioners registered to bring cases
before the ICC. Legal and statistical experts employed at the American
Trucking Associations’ headquarters in Washington, D.C., supplemented
the work of rate bureau staff members, including the staff of the Middle
Atlantic Conference. According to Wohl, senior officials at the Middle
Atlantic Conference—as attorneys and ICC practitioners—could “take
common action and engage in common defense of the members.”39
Altogether, rate bureau executives marshaled political clout for dealings
with federal officials and legal weight for dealings with shippers and com-
petitors. Up to 1970, these activities represented the key contributions of
rate bureaus to the workings of the regulatory regime. During the 1970s,
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however, consumer advocates and politicians, including each of the presi-
dents of the United States, sought to deregulate trucking by eliminating rate
bureaus’ antitrust immunity. Even before the 1970s, however, neither rate
bureau officials nor ATA attorneys were successful in reducing or eliminat-
ing the dangers to their rate making and operating rights posed by the
much-disdained freight forwarders.
Freight Forwarders’ Threat to Operating Rights
Freight forwarders built transportation businesses in the spaces formerly
ignored by railroads and truckers. On the face of it, the freight forwarding
business was uncomplicated. As one example, Harry M. Baker, president of
Coast Carloading Company of Los Angeles, a freight forwarding compa-
ny, arranged for pickup of small shipments in his own fleet of trucks. From
headquarters in Los Angeles, drivers working for Baker consolidated these
small shipments into much larger ones, delivering boxcar loads of mer-
chandise to railroads and trailer loads to trucking firms. The small shipper
paid the small shipment rate to Baker. Yet Baker, because he had delivered
a boxcar or trailer-sized load, paid a much lower rate to the railroads and
trucking firms with whom he contracted for services. The difference
between the two rates was his profit. Baker wrote a member of Congress,
moreover, that the rates he charged shippers were lower than those charged
by regular truckers, lower in one example by 20 percent. By the early 1970s,
Baker directed operations in nine states and Canada.40
Although day-to-day activities of freight forwarding firms were simple,
freight forwarders had failed to achieve a legitimated standing within the
transportation community. One textbook writer described freight for-
warders as “a hybrid in the transportation field.” Freight forwarders were
also an anomaly in the regulatory regime. Although freight forwarders had
existed throughout the twentieth century, the position of forwarders had
been a highly contested issue in debates leading up to the Transportation
Act of 1940. Not until 1942 did Congress and the president extend the pro-
tection of rate and territory regulation by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to the freight forwarding industry. At that point, freight forwarders
gained the protection of public policy. Yet freight forwarders still lacked
many of the legal rights accorded regular truckers, particularly the right to
establish lower rates with railroads on long-distance and especially piggy-
back service. In 1956, leaders of freight forwarding firms had testified with
truckers in opposition to rate competition sought by Secretary of Com-
merce Weeks. At that same hearing, the president of the Freight Forwarders
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Institute, the industry’s trade association, asked for the right to handle por-
tions of the fast-growing piggyback business at the lower rates available to
certificated truckers. That request never went beyond the hearing stage. As
late as January 1968, then, the chair of the ICC could still inform members
of a congressional committee that “freight forwarders have a distinctly dif-
ferent status . . . than other forms of transportation.”41 Like their counter-
parts in railroading and in the diverse segments of trucking, during the years
after World War II, freight forwarders had boundaries to protect and
boundaries to expand.
By the late 1960s, freight forwarders were ready for another effort to
expand their operating authority. In the middle of a period of fast economic
growth, small shippers were complaining to Congress about inadequate
service. In 1967, Giles Morrow, attorney for the Freight Forwarders Insti-
tute since 1940, asked Congress to consider legislation that would allow
freight forwarders to negotiate rates with railroads for long-distance ship-
ments. Morrow had the support of ICC commissioners; and an official in
the new U.S. Department of Transportation characterized Morrow’s bill as
“bring[ing] greater equality of regulation among all of the various surface
modes of transportation.”42 Late in January 1968, members of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on Mor-
row’s bill. In opposition stood certificated truckers and several of their
allies, hoping to keep regulatory boundaries as they were—or perhaps to
roll them back.
Most of the witnesses Morrow had lined up to testify in favor of his bill
worked as owners and senior managers at small manufacturing firms. These
owners and managers shipped in small lots, and their plants were located in
remote places. One of Morrow’s witnesses, Milton Strickland Jr., worked as
office manager of the Kex Plant of Callaway Mills in La Grange, Georgia,
which manufactured industrial wiping cloths. Strickland and the others
made nearly identical observations about the lower charges and higher-qual-
ity service provided by freight forwarders. Strickland urged passage of the bill
“in order to maintain this service and enable the freight forwarder to hold the
line on increasing costs and rates.” Railroads serving his area, Strickland
reported, “have discontinued accepting small . . . shipments,” and approval of
this bill would “insure us a continued good service for our small shipments.”43
Each of Morrow’s witnesses argued for equality of legal treatment for
freight forwarders relative to common carriers. Both freight forwarders and
regular carriers operated trucks and delivered merchandise to the railroads
and elsewhere. Existing law, however, limited the ability of freight for-
warders to contract with the railroads for shipments beyond 450 miles.
Holders of common carrier certificates faced no such mileage restrictions.
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Strickland wanted Congress to “authorize the freight forwarder to enjoy the
same privileges motor carriers have been enjoying for some time.”44 Mor-
row’s witnesses affirmed the principle of equality of treatment and the desire
to retain or gain some economic advantage.
No one spoke more forcefully about guiding principles and trucking
profits than executives and attorneys representing the American Trucking
Associations, the national trade association. Despite decades of disagree-
ment between their member groups, including Robert McBride’s common
carriers and Vee Kennedy’s contract carriers, ATA officials still recognized
freight forwarders as an enemy in common. “This bill,” the ATA’s senior
attorney Peter T. Beardsley told a congressional committee in January 1968,
“would enable freight forwarders to enter into contracts with railroads . . . at
rates below those charged shippers for the same service.” In other words,
Beardsley worried that freight forwarders, by promising large shipments,
could demand that railroad executives offer especially low rates, rates that
might prove lower than those available to his trucking common carriers.
Passage of Morrow’s bill, contended Beardsley, would “multiply . . . the
opportunities for forwarders to take advantage of the carriers who transport
their traffic.” Granting this additional authority to freight forwarders, he
added, would “intensify an already-evil situation. . . .”45
Participants in American transportation politics often used counterat-
tack as a legislative strategy. In this case, attorneys for disgruntled leaders of
the ATA urged legislation that would strip freight forwarders of their already
limited operating authority. In particular, Beardsley wanted members of
Congress to eliminate the right of freight forwarders to contract with truck
operators for what he characterized as “unconscionably low rates.” Such
repeal legislation would eliminate the legal underpinnings of the freight for-
warder industry, leaving “all shippers on an even keel.” According to the pres-
ident of a trucking firm located in Tampa, moreover, defeat of Morrow’s bill
and enactment of legislation stripping freight forwarders of their (con-
stricted) operating authority would actually “produce the most equitable sit-
uation . . . possible for the benefit of the shippers and receivers of freight in
all parts of our country.”46 Consistent with the “lessons” truckers had drawn
from their historical experiences, whenever their operating rights were
threatened, truckers went on the legal and political attack.
Shippers came forward in support of Beardsley and his common carri-
ers, not Morrow and his freight forwarders. One of those shippers was Sam
Hall Flint, the vice president for distribution at Quaker Oats, a large man-
ufacturer of breakfast cereals. Flint also served as chair of the National
Industrial Traffic League, a shippers’ organization. Flint invoked images of
“excessive pressures” that forwarders would impose on railroads to achieve
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lower rates for themselves, leaving remaining shippers (perhaps including
shippers like Quaker Oats) to “pay . . . substantially more than the freight
forwarders for the same transportation services from the railroads.”47
In reality, the legislative situation had been deadlocked from the start of
the hearings. Few with experience in American transportation politics could
have believed that members of Congress would actually follow Beardsley’s
advice and strip freight forwarders of their operating authority. Introduction
of that bill, which truckers secured from a willing member of Congress,
advertised the potential weight and authority of the federal government
behind the insistence of truckers and shippers that they, not the freight for-
warders, were the long-standing victims of discriminatory legislation. That
was the symbolism of the moment.
Equally decisive early in 1968 was the decision of railroad executives not
to endorse Morrow’s efforts on behalf of the freight forwarders. As one rail
executive explained to members of the committee dealing with Morrow’s
bill, freight forwarders made extensive use of the railroads’ piggyback ser-
vice, and the fear among rail executives was that forwarders would use that
volume as “a means for negotiating lower rates.” Award of contractual rights
to freight forwarders, he feared, “will deteriorate into a system of give-and-
take bargaining,” creating a situation that “can only lead to a reduction in
railroad revenues.” According to the handwritten notes of a member of the
house committee, rail executives “opposed . . .” contract rates out of concern
that “FF [freight forwarders] could play one R.R [railroad] against another.”
In short, legislated boundaries separating forwarders, common carriers, and
railroads appeared essential to maintenance of railroad and trucker revenues.
When it came to freight forwarders, moreover, rail leaders were in no mood
to approve so threatening an idea as “give-and-take bargaining. . . .”48
Morrow’s bill was dead. On January 17, 1968, Fred H. Tolan, chair of
the legislative committee of the National Industrial Traffic League and a
consultant to western shippers, wrote clients that “western railroads yester-
day rescinded their support . . . that had earlier been obtained under freight
forwarder pressure.” Earlier, reported Tolan, executives of southern and
eastern railroads had decided not to support Morrow’s bill. So convinced
was Tolan that this bill would languish that he was not even planning to
make a statement before the House committee. Only if the bill “reaches the
Senate,” Tolan informed clients, would he “request time to appear.”49
This victory by Peter Beardsley and his ATA members over Giles Mor-
row representing freight forwarders added one more anecdote to the con-
viction among postwar politicians and journalists that truckers were unbeat-
able in American politics. Whether it was the truckers’ success in securing
approval of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act or in turning back Weeks’s idea about
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creating a “zone of reasonableness” in which markets would determine ship-
ping prices, no one at the time doubted the ability and willingness of truck-
ing organization leaders to mobilize members and legal talent for another
fight in Congress or another presentation before the ICC or a federal judge.
Excellent at protecting their boundaries, truckers, for all their legal and
political weight, could not extend them outward to shove aside the much-
disliked freight forwarders. Put in place between 1935 and 1940, during the
postwar decades the trucking industry’s structure lacked political malleabil-
ity and its submarkets (freight forwarders and common and contract carri-
ers, for example) were largely impermeable from inside or outside the truck-
ing industry. In this legal and political climate, railroad executives enjoyed
little ability to move boundaries of the regulatory regime in their own favor.
Railroads in the Aftermath of the Weeks Report
In 1955, leaders of the Association of American Railroads (AAR) produced
a leaflet titled “Mrs. Kennedy’s Five Pounds of Sugar.” (Like the American
Trucking Associations, the AAR served as the trade association for the
nation’s rail executives.) The leaflet featured a photograph of a middle-aged
woman with her left hand on top of a box of granulated sugar. The woman
was engaged in an animated discussion with the grocer in the checkout lane.
Presumably, that conversation was focused on the high price of sugar in her
home city of St. Louis. The leaflet’s authors pointed out that railroads could
bring sugar to Mrs. Kennedy from New Orleans at a reduced rate, but “the
proposed rate reduction is never put through” (emphasis in original). Regulation
of railroad rates and service, a railroad publicist wrote, “denies the public the
benefits of the most efficient form of transportation.”50
Railroad executives had published “Mrs. Kennedy’s Five Pounds of
Sugar” as part of their effort to secure approval in Congress of reduced reg-
ulation of rates as recommended by Secretary Weeks. Like President Eisen-
hower and the rhetorically adept truckers, railroad leaders had taken up the
cause of the consumer. The broad intent of rail executives was to operate in
a less fettered manner when it came to determining rates and determining
whether they could extend trucking services. In fields as litigated and lob-
bied as railroad use of trucks and railroad rate making, however, that rail-
road leaflet portraying Mrs. Kennedy’s concern about sugar prices repre-
sented only a fraction of the printed and spoken words prepared during the
postwar decades to influence legislators and ordinary citizens regarding the
adverse effects of the regulatory regime on consumers and on railroad prof-
its, employment, and service.
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Ultimately, the effort of railroad leaders to win support for Weeks’s pro-
posals proved ineffective. In response to the Weeks plan, energetic truckers
had mounted, as we have seen, a united campaign aimed at persuading
members of Congress that only regulation could protect “the best trans-
portation system in the world.” In June 1956, a writer for the New York
Times reported that railroad executives were engaged in “soul-searching”
regarding “repeated political defeats—defeats that are reflected in balance
sheets and income statements.”51 In short, the failure of Weeks and Eisen-
hower to bring about partial deregulation reconfirmed what rail executives
had believed since 1920 or before—that politics and public policy guided
railroad operations, and guided them adversely.
In retrospect, the importance of “Mrs. Kennedy’s Five Pounds of Sugar”
rested less on its failure to persuade in this one instance than on the leaflet’s
symbolic and literal connections to the strenuous efforts of railroad man-
agers to reduce costs, improve service, and avoid future defeats, especially
defeat of plans for deregulating railroad managers. During the 1950s and
1960s, leaders of the nation’s railroads also expended vast amounts of capi-
tal and energy to complete the dieselization of their fleets, launch substan-
tial piggyback service, and merge operations, including the costly and time-
consuming merger of the gigantic New York Central and Pennsylvania
systems. In the 1950s and 1960s, rail executives attempted both to reduce
regulation (when it suited their interests) and at the same time to run suc-
cessful businesses within the narrow confines that the regulatory regime
made available to them. Both strategies resembled elements of earlier policy
options that had failed to secure broad support among railroad leaders or
public officials—transport coordination in the 1930s and railroad consoli-
dation in the 1920s.
Diesels and Piggyback
Conversion from steam locomotives to diesel electric engines proved the
most important mechanical innovation of the postwar era in railroading.
The diesel engine possessed greater pulling power, operated at a lower cost,
and led to fewer maintenance problems than old-fashioned steam engines.
Up to 1945, operation of more than 2,800 diesel units had provided railroad
management with substantial evidence of diesel’s many advantages.52
After World War II, rail executives launched full-scale conversion to
diesel motive power. As historian Albert J. Churella explains, “[R]ailroads
. . . understood that, in order to achieve the full economies of dieselization,
they would have to eliminate all of their steam locomotives, along with
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related service and repair facilities, as quickly as capital constraints would
allow ” (emphasis in original). Even rail executives whose lines handled
shipments of coal switched to diesel. In 1956, executives of the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad, a line that carried vast amounts of coal, retired their last
steam engine in favor of an all-diesel fleet of locomotives. Within a decade
and a half following World War II, executives of every railroad had com-
pleted the process of dieselizing the American locomotive fleet. In 1960,
fewer than eight hundred steam engines remained in service. At that point,
reports railroad historian John F. Stover, “it was almost easier to find a steam
locomotive in a museum than one operating on a railroad.”53
Widespread use of diesel engines reduced operating expenses and
boosted railroad productivity. Diesel engines cost $125,000 to $200,000
each, approximately twice the price of steam engines. Officers at the mighty
Pennsylvania Railroad determined, however, that diesel locomotives pro-
duced cost savings ranging between 20 and 40 percent. “Most of these sav-
ings,” Churella finds, “accrued from the replacement of inefficient steam
locomotives with a smaller number of more reliable . . . diesels.” Equally
important, steam engines at the Pennsylvania and at every other railroad had
required maintenance on a daily basis, which meant that rail executives oper-
ated service facilities such as water-supply equipment across their lengthy
systems. Unlike those cumbersome steam engines, diesel engines remained
in operation for thousands of hours without service, eliminating the need for
daily repairs and far-flung maintenance centers. According to Stover, then,
the diesel locomotive “brought a revolution to the nation’s railways.”54
Just as the diesel was the most important innovation in railroad loco-
motives, the trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) represented a key change in freight
service. Basically, the trailer-on-flatcar, known popularly as a piggyback car,
represented a simple innovation. Trucks still picked up freight from ship-
pers. Instead of carrying that freight to recipients, however, drivers brought
it to a railroad depot, where railroad employees loaded the trailer portion of
the truck onto a railroad flatcar. In turn, the railroad carried that trailer long
distances, where it was unloaded, connected to another truck tractor, and
delivered locally. Trailer-on-flatcars provided more rapid and more eco-
nomical handling of general and specialized freight. Piggybacking also
“proved,” asserts Stover, “that railroaders could serve truck shippers.”55 Even
more, full implementation of piggybacking held out the promise that rail-
roads might yet secure a dream dating to the 1920s and emerge as trans-
portation companies, escaping the rigid confines of ICC rules.
The idea of a flatcar carrying a truck or container was an old one in rail-
road circles. As early as 1833, editors of Niles’ Weekly Register reported that
the Baltimore & Ohio offered piggyback service. During the 1920s and
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1930s, executives of several railroads, including the Pennsylvania and the
New York, New Haven & Hartford, offered piggyback service on a limited
basis as part of efforts to make themselves into transportation companies.
Only in the mid-1950s, however, did rail executives develop piggyback oper-
ations throughout their systems. Although an industry publicist later judged
trailer-on-flat-car “the transportation story of the decade,” up to that point
not even awareness of piggyback principles and their practical application at
the hands of managers at the well-known New York, New Haven & Hart-
ford (hereafter the New Haven) had fostered its widespread adoption.56
As with most innovations in the transportation industry, political and
legal factors had impeded implementation of piggyback service. For years,
as a retired rail and piggyback executive explained in 1962, “there was a fear
on the railroads that establishing trailerload rates would hasten the conver-
sion from carload [a railroad vehicle] to trailer [a truck vehicle], producing
little actual increase in volume.” Early in 1954, however, attorneys for the
Chicago & North Western Railway (C&NW) sought permission from the
Interstate Commerce Commission to offer door-to-door freight service to
multiple points between Chicago and Green Bay, Wisconsin. They pro-
posed using 100 percent railroad-owned equipment. Officials of the
C&NW had crossed the sacred line into the “field” of “another carrier.” In
June 1954, leaders of six eastern railroads, several of which had first experi-
mented with trucks and trucking in the 1920s, filed to engage in wholly-
owned, piggyback service. In response, attorneys for the American Trucking
Associations filed a protest, arguing that the railroads would be engaged in
highway transportation without certification, violating the operating rights
of ATA members. Nonetheless, ICC officials determined to permit this
“experiment” to begin and took the entire question under extended study.57
Until the 1950s, another of those interminable boundary disputes that char-
acterized most of the politics of the regulatory regime had delayed intro-
duction of trailers-on-flatcars. In this instance, however, officials of the ICC
relocated the boundary.
With this boundary moved in their favor, rail executives quickly inaugu-
rated service. By 1959, fifty-seven railroads offered piggyback operations.
Without doubt, railroads earned the greatest revenues when they solicited
traffic from shippers and picked up merchandise in their own trucks, bring-
ing it to flatcars. Under the new ICC guidelines, however, rail executives also
accepted piggyback shipments from truckers. As early as 1960, about 25 per-
cent of piggyback volume consisted of trailers owned by trucking firms.
Regardless of the truck’s ownership, the idea of piggyback service gained
attention among railroad executives and observers as a method for boosting
rail income in a period of fierce—and often unsuccessful—competition with
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truckers. Even though this experiment fit neatly with the late 1920s and
1930s dreams of several rail leaders and transportation experts who had
sought to promote coordinated ground transportation through transporta-
tion companies, in 1960, sober economists such as John R. Meyer and his
colleagues at Harvard University described piggyback as “not simply a trailer
on a flatcar but a new concept in railroading.” Regardless of the origins of
piggyback, in 1967, an industry writer predicted that “the word for piggy-
back’s growth well into the ’70s will also be ‘spectacular.’”58
Much of the growth in piggyback service came not from hauling gen-
eral freight, but from solid increases in specialty shipments such as automo-
biles. In 1959, railroads carried 8 percent of the nation’s automobiles from
manufacturers to dealers. Beginning around 1960, executives at lines such as
the Louisville & Nashville Railroad (L&N) launched a program of aggres-
sive solicitation of automobile business. As a start, they mounted trilevel
racks on flatcars, allowing carriage of twelve standard-size automobiles and
up to eighteen imported vehicles. Soon, L&N trains made daily trips from
the Ford Motor Company’s assembly plant in Louisville to Nashville. Yard-
men connected that train with another carrying automobiles manufactured
in St. Louis, creating a lengthy and lucrative run to ports such as New
Orleans. L&N sales personnel had also solicited import car business that
filled its trains’ racks for the return trip. Between 1960 and 1962, L&N’s
automobile business experienced a phenomenal increase of 3,800 percent. A
publicist in Louisville headlined the L&N operation as “piggybacking at
full throttle. . . .” By 1966, moreover, the average cost of shipping an auto-
mobile from the Midwest to the West Coast fell from $280 to $120. As rail-
road carriage of automobiles continued on the upswing, that same year opti-
mistic editors at Railway Age headlined that the “Growth of Auto Traffic
Shows What Rails Can Do.”59
In reality, the first decade of trailer-on-flatcar service never delivered
loads and profits comparable to the inflated predictions of railroad observers
and executives. Up to the mid-1960s, piggyback operations generated only
a small portion of railroad revenues—less than 2 percent in 1960 and only
about 5 percent in 1966, a boom year. Among participants and observers in
an industry unaccustomed to positive news, however, piggyback service held
out the promise of recovery, perhaps even the return of a solid prosperity.
“For the first time in 18 years of declines,” observed Daniel P. Loomis, the
president of the Association of American Railroads, in January 1965, “the
railroads’ share of total intercity freight volume has leveled off at 43 per-
cent.” According to Loomis, “[T]he piggyback surge has been crucial to the
railroad renaissance.”60 In the railroad business, even a leveling off in the rate
of decline was reason for self-congratulation.
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During the mid-1950s, railroad managers completed the dieselization of
their locomotive fleets and simultaneously launched piggyback service. Such
innovations promised cost reductions and service improvements that many
rail officials hoped would make up for limits on operations imposed by ICC
regulations. Yet not even strenuous lobbying campaigns, including the
efforts of Sinclair Weeks, had convinced Congress to change most of those
regulations. Nonetheless, optimistic railroaders, journalists, and politicians
told themselves and one another that even without reduced regulation,
innovations such as dieselization and piggyback would help restore the
competitive position of the nation’s railroads. During the 1950s and 1960s,
many in and out of the railroad business also believed that mergers would
lead to a restoration of profitability. At one point, so many mergers had been
consummated or planned that contemporaries described the merger move-
ment as a period of “mania.”
Merger Mania
Mergers were another component of the postwar effort to restore prof-
itability and luster to the nation’s declining railroads. Rhetoric of the peri-
od resembled that of another time of stress for the railroads—the period
after World War I, when members of Congress wrote consolidation into the
Transportation Act of 1920 as the solution to multiple problems. This time,
advocates asserted, mergers would reduce costs. Consolidated operations,
advocates further argued, would eliminate time-consuming transfers at rail-
road interchanges, leading to more rapid flows of merchandise between sell-
ers and buyers. According to railroad observers, regulators, and executives,
then, merged railroads would have greater success in meeting the fierce
competition for long-haul traffic brought by barge operators, airline man-
agers, and aggressive truckers. If ICC commissioners, truckers, and politi-
cians could block Sinclair Weeks’s proposals to reduce railroad rate regula-
tion, and if again ICC commissioners, truckers, and those same politicians
could prevent railroads from owning aircraft, steamships, or fleets of trucks,
then at least newly merged railroads, many contended, would provide long-
distance and uninterrupted service—at a profit.61 Like piggyback service
and dieselization of locomotive fleets, moreover, mergers, even the largest
mergers, kept railroad managers strictly inside the railroading domain that
ICC officials and politicians had allocated to them. Ironically, every merg-
er had to begin and conclude with the approval of ICC commissioners, and
sometimes with the approval of leading members of Congress, presidents of
the United States, and justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
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In 1957, merger of the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway into
the Louisville & Nashville Railroad kicked off the period of “mania.” In
1961, promises of improved service and cost savings, especially in yard
work, underlay the reasoning as leaders merged the Erie Railroad with the
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad, creating the Erie Lackawanna
Railroad. In 1963, a similar logic guided proponents of a merger between
the gigantic Chesapeake & Ohio Railway and the equally mammoth Balti-
more & Ohio Railroad. The combined firm included eleven thousand miles
of track and a hefty level of debt. In 1966, an observer concluded that
“merger madness has reached a peak.”62
Rather than allowing the movement—or madness—to peak and taper
off, rail executives pursued additional mergers. Like consolidation efforts in
the 1920s and 1930s or the mid-1950s, each new merger in the mid-1960s
built on the hope and promise of reduced costs and improved service.
“We’ve got a route now that nobody can beat,” an executive at the recently
merged Seaboard Coast Line Railroad reported to Railway Age in July
1967, and “we’re going to give the truckers a fit.” Early in January 1967, a
writer listed seventeen actions underway that involved the merger, control,
and consolidation of more than forty railroads.63
Ultimately, the merger movement, like virtually every organizational
and operational feature of American transportation, took place as a child of
the regulatory regime. In a system that had been constructed by public pol-
icy and by the politics of the day, one must not be surprised that shippers,
railroad executives, union leaders, and politicians had much to say about
proposed mergers. As noted above, railroad executives described mergers in
terms of improved economies and improved service, and the process, unlike
in the 1920s, was driven directly by the carriers’ executives rather than by
ICC experts. Even so, railroad executives could not act alone to merge oper-
ations. Merger negotiations and subsequent filings with the ICC threatened
economic and political relationships, including those of shippers located
along the rights of way, merchants interested in low-priced and predictable
deliveries, and employees, whether at the railroads or in plants, warehouses,
and shops along those same rights of way. As one example, in January 1965,
an assistant U.S. Attorney asserted that the proposed merger of the Great
Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company
with the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad “would entail a basic and
irreversible change in one of the most significant influences upon the eco-
nomic life of this area, upon its farm production and marketing [and] its
industrial production.” Against matters of such obvious weight and magni-
tude for the millions of Americans living between Seattle and Chicago, the
U.S. Attorney insisted that the promised benefits of the merger in the form
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION, 1949–1970 / 125
RSB_chap4_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:29 PM  Page 125
of cost savings for the railroads and service improvements for shippers
appeared quite modest.64
With the stakes of larger mergers raised so high, politicians inevitably
represented the financial, employment, and transportation needs of their
districts and states. Members of the U.S. Senate and House heard often
both from voluble merger enthusiasts and from those whose opposition was
equally passionate. These conflicts spilled into preliminary negotiations sur-
rounding a merger and extended though court filings and appeals. With so
many hurdles, the execution of railroad mergers sometimes extended over
the course of a decade or longer. In February 1965, publicists for the Asso-
ciation of American Railroads described the merger process as “costly and
often painful.” Indeed, attorneys representing the Great Northern and other
roads had filed preliminary merger papers with the ICC in 1961. Not until
February 1970, however, did the U.S. Supreme Court finally approve the
proposed merger, creating the Burlington Northern.65
Penn Central Merger
Efforts to merge the New York Central and the Pennsylvania Railroads
proved especially lengthy, conflicted, and politicized. The Penn Central,
reports historian Richard L. Saunders Jr., was “the big merger.” On
November 1, 1957, at the beginning of the period of “mania,” the presidents
of the New York Central and Pennsylvania announced from New York City
and Philadelphia their plans to launch “‘further studies’” regarding a merg-
er. The combined road, if it came into being, would hold assets of $5 bil-
lion, making it the nation’s tenth-largest corporation. With 184,000 em-
ployees and revenues of $1.5 billion annually, the new firm would dominate
railroad traffic in its region. Despite their large revenues and immense scale
of operations, however, during 1957 the Pennsylvania and New York
Central each earned less than 1 percent on their invested capital. Naturally,
the two presidents emphasized the immense savings that would materialize
through joint rather than competitive operations. In January 1959, the pres-
ident of the New York Central, with his “merge” button still affixed, called
off merger talks, handing what historian Saunders describes as a “humiliat-
ing rebuff ” to James M. Symes, the president of the Pennsylvania.66
In September 1961, Alfred E. Perlman, the president of the New York
Central, restarted merger talks with a telephone call to Symes. Merger of
the two lines still held out the prospect of creating a successful railroad.
Now, managers promised savings of more than $60 million a year, freeing up
funds for new investments; they hoped to create what historian Saunders
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characterizes as “a sleek technological machine that would drive all others to
the wall.” As complex negotiations and the inevitable litigation got under-
way, managers at both lines ordered costly and important improvements at
the New York Central’s freight yards in Buffalo, Detroit, and elsewhere, and
at the Pennsylvania’s key Conway Yard near Pittsburgh.67
Like the proposed merger of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific
with the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, the real business of combining the
Pennsylvania and New York Central rested not only with company execu-
tives, but also with politicians, union leaders, ICC officials, and judges. In
March 1962, attorneys representing the Pennsylvania and New York Cen-
tral filed for approval of the merger with the ICC. Hearings extended over
129 days and included 463 witnesses and appearances by 338 attorneys who
altogether produced 25,000 pages of testimony and another 100,000 pages
of correspondence, exhibits, and so forth.68
The purpose of producing such an immense body of information and
opinion was not to persuade with fact, logic, or sheer volume. Nor was any-
one asked to achieve mastery of the information produced in the hearings.
More important, reports historian Saunders, was “how their ox was going to
be gored.” As one example, leaders of weak railroads such as the Erie Lack-
awanna and the New Haven sought inclusion in the proposed merger with
a view toward protecting already weak routes and assets. Once the Pennsyl-
vania and New York Central merged, freight that the Pennsylvania had for-
merly delivered to the New Haven would remain on combined Penn Cen-
tral operations, leaving the New Haven out in the cold. As far back as 1961,
aides to President John F. Kennedy had sought a solution for the New
Haven’s many problems, highlighting the importance of that road for the
politics and economics of the New York region. On January 5, 1966, New
Haven trustees accepted an offer of stock, bonds, and cash from Pennsylva-
nia and New York Central executives to take control of the New Haven’s
freight operations (but not its passenger service). The New Haven’s trustees
had managed to dispose of what historian Saunders describes as a “cadaver-
ous railroad running up annual deficits of $15 million.” Later, a member of
the ICC described the merger as “a big grab bag,” suggesting perhaps that
crafty New Haven trustees had helped their sagging railroad to a handful of
undeserved resources. As much as railroad leaders liked to portray them-
selves as under siege from truckers and others outside of railroading, the
truth was that mergers also encouraged venality and competition from
within, especially when regional politics created such a strong position from
which to demand a payout.69 Much of the remaining history of the Penn
Central merger is a history of persons and organizations who possessed some
clout and a willingness to use it to nail down their share of the supposed
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION, 1949–1970 / 127
RSB_chap4_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:29 PM  Page 127
profits, protections, and luster that the new firm was going to provide.
Leaders of railway labor had jobs to protect. In 1959, future Pennsylva-
nia president Stuart T. Saunders had been president of the Norfolk & West-
ern Railway, a Pennsylvania subsidiary. Merger negotiations he was con-
ducting with leaders of the Virginian Railroad drew the antagonism of
union leaders, whereupon Saunders negotiated an “‘attrition agreement’”
with them. Following the merger, the company might transfer an employee
to another job, but Saunders agreed to rule out future layoffs. On May 20,
1964, Saunders (since October 1963, the CEO of the Pennsylvania) signed
a similar agreement with leaders of Pennsylvania and New York Central
unions. Like the earlier deal, Saunders and his union counterparts deter-
mined that management could transfer an employee to another worksite,
but layoffs or dismissals were not permitted. Saunders also agreed that per-
sons laid off between the date of the agreement and the actual merger were
entitled to reemployment. “Labor and its political allies had been silenced,”
writes historian Saunders of the merger, leaving it to politicians to protect
other workers and other politicians.70
Politicians defended the perceived economic interests of their con-
stituents, sometimes even before those constituents realized those interests
needed a defense. The mayor of Newark, New Jersey, sought a stop for pas-
sengers at South Newark and assistance with the city’s urban renewal pro-
gram. The governor of Pennsylvania and the mayor of Philadelphia worried
that executives of the merged Penn Central would eliminate railroad service
to the Port of Philadelphia. In 1964, however, Pennsylvania Railroad offi-
cials promised continuing service to the port, which left only the objection
of Philadelphia’s mayor, who feared loss of the Pennsylvania headquarters to
New York and consequent reduction in jobs and diminution of the city’s
prestige as a corporate center. With all the prosperity that the combined
railroad was going to spread around, was it not possible for both cities to
retain important Penn Central offices? Once again, Pennsylvania and New
York Central officials paid the price asked. The combined Pennsylvania and
New York Central would maintain its executive offices in Philadelphia
along with general offices in both New York City and Philadelphia.71
Maintenance of commuter service into New York City by the bankrupt
New Haven represented the largest problem facing politicians. “Commuters
on the New York and New Haven,” reported a New York Times journalist,
“have long been subjected to uncomfortable rides in trains that have deteri-
orated badly and often just break down completely.” With the opening of
the Connecticut Turnpike in 1959, moreover, additional commuters drove
to work, at once reducing revenues for the New Haven and increasing the
financial burden of repairing deteriorated equipment. In 1962, consultants
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for the trustees had recommended that “no more federal funds, over and
above those already committed, will be advanced . . . to meet operating
deficits.” In 1965, however, seven members of the U.S. Senate—all from
states in which the New Haven maintained commuter service—introduced
legislation to provide federal subsidies for continuing operation. The federal
and state governments subsidized highways, waterways, airways, and air-
lines, John O. Pastore, one of those senators, told a hearing on March 2,
1965, while “the New Haven has been required to maintain its own track,
roadbed and other facilities and to pay taxes on its holdings.” Pastore
insisted that “there is nothing wrong with the New Haven that cash won’t
cure.”72
For all of the pressures exerted, side deals arranged, and senatorial rank
brought to bear, commissioners of the ICC still exercised first authority over
mergers. On April 27, 1966, more than four years after the filing, members
of the ICC voted unanimously to approve the merger of the Pennsylvania
and the New York Central. Commissioners ordered the entire New York,
New Haven & Hartford included in the new Penn Central, not just its
freight system, but permitted managers to discontinue a number of its pas-
senger lines. Commissioners also ordered payments to the Erie Lackawanna
and two other railroads for traffic that would be lost. Appeals by disap-
pointed holders of New Haven bonds to the federal courts and eventually
the Supreme Court served to delay the actual merger until February 1,
1968, boosting the period between filing and merger to nearly six years. As
part of their finding in favor of the merger, justices cited the importance of
maintaining New Haven operations.73
Local observers and participants found much to celebrate in creation of
the Penn Central. With promised savings of millions a year and no job
losses, editors of the New York Times perceived “a new era in rail transporta-
tion.” Managers of the Penn Central, predicted editors, would “be in a posi-
tion to slug it out with truck and air carriers.” Politicians representing
homeowners located along the New Haven’s right of way were especially
excited. With the Penn Central financing part of the New Haven’s opera-
tions and with direct federal aid and funds from New York State bonds, no
longer would thousands of commuters have to worry about elimination of
their daily transportation to New York City. No longer, moreover, would
local politicians and developers have to fear for the economic vitality of
fashionable suburbs such as New Rochelle in the event the railroad col-
lapsed and those commuters sought residence elsewhere. Executives of the
Pennsylvania and the New York Central predicted costs savings, upgraded
facilities, maintenance of service on the New Haven, and no diminution of
freight over former Pennsylvania and New York Central tracks. Looked at
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over the long history of efforts to achieve integration of railroad firms and
their disparate, competitive, and uneconomic operations, historian Saunders
concludes that the “dream[s]” of “Albert Cummins to Louis Brandeis to
Walker Hines to Joseph Eastman . . . would now be realized in the Penn
Central merger.”74
The Penn Central merger realized only financial and political disap-
pointments. In part because of poor planning, confusion characterized
freight deliveries. Often, shipments ran days or even weeks late, and Penn
Central managers had trouble locating behind-schedule deliveries for anx-
ious shippers and receivers. According to historian Saunders, Penn Central
“computers were asked . . . to locate twenty cars known to be on the system,
[and] couldn’t find any of them.” “Penn Central’s service failures,” observed
a reporter for the Wall Street Journal on July 12, 1970, “include[d] every type
of complaint ever registered, and in greater numbers than ever encountered
on any other line.” Products undelivered meant that wholesalers and retail-
ers lost business. Products arriving late (rather than not at all) such as
“‘stale’” beer encouraged shippers to take their business to the Erie Lack-
awanna or to a trucking company.75
Only after the merger did company officials discover that the much-
celebrated computer system at the New York Central was incompatible with
its less well known counterpart at the former Pennsylvania Railroad. Incom-
patible computer systems also meant that financial data essential to sound
management were often incomplete, in error, or simply missing. According
to historian Saunders, “unsettled accounts went from $57 million shortly
after the merger to $87 million in January of 1970, to $101 million in March
1970.”76
Employees also judged themselves incompatible with one another.
Whatever the new name, employees thought of themselves as Pennsylvania
or New York Central, not Penn Central. Conflicts led to resignations of tal-
ented and energetic executives. Following the merger, more than ninety
members of the well-trained and successful marketing staff assembled at the
former New York Central resigned. Employee morale remained low, espe-
cially among those who attempted to make a poorly planned merger work
for shippers and riders.77
Starting in late 1969 and into early 1970, a declining economy con-
tributed to the woes of Penn Central managers. The harsh winter of
1969–1970 added more costs to a fast-growing list of expenses. On June 12,
editors of the Wall Street Journal published an article titled “How Decaying
Service, Bickering Officials Led to Penn Central Crisis.” On June 21, 1970,
directors of Penn Central sought the protection of bankruptcy, at that time
the largest in American history. Company directors cited a “severe cash
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squeeze . . .” and the inability “to acquire from any source additional work-
ing capital.” In keeping with the political dimension of rail operations, a
New York Times writer reported that President Richard M. Nixon rejected
the request of Penn Central executives for a loan guarantee of $200 million
on the grounds that the “political risks were too great.”78 Whether the Penn
Central would have survived in a less hostile and less self-interested regula-
tory environment or in a faster-growing economic environment is unknown,
and unknowable. In 1970, politics and public policy informed virtually
every activity at the Penn Central, including its bankruptcy application and
requests for last-minute resuscitation.
In 1955, leaders of the nation’s railroads had launched their final drive
for deregulation with leaflets such as “Mrs. Kennedy’s Five Pounds of
Sugar.” Deregulation, they believed, was vital to successful competition with
aggressive and savvy truckers. Unable to alter the structure of the trans-
portation industries and prohibited from reaching into markets dominated
by truckers, rail executives such as Alfred Perlman completed the dieseliza-
tion of their locomotive fleets and launched ambitious piggyback programs.
No effort to reduce costs and overtake truckers held out more hope for rail-
road leaders than the great merger movement, the “mania.” Rail executives
young and old believed that mergers promised cost savings and service
improvements. That mergers were inconsistent with the professed commit-
ment of rail executives to restored competition was one of those inconsis-
tencies that never attracted much attention.
Conclusion
During the years after 1956, the Weeks report and the earlier report of
Commerce Secretary Sawyer took their places on the dusty shelves of
research libraries along with previous schemes to revamp the nation’s rail
system. Nevertheless, Weeks’s report and President Eisenhower’s endorse-
ment of it had caught the attention of economists, transportation execu-
tives, and politicians. Among those industry and policy activists, the exhil-
arating and frightening ideas contained in the Weeks report reverberated
through policy circles up to the partial deregulation of the trucking and
railroad industries in 1980. For a quarter-century, however, everyone with
something to protect (such as truckers) were enraged at the prospect of
price competition inside of a “zone of reasonableness”; and everyone with
something to gain (such as railroad executives and railroad workers) want-
ed some limited form of freedom—the zone of reasonableness—within
which to adjust rates and operations.
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The battle about the organization of the transportation industries and
regulation of the many transportation markets assumed several forms, again
depending on whether one stood to gain or lose. Truckers wanted to protect
the rate bureaus through which they engaged in collective rate making that
Congress had exempted from antitrust scrutiny in 1948. Truckers also
sought to protect their operating rights, which in effect were licenses
awarded by the ICC that allocated territories and commodities to individ-
ual firms within distinct fields of trucking such as Robert McBride’s com-
mon carriers and Vee Kennedy’s contract carriers. The system of operating
rights and rate bureaus founded by truckers like Lewis Raulerson set the
terms for every aspect of trucking operations. This system of operating
rights enforced by the ICC placed severe limits on the ability of the Bonacci
brothers to increase their scale of operations. Equally, the system of operat-
ing rights, including the “tacking” of those rights, had framed the growth
strategy that Abner Glikbarg and his associates employed to create the
gigantic Pacific Intermountain Express. Ultimately, ICC enforcement of the
system of operating rights and rate bureaus established boundaries that
defined common and contract carriers as regular players in the system, and
that left little room for freight forwarders, who remained as peculiar out-
siders. Savvy truckers and their attorneys, such as Neil Curry and Peter
Beardsley, took the fight to preserve the boundaries of this regulatory regime
to the courts, Congress, and to the White House. Between 1955 and the
early 1970s, they defended “the best transportation system in the world.”
Starting around 1970, however, as political leaders focused increasingly on
the high prices paid by “consumers,” truckers’ rhetoric, litigiousness, and
political tactics—which had served them so well during the previous four
decades—began to seem battle-weary and fragile.
As early as 1949, railroad leaders sought partial deregulation, even coin-
ing the term “zone of reasonableness.” Those same rail leaders continued the
drumbeat of rate-deregulation talk with publication of catchy flyers such as
“Mrs. Kennedy’s Five Pounds of Sugar.” Given the difficulty of modifying,
let alone abolishing, the regulatory regime, rail executives such as James
Symes at the great Pennsylvania Railroad introduced costly changes in
equipment and service with a view toward boosting profitability. Complete
dieselization of their locomotive fleets comprised one part of that competi-
tive strategy. Piggyback service was another favored device for improving
returns. So was the much-touted period of merger “mania” that started in
the mid-1950s and culminated in 1968 with merger of the gigantic Penn-
sylvania and New York Central lines, creating the Penn Central. Piggyback
service and mergers were among the few profit-seeking innovations permit-
ted to railroads under rules of the regulatory regime. Indeed, architects of
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each merger and especially the great Penn Central merger had to take
account of the myriad stakeholders along the way, including politicians and
workers seeking security or a payout.
Every president after Eisenhower also took up aspects of industry struc-
ture, rates, and “free markets” that Sawyer and Weeks had sought to change.
Put another way, President Eisenhower had launched a process whereby
elimination of barriers between truckers and railroads (and other “modes”)
and elimination of politically constructed transportation submarkets such as
contract and common carriers became part of the institutional office of the
president. Subsequent presidents and their staff members, moreover, did not
delve into the details of or even much care about rate bureau operations or
about the extended efforts of truckers to defend their operating rights
against one another or freight forwarders. Instead, each president and his
staff perceived transportation as part of a broader canvas—a canvas in which
the president of the United States assumed overall responsibility for the
functioning of the nation’s economy. During the 1960s, President Lyndon
B. Johnson and his senior officials took up the deregulatory idea with a view
toward “fine-tuning” the American economy. Starting in the 1970s, Presi-
dents Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter looked to
deregulation of transportation and other industries as a device that would
reduce the costs of production and consumption in an economy character-
ized by fast-rising prices and fast-rising unemployment—the dreaded
stagflation. Ironically, bankruptcy of the great Penn Central in June 1970 set
President Nixon on the path toward deregulation. President Nixon made
deregulation thinkable again. During the 1960s and 1970s, deregulation
was largely a presidential initiative. For President Lyndon B. Johnson and
his senior aides, deregulation, once achieved, would not only fine-tune the
economy, but help construct a presidential nation.
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ON NOVEMBER 22, 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson became president of the
United States, replacing the assassinated John F. Kennedy. In November
1964, Johnson was elected president by a vote of forty-three million to
twenty-seven million. Johnson believed that his tremendous victory rested
upon popular enthusiasm for the details of his domestic agenda, labeled the
Great Society.1 Stripped to the bone, however, much of the public relations
hoopla surrounding Johnson’s Great Society amounted to an effort by
senior federal officials to substitute a memorable and quotable phrase such
as the Great Society for the old and messy business of centralizing federal
agencies and approving new policies that would hasten the pace of eco-
nomic growth.2 As part of efforts to boost economic growth, Johnson
intended to revamp the federal government’s transportation programs.
During the Johnson years, economists and journalists described the process
of seeking faster economic growth as “fine-tuning.”
In July 1965, Johnson asked Joseph A. Califano, his top aide for domes-
tic policy, to oversee efforts to create a Department of Transportation. In
turn, the new secretary of transportation—a presidential appointee—would
centralize control of planning and spending on federal promotional pro-
grams such as runway, highway, and waterway building and simultaneously
start the process of eliminating regulation of transportation firms. In the
short run, moreover, Johnson and Califano sought authority for the presi-
dent to appoint the chair of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Yet
Johnson’s Great Society for transportation was not only a program of cen-
tralization and deregulation. Eventually, top officials in the proposed trans-
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Proposals to seek “broad-scale deregulation [had to be] considered
carefully in light of the strong political reaction.”
—Alan S. Boyd, Undersecretary of Commerce for 
Transportation, 1965
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portation department would guide private truck, rail, air, and water-carrier
firms in the direction of national systems of transport, leading to easier
movement of persons and merchandise from ship to rail, air, or truck. Here,
then, was the rebirth of the idea of federal transportation coordination that
Joseph Eastman and others of the Depression era had promoted. By the
1960s, however, creation of a department of transportation comprised not
only one part of building the Great Society, but also one part of building
what Califano later described as “a Presidential Nation.”3
Several of Johnson’s proposals for bringing the Great Society and its
economic fine-tuning to transportation encouraged solid opposition among
trucking and barge management and leaders of their unionized workforces.
Since the late 1930s, trucking industry leaders such as Abner Glikbarg and
the more smaller Bonacci brothers had built firms and shaped relationships
with suppliers, employees, and customers inside the confines of the regula-
tory regime. As we have seen, Glikbarg and the Bonaccis and every other
certificated trucker regularly endorsed the workings of the ICC in protect-
ing their firms from severe price competition that might follow a diminu-
tion of operating rights or the loss of antitrust immunity for their rate
bureaus. At the same time, politicians and especially senior members of the
U.S. Senate and House were accustomed to exercising solid influence in
writing complex formulas that dished out the cash for highway and runway
construction, shipbuilding, and river navigation projects directed by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
In October 1966, members of Congress approved creation of the U.S.
Department of Transportation, bringing scattered programs such as the
Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Aviation Agency into one
agency. As the price for congressional approval, however, Califano and
Johnson had dropped demands for deregulation, direct presidential control
of spending on transportation improvements, or even inclusion of the Mar-
itime Administration in the new department. Not even Johnson’s proposal
to have the president appoint the chair of the ICC survived congressional
fear of centralized authority, or at least centralized authority that many
judged threatening to regulated carriers, their employees, and congressional
prerogatives. Although Johnson and Califano created a Department of
Transportation, they could not win authority to undertake the larger goals
of reorganizing the transportation industries and restructuring transporta-
tion markets. As late as 1968, however, Alan S. Boyd, the new Secretary of
Transportation, still spoke in optimistic terms about fostering deregulation
and improving coordination among participants in the nation’s transporta-
tion systems.
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President Kennedy and American Transportation
In November 1960, president-elect John F. Kennedy started this particular
search for deregulation and administrative centralization. Like Johnson
after him, Kennedy sought to speed up the pace of economic growth, and
more efficient transportation was part of that overall goal.
Following his election, Kennedy asked James M. Landis to prepare a
report on the state of the nation’s regulatory agencies, reprising to an extent
the efforts of Joseph Eastman for Franklin Roosevelt. Landis was a brilliant
legal thinker with wide administrative experience, including prior services as
dean of the Harvard Law School and chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
In December 1960, Landis reported to Kennedy that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission “lacks positive direction” and that the methods of the
Civil Aeronautics Board produced “inordinate delay” and “a failure to do
forward planning” that “promote[ed] . . . air commerce.” According to his-
torian Thomas K. McCraw, “in less than six weeks” Landis had produced a
“merciless dissection of the commissions’ failures.”4
No one solution or even several, Landis believed, could remedy the many
problems that encumbered regulatory agencies. At the outset, however, he
recommended administrative changes, including the often-discussed idea
that Congress empower the president to appoint the chair of the ICC. In
turn, Landis hinted at creation of a department of transportation that would
enhance presidential authority. “Evolution of a national transportation pol-
icy,” Landis asserted, “must have a close and intimate relationship to the
President.” Equally, Landis urged Congress to authorize mergers “within
and between different modes of transportation.” Although Landis did not
say so specifically, he had to realize that permitting mergers between, say,
truck and railroad corporations would lead to creation of transportation
firms that would compete with or even supercede companies that provided
only truck, rail, or even air services. Although Dean Landis had served as
one of the architects of the regulatory regime, in 1960 he presented one of
the first systematic attacks upon its existence.5
Historian McCraw finds that Landis’s “powerful arguments for regula-
tory reform found a receptive ear at the White House.” On April 5, 1962,
President Kennedy sent a Special Message to the Congress on Transporta-
tion. Kennedy complained about the presence of “a chaotic patchwork of
inconsistent and often obsolete legislation and regulation.” Kennedy wanted
“less federal regulation and subsidization”and he also urged “a more coordi-
nated federal policy and a less segmented approach.”6 Presidents Hoover,
Roosevelt, and Eisenhower had made similar recommendations. By the early
1960s, moreover, members of a new and rising generation of transportation
economists, including Paul W. MacAvoy, John R. Meyer, and George W.
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Hilton were urging deregulation of the transportation and other industries.
In the short run, Kennedy and Landis failed to create a department of
transportation or bring about deregulation of the nation’s transportation
industries. In 1962, neither members of Congress nor leaders in the trans-
portation industries were prepared to award additional authority to the
executive branch based upon the urgings of a president or the say-so of
Dean Landis and a few professors of economics. McCraw finds, however,
that Kennedy’s legislative recommendations had the effect “for a season . . .
of draw[ing] the public’s attention to the seriousness of long-neglected
problems.”7
President Johnson and Creation of a Department
of Transportation
Beginning in mid-1964, President Johnson took his turn at trying to bring
about deregulation and build a transportation department.8 Johnson sought
to make transportation firms and federal transportation agencies part of his
Great Society and part of a presidential nation. Like President Eisenhower,
Johnson also chose to avoid conflict with truckers and others who liked
most aspects of regulation. Ultimately, the politics of the day encouraged
Johnson and his aides to award first priority to assembling a transportation
department rather than seeking deregulation. Johnson’s search for legisla-
tion leading to the transportation portions of the Great Society started with
the report of his Task Force on Transportation Policy.
In June and July 1964, President Johnson created fourteen task forces.
Reports of these task forces, Johnson told his cabinet on July 2, would “pro-
vide the background for discussion among the Cabinet agencies and the
White House in formulating the 1965 legislative program.” In short, John-
son’s task forces would create outlines for legislating the Great Society, but
done in the Johnson way. Johnson insisted that members of these task forces
deliberate in secret. According to political scientists Emmette S. Redford
and Richard T. McCulley, secrecy encouraged “candor, even boldness”
among task force members, qualities that the president found lacking in
federal officials “dedicated to preserving the status quo.” Just as important,
secrecy allowed the president to “consider . . . policy options and . . . politi-
cal feasibilities.” Secrecy, according to Redford and McCulley, made it pos-
sible for President Johnson to “maintain . . . his mastery of the process.”9 At
the outset, shaping the details of the Great Society was also part of the
process of shaping a presidential nation.
During mid-June 1964, Kermit Gordon, director of the Bureau of the
Budget, prepared an initial list of names of members of the Task Force on
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Transportation Policy. As had often been the case in efforts to define and
shape transportation policy, the aura of “objective” expertise retained a spe-
cial appeal to politicians, and each person on Gordon’s list was an econo-
mist. This pattern reflected the growing perception among policy leaders,
including Gordon, that economists really could articulate ideas leading to
national economic growth. As a member of the President’s Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers during 1961–1962, moreover, Gordon would have been
keenly aware of the scholarly and policy preferences of his junior colleagues.
In turn, Gordon selected members of a younger generation of economists
who had already begun to criticize government regulators and government
regulations. As early as 1959, John R. Meyer (and several colleagues), a Har-
vard University economist and one of the persons selected for the commit-
tee, had recommended “a substantial reduction in government regulation of
transportation and heavy reliance on the forces of market competition to
insure services and rates.” Gordon himself described George W. Hilton, the
task force’s future chair, as an “economist with emphasis in transportation
regulatory problems.”10 By selecting George Hilton and John Meyer and
other economists for membership on the transportation task force, Gordon
had largely predetermined the task force’s orientation toward the prospect of
changing federal transportation policies.
Budget director Gordon also determined the agenda of the transporta-
tion task force. He sought “better cost data” on rail, truck, and other freight
operations. Data on costs, he contended, would help determine “areas in
which the possibilities of intra-modal competition make deregulation desir-
able.” Anyone in the trucking industry would have recognized that
intramodal competition meant that Vee Kennedy’s contract carriers and
Robert McBride’s common carriers would be permitted to compete directly
with one another. As another part of the agenda he had in mind, Gordon
wanted members of the task force to report on “the charter of the new
Department of Transportation,” which, when operating, would “lay the
groundwork on which a basic re-evaluation of Federal transport policy could
be evolved.” Members of Hilton’s transportation task force would focus on
both deregulation of freight rates and enhanced coordination of federal
investment in transportation facilities.11 At the outset, Budget Bureau direc-
tor Gordon had sketched a program of transportation coordination and
deregulation more ambitious than anything prepared by Joseph Eastman for
Franklin Roosevelt or by Sinclair Weeks. Gordon and other members of the
Johnson administration knew what they wanted by way of policy changes,
and now it was up to Hilton and his associates to deliver.
On November 16, 1964, members of Hilton’s task force submitted their
report to the president. At the core of large number of proposals stood the
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same two ideas that Gordon had recommended months earlier. First,
Hilton and his colleagues advocated deregulation of freight rates and easing
of entry requirements into fields such as trucking. “Entry” was the word that
policymakers and transportation officials often used to describe the system
of operating rights that limited common and contract carriers to certain
commodities on certain routes, and that shut out others such as freight for-
warders from soliciting for that business. If Hilton and his committee mem-
bers had their way, moreover, the federal government would repeal the
Reed-Bulwinkle Act permitting rail and truckers’ rate bureaus to determine
prices. The nation’s transportation system, they contended, would “best
serve the Great Society if it operates . . . with highest attainable efficiency.”
Creation of markets following elimination of rate and entry regulations,
committee members added, could lead to railroad ownership of trucking
companies, a course of action they described as consistent with their goals
of “flexibility and experimentation.”12 Again, here was a plan for reorganiz-
ing transportation industries and restructuring transportation markets.
Hilton’s task force also endorsed Gordon’s second goal, creation of a
department of transportation. Leaders of the department, as the committee
reported, would coordinate federal investment in transportation such as
highways and ports and allow the secretary of transportation to present a sin-
gle point of view to regulatory agencies dealing with rates and operating
rights. As presently constituted, Hilton’s committee reported, federal trans-
portation policy appeared “not a policy but many fragments of a policy.” Dur-
ing the mid-1960s (as in previous decades), one way to solve a political
dilemma was to create a federal agency, hoping that centralized administra-
tion by nonpolitical experts would foster presidential authority and eliminate
the give and take of ordinary politics. Curiously, members of the transporta-
tion task force had found achieving consensus difficult, which ought to have
suggested the greater difficulty ahead in writing a program that satisfied
truckers and others with deep stakes in a fragmented-regulatory regime.13
Early in July 1965, Lyndon Johnson asked Joseph A. Califano to find
the next level of agreement. Califano, then thirty-four years old, had grad-
uated from the College of the Holy Cross and Harvard Law School. Before
moving to the White House as coordinator of Johnson’s domestic policy
agenda, Califano worked directly under Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara as a systems analyst. Califano carried ideas about systems from
discussions among military, engineering, and business leaders to the offices
of presidential aides.
Beginning in July, Joseph Califano served as the White House staff offi-
cer in charge of coordinating construction of what he subsequently labeled
a “presidential nation.” A presidential nation for transportation, Califano
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later wrote, consisted of a “single executive [who] had the authority to shape
and conduct a coherent policy that promoted the public’s interest in mod-
ern, cheap . . . and fast transportation.” At the outset, Joseph Califano sought
centralization of $6 billion in federal transportation spending and one hun-
dred thousand federal employees in the office of the president. In Califano’s
version of a presidential nation, the president would take responsibility for
“fine-tuning” the American political economy.14
Califano turned to another committee for advice on how to assemble the
transportation components of that presidential nation. Members of this
committee included senior officials assigned to the Council of Economic
Advisers and the Departments of Commerce and Treasury. Alan S. Boyd,
formerly chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board and recently appointed by
Johnson to the post of Undersecretary of Commerce for Transportation,
served as chair. On August 12, only eighteen days in office, Califano
directed Boyd to prepare a report on the “pros and cons” of creating a
Department of Transportation and on how to bring about “greater flexibil-
ity in the regulation of transport rates.” Califano also charged Boyd and
members of his committee to examine the recommendation of another task
force that the president appoint the chair of the Interstate Commerce Com-
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FIGURE 15. Joseph A. Califano directed President Lyndon B. Johnson’s effort to create a
Department of Transportation. Johnson and Califano sought to centralize the federal gov-
ernment’s transportation activities and simultaneously foster deregulation of railroads and
truckers. Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. Used with permission.
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mission. In all, Califano sought “a vigorous and imaginative program for
consideration by the Second Session of the 89th Congress.”15
Whatever Califano’s preferences for an imaginative program, he relied
for a detailed set of recommendations on federal officials long steeped in the
politics of regulation. No idea carried more weight in their deliberations
than the often-repeated admonition that truck operators liked regulation
and would energetically oppose deregulation. Given that perception, the
best for which Califano could have hoped was a cautious set of recommen-
dations. On August 27, now one month into his new assignment, Califano
dropped the demand for imagination and vigor in favor of “concrete pro-
posals and goals toward which the Great Society can move.”16 In this itera-
tion, the Great Society appeared as a legislative program capable of secur-
ing a majority vote in Congress.
On September 2, Boyd submitted the report of his committee to Cali-
fano. In principle, Boyd endorsed “more flexibility in regulation . . . [and]
greater reliance on competitive market forces.” Yet proposals to seek “broad-
scale deregulation,” he advised, had to be “considered carefully in light of the
strong political reaction.” Even on the question of creating a department of
transportation, Boyd urged restraint. Agreement among senior federal offi-
cials for creation of a transportation department appeared “widespread.”
Boyd, however, judged that it “would represent a major legislative effort.”
The one idea Boyd endorsed without reservation was that of making the
chair of the ICC a presidential appointee.17
Early in September, Califano had an unambiguous recommendation for
only one of his “concrete goals,” that of presidential appointment of the ICC
chair. On September 11, Arthur M. Okun, a member of the President’s
Council of Economic Advisers, found Boyd’s proposals “sure-footed, slow-
paced, [and] cautious,” adding that “they pussyfoot particularly on deregu-
lation.” President Johnson, Okun believed, “is going to be disappointed,
unless something is done to break the traffic jam.” On September 13, a
senior official in the Bureau of the Budget characterized the state of delib-
erations as that of “transportation chaos.”18
Once again, Califano took charge of planning for transportation legisla-
tion. On September 22, Califano wrote Johnson that he would meet in a
few days with Boyd and another senior official and “ask them to consider
and prepare papers,” leading to creation of a department of transportation
(or some reorganization of the executive transportation functions) and a
“program of deregulation to make transportation rates more competitive
and rational.” At the bottom of that memo, Johnson wrote “Hooray.”19 In
Califano’s hands, administrative centralization and deregulation remained
the orders of the day.
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By mid-October, now having served three months as the president’s
domestic policy adviser, Califano had presided over a process of consolidat-
ing and limiting the scope of proposals for changes in federal transportation
policy. A program described by economist Okun a month earlier as “pussy
footing” in the area of deregulation had nonetheless begun to congeal. On
October 12, however, Califano characterized his recommendations for Pres-
ident Johnson as “streamlining our government and getting us out of the
old, outmoded regulatory structure.” During the next year, he added, with
transportation and other legislation in place, “the President and the Con-
gress should be the Great Managers, the Great Administrators—the archi-
tects of efficient, effective government.” Altogether, he asserted, this legisla-
tion, including transportation legislation, constituted a process of
“organizing our Government for the Great Society.” According to historian
Robert Dallek, President Johnson already believed that “consolidation of
control in the executive assured greater economy and efficiency.”20 Whatever
the mix of flattery and policy recommendation, by October Califano had
redefined the Great Society as an organizational phenomenon.
Early in December, Califano launched negotiations with railroad execu-
tives and with senior officials of barge and truck firms. The idea, he told
President Johnson, was “to explore the views of everyone interested on a
totally confidential and off-the-record basis.” In addition, Califano asked
Johnson’s permission to talk with Senator Warren G. Magnuson, chair of
the commerce committee. Califano wanted to “get Magnuson’s agreement
to keep an open mind before any interests (particularly the trucking inter-
est) get to him.”21
Among executives and politicians associated with the transportation
industries, however, rare were the persons who had not adopted a point of
view. For example, Stuart Saunders, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad,
told Califano and presidential aide Lee C. White that he wanted “an inte-
grated transportation set up.” In the sometimes arcane language of the
transportation industries, that phrase since the 1920s had meant that “rail-
roads should be permitted to acquire trucking companies.” Leaders of truck-
ing firms, however, reported that rail ownership of trucking operations
served—as always—as an area of “great anxiety” for them. Truck operators
also perceived “plenty of vigorous competition in the industry today,” and
expressed concern that “any movement to deregulate would bring a return to
chaos and irresponsibility.” Provided no changes were made in regulatory
policy, however, truckers expressed willingness to approve creation of a
department of transportation, leading President Johnson in an optimistic
moment to tell Califano that “‘we’re going to get our Department of Trans-
portation.’”22
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Discussions with Senator Warren Magnuson and Representative Harley
O. Staggers reinforced the view that creation of a department of trans-
portation might prove politically feasible, but that deregulation had no sup-
porters. On January 10, 1966, Lee White learned that Magnuson was
“strong” for creation of a department of transportation and for presidential
appointment of the chair of the ICC. In these areas, Magnuson was so
favorably disposed that he even wanted to introduce the legislation. Simi-
larly, Staggers endorsed the idea of creating a transportation department.
On January 25, Staggers also told White that he “had no difficulty” with the
idea that the president would appoint the chair of the ICC. As for propos-
als to deregulate the transportation industries, Staggers “predicted bitter
opposition and controversy over them.” Equally, Magnuson, according to
White’s memo to the president, “believe[d] that they should not be submit-
ted and that they won’t get anywhere if they are.” According to political sci-
entists Emmette Redford and Marlan Blissett, “the bold and imaginative
program [originally sought by Johnson and Califano] had become, for the
moment, two structural reforms—a department of transportation and a
presidentially designated chairman of the ICC.”23
On March 2, President Johnson sent a message to Congress urging cre-
ation of a department of transportation and presidential appointment of the
chair of the ICC. Despite the scaled-down program he was proposing,
Johnson invoked the idioms of centralized control and rapid economic
growth. “We must clear away the institutional and political barriers which
impede adaptation and change,” he told members of Congress. At the same
time, Johnson, sounding like President Roosevelt and Joseph Eastman,
asserted that “we must coordinate our transportation agencies in a single
coherent instrument of government.” Such a program, he contended, would
“strengthen the national economy as a whole.”24
Early on, political and business leaders joined in expressions of enthusi-
astic support for Johnson’s proposals. Citing opportunities to achieve what
he labeled “effective leadership” and “vigorous administration,” Governor
Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon urged members of his state’s congressional del-
egation to vote in favor of the transportation bill. Equally, on March 23,
members of the executive committee of the American Trucking Associa-
tions held a special meeting to consider the pending legislation. Truck exec-
utives “applaud[ed]” what was described as “the President’s recognition” that
regulatory agencies “should remain unaltered.” Those same trucking execu-
tives did voice concern about the contents of Section 7, an obscure portion
of the bill dealing with the authority of a secretary of transportation to deter-
mine what were known as transportation investment standards. On balance,
however, trucking leaders notified the press that they favored creation of a
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department of transportation. “I am . . . gratified,” the savvy executive direc-
tor of the ATA wrote Califano on March 30, “to officially stand up and be
counted.”25
No sooner had truckers and maritime officials finished endorsing John-
son’s proposals in general than they and others organized to block approval
of several parts of it. The ensuing legislative struggle often revolved around
arcane matters. For example, leaders of the American Trucking Associations
had gone along with Califano and Johnson’s plan to create a department of
transportation. ATA leaders, however, disliked the section in Johnson’s
transportation department bill that would permit a future Secretary of
Transportation to determine transportation investment standards. Equally
troublesome was Johnson’s proposal to include the Maritime Administra-
tion as part of the new transportation department.
Opposition to presidential determination of transportation investment
standards—known as the Section 7 controversy—appeared first. In short,
the question was whether Congress would permit the secretary of trans-
portation, a presidential appointee, to coordinate federal construction of air-
ports, roads, and waterways, including projects undertaken by the influen-
tial engineers at the well-funded Federal Highway Administration and U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. As early as March 29, 1966, Senator Magnuson
had expressed concern about replacing “able individuals like the heads of the
FAA and the Bureau of Public Roads . . . with planners.” On April 29, Mike
N. Manatos, Johnson’s liaison to the Senate, reported to Johnson on his con-
versation with the staff director of the Senate Committee on Government
Operations, a committee chaired by the powerful Senator John L. McClel-
lan. Members of the committee, Manatos reported, were engaged in “nego-
tiations . . . to find language with which ‘the committee could live.’” If John-
son agreed to delete Section 7, Manatos had learned that “you’d have a bill
almost immediately.”26
By mid-May, others among President Johnson’s top officials were pre-
dicting legislative doom, unless Johnson agreed to drop the unpopular Sec-
tion 7. On May 11, Alan Boyd, one of the bill’s principal architects, wrote
commerce secretary John T. Connor that amendments to Section 7 pro-
posed by members of Congress would “leave the Secretary of Transportation
with less freedom than he would have in the absence of Section 7 alto-
gether.” With the presence of Section 7 now placing “the entire bill . . . in
jeopardy,” Boyd urged its elimination.27
Inclusion of the Maritime Administration in the new department of
transportation comprised a second area of contention. The Maritime
Administration provided construction and operating subsidies to owners of
the nation’s shipping fleet. Labor leaders had long joined with their coun-
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terparts in executive offices in supporting those subsidies, creating a formi-
dable coalition in meetings with congressional and presidential leaders. In
this instance, labor and management opposed inclusion of the Maritime
Administration in the proposed department of transportation. Sounding
like airline executives fighting possible regulation by the ICC during the
1930s, maritime leaders feared a loss of clout if the federal government’s
vast water-borne shipping programs were subsumed in a much larger
agency less susceptible to their immediate and combined influence. In turn,
a loss of influence, management and labor officials had concluded, might
mean construction of fewer ships and creation of fewer jobs. Participation
in a unified department of transportation with emphasis by administrators
on transportation coordination threatened maritime autonomy and
finances. Altogether, report political scientists Redford and Blissett, “the
real issue . . . [was] money.” On May 12, one of President Johnson’s aides
reported “growing pressure on you to ‘do something’ in the maritime field.”28
The struggles regarding the Maritime Administration and the arcane
Section 7 controversy comprised only the most visible portions of a grow-
ing concern among congressional and transportation officials about the loss
of control of federal subsidies for highway building and other construction
and safety programs related to transportation. The best way to maintain
control of programs, argued critics of Johnson’s proposal, was to transfer
agencies such as the Federal Highway Administration directly into the new
department of transportation. Members of Congress and leaders in the
transportation industries described this desire for the continuing indepen-
dence of their favorite transportation agencies with phrases such as “legal
entity” and “modal autonomy.” Whether called a legal entity or any other
name, the idea was to transfer agencies such as the Federal Highway
Administration and the Federal Aviation Agency directly into the new
department of transportation. Senator Mike Monroney, nicknamed “Mr.
Aviation,” was also insisting on Senate confirmation of agency heads. As
Monroney complained during hearings, he did not want agency adminis-
trators (such as the administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency)
“report[ing] to the secretary [of transportation] ‘through a barricade or layer
of assistant and under secretaries.’”29 In 1966, Monroney stood four-square
behind the policy of continuing the Civil Aeronautics Board and the avia-
tion industry as separate and distinct from railroading, trucking, and water-
way carriers. Whether or not he knew the history of American transporta-
tion policy, Monroney also stood foursquare behind a continuation of the
fragmented transportation programs and policies put in place in 1940, and
scorned during the 1960s by James M. Landis, by budget bureau director
Kermit Gordon, and by members of George Hilton’s task force.
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Leaders of trucking, barge, or railroad firms rarely or never conceptual-
ized in such abstract terms as legal entities, vesting, or presidential nation.
These executives and their union counterparts knew, however, what they
liked, and what they feared. They feared deregulation and they liked the way
federal policy had fostered creation of separate and distinct air, rail, barge,
and truck industries, including the many subcategories of trucking such as
common and contract carrier. In turn, truckers and nearly everyone else
associated with one of these distinct transportation “modes” feared enhance-
ment of presidential authority at the expense of federal officials such as the
Federal Highway Administrator and officials of the Corps of Engineers,
who had long supported generous programs of road building, airway guid-
ance, and river improvement. Within a few weeks of hearing Johnson’s mes-
sage, transportation executives organized to protect the autonomy of federal
agencies upon which their firms and industries had come to depend. For
example, on March 16, W. J. Barta, president of the Mississippi Valley Barge
Line, expressed concern to about 150 transportation executives regarding
what he had identified as a new transportation policy. That new transporta-
tion policy, Barta contended, raised the prospects of rate deregulation and
railroad ownership of barge companies. Equally, an executive of a trucking
company raised questions about such matters as investment criteria fixed by
a secretary of transportation and inclusion of the Bureau of Public Roads in
a transportation department. Truck operators had long supported the
autonomy of the Federal Highway Administration with its emphasis on
highway spending, especially spending to complete construction of the
high-volume Interstate Highway System. At this point, the Section 7 con-
troversy—who would determine investment standards for waterways, roads,
and airport runways—had become merged with the legal entity debate. By
April 6, as members of a house subcommittee opened hearings on the trans-
portation bill, editors of Traffic World published an article reporting “More
Doubts on Dep’t of Transportation.”30
Califano and Boyd agreed to delete many of the aggravating sections. As
early as May 24, Califano had told Senator McClellan “that there would be
no problem on Section 7.” On May 30, Califano accepted relative autonomy
for each of the agencies scheduled for transfer to the new department of
transportation. The revised transportation bill would “designate . . . four
modal Administrations—Aviation, Highway, Maritime, and Rail.” As long
as these modal administrators reported to the secretary of transportation,
Califano and Boyd believed that they had preserved the principle and per-
haps the long-run potential of enhanced presidential coordination of trans-
portation activities as a whole.31 As Joseph Eastman had learned in 1935
when attempting to bring all transport regulation inside the ICC, consoli-
dation of authority was very difficult.
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House and Senate leaders wanted more than these partial concessions.
Congressional leaders continued to talk about vesting and the transfer of
legal entities. As before, the real question was whether day-to-day author-
ity in an area such as highway construction would reside (vest) with the
Federal Highway Administrator or with the secretary of transportation. No
one supported vesting with agency administrators more than Senator
Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson of Washington. During the first weekend in
August, Boyd and three other members of the administration met with
Senator Jackson’s aide in a room on the second floor of the White House.
Whatever their doubt or doubts about vesting, they thrashed out an agree-
ment providing that in areas of safety, decisions of the rail, air, and other
administrators were “administratively final and not subject to Secretarial
review.” Apparently, the phrase “administratively final” provided the preci-
sion judged lacking in vesting, the older phrase meant to carry the concept
of modal autonomy. “Senator Jackson is delighted with the draft language
developed over the weekend,” Boyd wrote Secretary of Commerce John
Connor on August 9, “and accepts it as his own.” Recognizing the limits he
had accepted, on August 30 Califano wrote President Johnson that “safety
can be so broadly defined that it can embrace virtually every function”
(emphasis in original).32
Still looming was a determination about whether Congress would
approve movement of the Maritime Administration from the Department of
Commerce into the proposed Department of Transportation. Between
August 23 and August 25, aides to President Johnson, including Califano,
negotiated with members of a joint group of ship operators and union lead-
ers. On this issue, executives of shipping firms and their union counterparts
spoke as one. While Califano and other administration officials articulated
the promise of enhanced efficiency and coordination that would follow cre-
ation of a transportation department, leaders of the joint labor-management
group invoked images of “a ghetto of relative insignificance” for the nation’s
shipping industry. According to notes prepared by an assistant to Califano,
members of the maritime group sought “a preferred position for the Mar-
itime Administration in the new Department,” especially creation of a “sub-
sidy board.” Despite Califano’s promise of “a new maritime program” as the
“first order of business” once the transportation department was launched,
by the morning of August 25, a union negotiator had determined “that there
can be no deal short of the Maritime Administration as a separate indepen-
dent agency.”33
Maritime leaders also possessed the clout to secure a portion of what they
wanted. On August 30, members of the U.S. House of Representatives voted
190 to 63 not to move the Maritime Administration to the Department of
Transportation. According to historian Dallek, George Meany, President of
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the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations,
had “effectively pressured House members into excluding merchant ship-
ping from department control.”34 In all, members of Congress and industry
leaders had supported creation of a department of transportation, but not
one that included the Maritime Administration, deregulation, or the now-
infamous Section 7. Congress had even refused to award the president
authority to appoint the chair of the Interstate Commerce Commission. For
the moment, the operating rights and rate bureaus that truckers so prized
remained safe from the presidential grasp. In addition, the idea of the 1940
transportation act—that each “type” of transportation enjoys its own regu-
lation and its own promotional agency—remained secure in federal law.
On October 15, 1966, Johnson presided at a signing ceremony for legis-
lation creating the U.S. Department of Transportation. On Johnson’s orders,
leaders of the Maritime Administration were not invited. Johnson told
guests that the transportation department would “have a mammoth task—
to untangle, to coordinate, to build the national transportation system for
America that America is deserving of.” In the language of rural America
that politicians sometimes invoked, Johnson added that creation of the
department represented “another coonskin on the wall.”35
Only the day before the signing, an official of the Bureau of the Budget
had reminded Johnson that the pending legislation left out the maritime
administration and placed “restrictions on the authority of the Secretary”
(emphasis in original). On balance, that official recommended that the pres-
ident sign the bill, contending that it “will allow the new Secretary of Trans-
portation to assume leadership in formulating and executing our national
transportation policy.” The rhetoric of the Great Society and a presidential
nation was that of administrative coordination. Not even Johnson’s invoca-
tion of rustic metaphors, however, could obscure the impressive triumph
won by his opponents who had advocated the continuing autonomy from
the presidential grasp of federal transportation agencies and the privately
owned transportation firms that enjoyed specialized operating rights and
antitrust exemption.36
Following the bill signing, Califano resumed his efforts to place addi-
tional authority over transportation spending, regulation, and coordination
in the president’s hands. Perhaps with more energy on his part, Califano
reasoned, members of Congress and transportation officials would concede
the importance of centralized management aimed at speeding the pace of
national economic growth. On October 25, Califano created another com-
mittee, this one under the direction of John Connor, the secretary of com-
merce. Califano directed Connor to plan transportation legislation for the
next Congress. Once again, Califano wanted plans that were “vigorous and
imaginative” and that included presidential appointment of the chair of the
148 / CHAPTER 5
RSB_chap5_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:30 PM  Page 148
Interstate Commerce Commission. Califano also wanted proposals that
would lead to enhanced flow of merchandise and passengers from one
transportation system to another, as for example the fast-growing business
of transferring containers from ships to rail and truck.37
By late 1966, however, appointment of another committee and the use
of overworked and overblown phrases such as “vigorous” and “imaginative”
proved only an exercise. Califano and Johnson had exhausted their negoti-
ating skills and resources. “The Transportation Department bill had been
the toughest legislative fight of the 89th Congress,” Califano reported years
later. That fight, he added, had consumed “perhaps 15 percent of my time
in 1966 and required almost daily presidential attention.” Altogether, Cali-
fano concluded, “we could not afford an effort like that again.”38 At or near
the peak of his authority as president, not even Lyndon Johnson possessed
sufficient clout to create a transportation department, including a secretary,
authorized to coordinate among leaders of truck, rail, air, and barge indus-
tries or break open to the many submarkets of transportation such as Vee
Kennedy’s contract carriers and Robert McBride’s common carriers.
Appointment of senior officials to the new Department of Transporta-
tion might still yield a part of what Congress had refused. As a start, John-
son appointed Alan Boyd as the first secretary of transportation. Before tak-
ing up the post of undersecretary of commerce for transportation in 1965,
Boyd had enjoyed years of experience in managing large and complex trans-
portation systems, including service as a member and chair of the Civil
Aeronautics Board and as a member of the Florida Railroad and Public
Utilities Commission. Whether as an undersecretary or as the secretary-
designate, however, Boyd had long disliked the reality of transportation as a
mishmash of trucking firms, railroads, barge lines, air carriers, and as yet
another mishmash of federal programs for road building, waterway devel-
opment, or aides to airlines. Instead, Boyd envisioned the nation’s trans-
portation in terms of interconnected systems that would deliver materials
and personnel from ship to rail to truck or air in a nearly frictionless fash-
ion. In turn, Boyd looked forward to the prospect of guiding the nation’s
transportation systems and investments in the direction of newly emerging
concepts such as logistical science and away from a process perceived as
endless negotiations and litigation among regulators, shippers, and carriers
about such mundane and self-serving matters as operating certificates,
rights-of-entry, rate bureaus, or whether railroads could own trucking com-
panies. Sounding like Joseph Eastman, Boyd judged those deliberations
“picayune.”39
The presence of the large Department of Transportation whose officials,
including Alan Boyd, emphasized ideas such as systems and intermodalism
did foster diffusion of those concepts among business and political leaders.
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On January 31, 1968, approximately eight hundred transportation execu-
tives and political leaders gathered for a meeting and luncheon at the Wal-
dorf Astoria Hotel in New York City. Presentations at the meeting revolved
around topics such as transportation logistics and methods for improving
the coordination of freight between surface, water, and air carriers. The lun-
cheon speaker, Senator Monroney, who had so energetically supported relo-
cation of agencies to the transportation department as “legal entities,”
alerted his audience to dramatic changes coming to transportation politics.
“In the not too distant future,” Monroney contended, Congress will “wres-
tle with such issues as deregulation of rates, intermodal ownership, and
removal of entry controls.” As it was, he contended, “existing statutes mili-
tate against a system approach to transportation.” Monroney added that “I
do not relish the legislative fray that will occur.”40 Even in his use of the new
language of systems and intermodalism, Monroney (as well as every truck
operator) expressed a preference for the traditions and security of the regu-
latory regime that had been given its final legal form in 1940. In the midst
of the prosperity of the mid- and late 1960s that was buoying up revenues
for large segments of the rail, air, and trucking industries, moreover, no one,
it appears, wanted to enter that fray.
Beginning in 1969, members of the administration of President Richard
M. Nixon assumed direction of the nation’s political economy, including its
transportation networks. During the 1960s, President Johnson had dealt
with transportation as part of the politics of managing growth. During the
1970s, Nixon and his successors dealt with transportation and other indus-
tries as part of the politics of economic decline—a decline marked simulta-
neously by rising levels of unemployment and rising levels of inflation. Like
Johnson, Nixon sought to build a presidential nation. Consequently, Nixon
followed Johnson in urging greater centralization of authority in the office
of the president. Nixon even secured congressional approval for presidential
appointment of the chair of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Rather
than using his new and existing authority to “fine-tune” the American polit-
ical economy, however, President Nixon and his senior advisers settled on
deregulation as the cure for the problems of transportation and for many of
the problems of the economy as a whole. Not until the late 1980s did senior
political figures return to Johnson and Califano’s efforts to use federal
authority to foster coordination and intermodalism. Instead, the 1970s
started with bankruptcy of the Penn Central and ended late in 1980 with
deregulation of railroads, trucks, and airlines.
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IN RESPONSE TO the Penn Central bankruptcy, President Richard M.
Nixon launched a sustained effort to deregulate trucking firms and rail-
roads. Deregulation, if it came about, would shift authority in this field of
ground transportation from the Interstate Commerce Commission—and
the president, who appointed its members—into the hands of executives of
rail and trucking companies. In the face of rising prices and declining
employment, moreover, Nixon abandoned difficult-to-achieve goals such as
fostering improved coordination among truckers, railroaders, and operators
of other “modes” in favor of the more straightforward task of diminishing
or eliminating barriers among transportation markets, as for instance
between common and contract carriers. During the early 1970s, however,
Nixon could not identify a constituency who would join him in lobbying
Congress for deregulation. When heads of trucking firms along with Frank
E. Fitzsimmons, leader of the powerful International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, refused to support deregulation, Nixon, like Eisenhower and
Johnson before him, chose not to press the matter with members of
Congress. By 1972, electoral politics took precedence over the politics of
deregulation. Although Nixon ultimately failed to support his own deregu-
lation proposals, he had nonetheless helped move the idea of deregulation
from the realm of the thinkable—where Eisenhower and Kennedy had left
it—into the mainstream of American politics.1 Equally, by securing
approval from Congress for presidents to appoint the chair of the ICC,
Nixon also placed a powerful tool for deregulation in the hands of his suc-
cessors.
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Richard M. Nixon and Planning for 
Deregulation, 1970–1974
Prospects [for achieving deregulation] are being diminished by what
is being perceived as a failure on the part of the Administration to
back the bill.
—Presidential aide David M.Gunning to Peter M. Flanigan, 
May 11, 1972
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Nixon and Deregulation
As had happened with Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower, a
railroad crisis encouraged President Nixon to focus on transportation and,
in this case, to restart the drive for deregulation. On Sunday, June 21, 1970,
attorneys for the gigantic Penn Central Railroad entered federal court seek-
ing the protection of bankruptcy. “The biggest and most heralded merger in
railroad history,” reported the Wall Street Journal, “has turned into a disas-
ter.” Stuart T. Saunders, former chair of the board of Penn Central, told
members of the Senate commerce committee that the railroad industry,
including Penn Central, had “been hit hard by the recession, inflation, tight
money, and high-interest rates.” Bankruptcy at Penn Central, he added, had
come to pass not because of “mismanagement,” but because of “problems
which were unmanageable.”2
As historian Allen J. Matusow explains, Nixon’s senior economists
thought that the economy was “tottering” and that bankruptcy of the Penn
Central Company, if it came, “just might bring it down.” Not just another
large railroad in declining economic health, contemporaries calculated that
collapse of the Penn Central would boost unemployment by several hundred
thousand and affect shipments for nearly half of the nation’s factories. Even
before the official announcement of the bankruptcy action, President Nixon
was prepared to take action. On June 4, according to notes taken in secret by
presidential aide John D. Ehrlichman, Nixon told members of his inner
group of advisers that “this railroad must be saved.” Nixon authorized a pack-
age of federal loan guarantees for Penn Central, which would keep the firm
operating. Nixon instructed his staff, however, that Secretary of Transporta-
tion John A. Volpe, not the White House, should “carry” the loan package to
Congress. Otherwise, the president told aides that he wanted the company’s
debts paid off, nonrailroad assets sold, and Saunders “kick[ed] . . . out as pres-
ident and executive.”3 Rhetorically at least, Nixon was appointing himself to
the post of acting receiver for the Penn Central.
The Penn Central bankruptcy and its potential for upsetting the nation’s
economy and the federal budget also encouraged Nixon to consider innova-
tive policies. Nixon sought to accomplish more than a quick fix for railroad
finances such as the loan guarantees. At a meeting held on March 5, 1970,
(more than three months before the Penn Central filed for bankruptcy),
Nixon had directed senior officials in his administration to review the idea
of deregulating trucking firms and railroads. (In 1970, airlines still retained
their special status as the first line of defense in the cold war.) At that meet-
ing, Nixon urged study of the railroad problem “on a broad basis.” As part of
that broad review, Nixon instructed transportation secretary Volpe to “see
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[the] Council of Economic Advisers.” Like their predecessors and a grow-
ing number of contemporary economists, members of the council advocated
deregulation of transportation.4
Volpe’s meeting with members of the council turned into another gov-
ernment committee. This one, however, was focused on deregulation. Early
in May, two months after the president’s directive to Volpe, members of a
group entitled the Subcommittee on Transportation held their first meet-
ing. Hendrik S. Houthakker, a member of the Council of Economic Advis-
ers, served as chair of the committee, which included senior officials located
in the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Labor, Justice, and the
Office of Management and Budget. At the outset, members of the com-
mittee had the appearance and ideological commitments of Presidents
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson’s earlier task forces and committees that
had promoted the idea of deregulating transportation.
Although Houthakker and his colleagues were disposed toward the idea
of reducing government’s role in transportation, a memo prepared by Peter
M. Flanigan focused their deliberations on the idea of deregulation in par-
ticular. On May 4, before the committee had met, Flanigan, an assistant to
President Nixon for commercial and economic matters, sent a memo to
each member of the committee. The purpose of their upcoming meeting, he
informed Houthakker and the others, was “to discuss how the Administra-
tion can best proceed in bringing about less restrictive regulation.” As part
of the memo, Flanigan included an “options paper” prepared on May 1 by a
member of the committee that sketched topics such as “deregulation strat-
egy objectives.”5 As part of their role in a presidential nation, senior aides to
the president had set out the framework for committee deliberations possi-
bly leading to reduced government regulation of transportation.
In their report, members of Houthakker’s subcommittee repeated con-
cerns about the cost and effectiveness of transportation services that had cir-
culated among federal officials since at least Herbert Hoover, and that had
prompted discussions about deregulation since the presidency of Dwight
Eisenhower. On September 22, Houthakker and his associates told mem-
bers of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy that “regulation has led
to rates which are generally higher than they would be in the absence of reg-
ulation and to an inefficient utilization of national transport resources.” In
turn, members of Houthakker’s subcommittee recommended that the
administration pursue a program leading to “decontrol of transportation.”6
In 1964, members of a task force created by President Johnson had used the
word “decontrol” rather than “deregulation,” suggesting that six years later
deregulation still lacked a political context and a historical narrative known
to policymakers.
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Whether described as decontrol or deregulation, leaders of the Nixon
administration proceeded cautiously. Similar to leaders in the Eisenhower
and Johnson administrations, the question before Nixon’s top aides was
whether the economic benefits of deregulation would prove worth the effort
and political risk in trying to bring it about. In January 1970, before the
Penn Central crisis peaked, Nixon had concluded that a broad, consumer-
oriented coalition could be assembled around the idea of deregulating trans-
portation. Nixon told his advisers that “consumerism” enjoyed a “hi [sic]
public interest” and appeared “flamboyant” and “sexy.” In turn, organized
consumers, it was hoped, would offset the certain arguments of truckers and
teamsters that deregulation would destroy operating rights and the work of
their rate bureaus and was thus certain to bring financial losses and lower
wages. In December 1970, however, Virginia A. Knauer, Nixon’s adviser on
consumer matters, reported a sense of “skeptic[ism] that the aid of the
national consumer organizations could be successfully solicited” in support
of a program of deregulation.7
In the absence of general enthusiasm among consumer organizations to
lobby for deregulation of trucking and railroads, Nixon’s and his top officials
determined to create their own coalition of deregulation enthusiasts. This
coalition, it was hoped, would be composed both of shippers and long-
suffering railroad executives and their union counterparts. In that way, polit-
ical risk, policy change, and a restoration of economic growth might still
prove compatible. Consultations and coalition building began in June 1971,
with Peter Flanigan and President Nixon serving as the lead officials.
Richard Nixon was the first president to meet with railroad managers
and workers regarding deregulation. Nothing said at these two meetings had
not been repeated, and repeated often, since 1949. According to notes pre-
pared after the meeting held on June 10, railroad executives blamed union
work rules and delays in bringing about mergers. “Proposed mergers,” they
reported, had “been delayed from seven to nine years,” which appeared
“inexcusable.”8 Even a year after the Penn Central bankruptcy, rail execu-
tives were still hoping to revive their companies with additional mergers.
Nixon promised to secure a speedup in merger approvals. What Nixon
really wanted, however, was the help of railroad executives in building polit-
ical support for eliminating or at least reducing regulation. Unlike attorneys
at the U.S. Department of Justice who had delayed mergers, Nixon
reminded rail leaders that members of regulatory commissions were inde-
pendent, making it “more difficult to get faster action in the regulatory
process.” Nixon believed, nonetheless, that “most of the regulatory commis-
sions are obsolete in the way they function.” Only “a drastic overhaul” of reg-
ulatory agencies could “meet the needs of the times.” Nixon urged rail lead-
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ers to help bring about that overhaul. “We need grassroots support” that
would “get Congress moving on some of these things.”9
In his meeting several days later with fourteen railroad labor union offi-
cials, Nixon learned that they blamed regulators and managers—not work-
ers or work rules—for the many problems affecting their industry. Charles
Luna, president of the United Transportation Union, told Nixon that rail-
road management had purchased nonrailroad firms, creating conglomerate
businesses that led to “railroading becoming secondary to the conglomerate”
(emphasis in original). As for labor’s productivity, a commonplace topic in
the industry, Luna asserted that “freight in transit moves only 2 hours in
24,” demonstrating, he contended, “the need for better management.” Rail-
roads had to prosper, all agreed, but not, as Luna put it, “out of the pock-
ets of the working men.” Still another union president, Charles R. Pfen-
ning of the American Train Dispatchers Association, reported to Nixon
that “labor . . . [was] not the basic problem.” Instead, according to Pfenning,
“the heart of the matter . . . [was] unfair regulatory practices.” Only a few
months earlier, in fact, a leader of one rail union had told a reporter that
“‘we’re going to have to get back to the original philosophy of free compe-
tition.’” The ICC, he concluded “should be abolished.”10 Much as Flanigan
and Houthakker were hoping, leaders of railroad labor appeared ready to
join that “grassroots” effort aimed at eliminating a portion of the regulatory
regime.
Now that the president and his assistants had met with rail and labor
leaders, executives of firms that shipped in large quantities wanted to articu-
late concerns about regulation at their own private meetings with presiden-
tial officials. Railroad executives, a Cargill executive wrote Flanigan on July
6, “have each had an opportunity to express themselves at meetings in the
White House,” adding that now it was time “that the people who pay the
bills be afforded the same courtesy.” Again, no one said anything that had not
been said before. Always articulate and well versed in converting economic
ideas into policy pronouncements, one executive supported increased com-
petition in transportation on grounds of “ferret[ing] out some of the ineffi-
ciencies that currently plague the industry.”11 In other words, large shippers
blamed regulators and regulations for high transportation costs.
By early July, members of the Nixon administration had completed this
first round of “grassroots” organizing. On July 9, John Glancy, an assistant
to Peter Flanigan, outlined the “probable sources of support and opposition
for proposed deregulation bill.” Truck operators, as Flanigan and others had
learned in separate meetings at the White House (and much as everyone
had expected), would “strenuously oppose” deregulation measures such as
limitations on rate bureaus in setting rates or curbs on operating rights that
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would permit more truckers to enter a lucrative route. Equally, Glancy
believed that teamster leader Frank Fitzsimmons “will probably take [a]
position . . . much like those taken by the trucking companies.” As for lead-
ers of the rail unions, Glancy reported that they would support deregulation
plans that permitted railroads to abandon unprofitable lines. “The rail
unions,” Glancy pointed out, “would like to share with the railroad compa-
nies in the pecuniary benefits from abandonments.” Like their counterparts
in the trucking industry, however, railroad leaders disliked the “idea of
removing anti-trust immunity for some rate bureau activity.” Although, as
senior officials had learned, large shippers favored many of their deregula-
tory proposals, “smaller shippers are likely to be more timid and some will
support the truckers’ position on these issues.” Nor could Nixon and his
aides rely on leaders of farm groups to endorse deregulation, because farm-
ers “now benefit from below-cost rail rates.” Indeed, on July 9, the acting
secretary of agriculture wrote Flanigan that “agriculture would be giving up
a lot and getting very little in return.”12 In mid-July 1971, that “grassroots
support” for rail and truck deregulation that Nixon and his aides were seek-
ing was nowhere in sight.
Despite Glancy’s pessimistic appraisal, by early August 1971 Nixon’s
aides had prepared draft legislation proposing partial deregulation of truck-
ing and railroading. That bill, as Glancy explained to another senior official
on August 6, aimed to “reduce regulation of surface freight transportation in
certain respects,” including reduced authority for rate bureaus to set rates
and limiting truckers’ operating rights, an idea that was increasingly
described as easing entry for competitors.13 The twin goals at this early stage
of deliberations were first to rescue ailing railroads and second to boost the
overall pace of the nation’s economic activity by attacking price and route
restrictions that every certificated trucker such as Abner Glikbarg and the
Bonacci brothers had long and enthusiastically supported. The next and
most important step in assembling that “grassroots” coalition was to secure
the approval of Frank Fitzsimmons, general president of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. Like truck owners, however, Teamster jobs and
high wages depended on that same set of price and route restrictions.
On August 18, Flanigan and Fitzsimmons met for a period of two
hours. Flanigan recognized, he told Fitzsimmons, that a “community of
interest existed between the Teamsters and the Truckers.” At the same time,
Flanigan observed, leaders of trucking groups had entered objections to
many aspects of the administration’s proposed deregulation bill, such as their
objection to “freedom to reduce rates and some limit on rate bureau activi-
ties.” Flanigan also told Fitzsimmons that “all of the objections . . . were
probably not shared by the Teamsters,” suggesting that Flanigan hoped to
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split teamsters from truckers on part of their proposed plan of deregulation.
“Fitzsimmons listened to the details of the proposal,” Flanigan noted, and
then “voiced two objections.” Elimination of rate bureaus in determining
single line (not interlined) rates, Fitzsimmons feared, could “lead to serious
inequities where a [trucking] company will grant a shipper an advantage in
one competitive market in order to secure its business in other markets.”
Fitzsimmons also worried about the consequences that would follow easing
of entry rules, or what he described as “removal of geographic restrictions in
certificates.” Removal of those restrictions, asserted Fitzsimmons, could
boost tonnage carried by larger trucking firms, but “could well spell the
death bell for the local truckers.”14 Teamster leaders such as Fitzsimmons
could also talk the language of truck company managers and owners who
had long preferred maintenance of a rigid wall between railroads and truck-
ers as well as maintenance of segmented trucking markets, as for instance
between common and contract carriers.
On October 22, Flanigan responded by letter to the issues Fitzsimmons
had raised at their meeting and later in writing. Members of the Nixon
administration, Flanigan wrote, had been trying to “to work out ways of
meeting the concerns you expressed.” In terms of plans to reduce the immu-
nity of rate bureaus, Flanigan explained that the goal was “eliminat[ion] of
regulatory delays” that would, in turn, allow “both shippers and carriers . . .
to receive the full benefits of the contemplated rate flexibility.” Flanigan,
moreover, promised a “floor” on rate reduction, a floor “below which no
motor carrier could lawfully go.” Here, then, was a modified version of the
railroads’ proposal dating from the late 1940s to establish a “zone of reason-
ableness.” As Flanigan knew, however, truckers and teamsters identified
terms such as “rate flexibility” as a euphemism for the destruction of their
rate bureaus and for a period of rate wars, losses, and layoffs judged soon to
follow. “Members of the Nixon administration,” Flaningan assured Fitzsim-
mons, possessed “no desire to see a return to unrestrained cutthroat compe-
tition in the trucking industry.”15
On October 22 and 23, Fitzsimmons held separate meetings with
Charles D. Baker, an assistant secretary in the Department of Transporta-
tion, and with John N. Mitchell, the Attorney General. Only a month
before, on September 22, a senior official had written Flanigan that legisla-
tion aimed at making it easier for truckers to enter new routes would produce
“the battle of our lives.” Mitchell, however, still wanted to “meet Fitzsim-
mons at least half way.” Mitchell’s reasoning was that “Fitzsimmons will be
in a position to offset, to some extent, trucker opposition.” What Mitchell
and Baker also determined at those meetings was that “we could go ahead
with the deregulation bill . . . without jeopardizing the overall relationship
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between the Teamsters and the Administration.” On October 28, Flanigan
informed top officials in the Nixon administration, including Attorney
General Mitchell, that a bill seeking partial deregulation of surface trans-
portation would go forward.16 For now, risk taking for economic growth
took precedence over legislative and electoral risk.
Politics soon took over. In a replay of Eisenhower’s failure to support
Weeks’s limited deregulation proposal, no sooner had the bill gone to Con-
gress than leaders in the Nixon administration failed to lobby energetically
for its approval. As early as October 1971, a leader of a farm group reported
that Flanigan appeared more concerned about “what the hell the carriers
were going to say, rather than with the shippers’ reactions.” Still enthusias-
tic nonetheless about this proposed legislation, on October 29, John Glancy
recommended that Flanigan “talk . . . with some of the key people on the
Hill,” including Representative Gerald R. Ford and Senator Norris H. Cot-
ton. By November 24, however, Glancy reported to Flanigan that “I didn’t
leave the meeting this morning feeling very reassured about our program for
pushing” the deregulation bill (and an accompanying bill providing loans
and grants to railroads). Glancy complained that “we haven’t yet done much
with the general press or in the speech-making area.” Although Glancy
believed that shippers were “giving the bills some solid support,” he worried
that Russ Murphy, a new member of the staff, “seems to have little appetite
for the job of developing contacts with the key people in the world of ship-
pers.” By May 1972, following months of inaction, Flanigan learned that
deregulation-minded staff at the Department of Justice and the Council of
Economic Advisers “believe that . . . prospects [for achieving deregulation]
are being diminished by what is being perceived as a failure on the part of
the Administration to back the bill.”17
Truckers and teamsters were not waiting to learn whether Flanigan and
his aides were prepared to “back the bill.” Not only did truckers and team-
sters still possess much of their celebrated clout, but they were willing to use
it to block the administration’s legislation. On June 30, James M. Beggs, the
Undersecretary of Transportation, wrote Flanigan that “bills have emerged
from both sides of the Hill” that include “no” reduction in the authority of
rate bureaus to determine rates, and “no” restrictions on operating certifi-
cates, the hated liberalization of entry. Worse yet, those bills even authorized
senior officials of the Interstate Commerce Commission to “budget directly
with Congress without submission to OMB [the Office of Management
and Budget].”18 Such a course of action, as all understood, would have
enhanced the authority of the ICC, just at the moment that a few in and out
of Congress had begun to speak of diminishing or even eliminating the reg-
ulatory regime. In the time-honored tradition of the trucking industry, a
threat to operating rights or the prerogatives of rate bureau officials encour-
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aged submission of legislation seeking to expand the boundaries of pro-
tected transportation industries or modes and their many submarkets com-
posed of railroads, contract and common carrier truckers, and the rest.
With deregulation appearing doomed, by June 1972, members of Con-
gress were more interested in advancing $5 billion in loans to ailing rail-
roads than in advancing deregulation. Approving grants and loan guaran-
tees—and all that money for paying employees and suppliers—was bound
to prove more attractive to members of Congress in an election year than
the messy and risky business of deregulating hard-nosed truckers and their
teamster allies. The popular loan program also created one last opportunity
for Flanigan and other top aides to lobby for partial deregulation, if they
chose to risk it. The strategy, as another Nixon official outlined it for Flani-
gan, was a simple one. “Tell Congressmen,” went the reasoning, “that if the
Administration position on . . . [partial deregulation] is accepted, the
Administration will support . . . the enlarged system of loan guarantees.19
Shippers, who were supposed to have joined the grassroots program for
deregulation, were also urging approval of loans to railroads shorn of trou-
blesome deregulation proposals. A senior official of the Transportation
Association of America told Flanigan that the bill was “not perfect” but
urged a spirit of “compromise.” Insistence by Flanigan on inclusion of what
were described as “highly controversial provisions . . . that carriers bitterly
oppose” would lead to “waste by the failure of Congress to act” and could
also encourage “affected groups to withdraw support and become a strong
opposition force, especially in this election year.” Much as Peter Flanigan’s
aide John Glancy had predicted a year earlier, smaller shippers had become
“more timid.”20 Especially during this presidential election season, a portion
of the nation’s many shippers preferred the certainties of the regulatory
regime—and loans to railroads on whom many depended—to the uncer-
tainties of deregulation.
At a moment during which only politics mattered, John Volpe, the sec-
retary of transportation, recommended acceptance of the loan program—
without deregulation. On August 8, Volpe sent a letter to John Ehrlichman,
one of President Nixon’s top two assistants. Volpe focused on “the political
aspects of the transportation regulatory and assistance legislation.” Volpe
reminded Ehrlichman that “we already have six major railroads in reorgani-
zation,” and without relief “there is little doubt that the Penn Central will
run out of cash and may land in our hands.” Volpe also worried about jobs
lost, which he numbered at “tens of thousands of them on the railroads
themselves, in addition to the literally hundreds of thousands . . . that would
be affected if the Penn Central and other railroads are allowed to fall by the
wayside.” In a process Volpe described as “speaking politically again,” he
told Ehrlichman that “if we insist on the entry . . . and . . . other provisions
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. . . , we not only miss the opportunity to save the railroads but we antago-
nize the truckers [and] teamsters.” Failure to “compromise at this point,”
Volpe warned, would also signal truckers “that the Administration would be
coming in next year insisting on a bill that would have entry provisions and
other things they are definitely against.” Support of this legislation, Volpe
concluded, would allow leaders of the administration “to take credit for sav-
ing many jobs, and keeping this industry in private hands,” all of which, he
added, amounted to “Good Republican philosophy.”21 In August, Flanigan
relented, permitting a program of loans and loan guarantees to go forward
without insisting upon deregulation. In 1972, electoral politics triumphed.
Politics triumphed again in 1973. Early in the year, leaders of a small
group located in and out of the federal government coalesced to support a
program of deregulation. Members of this group included Hendrik
Houthakker and Jack C. Pearce. In 1971, Houthakker had returned to the
economics department at Harvard University. By April 1972, he had circu-
lated a statement among twenty-five economists asking them to support
Nixon’s deregulation proposals. Jack Pearce formerly served as an attorney in
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, where he had pre-
pared drafts of President Kennedy’s legislation aimed at achieving partial
deregulation of transportation firms. During 1970–1971, Pearce worked as
deputy general counsel in the White House Office of Consumer Affairs. In
that post, Pearce served on Houthakker’s Subcommittee on Transportation
that had recommended a program of deregulation to Peter Flanigan and
members of Nixon’s Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy. Now in pri-
vate practice, Pearce’s clients included shippers who had banded together
under the acronym COMET, the Committee on Modern Efficient Trans-
portation. Created in February 1972 to lobby for Nixon’s deregulation bill,
executives of several of the nation’s largest shippers such as Sears and Gen-
eral Mills had joined COMET. In February 1973, a Nixon official reported
that COMET officials were “independently in contact with [the new Sec-
retary of Transportation Claude S.] Brinegar and the DOT bureaucracy.”
For the first time, the idea of deregulating rail and truck firms had an iden-
tifiable constituency, alongside railroad labor and management, that
included a professional economist located at the prestigious Harvard Uni-
versity and an attorney with several large and politically savvy shippers as his
clients. An official in the Nixon administration described the goals of
COMET members as “‘greater latitude’ for carrier managements in the
management of carriers’ business.”22
During early 1973, however, highway politics trumped deregulatory pol-
itics. For several years, President Nixon and his senior transportation offi-
cials had been asking members of Congress to spend money in the highway
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trust fund for mass transit, not just for highway building. Under terms of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, all gasoline taxes went into a trust fund;
and truckers, longtime advocates of highway improvements, had regularly
opposed what they described as “diversion” of those taxes from the trust
fund to nonhighway projects such as mass transit. Anxious to secure
approval of a limited “diversion” precisely for mass transit, on March 19 a
senior official at the Department of Transportation sent a handwritten note
to one of President Nixon’s aides reporting “we are doing all we can not to
aggravate the truckers right now.” In 1973, moreover, few believed that
Congress would pass deregulation proposals.23 Politics was still in charge.
Fear of the power of organized truckers prevailed again in the middle of
1973. By late July, leaders of the Nixon administration had prepared yet
another bill aimed at fostering deregulation. This effort, however, focused
only on deregulating the nation’s declining railroads, unlike the bill
approved by Flanigan in the fall of 1971 that had included regulated truck-
ers. Only one member of the cabinet, Secretary of the Treasury George P.
Schultz, held out for additional legislation that would have permitted truck-
ers carrying exempt agricultural commodities to compete for regular com-
mon carrier business. Schultz, an economist and a former dean of the Grad-
uate School of Business at the University of Chicago, had years of
experience with the lectures and publications of his university faculty such
as economist George J. Stigler who opposed federal regulation of trans-
portation and other industries. Nonetheless, Michael Raoul-Duval, one of
President Nixon’s new aides, joined Brinegar in opposing the addition
sought by Schultz. “I concur with Secretary [of Transportation Claude S.]
Brinegar’s assessment,” Raoul-Duval wrote top presidential assistant
Melvin R. Laird, “on the grounds that it will trigger a very adverse reaction
to the entire bill by the trucking industry.” If Congress approves deregula-
tion of the railroads, Raoul-Duval added, then we could “follow up with
other regulatory reforms.”24 In 1973, Secretary Brinegar and DOT officials
along with trucker opposition had succeeded in driving trucking deregula-
tion from the administration’s transportation agenda. Thereafter, until
Nixon resigned from office on August 9, 1974, the politics of dealing with
the Watergate break-in took precedence over the politics of deregulation.
Politics remained in the driver’s seat.
Nixon and Appointment of the ICC Chair
Deregulation of railroads and trucking firms never had comprised all or
most of President Nixon’s transportation policy initiatives. Like several of
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his predecessors, including Roosevelt and Johnson, Nixon and his aides also
pursued administrative and legislative changes aimed at centralizing trans-
portation regulation in the president’s hands. Historian Joan Hoff describes
this process of centralization as one in which Nixon sought to reorganize
the executive branch of the federal government to look and behave more
like a corporation, with the president as the nation’s chief executive officer.25
Direct presidential appointment of the chair of the Interstate Commerce
Commission comprised one of Nixon’s centralizing efforts. In 1969, Nixon
sought authority from Congress to appoint the ICC chair. Three years ear-
lier, in 1966, members of Congress had denied that identical authority to
President Johnson, just as members of an earlier Congress had stopped
President Roosevelt from tampering with the ICC. Up to the late 1960s,
then, commissioners rotated the chair among themselves on an annual
basis, creating a collegial form of governance. Presidential responsibility for
economic performance, however, had suggested to Nixon and his predeces-
sors at least as far back as Roosevelt the desirability of enhancing presiden-
tial control over each of the federal levers of economic activity, including
regulatory agencies such as the ICC.
No doubt aware of Johnson and Califano’s failed effort, Nixon and his
senior aides chose a different path to control the ICC chair. Rather than ask-
ing Congress to approve legislation allowing the president to appoint the
Chair—Johnson and Califano’s chosen tactic—Nixon sought that authority
through a process called administrative reorganization. On January 20, 1969,
in his first message to Congress, Nixon asked for a two-year renewal of the
president’s authority to reorganize the federal government, which had lapsed
at the end of 1968. On March 27, members of Congress approved the exten-
sion.26 Rather than having to seek legislation allowing presidential appoint-
ment of the chair of the ICC, now the president was asking for authority to
make that appointment subject only to a resolution of disapproval voted by a
majority in each house of Congress within a period of sixty days.
Despite the change in tactics, Nixon’s reasoning in seeking to appoint
the chair of the ICC was identical to that of Califano and Johnson. On July
22, 1969, in a message to Congress urging approval of the reorganization (as
it was now labeled), Nixon cited the importance of “firm and clear legal
responsibility for management of the Commission’s . . . affairs.” As Nixon
phrased it, “no modern business . . . would tolerate the practice of annually
rotating its chief executive.” Authors of Nixon’s reorganization plan also
spoke of vesting authority in the chair of the ICC.27 In 1966, however, oppo-
nents of Johnson’s plan for centralizing transportation authority in the
Office of the Secretary of Transportation had spoken of vesting authority
with the administrators of the modal agencies such as the Federal Highway
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Administration. Now, Nixon wanted to vest authority with the chair of the
ICC for such crucial matters as appointment of personnel, budgeting, and
the allocation of workloads and responsibilities among remaining members
of the commission. By the late 1960s, the language of corporate managers
was emerging as a routine part of the language of politicians.
Nixon’s proposed reorganization still had to avoid congressional disap-
proval. As before, leaders of the National Industrial Traffic League, a large
organization of shippers, opposed presidential appointment of the chair.
They cited the importance of the ICC’s autonomy. In this context, what
traffic league officials meant was that they feared the potential of a strong
chair who might vote to permit higher shipping rates or allow truckers and
railroad executives to stop making deliveries to remote places. Among those
such as small shippers who often talked about the advantages of markets,
regulation of transportation rates and mandated delivery still had their uses.
Leaders of the Association of American Railroads, however, supported
presidential appointment of the ICC chair. In a letter to the house commit-
tee appointed to review the president’s plan, the president of the AAR
spoke of “pav[ing] the way for improved management and increased effi-
ciency.” In short, railroad executives wanted higher rates, additional merg-
ers, and less frequent service to small towns. Equally, the head of the Air
Freight Motor Carriers Conference, a group of truck operators who brought
freight to and from air carriers, endorsed the idea of presidential appoint-
ment of the ICC chair. The attorney for that group advocated “intermodal
coordination,” which was, he asserted, emerging as a “reality.” That reality,
asserted the attorney, now required improved coordination among federal
regulatory agencies. Even the chair of the house subcommittee had discov-
ered a “need for closer . . . working relationships in the area of regulation.”28
Nothing in Nixon’s plan mentioned or hinted at enhanced federal coordi-
nation, higher or lower transportation rates, or less or more service to the
nation’s remote areas. Altogether, here was another illustration of the cus-
tomary scramble among leaders in the transportation industry to promote a
favored outcome, or to head off one that was undesirable, uncertain, or
unknown. Among activists in the politically constructed transportation
industries, the effort to protect or expand the boundaries of industries and
markets extended back over many years, and sometimes over many decades.
Whatever shippers, carriers, or members of Congress imagined about
the likely outcomes of presidential appointment of the ICC chair, the fact
that Nixon had sent it forward under the renewed Reorganization Act
placed the burden on Congress to vote it down, which it determined not to
do. Perhaps Nixon benefited in this matter from a congressional inclination
not to refuse a presidential request early in his term. Beginning in January
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1970, the president of the United States possessed the authority to appoint
the chair of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In turn, the chair would
possess authority over such weighty matters as the ICC’s budget and the
workload of remaining ICC members. In an instant, Congress awarded
President Nixon what it had denied President Johnson. In 1969, the politics
of centralization and administrative coordination could still command a
wide allegiance.
Conclusion
Since 1945, every president of the United States has recognized his special
responsibility for boosting employment and earnings. In 1955 and 1956,
President Eisenhower and Secretary Weeks proposed partial deregulation
of rail and trucking firms with a view toward rescuing failing railroads and
the businesses and travelers who still depended heavily upon them.
President Johnson created the Department of Transportation and contem-
plated deregulation of railroad and trucking firms with a view toward accel-
erating the pace of economic growth. Members of that 1960s generation of
political and business leaders described the process as one of “fine-tuning”
the economy. Whether in the 1950s or the 1960s, the goal of would-be
deregulators was to reduce or eliminate politically contrived barriers
between transportation industries and markets, again as for instance
between railroaders and truckers, whether common or contract carriers.
President Nixon inherited an economy in the early stages of a lengthy
period of decline. Like Johnson, however, Nixon’s response to economic
downturn was to seek both centralization of federal regulation in the form
of presidential appointment of the ICC chair and deregulation of trans-
portation prices and services. Historian Hoff describes a process whereby
Nixon sought “centralized planning and structural decentralization in
domestic affairs.” Nixon himself described this paradoxical situation with
great clarity. Years after leaving office, he told Hoff that “bringing power to
the White House [was necessary] in order to dish it out.”29
By taking risks, President Nixon had made deregulation a regular if
sometimes unpopular topic of conversation among leaders in transportation
and politics; and by taking additional risks, Nixon had secured authority for
the president to appoint the chair of the ICC. In 1972 and 1973, however,
the politics of reelection (and especially the politics of not offending tem-
peramental truckers and teamsters) caused Nixon to hold back on deregula-
tion efforts. Starting in 1973, the politics of the Watergate break-in eroded
and then destroyed Nixon’s presidency. Beginning in 1973, the politics of
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the Watergate break-in also undercut Nixon’s deregulatory efforts and lim-
ited his ability to bring additional centralization and coordination to trans-
portation agencies. Because plans for centralization of transportation (and
other federal agencies) were so negatively associated with President Nixon,
his successors had only deregulation (the opening of transportation’s many
submarkets) remaining as a tool in the presidential arsenal of devices for
dealing with railroads, trucks, and airlines in a declining economy. Not for
another two decades did the idea of coordination among rail, airlines, and
trucking return to the top of the federal list of priorities. By then, propo-
nents of coordination operated under the newly fashionable idea called
“intermodalism.”
Starting in 1974, President Gerald R. Ford and Senator Edward M.
Kennedy began the lengthy process of transforming deregulation into an
increasingly plausible idea for restoring growth without inflation to the
American economy. As part of that process, Kennedy and especially Ford
also launched a process of identifying and recruiting a constituency for
deregulation. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter started deregulation of
trucking on an administrative basis, relying on his ability to appoint the
chair of the ICC. Not only were American presidents such as Eisenhower
and Kennedy among the earliest and most visible advocates for deregulation
of rail and truck, but later presidents starting with Nixon and extending to
Ford and Carter used the growing authority of the presidential office to
bring that deregulation into being. Ford’s first step was to discredit the reg-
ulatory regime; and his next was to use the authority of the Department of
Transportation to approve railroad loans as a lever to bring about partial
deregulation.
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Between 1974 and 1980, Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter
presided over deregulation of the nation’s air, truck, and rail systems. Ford
and Carter took different approaches to the process of bringing about that
deregulation. Ford attempted to foster deregulation first by discrediting the
seemingly bizarre rules and the many rule-makers who worked at the ICC
and other regulatory agencies. Once having diminished regulations and reg-
ulators, Ford introduced legislation aimed at deregulating railroads, trucks,
and even airlines. Only because bankrupt railroads were in desperate need
of loans and grants, however, was Ford able to secure a limited railroad
deregulation as the price for award of government credit and cash.
Jimmy Carter also wanted to eliminate all or most of the regulatory
regime. At the outset of his term beginning in January 1977, Carter and his
aides relied less on legislation and more on administrative measures to fos-
ter deregulation. Carter appointed deregulation-minded economists to chair
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board. In
turn, those economists, such as Alfred E. Kahn, began the process of dis-
mantling the regulatory regime. At the same time, Carter recognized that
eventually deregulation would have to enjoy legislative approval. For that
task, he employed talented and energetic aides such as Mary Schuman,
Richard M. Neustadt, and Stuart E. Eizenstat. They organized a coalition
of proderegulation business leaders to offset the strenuous efforts of airline
executives, truckers, and teamsters who sought to maintain regulation. In
1978, President Carter and his aides secured deregulation of airlines; and in
1980, they brought about deregulation of trucking and further deregulation
of railroads.
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C H A P T E R  7
Gerald R. Ford and Presidential 
Deregulation, 1974–1977
Ford is now further out on the deregulation limb than Kennedy,
Johnson and Nixon ever allowed themselves to get.
—Louis M. Kohlmeier, National Journal, 1975
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Despite these modest differences in their approach to deregulation, Ford
and Carter had much in common. Senator Edward M. Kennedy was a com-
petitor with both Ford and Carter for the presidency. Throughout this
period, however, Kennedy cooperated with Ford and Carter’s efforts to
bring about deregulation. Equally, both Ford and Carter (and several of
their top aides) recognized—always in private—that the much-touted stud-
ies by deregulation-minded economists were in fact limited in scope. As the
attending physicians for the American political economy, Ford and Carter
had determined nonetheless to run the risk of prescribing deregulation of
truck, rail, and airline firms as their recommended cures for rising levels of
unemployment and inflation. Unlike President Johnson’s desire to use
deregulation to enhance presidential authority and then “fine-tune” the
economy, Ford and Carter tied the remote concept of deregulation to eco-
nomic problems understood and felt by every American. Discrediting regu-
lation and regulators came first.
Discrediting Regulation and Regulators
Gerald Ford served as president between August 1974 and January 1977.
During that period of two and a half years, Ford brought deregulation front
and center as a main topic in a large number of public addresses. Ford
launched this rhetorical war on the regulatory regime soon after taking
office. Inflation loomed as a major problem, he told members of the U.S.
Senate and House of Representatives at a joint session of Congress held on
October 8, and government was a key source of that inflation. The federal
government, Ford asserted, “imposes too many hidden and too many infla-
tionary costs.” As a start, Ford urged Congress to create a National
Commission on Regulatory Reform. Members of that group would provide
a “long-overdue total reexamination of the independent regulatory agen-
cies” aimed at “eliminat[ing] existing Federal rules and regulations that
increase costs to the consumer without any good reason.” Members of
Congress failed to create Ford’s regulatory reform commission. Within two
months of taking office, however, Ford had linked the presence and activi-
ties of those regulatory agencies with his own efforts to “whip” inflation,
which the president described as a threat to “our country, our homes, our
liberties, our property, and . . . our national pride.”1
During the next two years, President Ford spoke often about the appar-
ent links between inflation, unemployment, and government regulation. In
each talk, Ford highlighted the problems that regulation had reportedly
brought about, and urged members of his audience to mobilize for reform.
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For example, in his speech on October 15, 1974, to participants at the
annual convention of the Future Farmers of America in Kansas City, Mis-
souri, Ford asserted that regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion caused “many, many trucks [to] return empty.” Ford drew direct links
between high costs faced by farmers and regulations prepared by a distant
federal agency, asking audience members “to work with others to eliminate
[these] outmoded regulations that keep the cost of goods and services
high.”2
During spring 1975, Ford’s attacks on regulation contrasted federal rules
with his own efforts to restore prosperity. On April 18, for instance, Ford
highlighted restoration of “economic health” with a proposed reduction in
the size and scope of the federal bureaucracy. In an address to participants
in a White House Conference on Domestic and Economic Affairs, held in
Concord, New Hampshire, Ford asserted that “more than 100,000 people
are employed by the Federal Government for the sole and exclusive respon-
sibility of writing, reviewing, and enforcing some type of regulation.” It was
true that some fifty federal regulatory agencies, including the now visible
ICC and the less visible Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
employed approximately one hundred thousand persons. Whether Presi-
dent Ford or anyone else had actually determined the precise role of each
senior and junior employee or each agency as a whole in bringing about
inflation mattered less in this context than the image of those one hundred
thousand federal workers described by Ford as residing in a “bureaucrat’s
dream of heaven.” Heaping further blame on federal regulation and regula-
tors for the economic downturn, on June 17 Ford told members of the
National Federation of Independent Business that “a big businessman is
what a small businessman would be if the Government would ever let him
alone!” Rather than trying to explain often difficult-to-understand institu-
tions such as rate bureaus or the rigid distinctions in federal law and regula-
tory rules between common and contract carriers, Ford instead attempted to
mobilize a constituency for deregulation by invoking the language of pro-
ductivity and growth in an age of economic decline.3
As Ford made these speeches, Senator Edward M. Kennedy added to
the emerging political drama of transportation deregulation. Kennedy
focused on the airlines. In spring 1975, he held much-publicized hearings
on intrastate airfares under the direction of Stephen G. Breyer, a new mem-
ber of the Harvard Law School faculty. Kennedy asked witnesses to explain
why unregulated airlines operating only in California and Texas could
charge lower fares and still provide frequent service at high load factors.
Kennedy’s questions, contends business historian Richard H. K. Vietor,
“posed . . . inexplicable contradiction[s] or, worse, . . . [were] simply unan-
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swerable.” President Ford, citing reports of the Kennedy hearings and espe-
cially the finding that airline fares in Texas and California were “as much as
40-percent lower than those controlled by the CAB,” concluded that “some-
thing must be wrong.” In May 1975, Louis M. Kohlmeier, a writer for the
National Journal, observed that “Ford is now further out on the deregulation
limb than [President] Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon ever allowed themselves
to get.”4
Unlike Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, or even Nixon, how-
ever, President Ford wanted to create the impression that government never
had a valid reason to deny the unambiguous virtues of competition between
truckers, railroaders, and other transportation firms. Without doubt, the
regulatory regime, including the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate
Commerce Commission with their emphasis since the late 1930s on sepa-
rate and distinct transportation industries such as airlines, railroads, and
trucking and their intricate submarkets such as common and contract car-
riers, were and remained creatures of the federal government. Again, rather
than using his speeches to explain the complex politics of regulation, Ford
chose instead to represent himself as the chief economic officer of the
national economy. Like his counterparts at large, vertically integrated firms
such as Sears and General Motors, Ford imaged the regulatory regime in
the form of recalcitrant middle managers at the CAB and ICC who
through ineptitude, stupidity, or downright malevolence had slowed the
flow of merchandise from production to distribution and consumption. In
the corporate state, as in the corporation, top executives oversaw a process
of ratcheting up production, simultaneously closing down units and termi-
nating the services of those who blocked the visible hands of senior man-
agers such as themselves.
Ford’s message got through to journalists. Prior to the Kennedy hearings
and President Ford’s many speeches, deregulation had remained in the
provinces of economists such as Hendrik Houthakker and presidential
advisers such as Joseph Califano and Peter Flanigan. As an example,
between 1970 and 1974, editors of the New York Times never used the words
“regulation” or “deregulation” in the title of a news story. During 1975, how-
ever, those same editors published thirty-six stories containing the word
“deregulation” in the title. In 1976, editors of the New York Times ran
another thirty-five stories employing the word “deregulation” as part of a
story’s title.5
Not every newspaper editor published stories with the word “deregula-
tion” in the title. Even so, editors of newspapers and magazines with wide-
spread readership, such as the Christian Science Monitor, the Los Angeles
Times, the Chicago Tribune, and Time, ran stories about economic condi-
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tions and about the rhetorical and legislative efforts of Senator Kennedy and
President Ford to reduce or eliminate federal regulation of transportation
and other industries. What Kennedy and especially Ford accomplished with
their antiregulation rhetoric was to launch a process whereby Americans not
familiar with the principles and details of government regulation began to
associate remote and perhaps unheard-of agencies such as the Civil Aero-
nautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission with concrete
problems such as unemployment, energy shortages, and high prices for air
travel, food, and package delivery. In May 1977, editors of U.S. News &
World Report published just such a story. Repeating President Ford’s count
of more than one hundred thousand persons working in federal regulatory
agencies, a writer added that the decisions of those regulators “affect the
food that people eat, the cars they drive, the fuel they use, the clothes they
wear, the houses they live in, the investments they make, the water they
drink and even the air they breathe.”6 Long before economists such as
Alfred E. Kahn took charge of the Civil Aeronautics Board, President Ford,
Senator Kennedy, and many journalists had set about the task of educating
ordinary Americans and their representatives about the apparent costs
imposed on them by government regulators and their regulations and about
the presumed advantages of transportation deregulation.
President Ford’s next step was to convert images and rhetoric into leg-
islative action. The railroads came first. Starting in March 1967 with the
Central Railroad of New Jersey, by mid-1974, executives of eight railroads
now including the once-mighty Penn Central and the more modest Lehigh
& Hudson River Railway had sought the protection of bankruptcy. Trains
still operated, but sometimes at speeds no greater than ten miles per hour, a
condition brought about by federal speed limits on tracks and bridges in
poor condition. As part of a ruling on consolidating those eight railroads
into one, in December 1974, justices of the U.S. Supreme Court found “a
rail transportation crisis seriously threatening the national welfare.” Several
of the weakest railroads, moreover, were located in the Northeast and Mid-
west, regions in which rising costs for heating oil during a severe winter had
added to inflationary pressures and unemployment. Equally important,
those railroads carried coal and freight. Delivery of those items not only cre-
ated jobs for railroad workers, but also sustained many more jobs in nearby
factories and then down the economic line among wholesalers and retailers.
Directly and indirectly, countless households depended on bankrupt and
weakened railroads for jobs and supplies. We now face the “grim reality,”
transportation secretary William T. Coleman wrote Ford on April 12, 1975,
of “a major breakdown of our rail freight system.”7
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Cost, history, and politics added to the complexities of starting railroad
deregulation. Late in 1973, members of Congress and President Nixon had
approved the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, bringing into existence the
United States Railway Association (USRA). Headed by an eight-person
board of directors, Congress charged officials of the USRA to prepare a plan
for managing the assets and maintaining the service of Penn Central and
the other bankrupt railroads. On May 29, 1975, directors of the USRA
voted to create the Consolidated Rail Corporation, soon known popularly
as Conrail. In turn, officers of Conrail would assume responsibility for day-
to-day rail operations, presumably keeping shipping costs low through
competition with other railroad lines. As part of the USRA’s focus on the
maintenance of low-cost shipping, moreover, officers of two profitable rail-
roads, the Chessie System and the Norfolk & Western, would assume con-
trol of parts of the bankrupt lines. Members of the USRA board gave this
plan the technical name “Three Carriers East,” which journalists popular-
ized as the “Three-system plan.” Both names bore a striking resemblance to
the “three-system East” plan conceived in the late 1950s by James M.
Symes, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad. The USRA plan and the
earlier Symes plan were part of the legacy of numerous plans for railroad
consolidation that had consumed so much attention among railroad execu-
tives, ICC regulators, and academic economists between 1920 and 1932.8
The three-system plan, like those earlier consolidation schemes, con-
tained elements certain to make nearly everyone jittery, or angry. Abandon-
ments, some seven thousand miles worth—and still more unemployment—
loomed in the future, unless some public entity, presumably the federal
government, subsidized maintenance and service on those less-used tracks.
Indeed, much of the trackage likely to be abandoned carried little freight.
Even so, observes historian Richard Saunders Jr., “as long as the railroad was
there [in small towns located in areas facing especially difficult economic
times including western Pennsylvania, portions of Ohio and Michigan, and
sections of upstate New York], there was hope that the factories would come
and the young people would stay.” Early in February 1975, U.S. senator
James Buckley of New York described plans to abandon railroad mileage as
“shocking and intolerable.” Already, the American landscape contained
many cities such as Camden, Ohio, and Ligonier, Pennsylvania, that design-
ers of the Interstate Highway System had bypassed and from which railroad
executives had withdrawn service during the recent past. In this environ-
ment of decline that had occurred and fear of worse to come for residents of
another group of cities and towns, on June 7, governors of seventeen states
met with President Ford to express concern about proposed abandonments.9
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Nor was there enthusiasm about the three-system plan at the executive
offices of the Chessie System and Norfolk & Western. Presidents of the two
railroad firms liked the idea of gaining a few lucrative routes, especially in
the Philadelphia and New York City areas. But they did not want to acquire
the less profitable routes—as for example the Erie Lackawanna Railway’s
line from Buffalo to the New York terminal area in New Jersey—or those
requiring lots of expensive upgrading—unless the federal government
would pay for the upgrades. Equally, the USRA plan provided $250 million
to pay laid-off railroad workers, leading Chessie executives to seek assurance
that the federal government would “cover” all former-employee costs. Even
more, one Chessie System official worried that a planned federal payout to
Penn Central bondholders would prove insufficient, eventually leading a
court at some future date to impose a deficiency judgment on the Chessie.
Creditors and Penn Central officials also wanted more money from the fed-
eral government. Writing in 1975, economist George W. Hilton character-
ized the organization and funding of Conrail as “an extreme example of
denying a market test.”10
Costs of creating Conrail loomed large among Ford’s top aides. Based
only on the formal plan, they informed the president of their estimate of $4
billion in federal loan guarantees and another $1.6 billion in federal grants
over a ten-year period. Worse yet, one aide told Ford that Conrail “will not
be financially viable at any foreseeable time.” The president of the Chessie
System took essentially the same view of Conrail’s likely costs, rendering his
judgment in the rhetoric of privately managed enterprise. Conrail, he told a
reporter for the Wall Street Journal, appeared a “political rather than an eco-
nomic solution,” leading him to conclude that what was taking place was
“changing the ownership [and] changing the name of the rathole.” Perhaps
as a consequence of years of conversation and problem solving in the trans-
portation industry, senior federal officials and their counterparts at the rail-
roads shared the same negative outlook regarding government management
of large enterprises such as the railroads.11
On May 19, 1975, President Ford sent omnibus railroad legislation to
Congress linking loans with deregulation. In his accompanying message, Ford
stressed that a proposed loan program would lead to “speedy and rational
restructuring of the railroads” and removal of “regulatory restrictions”
deemed “excessive and antiquated.” What was now called railroad “revital-
ization,” Ford promised, was only the first step of an “overall program to
achieve fundamental reform of transportation regulation.” In short, restruc-
turing and deregulating the railroads would serve as the opening round in a
much lengthier campaign of restructuring and deregulating the nation’s
transportation industries. A draft of the president’s message even described
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a process whereby deregulation of transportation would help “revitalize our
entire free enterprise system.” Increasingly, the essence of government in the
1970s and beyond was not that of facilitating a return to much-discussed
markets but was instead an effort to create those markets.12 Implementing
such a grand design brought federal officials right back into the thick of
politics.
Members of Congress had no intention of leaving so important and
contentious a set of matters as railroad loans and reorganization solely in the
hands of creditors, USRA trustees, railroad executives, or the president of
the United States. Anticipating problems that would emerge following
publication of the Final System Plan, in 1973 members of Congress had
guaranteed themselves sixty legislative days to approve the plan, or disap-
prove it. A majority in the Senate or the House could exercise a veto. Given
the congressional recess in August, a journalist reported that action was not
“expected . . . until late Fall.”13
Representative Brock Adams also planned to exercise clout in the realms
of railroad funding and deregulation. Born in 1927, Adams had served in
the U.S. Navy during World War II. Returning to civilian life, in 1949,
Adams graduated from the University of Washington with a degree in eco-
nomics. In 1953, he earned a law degree at Harvard University. In 1961,
early support for John F. Kennedy’s presidential ambitions helped Adams
secure appointment as U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washing-
ton. In 1964, Adams won election to the U.S. House of Representatives. His
district and nearby areas in Seattle and Tacoma included truck depots; an
airport and seaport that had long served as transportation hubs for domes-
tic and international traffic; several major railroad lines such as those of the
Great Northern Railway and the Northern Pacific Railroad; a large number
of unionized-transportation workers; and the Boeing Company, a gigantic
manufacturer of commercial and military aircraft. In September 1973, as
negotiations on rail legislation neared conclusion, a staff member to the
New England Congressional Caucus described Adams as “the most knowl-
edgeable member of the House Sub-Committee on rail issues.”14 Smart and
likeable, Brock Adams had decided to make railroad legislation into one of
his areas of specialization.
Brock Adams was also a practical and ambitious legislator. Academic
proponents of deregulation, he told an audience of airline executives in
November 1975, were “theorists and ‘other-world economists.’” Fond of
publicly extolling concrete solutions over the still-untested proposals of
economists, Adams was in fact prepared to go along with many of President
Ford’s recommendations aimed at loosening regulatory constraints on rail-
road management. Loan guarantees for the railroads appeared satisfactory,
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Adams judged, as did the prospect of “using the financial leverage created by
government financing to promote regulatory reform . . . [and] a more ratio-
nal system through mergers of railroads.” By mid-1975, with many once
again fearing collapse of the railroads and ensuing federal ownership, these
ideas enjoyed standing as evidence of practicality. Perhaps word during
August 1975 from Woody Price, Adams’s senior legislative aide, that reac-
tion of “folks” to the Final System Plan appeared “sullen but not mutinous”
emboldened Adams to run the risk of taking a leading position on railroad
consolidation and deregulation.15 Beginning in August 1975, Adams coa-
lesced with members of Congress and leaders of the Ford administration to
help write that omnibus bill. Probably without realizing it, Adams was fol-
lowing the steps of John Esch and Albert Cummins, also practical legisla-
tors who through study and inclination had played pivotal roles in shaping
the Transportation Act of 1920.
With so many jobs, railroads, and associated businesses at stake, negoti-
ations between Secretary Coleman and leaders in Congress proved difficult
and lengthy. On October 23, Woody Price sent a gloomy report on prospects
for passing railroad legislation. “Neither labor nor management,” Price
wrote Adams, “are very enthusiastic about the bill.” Each was “frightened by
the quickie merger and restructuring provisions.” Mergers and restructuring
raised the specter of abandonments that would in turn foster a loss of ser-
vice and jobs. Leaders of railroad unions wanted guarantees of wages for
laid-off workers, a deal already included in the legislation that had set up
Conrail in 1973. “This bill has more problems than a dog has fleas,” Price
warned, adding that one person had retitled the omnibus bill as the “‘omi-
nous’ bill.”16
Secretary Coleman was already dissatisfied. President Ford was prepared
to spend or guarantee loans for $5.8 billion. Free-spending members of the
Senate commerce committee, Coleman wrote the director of the Office of
Management and Budget on November 24, had approved a total of $9.7 bil-
lion. Although the “pricing flexibility” Coleman and Ford sought for rail-
road executives had survived the vote of a House committee, Congressman
Adams “has tried in subcommittee to weaken the regulatory reform . . . and
may continue his efforts in full committee.” On December 19, Coleman
publicly announced the threat of a presidential veto. He cited a “significant
increase in the federal deficit” and what he characterized as the “frustration”
of his deregulation program that would “revitaliz[e] . . . the nation’s rail-
roads.” An aide to a member of the Senate characterized Coleman’s position
as that of “‘veto, veto, veto unless you give me exactly what I want exactly the
way I want it.’”17
Threat of a presidential veto produced results. Although members of the
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Senate and House had passed a common bill, Senate leaders did not enroll
their legislation. The promised veto, Coleman and other senior officials
wrote Ford late in December, had now created “a willingness to pursue a
compromise with the Administration.” William Coleman directed the
administration’s negotiators through his undersecretary and senior staff in
the Department of Transportation; and because members of the House and
Senate left negotiations in the hands of their assistants, Brock Adams exer-
cised influence through Woody Price, his legislative aide. Never far from
negotiators and their principals stood shippers, truckers, and railroaders—
both management and labor. Members of Congress remained nearby as well,
always concerned about federal spending for loans, grants, and improve-
ments and about whether deregulation would lead to abandonments of ser-
vice in their districts and states. Formal negotiations began January 2, 1976,
and continued up to January 15, a few days before Congress reconvened.18
On January 14, Coleman reported to senior officials that “negotiations
have gone well.” Now, the federal government would make loans and grants
totaling $6.098 billion, including money for Conrail, for subsidizing opera-
tions on lines scheduled for abandonment, and for track and bridge
improvements on the Conrail system. Coleman also liked the “substantial
improvements to the regulatory provisions of the bill,” which included
enhanced rate-making authority for railroad executives and limits on the
pricing authority of their rate bureaus.19 In the mid-1970s, the award of sub-
stantial pricing authority to railroad managers went under the awkward-
sounding name of a “no-suspend zone,” which was identical in practice to
the peculiar-sounding “zone of reasonableness” that Commerce Secretary
Weeks had sought in the mid-1950s for rail and truck executives.
By whatever name, President Ford and Secretary Coleman had pre-
vailed upon Brock Adams and his colleagues to award limited-pricing dis-
cretion to rail managers. As the principal advocates of deregulation, Cole-
man and Ford had created their first market, in this case the market that
would take place within the newly designated zone of reasonableness. The
price Ford and Coleman paid included federal loans, branchline subsidies,
job guarantees, and federal payments to the railroad workers who would be
laid off. Limited deregulation of rate making and some shrinkage of service
was a deal that members of Congress were willing to make with Ford in
order to guarantee federal spending, jobs, and (diminished) railroad service,
including start-up of Conrail on April 1, 1976. All in all, however, remain-
ing institutions of the regulatory regime including rate bureaus, ICC regu-
lations, and the concept of independent transportation modes had survived
presidential speeches, meetings, and legislative arm-twisting. Only billions
for “revitalization” in an environment of inflation and unemployment and
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the threatened shutdown or nationalization of part of the railroad system
had brought William Coleman, Brock Adams, President Ford, and railroad
labor and management that far. Such were the politics of the Railroad Revi-
talization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R), which President Ford
signed on February 5, 1976.
Approval of 4-R also represented the high-water mark in Ford’s efforts
to deregulate American transportation. By late February 1976, only a few
weeks after Ford signed the 4-R Act, a portion of the deal aimed at restor-
ing competitive railroad service to the New York and New England areas
was coming undone. Executives of the Southern Railway and Chessie Sys-
tem had agreed to purchase approximately twenty-two hundred miles of
track formerly owned by the Reading Railroad or the Erie Lackawanna, two
among the bankrupt carriers whose properties and employees were to be
transferred to Conrail. Union leaders representing Erie Lackawanna and
Reading employees, however, refused to accept work rules offered by
Chessie executives, even if those rules were the same ones under which cur-
rent Chessie employees worked. Union officials preferred both the older
work rules and employment by the new Conrail management—backed by
Congress—and had no reason to change their minds. Editorial writers
invoked phrases such as “union rigidities” and a “booby trap . . . set by the
friends of organized labor.”20
Secretary Coleman still hoped to rescue the purchase of those twenty-
two hundred miles. He scheduled a meeting with leaders of the Chessie and
Southern railroads and their union counterparts for February 25. Even with
Coleman’s pressure, no one budged. On April 1, 1976, Conrail started oper-
ations, including operations on the former Erie Lackawanna lines.
Employee desire for job security trumped the desire of politicians and
Chessie officials for railroad competition in the New York region.21 Airline
executives, teamsters, regulators, and members of Congress also held their
own in the contest with President Ford and Secretary Coleman.
Inability to Deregulate Airlines and Trucking
Companies
During 1974 and 1975, President Ford regularly articulated the advantages
of deregulation, including the advantages of securing deregulation of truck-
ing and airline firms. In 1975, as Congress took up rail legislation, Ford’s
senior officials, including Secretary Coleman, shaped legislation to deregu-
late the airline and trucking industries. Because deregulation—or regula-
tion—were never unitary concepts, officials dealt with administrative, legal,
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and political problems, including such esoteric matters as the extension of
pricing flexibility to airline and trucking company managers and elimina-
tion of antitrust immunity from their air and truck rate bureaus. Every dis-
cussion of deregulation also included the politically difficult idea of “free-
dom of entry.” The very point that had enraged truckers when first adver-
tised in 1955 by Secretary Weeks, freedom of entry portended easy move-
ment of would-be competitors into lucrative routes, reducing or eliminat-
ing the ability of truck operators and rate bureau officials to determine
prices charged both by the gigantic Pacific Intermountain Express and the
tiny AAA Trucking Corporation owned by the Bonacci brothers. Freedom
of entry also portended a loss of their valuable operating rights long pro-
tected by leaders of national trucking associations such as the American
Trucking Associations and the Regular Common Carriers Conference.
Since the start of the regulatory regime for truckers in 1935 and for airlines
in 1938, jobs and profits rested on the protections offered by rate bureaus
such as the Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, on attorneys such
as Robert McBride at the Regular Common Carriers Conference, and on
always watchful members of the Civil Aeronautics Board and at the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Starting in 1955, moreover, announce-
ment by Weeks of his plan to seek limited “freedom of entry” and pricing
flexibility had energized truckers and their union counterparts to undertake
new levels of political organizing and self-protecting litigation. Late in
1975, an official of the Teamsters Union described Ford’s plans to deregu-
late the trucking industry as “the most destructive legislative proposal in the
last 40 years.”22
Like his predecessors, President Ford worried less about the gripes of
any one group such as truckers and teamsters and more about the overall
functioning of the economy. In turn, Ford’s administrators served the pres-
ident and his goals. Shorn of arcane deliberations about how to deal with
entry rights or rate bureaus, Ford’s senior administrators sometimes thought
of themselves as doing for business executives what those executives ought
to have done for themselves. Economist George C. Eads, a Ford official
active in the airline deregulatory effort, had determined that airline execu-
tives posed the chief impediments to eliminating those inefficiencies. “To be
blunt,” he wrote another administration official on June 19, 1975, airline
executives appeared “afraid that they have guessed wrong about the type of
service that even the business executive would prefer.” The problem, as Eads
had it, was that airline officials were “afraid to test that possibility.” What
was required to bring about “operational changes,” asserted Eads, was
“increased flexibility in both entry and exit.”23 Whether the remedy for
those “inefficiencies” included changes in entry policy or some other set of
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proposals, senior officials in the Ford administration defined themselves as
the authors of enhanced competition and lower prices in the transportation
industries—ground and air.
In practice, airline deregulation came first. The Kennedy hearings earlier
in the year had brought substantial attention to low-priced fares available in
California and Texas. As was shown in the chapter on airlines after World
War II, by the early 1970s, federal leaders no longer identified the nation’s
air fleet as the key factor in cold war preparations. Altogether, airlines had
joined trucks and railroads as likely targets of these would-be deregulators
and market-builders. During the mid-1970s, however, airlines still retained
much of the glamour of their early years. Even silly promotions such as
equipping larger aircraft with piano lounges and crooners only added to the
popular association of airlines with affluent lifestyles, especially among the
business and professional persons who flew regularly in first class. Airline
deregulation, if it came about, promised fare reductions that those business
and other flyers would recognize, and could serve as a first step in the larger
effort to deregulate other industries such as trucking and even banking and
telephony. “The air bill,” a senior official in the Office of Management and
Budget wrote President Ford on September 29, “is the most publicly visible
in that it deals with a direct consumer service and pocketbook issue.” The
idea, then, was to “assure increased consumer attention to the legislation.”24
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FIGURE 16. President Gerald R. Ford meeting with members of his Task Force on Airline
Reform, October 8, 1975. Prominent in this photo (from left to right) are President Ford,
William T. Coleman (shaking hands), and John W. Snow. Source: Gerald R. Ford Library.
Used with permission.
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Beginning early in 1976, that effort to deregulate the nation’s airlines
shifted from the arena of press conferences and internal memos to the arena
of political organizing. In mid-February 1976, President Ford and Senator
Kennedy exchanged letters employing phrases such as “leadership,”
“thoughtful efforts,” “cooperation,” and Ford’s stated conviction that “con-
sumers and businessmen alike stand to gain from prompt and positive leg-
islative action.” One presidential aide, Edward C. Schmults, had advised
Ford on February 18 that a letter to Senator Kennedy “would play an
important part in building the bipartisan coalition needed for enactment of
the air bill.”25
President Ford assigned John W. Snow to assemble that coalition. In
1976, Snow was serving as a senior official in the Department of Trans-
portation. Holder of a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Virginia
and a law degree from George Washington University, Snow harbored none
of the fears often expressed by airline officials that opening routes would
increase financial problems, or bring ruin. In December 1975, for example,
Snow had written Secretary Coleman that opening of entry to competitive
airlines would lead to creation of an “efficient . . . financially sound . . .
industry.” Snow further believed that increased demand for air travel would
“moderate the effects of competition,” leading another senior member of
the Ford administration to write in hand on her copy of the memo, “not
really sure about this.” In the mid-1970s, as many senior officials and mem-
bers of Congress such as Brock Adams recognized, proposals to deregulate
airlines or trucking rested more on conviction or on economists’ hypotheses
than on a large and solid empirical base. “‘Deregulation’ had entered the
national vocabulary only recently,” observes historian McCraw, “and so far
there was little besides bombast to stand behind it.”26 For John Snow, how-
ever, deregulation of American transportation, starting with the airlines,
represented an opportunity to extend an academic conviction into a policy
outcome. Unlike Sinclair Weeks or Dwight Eisenhower, for whom limited
deregulation of trucking and railroads appeared a pragmatic response to
railroad decline, John Snow and his colleagues in the Ford and later admin-
istrations advocated construction of transportation markets as their major
form of political expression.
Snow launched this coalition-building by organizing Ford’s senior offi-
cials into liaison teams. Next, Snow directed team members—including
William Coleman, the secretary of transportation—to “brief ” members of
Senate and House committees and their staffs. Snow himself anticipated
conversations with fifty members of Congress, a figure in addition to the
twenty-two members of the Senate and House and their staffs with whom
he had met since the previous October. Most likely, Snow had identified
those seventy-two members as his core constituents for deregulation. Next,
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Snow assigned Ford personnel to meet with editors of major newspapers
and magazines such as Business Week, the Denver Post, the Chicago Sun
Times, and the Wall Street Journal. Snow directed others to conduct research
on topics such as airline safety and the increasingly vexing matter of service
to small towns. Preparation of testimony, which Snow wanted completed a
week before hearings started in April, was to include “defense” of airline
deregulation against such anticipated charges as “decrease[d] safety,” “dam-
age . . . [to] smaller communities,” and that it would “result in industry chaos
and financial ruin.” Altogether, Snow estimated that twenty-four persons
would expend more than seven hundred hours in conducting briefings and
research and in identifying likely supporters in Congress.27
Snow also ordered team members to conduct a process labeled “liaison
with interest groups.” Those interest groups included the Consumers Union
and several others identified as “consumers” and three environmental groups
such as the Sierra Club. Although few women occupied senior posts in the
Ford administration, Snow assigned them to meet with members of the
consumer and environmental groups. Snow directed other top-level staffers,
all male, to meet with leaders of groups identified as “economists,” “financial
community,” and “banks,” including Walter B. Wriston, chief executive offi-
cer of the Chase Manhattan Bank. Snow himself would “handle all con-
tacts” with executives of three regional airlines such as Air West.28 In the
event that Congress permitted regional carriers to enter the more lucrative
routes held by United and the other major carriers, executives of firms like
Air West had much to gain. Just as efforts to protect regulation consisted of
defending a federally drawn line, proponents of deregulation aimed to
restructure transportation industries and reduce transportation prices by
redrawing that same line in someone else’s favor.
On May 11, John Snow testified before the House subcommittee on avi-
ation, restating the key points that members of his teams had been making
all spring. “The present regulatory system,” Snow announced, “has become
a major obstacle to the provision of air service at the lowest cost.” Snow
urged a program of “price competition” that would lead to creation of “a
healthy air transportation industry.” Legislation introduced by Senator
Kennedy, Snow reminded the committee, “also includes an increase in pric-
ing flexibility as one of its key features.” As early as January 1976, officials
of United Airlines had signaled a willingness to accept some degree of price
competition, but remained concerned that easing of entry threatened “a
sound system of financially healthy air carriers.” Snow, however, told mem-
bers of the House subcommittee that easing of entry requirements would
“police . . . behavior,” encouraging carriers to “keep prices at a level low
enough to forestall entry of competitors.” As for fear that deregulation
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would encourage airlines to quit small towns, Snow contended that, by
eliminating restrictions “the proposed legislation would result in more, not
less, air service.” Rather than the “‘market chaos’” promised by airline exec-
utives in the event of deregulation of entry and prices, Snow once again
turned to one of the key findings of the Kennedy hearings, pointing out that
“there is no chaos” in the California and Texas markets.29
Briefings by members of Snow’s liaison teams and his own assurances of
lower prices and continuing service to small towns could not overcome
doubts about diminished service to those same small towns, or about eco-
nomic “chaos” among airline corporations. In March 1976, Secretary Cole-
man offered a potential sweetener in the form of promised subsidies to air-
lines serving small towns.30 At that late date, however, few paid attention.
During summer and fall 1976, as political party conventions met and the
presidential campaign got underway, neither President Ford nor his oppo-
nent, Georgia governor Jimmy Carter, talked in detail about airline and
truck deregulation. According to journalist Richard E. Cohen, “the
momentum for regulatory reform . . . [had] stalled.” The basic problem,
Cohen observed, was that “neither of the principal candidates believes that
there is a readily obtainable constituency.” Departure of John Snow to serve
as director of a federal agency, Cohen thought, added to “the sense of ener-
vation on the part of the Ford regulatory reform program.” During the fall,
moreover, with the campaign in full swing, one of Ford’s top officials
warned him about “alienat[ing] truckers and teamsters” and urged the pres-
ident to “low-key our support” of trucking deregulation in public remarks.31
Beginning in mid-1976, President Ford substituted electoral politics for the
politics of deregulation and national economic management.
As they prepared to leave office, leaders in the Ford administration pub-
lished a postmortem account of their unsuccessful efforts to bring about
deregulation of the airline and truck industries. On the one hand, they
blamed leaders in the trucking and airline industries. “Airlines, trucking
firms . . . , and some labor unions,” reported authors of the administration’s
account, “have been highly critical of any attempts to change the economic
regulations which govern their operations.” As examples, they reported that
pilots had “registered complaints against the Administration’s air bill, and
the Teamsters objected to proposed changes in regulation of motor carriers.”
According to Ford’s senior officials, “labor and management have generally
been on the same side of the economic issue.” On the other hand, Ford’s
administrators reported “disappointment that organized consumer groups
were not more helpful in encouraging the Congress to act.”32 In other
words, opponents of deregulation remained articulate and well organized,
and the much-sought-after coalition of deregulation supporters had not
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materialized.
Failure to secure deregulation was a more complex phenomenon than
Ford’s officials admitted or understood. At the outset, one must not under-
estimate the ability of pilots, teamsters, and executives of airline and truck-
ing companies to make concerns known to members of Congress. Union
leaders represented thousands of members located in virtually every con-
gressional district; and union leaders such as Frank Fitzsimmons possessed
years of experience in dealing with federal officials, whether members of
Congress or presidents of the United States. At the same time, Ford and his
top administrators had made choices that helped predetermine the outcome
of deregulatory efforts in the airline and trucking industries. In short, lead-
ers in the Ford administration had not taken account of likely winners and
losers in the politics of deregulation.
Comparison of Ford’s strategy in securing partial deregulation of the
railroads is instructive. Ford and Coleman had insisted on a direct linkage
between “regulatory reform” and the expenditure of more than $6 billion for
loans, loan guarantees, and outright grants of funds for purchase of up-to-
date equipment. In July 1975, an interviewer with Railway Age asked Sec-
retary Coleman whether he was “willing to give any money without the reg-
ulatory package,” to which Coleman responded that “I am not going to take
public money and throw it down the drain.”33 Eager to maintain railroad
employment and rail service to constituents, members of Congress located
in the Midwest and Northeast accepted the dose of regulatory reform that
Ford measured out. Ford’s program of deregulation produced no immediate
winners, but did hold out hope—and cash—that the deteriorated and pre-
carious situation among many shippers and perhaps millions of workers in
the Northeast and Midwest would not grow worse.
In proposing deregulation of airlines and trucking firms, however, Pres-
ident Ford had failed to identify and mobilize clear winners, and limit the
number of self-identified losers. Teamsters and airline employees, the front-
line workers, feared their jobs were at stake. Ford might have offered airline
employees the same deal that Brock Adams and others had offered railroad
workers in 1973, which amounted either to a guaranteed job or what was
described as a “monthly displacement allowance.” In the process of shaping
the program of airline deregulation, however, President Ford ruled out assis-
tance to airline workers facing job losses in the event of shutdowns at Pan
American or the other ailing carriers. In mid-March 1975, one of Ford’s
aides had prepared notes for the president’s use in an upcoming meeting
with Secretary Coleman focused on transportation deregulation. The presi-
dent would tell Coleman that the administration expressed “sympathy and
compassion for owners and employees of [airline] companies in financial
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difficulty.” At the same time, Ford expected Coleman to “do everything pos-
sible to limit Federal financial exposure except in the most extreme cases.”34
Brock Adams had supplied railroad workers with sweeteners. President
Ford, however, chose to defend the budget, leaving employees to stand alone
at the precipice.
Nor were the winners clearly identified and persuaded of the benefits of
deregulation. President Ford and Senator Kennedy promised flyers that air-
line deregulation would bring less expensive airline tickets. Cheaper tickets,
if they materialized, would translate into lower personal expenses, higher
corporate profits, or aggregate savings. Airline passengers and other “con-
sumers” remained unorganized, however, failing to appear on behalf of
Ford’s deregulation efforts. President Ford and Secretary Coleman had also
promised shippers that deregulation would lower the costs of conducting
business. The amount of those savings, however, remained more asserted
than demonstrated. Again, lacking the sweeteners offered railroad workers,
Ford’s plans to deregulate trucking asked shippers to run the risk of higher
prices in a deregulated environment. Equally, Ford’s plan for deregulation of
trucking asked shippers to jeopardize relationships with truck operators and
drivers built up over years or even decades.
Nor had President Ford and his senior staff convinced small-town ship-
pers and travelers—and their numerous representatives—that deregulation
of truck and airline firms would not mean lost service, bankrupt firms, and
still higher levels of unemployment. In an economy and polity, moreover,
that were increasingly national and international in scope, loss of trans-
portation services presaged further diminution of small-town economics,
prestige, and political leverage. Rather than being attracted by the promise
of efficient markets at work, small-town workers, owners, and politicians
identified deregulation as one of those political contrivances that would
hasten the pace at which they became losers. Again, one must not underes-
timate the tireless efforts of airline and truck executives and union leaders
in defeating Ford’s deregulation bills. Yet Ford’s efforts to deregulate truck-
ing and airlines in 1976 also failed because they posed risks—for shippers,
for air and truck workers, for residents of small towns, for business owners
and their employees, and for politicians. After mid-1976, even President
Ford had chosen not to run the risk of irritating airline and trucking com-
pany employees or the many others who figured that they stood to lose in a
program of deregulation.
Had President Ford secured a second term, however, perhaps he rather
than President Jimmy Carter would have supervised deregulation of the
nation’s transportation industries. In 1974, deregulation was an esoteric
topic discussed among economists, senior presidential aides, leaders in
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Congress, and solid opponents such as truckers and teamsters. By early
1977, President Ford and his staff, along with a few others such as Edward
Kennedy, Brock Adams, and journalists and pundits, had converted deregu-
lation into a topic enjoying widespread attention in newspapers and maga-
zines, a guaranteed place on the agenda of Congress, the sustained attention
of regulators, and a small but increasingly savvy constituency. One of the
keys to Carter’s subsequent success was the organization and management
of that constituency for deregulation, a political program that proponents
now regularly described using the more engaging term of regulatory reform.
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IN THE MID-1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower and Commerce Secretary
Sinclair Weeks had launched the deregulation drive, seeking legislation that
would partially deregulate trucking firms and railroads. Every president
after Eisenhower advocated deregulation in some form. As part of his effort
to bring about deregulation, President Johnson had created the Department
of Transportation; and President Nixon had secured from Congress author-
ity to appoint the chair of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Deregulation was part of the institutional office of the president, and the
tools of deregulation, including the power to appoint the ICC chair, were
part of the patrimony that presidents bestowed on their successors. Every
president engaged in this lengthy effort had urged federal construction of
transportation markets as part of efforts to save railroads, “fine-tune” the
economy, or later, during the 1970s, to rescue railroad service and the over-
all economy from inflation and unemployment. Not until 1976, however,
had President Ford achieved limited deregulation of the nation’s railroads,
creating the long-sought-after “zone of reasonableness.”
Beginning in January 1977, President Jimmy Carter took his turn at try-
ing to deregulate the nation’s transportation industries. Carter made use of
his immense powers to appoint like-minded persons such as economists
Alfred E. Kahn to chair the Civil Aeronautics Board and Darius W. Gask-
ins Jr. to chair the Interstate Commerce Commission. Under President
Carter, moreover, deregulation of airlines and trucking and the hoped-for
creation of trucking and airline markets began as administrative rather than
as legislative initiatives. First having launched deregulation on an adminis-
185
C H A P T E R  8
Jimmy Carter and Deregulation 
of the “Best Transportation System
in the World,” 1977–1980
Regulation suddenly assumed a political importance it had not
attained since the Progressive Era.
—Historian Thomas K. McCraw, 1984
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trative basis, Carter next relied on his talented staff and especially Mary
Schuman, Richard M. Neustadt, and Stuart E. Eizenstat to assemble a
coalition of shippers, consumers, and breakaway truckers who supported
legislation aimed at making those newfound markets permanent.
In 1978, President Carter presided over deregulation of the nation’s air-
lines; and in 1980, he supervised deregulation of trucking and further dereg-
ulation of the still-ailing railroads. As often happened in the past, during the
1970s, politicians such as Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter found economists
useful as experts and as heads of regulatory agencies. Whether by adminis-
trative or legislative action, however, the drive toward deregulation and the
simultaneous creation of transportation markets began and ended as presi-
dential—and political—initiatives.
J immy Carter and Airline Deregulation
Jimmy Carter brought no original ideas or experience to deregulation. In
1976, presidential candidate Carter had endorsed “greater federal aid to the
railroads in order to reduce their tax burdens.” Equally, Carter sought “clos-
er . . . coordination at the federal level” of the nation’s transportation sys-
tems. Yet at the same time, Carter wanted to “mov[e] decisively to reform
regulation of airline industry.”1 Candidate Carter had adopted the mix of
centralizing and decentralizing proposals advocated during the 1970s by
Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. As president, however, Carter determined
to bring about deregulation of the nation’s truck, rail, and airline industries.
Airline deregulation came first. Many still judged airline travel glam-
orous, which meant that journalists reported regularly on air travel. Equally
important, if airline deregulation actually led to lower fares, business execu-
tives who flew regularly would see savings immediately, presumably adding
to the political momentum for truck and further rail deregulation. Within a
month of taking office, moreover, Carter’s top advisers reported that several
members of Congress had already introduced bills aimed at deregulating the
airlines. Consequently, Stuart E. Eizenstat, who served as Assistant to the
President for Domestic Affairs and Policy, did not want Carter to endorse a
bill, since “endorsement of one . . . would needlessly alienate the sponsors of
others.” 2 Under those circumstances, one must suspect that Carter’s
appointment of the flamboyant economist Alfred E. Kahn to the Civil
Aeronautics Board and his enthusiastic and successful promotion of airline
deregulation was part of an effort to foster deregulation without “needlessly
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alienat[ing]” anyone. Instead, Kahn launched the process of deregulating
the nation’s airlines on the basis of administrative rulings rather than on the
basis of legislative change. In the politics of airline deregulation, Kahn’s
ideas and personality mattered.
Like many presidential advisers who had dealt with transportation
issues over the years, including William Ripley, Joseph Eastman, James
Landis, and John Snow, Kahn now had the opportunity to merge academic
expertise with policy leadership in the field of transportation. Although
Kahn lacked familiarity with details of airline operations and management,
in 1971 he had published a study that included a section on the economics
of airline pricing. Anticipating the revelations of the Kennedy hearings by
four years, Kahn asserted that reduced prices offered by an airline in Cali-
fornia had brought about an increase in the number of passengers, and
higher revenues.3 Again, the California and Texas findings rested on a small
and not-representative sample of unregulated air travel and prices. In the
hands of presidential advisers, editorial writers, and now Chairman Kahn,
the limited validity of Kennedy’s findings nonetheless emerged in editorials
and press conferences as hard, irrefragable, and universal facts that only a
selfish opponent could fail to recognize and endorse. Beginning in 1977,
moreover, Kahn also possessed the full weight and authority of the chair’s
office to bring about regulatory change. No longer a professor of economics
studying the promise of deregulation to create transportation markets, Kahn
and members of the CAB could now order it.
When Kahn arrived at the CAB, he inherited seventeen years of on-
again, off-again fare discounting. As early as 1961, members of the CAB
had authorized special fares, as for instance family fares. Beginning in 1972,
CAB officials eliminated the family fare and other special fares. By early
1977, however, Kahn’s immediate predecessor as chair of the CAB had
voted with his colleagues to permit executives of American Airlines and
several others to reintroduce promotional fares. According to historian
McCraw, “with Kahn on the scene, the dike burst.” By a vote of 5–0, mem-
bers of the CAB, including Kahn, authorized airline managers to lower
prices as they judged wisest. Soon, airline officials created a variety of dis-
count fares with catchy names such as “Super Coach” and “Simple Saver.”
By mid-1978, about half of all coach passengers flew on discount tickets.
Although ticket prices had declined for many passengers, profits for the
major airlines were double those earned in the previous year. A temporary
revival in the American economy contributed to airline traffic and profits,
but deregulation proponents argued that rising patronage and rising profits
illustrated the advantages of deregulation.4 During the late 1970s, few
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recalled that between 1945 and 1953, members of the CAB, with their tem-
porary policy of allowing the “nonskeds” to offer airline service, had helped
usher in the first stages of mass market air travel.
Kahn went further, insisting that airline executives compete for business
on routes formerly assigned to competitors. Executives of trunk carriers
such as Delta, however, feared unlimited entry of competitors into “their”
routes even more than they feared price competition. Earlier CAB officials
had regularly approved additional routes, but only for members of that small
group of certificated carriers including Eastern, Delta, and American. One
of Ford’s top staffers, John Snow, had attempted to win legislative support
for easing entry rules. Now, Kahn and his colleagues simply authorized
additional competition. In one case, Kahn and his board members granted
authority to two applicants to fly from Chicago’s small Midway Airport,
creating competition for older carriers flying from their hub at busy O’Hare.
No longer, moreover, were CAB officials going to look after the financial
health of the airline firms, which earlier boards had occasionally done in
order to keep the weakest carriers such as Northeast Airlines flying. During
a hectic period of about a year and a half, Kahn and members of his board
believed that they had “‘introduced unprecedented substantive and proce-
dural innovations.’”5 Following World War II, members of the CAB such as
Chair James Landis had permitted several fare innovations. In the context
of the late 1970s, however, Kahn’s innovations such as handing out long
routes to regional carriers were fostering another round of price competition
and the first steps in airline deregulation.
Despite the many changes in pricing and entry policy that Kahn and his
colleagues had brought about, leaders of airline unions and airline corpora-
tions such as Frank Borman at Eastern Airlines still resisted the prospect of
rate and route deregulation. In addition, those opponents had access to the
courts, to members of Congress worried about service to their own commu-
nities, and to members of a CAB appointed by a future president perhaps
less interested in deregulation. According to McCraw, Kahn himself recog-
nized that “the real fight . . . had just begun.” What was needed, Kahn
observed, was legislation that would “‘secure these advances against a change
of agency policy.’”6 Possessing a smart and amusing wit and having won the
affection of journalists, Kahn played an important part in persuading mem-
bers of Congress about the value of deregulation.
From the first days of the Carter administration, however, Stuart Eizen-
stat and his senior aides had taken charge of day-to-day efforts to enact that
legislation. Mary Schuman was in charge of those efforts. Prior to her posi-
tion as one of Eizenstat’s top assistants on the Domestic Policy Staff, Schu-
man had worked for the Senate commerce committee, where she coau-
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thored portions of an early airline deregulation bill sponsored by Senator
Howard W. Cannon and Senator Kennedy. In November 1977, Schuman
moved to the Carter/Mondale transition team and then to the Domestic
Policy Staff. A recent graduate of the University of Washington law school,
Schuman was an activist for airline deregulation. In March 1977, she
announced that deregulation would bring “a healthier industry because you
won’t see half-empty planes in the skies with all the frills we see now.” Like
John Snow in the Ford administration, Mary Schuman came to Washing-
ton convinced of the efficacy of deregulation and determined to create a
vibrant market for airline operations.7
Schuman also brought great energy to her new job as a member of
Eizenstat’s team. During the summer of 1977, Schuman spoke to business
and civic leaders in sixteen cities. Self-confidence added to Schuman’s cen-
tral role in the effort to achieve “reform.” Schuman was at ease telling jour-
nalists in every city on her tour about the advantages of deregulation. In
August 1977, one of those newspaper writers who liked the idea of deregu-
lating airlines described Schuman as “a singularly attractive and brainy lady.”
Schuman was also comfortable telling airline executives that they had to talk
with her about deregulation, not with President Carter. In November 1977,
a writer for Business Week observed that “reaction to Schuman might be dif-
ferent if she were a 35-year-old male and if she were pushing a policy that
was agreeable to more transportation executives.” Again like John Snow,
Schuman was in charge of assembling that coalition in and out of Congress
in favor of airline deregulation. Ten years later, political scientist Dorothy L.
Robyn described Schuman as “Washington lobbyists’ choice for the single
individual most responsible for passage of the airline bill.”8
Even a savvy operative like Schuman soon discovered that an emphasis
on tough rhetoric and use of euphemistic phrases such as reform had their
limits. In mid-1977, most airline executives still opposed deregulation.
Delta’s leaders especially disliked the prospect of opening “their” routes to
competitors. “It is my intention,” the chair and chief executive officer of
Delta Airlines wrote President Carter on August 8, “to expend whatever
energy and resources we have available to us to fight deregulation in its pre-
sent form.”9
Nor was there uniformity and certainty among leaders in Congress and
the administration regarding important details of deregulation. Like the
railroad bill signed in 1976 by President Ford, many, including the powerful
Senator Warren Magnuson as well as Carter’s Secretary of Transportation
Brock Adams, sought protection for airline employees in the event that
large-scale layoffs followed deregulation. Adams, moreover, expressed con-
cern about loss of service to small towns, telling a journalist early in March
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that persons who had prepared studies showing that deregulation would
bring no diminution of service “were economists and people who dealt with
theoretical aspects of it as opposed to people who’ve been out in those com-
munities and saw what happened.”10
Schuman’s first task was to maneuver Brock Adams into a public
endorsement of most aspects of deregulation. At the request of Adams and
his top officials at the Department of Transportation, Schuman and others
had agreed to present legislation that would phase in deregulation of airline
entry and pricing over a period of two or three years. Although Schuman
judged the lengthier phase-in “good on the merits, and politically it is desir-
able because Congress is more likely to go along with it,” on March 18 she
reported to Eizenstat that no further advance was possible to accommodate
Adams. Reviewing testimony that Adams and other transportation officials
had prepared for Congress, Schuman found their remarks “totally negative
[and] spoke only of predation, bankruptcy, large carriers squeezing out small
ones, etc.” Schuman returned the testimony to Adams, telling him and his
aides that “testimony must be positive, and that the negative aspects of the
issue could be covered in questions and answers.”11 Mary Schuman was as
confident and as direct with cabinet secretaries as with airline executives.
President Carter and Stuart Eizenstat handled the next stage in dealing
with Adams. “We are concerned,” Eizenstat wrote Carter on March 23,
“about the testimony of Brock Adams.” In turn, Carter told Eizenstat in a
handwritten note to “give me a brief tabulation of points from testimony so
far [and] I’ll send it to Brock for quick comment.” Carter’s determination to
make deregulation policy, a journalist had reported earlier in the month,
“reveals that it is the White House, not the Transportation Department,
that is calling the signals on CAB reform.”12
Presidential intervention secured results. “DOT’s testimony is near
great!” Schuman wrote Eizenstat on March 31, “the tone is very positive.”
Adams was prepared to testify in favor of “pricing flexibility . . . [and] entry
and exit liberalization.” Nonetheless, Adams would not relent on guarantees
for small-town airline service or on job protections for airline employees.13
President Carter was willing to risk a diminution of small-town service.
“Claims” that smaller cities “would be left without service,” Eizenstat wrote
Carter on March 25, “have been shown to be totally without foundation.”
Perhaps uncertain about the accuracy of the few and limited studies report-
ing no harm to smaller cities following deregulation, Carter wrote by hand
on one of the versions of the memo of March 25, “hope this is true.” Simi-
larly, in December 1975, a senior official in the Ford administration had
written “not really sure about this” in reaction to the high hopes for airline
service following deregulation. Nevertheless, within two months of taking
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office, the limited findings to come from the Kennedy hearings and the
results of studies by several economists such as Paul W. MacAvoy on
“deregulation effects” had emerged among many or most in the Carter
administration (and earlier among many or most in the Ford administra-
tion) as fact and prophecy with universal applicability. With Adams’s testi-
mony now complete as part of a nearly uniform endorsement by senior
Carter officials of deregulation and its many benefits, Schuman planned to
“launch a good lobbying effort on the Hill to counteract the industry.”14
Good luck intervened. By early June, Senator Kennedy and several col-
leagues in the Senate had revised their bill to provide a continuation of
small-city airline service. Up to that point, the federal government had paid
subsidies to regional carriers serving smaller cities and towns. Under the
revised bill, as Schuman and Eizenstat explained it to President Carter, “the
current federal subsidy program is reformed to guarantee service for 10 years
to all small communities currently receiving service.” Because the program
of subsidies “is steamlined,” they added, “there will be no increase in federal
subsidy.”15 Like railroad deregulation under President Ford, members of
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FIGURE 17. Discussion of airline regulation, Oval Office, May 4, 1977. (From left to right)
Stuart Eizenstat, Charles L. Schultze (seated, back to photographer), Mary Schuman, Brock
Adams, Frank Moore, Jack Watson, and President Jimmy Carter. Each president of the
United States, starting with Dwight Eisenhower and concluding with Carter, made trans-
portation deregulation a centerpiece of his policy agenda. Deregulation of transportation
began and concluded as a presidential initiative. Source: University of Washington archives.
Used with permission.
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Congress offered a program of straightforward sweeteners to residents and
leaders of small cities and towns worried that deregulation would convert
them into losers. In case economists such as Alfred Kahn and Paul
MacAvoy were proven wrong about the beneficial effects of deregulation for
all, the state would subsidize the small-city airline market that Mary Schu-
man and others were planning to create for airline service.
In mid-June, Schuman launched her lobbying campaign among mem-
bers of Congress, featuring President Carter as the lobbyist-in-chief. Schu-
man had scheduled a meeting for Carter on June 20 with leaders in Con-
gress. A public briefing would follow, with the congressional meeting
described as a “photo opportunity” and the public briefing described as
“open to press coverage.” In a memo listing “talking points” for these two
events, Schuman and Eizenstat wanted Carter to reemphasize the “guaran-
tee” that “no small community now receiving service will lose it for 10 years.”
Otherwise, Schuman and Eizenstat scripted Carter to sound like President
Ford, asking him to repeat the well-known findings of the Kennedy hear-
ings that “fares are much lower in Texas and California where the CAB does
not regulate.”16
By late July, Mary Schuman had immersed herself in the details of leg-
islation. She reported to Eizenstat that Kennedy’s revised bill now provided
“automatic route entry” for large and small carriers and a “‘zone of reason-
ableness’” permitting airline management to raise fares up to 5 percent for
the first two years after the bill passed, and to lower fares up to 55 percent.
More problematic was a section of the bill easing entry by carriers, includ-
ing regional carriers, into one another’s routes. “Our strategy at this point,”
Eizenstat learned, is to hold on to the entry provisions in the bill” (emphasis
in original), subverting an effort by members of the Senate committee “to
eliminate the automatic route entry section and replace it with a require-
ment that the Board implement its own.”17 Because the regulatory regime
had long consisted of numerous administrative and legislative items such as
entry requirements, pricing policy, and small-city subsidies, the process of
securing deregulation consisted of an equal number of administrative and
legislative innovations.
In late September, Schuman reported “some good news . . . on the airline
markup.” By a vote of 13–5, members of the Senate commerce committee
had defeated an amendment aimed at eliminating automatic entry by airline
management into one another’s routes. By more than two to one, members
of the committee had affirmed the opening of airline routes, overturning one
of the central pillars of the regulatory regime. Open entry promised substan-
tial price competition, which was precisely the reason airline executives had
opposed it. Curiously, the market-oriented Senator Barry M. Goldwater was
192 / CHAPTER 8
RSB_chap8_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:32 PM  Page 192
one of the five who favored a continuation of limited entry. “The votes
today,” Schuman told Eizenstat and several others, “should get the bill mov-
ing.”18 “Good!” Eizenstat wrote on his copy of the memo.
During succeeding months, Schuman and Eizenstat turned often to
Carter for additional assistance in negotiations with Brock Adams or recal-
citrant legislators. For instance, on September 27, Schuman wrote Eizenstat
and other top officials that Senator Warren Magnuson was “against us” on
opening of airline routes to new competitors. On October 24, Eizenstat
reported to Carter that Magnuson “has been filibustering.” At Eizenstat’s
urging, Carter telephoned Magnuson, leading to the positive report by
Carter that Magnuson “wants us to help him get a quorum Thursday.”19
Efforts to modify airline entry and price policy started with President
Carter and his senior officials.
Carter could not always control each detail of legislation. In late May
1978, members of the Senate voted to provide salary payments for up to
three years to airline employees who lost their jobs, or whose salaries were
reduced by the onset of hard times for airlines. Federal payments would
even include relocation expenses and compensation for the sale of a house
below market value. Members of the house voted for six years worth of ben-
efits. “The principle of equal treatment of unemployed workers is violated,”
a senior official in the Office of Management and Budget wrote Eizenstat
on May 26, “when a small group is singled out for extra-ordinary Federal
benefits for which their unemployed neighbors are not eligible.” On Sep-
tember 27, as the airline bill headed for a Senate-House conference, Eizen-
stat and another senior official nonetheless assured President Carter that
“recent events show that airline employees benefit from airline competition,
so the prospects for having to invoke this provision are not great.”20 By
October 1978, Carter’s desire to deregulate the airlines immediately mat-
tered more than economists’ predictions, justice in the abstract, or the
prospect of making comparatively modest payouts to unemployed workers
sometime in the future.
Luck intervened one more time. President Ford had sought to bring
about a change in CAB policy through a program of what political scien-
tists Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk characterize as “appointments and
exhortation.” Nonetheless, Ford’s primary focus was on legislating deregu-
lation. By appointing Alfred Kahn as chair of the CAB, Carter had
launched deregulation on an administrative basis, achieving quick and sub-
stantial results. Early in 1977, however, neither Carter nor his top aides such
as Mary Schuman and Stuart Eizenstat had foreseen the dramatic effect
that Kahn’s actions would have on airline executives and their earlier oppo-
sition to deregulation. By early 1978, airline executives, including those at
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Delta, no longer opposed deregulation. By late 1978, airline executives actu-
ally sought deregulation. “The deregulatory activism of the commission,”
report Derthick and Quirk, “gave the airline . . . industr[y] compelling rea-
sons to prefer some sort of statutory result, to want that result to be reached
quickly, and if necessary, to accept broad procompetitive provisions to get
it.” On October 24, President Carter signed the Airline Deregulation Act.
Members of the House had approved the conference report 356–6, and the
Senate had approved it 82–4. Again like the zone of reasonableness pricing
concept Secretary Weeks had advocated for trucking and railroad, airline
executives could now raise and lower fares within a broad range; and open
entry, formerly detested by airline and union managers, was now a matter of
public policy. Beginning on January 1, 1985, the CAB would go out of exis-
tence. As President Carter observed at the signing ceremony, early in 1977,
“[T]his bill had few friends. I am happy to say that today, it appears to have
few enemies.”21
Although mostly in the background, President Carter in particular had
played a key role in bringing about deregulation. Not only had Carter
appointed Alfred Kahn to chair the CAB, starting the program of adminis-
trative deregulation. It was Carter alone, as president, who made the deci-
sion to pursue legislative deregulation. Sometimes, moreover, Carter pro-
vided straightforward instructions to senior staff members regarding his
preference for deregulation. During April and May 1978, as negotiations
with congressional leaders seeking antinoise legislation for airports as part
of deregulation grew more intense, Carter sent handwritten memos to Stu-
art Eizenstat and others exhorting them “to hold to maximum deregulation”
and “support all deregulation.”22 Since the Eisenhower administration,
deregulation had rested in presidential hands.
President Carter, along with Mary Schuman, Stuart Eizenstat, Alfred
Kahn, and Senator Kennedy, had installed a new doctrine for airline opera-
tions. No longer would presidential appointees at the Civil Aeronautics
Board and their staff of experts determine routes and rates and no longer
would those officials take responsibility for the financial and organizational
security of the industry or its member firms. In turn, Carter, Kennedy, and
the others hoped that the experience of several airlines operating in Texas
and California could be replicated in the form of service, pricing, and organ-
izational innovations among many more airlines operating nationwide net-
works. Never one to doubt his research findings or the perceived experience
of deregulated airlines in two states, CAB chair Kahn announced that soon
“the airlines . . . will be knee deep in the free-enterprise system and not
returnable.” In the short run, moreover, airline deregulation would serve as
the first step in a much larger campaign to deregulate trucking and other
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industries and help reduce inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, congressional
leaders protected some of their best organized constituents, agreeing to sub-
sidize small-city service for ten years, and also to pay the salaries and moving
expenses of displaced workers for up to six years—were that action to
become necessary. In the event airline deregulation produced negative
results, protection of airline employees and small-city residents also pro-
tected members of Congress from their anger. Brock Adams well understood
the fears of his former colleagues in Congress and the aspirations of his for-
mer constituents in Washington State. Despite having conceded these points
to Adams, Magnuson, and others, Carter, his staff, and Senator Kennedy
worked as a group described by political scientist Anthony E. Brown as “‘pol-
icy politicians’ united by their commitment to deregulation.” Altogether, the
success of these policy politicians rested on dissatisfaction among sections of
the polity with inflation, unemployment, and with government itself, and on
the still-untested idea that so simple an act as deregulating airlines and the
subsequent appearance of this latest round of government-created price and
service competition would reduce inflation and unemployment, reversing the
dreadful effects of stagflation.23 Carter and his staff of policy politicians also
led the effort to deregulate the trucking industry.
Deregulating Trucking
Carter’s goal in fostering deregulation of trucking and railroads was identi-
cal to that of Ford and Nixon. If the prices charged by truckers and railroads
could be reduced, ran the argument, then in an era of inflationary pressures
the price of every other commodity would also fall. On February 7, 1979,
Eizenstat told a meeting of consumer groups that “the costs of regulated sur-
face transportation are borne by . . . consumers as reflected in the price of vir-
tually every product available in the marketplace.” In 1955, Secretary Weeks
and President Eisenhower and the railroads’ fictitious “Mrs. Kennedy’s Five
Pounds of Sugar” had made the identical point. At the outset of this latest
drive to deregulate trucking, moreover, keen observers of transportation pol-
itics judged that teamsters and truckers still possessed formidable defenses.
In mid-1979, according to a writer for the Wall Street Journal, directors of the
American Trucking Associations could rely upon a staff of lobbyists and the
combined efforts of more than seventeen thousand trucking-company
members. Leaders of the Teamsters Union and their six hundred thousand
members, ran the reasoning, would stand “side by side [with employers]
against deregulation.” Similar to the effort of each president since
Eisenhower, however, Carter, Eizenstat, and Schuman planned to rely on
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what Eizenstat characterized as “strong leadership from grassroots groups
throughout the country.”24
As Mary Schuman learned in a series of meetings with leaders of truck-
ing companies, moreover, many executives remained united around the
time-honored defenses of trucking regulation. At those meetings held late
in 1977, trucking officials, and especially truckers holding operating rights
as common carriers, spoke of low rates, predictable employment, and pre-
dictable service. Again like their contemporary counterparts in the airline
industry, these same truckers spoke often and voluminously about mainte-
nance of reliable service to small cities and towns. “The current system,” an
executive of Southeastern Freight Lines told Schuman, “is basically sound.”
Deregulation would lead to rate increases of 20–30 percent on less-than-
truckload shipments, the head of Georgia Highway Express told her. “Open
Pricing and free entry,” argued an official of Briggs Trucking Company,
“would return the industry to the cutthroat competition that existed prior to
1935.” Changing the nation’s trucking industry, he predicted, “would have
sociological impacts that would boggle the mind.” Leaders of African
American truck owners also joined in celebration of the regulatory regime.
According to notes of a meeting held on November 18, 1977, African
Americans operating trucking firms told Schuman “that the rules should
not be changed just when minorities are entering the game.” Schuman
wrote Eizenstat that truckers “made precisely the same arguments the air-
lines made against deregulation early in the airline debate.”25
Not familiar with the long history of regulation and deregulation, Schu-
man could not have recognized the degree to which truck operators in the
late 1970s were actually repeating the proregulation arguments they had
been advancing since the 1930s. Starting in 1948 with congressional
approval of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, leaders of the American Trucking
Associations and especially managers of common carrier firms such as
Briggs had identified the antitrust immunity of their rate bureaus as a key
feature of the legal and ideological underpinnings of the regulatory regime.
Nor would Shuman and her associates have been aware that in 1955, fol-
lowing Sinclair Weeks’s proposal to bring about partial deregulation of
trucking and railroading, truckers’ rhetoric and behavior had congealed into
a series of set phrases such as the “best transportation system in the world,”
and into several decades of lawsuits and aggressive lobbying at the hands of
industry leaders such as Robert McBride, Albert Rosenbaum, and their
uncompromising attorneys and lobbyists. In 1979, as before, managers of
common carriers such as Briggs and Southeastern were prepared to defend
their operating rights and the right of their rate bureaus to determine prices
charged shippers.26 As Schuman was in the process of discovering, among
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truckers and again especially among executives of common carriers such as
Briggs and Southeastern, history (and powerful lobbying efforts, often in
conjunction with the Teamsters) really mattered.
At those meetings, however, Schuman also learned that leaders of com-
peting trucking organizations were now open to the idea of limited deregu-
lation. Since the late 1930s, differences between contract carriers formerly
led by Vee Kennedy and common carriers formerly led by McBride and
Rosenbaum had been part of trucking politics. McBride and Kennedy and
the many truckers they represented had long cooperated and competed with
one another. Contract carriers could offer lower rates than common carri-
ers, but were limited to handling door-to-door deliveries in bulk and further
limited to serving no more than eight customers. If, however, legal distinc-
tions between contract and common carriers were reduced, or even abol-
ished, as the chair of the Contract Carrier Conference now recommended
to Mary Schuman, then contract carriers, such as Don and Al Schneider’s
Schneider National, could move into areas of the trucking business long
dominated by common carriers.27 Once again, trucking politics, like trans-
portation politics as a whole, consisted of efforts to move a federally drawn
line in one’s favor, and against the interests of competitors.
With the opening created by Carter and Schuman, moreover, in the late
1970s officers of several firms operating their own trucking fleets—the pri-
vate truckers—joined the assault on the regulatory regime. With their
trucks often returning empty from deliveries, officers of corporations that
operated their own trucking fleets, such as textile manufacturer West Point-
Pepperell, asked Schuman to help them secure authority to transport not
only their own merchandise, but the merchandise of other firms.28 Owners
of private truck fleets wanted to continue to operate as private carriers part
of the time, and as contract carriers at other times. Again, deregulation pro-
posals resonated not in the abstract, but because they offered a concrete
opportunity to redraw competitive lines.
Even the long-disparaged freight forwarders joined the antiregulation
fray. Freight forwarders handled small shipments through other truckers
and railroads. During the post–World War II years, as often as forwarders
and their attorney Giles Morrow had attempted to expand their operating
rights, leaders of common and contract carriers blocked those efforts in
Congress. In 1977, Schuman learned that those forwarders still “opposed
general deregulation . . . ,” but hoped to secure the ability “to make contract
rates with . . . railroads and to operate pickup and delivery service outside
their terminal areas.”29 In short, freight forwarders, private truckers, and
contract carriers wanted federal officials to bestow upon them what was
already bestowed on their competitors.
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Late in 1977, however, leaders of the freight forwarders and other seg-
ments of the trucking industry, including the loyal Teamsters, were not pre-
pared to overturn the regulatory regime for some unspecified and uncertain
system labeled regulatory reform. Instead, leaders of each of these groups
such as the freight forwarders wanted maintenance of rules that advantaged
their segment of the industry, and abolition of rules that did not. With luck,
they were reasoning, the passion of Senator Kennedy, President Carter, and
Mary Schuman for deregulation might yet be refocused to bring about the
kind of deregulation that offered business opportunities for themselves and
that with the same stroke disadvantaged competitors.30
In 1978, however, deregulation-minded commissioners of the ICC
opened the door to a rupture in the formerly united front of truckers oppos-
ing deregulation. In Toto Purchasing and Supply Company, Inc., commission-
ers determined that private carriers such as West Point-Pepperell were enti-
tled to carry freight for others, and to charge them for the service. Naturally,
leaders of the Teamsters and the American Trucking Associations and their
attorneys made an effort to undo Toto, asking Congress and the federal
courts to provide relief. Leaders of the Private Carrier Conference, however,
joined Carter’s aides in seeking to codify Toto in federal legislation. Again,
the idea at this point among private truck operators was not to overturn the
many elements of the regulatory regime, but to enhance their own share of
the action inside of it.31
The Toto decision created an opening for contract carriers to join the
deregulators. As early as 1976, when President Ford and Senator Kennedy
were launching the truck deregulation effort, Thomas Callaghan, the man-
aging director of the Contract Carrier Conference (earlier directed by Vee
Kennedy), wanted the rule of eight overturned. “We could argue,” he later
told political scientist Dorothy Robyn, “that it was unfair to limit the num-
ber of customers contract carriers could serve and thereby punish them for
their success. The issue,” he added, “was appealing to the membership and
an easy story to tell to the outside world.”32  By the mid-1970s, the self-inter-
est of contract carriers coincided with the general commitment of business-
oriented politicians and ordinary Americans to reward successful managers
and entrepreneurs.
Long experience had also taught truckers that political action had to
coincide with the telling of their apparently easy or engaging stories.
Callaghan also took the bold step of establishing “the Kennedy connection”
in support of their joint efforts to deregulate common carriers. Callaghan
testified before Kennedy’s committee and even appeared at a press confer-
ence at which Kennedy announced his plan to repeal antitrust immunity
granted rate bureaus in the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948. “Normally,”
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Callaghan told political scientist Robyn, his members would “never have
established a political connection with Teddy Kennedy, but they were
peeved and feeling feisty.” By themselves the partial defection of the private
carriers and the total defection of the contract carriers would not have
proved sufficient to undo the clout of the ATA and its energetic core of
common carriers such as Southeastern, Briggs, and Consolidated Freight-
ways, who in good times had profited handsomely from the workings of the
regulatory regime. Those defections, however, limited the ability of ATA
leaders to appear at congressional hearings and in congressional offices mak-
ing claims of industry-wide unity in their opposition to deregulation.33
Disagreements among trucking industry leaders created an opportunity
for President Carter to exploit. On May 15, Carter sent a handwritten note
to Stuart Eizenstat, “Stu, Move—Very Good.” With that note, Carter and
his senior staff, including Mary Schuman and Richard “Rick” Neustadt, for-
mally launched the effort to deregulate trucking.34
Like President Ford, public appearances came first. On June 21, Carter
hosted a ceremony in the White House Rose Garden to announce the kick-
off of efforts to deregulate trucking. Senator Kennedy was the first to speak,
reflecting Carter’s decision to submit a joint deregulation bill. Like the con-
tract carriers, President Carter found value in establishing his own Kennedy
connection. The ceremony also provided a large audience for Senator
Kennedy’s announcement that deregulation of trucking would eventually
“sav[e] consumers and business men and women $5 billion.” Still others
invited to the reception included leaders of Sears, the American Farm
Bureau, Consumers Union, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the Private
Truck Council, the trade organization of the private truckers who were anx-
ious to get into commercial trucking.35 The announcement ceremony put on
public display for ATA officials, teamsters, and members of Congress the
size and diversity of the trucking deregulation coalition assembled by Mary
Schuman—the coalition for which every president since Dwight Eisen-
hower had been searching.
Beginning around September 1979, however, Mary Schuman no longer
served as the person in charge of day-to-day coalition management and leg-
islative maneuver. At her request, President Carter appointed Schuman gen-
eral counsel of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the agency that she, Carter,
Alfred Kahn, and others had set for abolition in 1985. Schuman’s job at the
CAB, one suspects, was to insure a continuing emphasis on deregulation,
rather than a return to the regulatory regime in place up to early 1977. In turn,
Richard Neustadt and a few senior officials at the Department of Trans-
portation assumed Schuman’s responsibilities for the legislative component
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of trucking deregulation. Neustadt was the son of Richard E. Neustadt, pro-
fessor of government at Harvard University, who himself had served as a
member of President Truman’s staff and later as an adviser to President
Kennedy. Before joining Carter’s Domestic Policy Staff, “Rick” Neustadt, an
attorney, had worked as a political writer for CBS News. A decade later,
political scientist Robyn reported that “Neustadt was regarded as one of the
brightest young minds in the White House.”36
Beginning in June 1979, Neustadt and his colleagues at the Department
of Transportation made plans for the legislative use of their newly created
constituency for deregulation. This process was complex and lengthy. Senior
officials at DOT worked from a “basic list of supporters, including major
shippers, business and agricultural groups and others.” Rather than make a
general appeal to persons and corporations on the list, however, the first step
was to select shippers who resided in “targeted states and districts,” repre-
sented by members of key congressional committees. In addition, an admin-
istration official wanted those shippers “to advise their employees of the
benefits to their firms resulting from the bill and to encourage them to write
as well.” The goal was to “mobiliz[e] their stated support [that] could effec-
tively neutralize much of the trucker opposition.”37
President Carter used his authority to appoint the chair of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and two additional members to accelerate the
process of neutralizing truckers. In mid-May 1979, Carter penned another
note to Eizenstat, “p.s. Let’s move on ICC member appointments.” With
that note, Carter combined the search for legislative deregulation of truck-
ing with a search for deregulation-minded appointments to the ICC.38
For chair of the ICC, Carter elevated Darius W. Gaskins Jr., a member
since early 1979. Gaskins was professor of economics at the University of
California at Berkeley, and more recently had worked for Alfred Kahn at the
CAB as director of his newly created Office of Economic Analysis. Gaskins
enjoyed professional experience in assessing transportation markets and in
the politics of achieving administrative deregulation. At his confirmation
hearing in June, Gaskins told members of the Senate commerce committee
that deregulation of the airline industry suggested “that there may be sub-
stantial advantages to relying on competition.”39
Starting in October 1979, Gaskins and Carter’s two other appointees to
the ICC eased rules on entry, rates, and routes, the same tactic that Kahn
had used at the Civil Aeronautics Board two years earlier. As a start, Carter’s
new members permitted truckers to offer service on routes assigned to com-
petitors, the dreaded opening of entry. Since approval of the Motor Carrier
Act of 1935, those seeking to serve new routes had to prove that existing
service was inadequate, a difficult task. In December, moreover, Gaskins and
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his colleagues allowed truckers to make pickups and deliveries at all points
in their certificates, not just at designated points such as Chicago and then
New York. In February 1980, Gaskins told members of the board of gover-
nors of the Regular Common Carrier Conference (with members including
Southeastern Freight Lines, Briggs Trucking, and Consolidated Freight-
ways) that Congress was “almost certain” to remove “privileges” such as
“broad antitrust immunity [and] strict control over entry.” Members of his
audience, Gaskins urged, ought to “step forward and make the choices
which best serve your interests,” including “greater ratemaking freedom . . .
[and ] a parallel reduction in the remaining entry barriers and antitrust
immunity” of their rate bureaus. In short, Congress and the ICC were elim-
inating portions of the regulatory regime, and truckers had reached the last
moment to seek “new and valuable freedoms that might be made available
to your fellow businessmen [such as private and contract carriers] in other
segments of the industry.”40
By early 1980, President Carter and his senior staff had shaped most of
the legislative and administrative measures supporting trucking deregula-
tion. Darius Gaskins and Carter’s other appointees at the ICC issued rules
that partially deregulated trucking, a strategy pursued in earlier efforts to
deregulate airlines. In addition, the president’s staff starting with Mary
Schuman and continued by Richard Neustadt had assembled a large coali-
tion of enthusiasts for deregulation, including major shippers such as exec-
utives at Dow Chemical and others who represented retail-level consumers.
By promising relief from rate bureaus and removal of limits on intercorpo-
rate hauling, moreover, Schuman and Neustadt had added contract and pri-
vate carriers to the coalition (a tactic first attempted by members of the Ford
administration). By 1980, Schuman’s many interviews and conversations
extending back to 1977 started to pay dividends in the form of carefully
orchestrated legislative and administrative assaults on portions of trucking
regulation.41
Furious teamsters and unhappy truckers made a strenuous effort to
protect the shrinking boundaries of the regulatory regime. On March 1,
1980, Bennett C. Whitlock Jr., president of the American Trucking Asso-
ciations, sent a letter to his members ominously marked, “To all Persons
Interested in the Survival of the Motor Carrier Industry.” Whitlock
reminded members of their decades-old conviction that “sound entry con-
trols and collective rate-making are essential to a workable motor carrier
system.” Equally, Whitlock worried that “small towns and small shippers
would either see a reduction in service or an increase in rates.” In the
absence of the classic specter of the evil railroad, Whitlock was reminding
members and politicians of the time-honored idea that small-town service
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represented a truckers’ gift to the nation, in return for which the use of rate
bureaus to make rates was only common sense rather than a legally bestowed
privilege. On March 21, Whitlock issued another notice to members, telling
them that “this is it.” Again, Whitlock listed perceived threats built on the
memory of political and legal action extending back decades, as for instance
“elimination of antitrust immunity . . . [that] would spell the end of
ratemaking and . . . the end of regulation.” Once more, Whitlock wanted
members to come to Washington “during this crucial period,” adding that
“there is no substitute for personal, eyeball-to-eyeball contact with your
Senators.” And once again, several hundred trucking company executives
went to Washington.42 As during their struggle in 1955 and 1956 against the
Weeks proposals and in favor of the Interstate Highway System, truckers
still relied on “political strength” and on the conviction that every sentient
observer recognized their contribution to the “best transportation system in
the world.” Among truckers anyway, history still mattered.
The Teamsters’ message was more strident, less historical, but just as
political. “Don’t Destroy Our Jobs,” ran the headline in the Ohio Teamster for
April 1980. Authors of a flyer prepared by the Ohio Conference of Team-
sters announced that “the Kennedy-Carter Deregulation Bill is a Union
Bustin’ Tactic!!!” Particularly disturbing was the prospect of free entry by
nonunion trucks into routes that the ICC had assigned years earlier to their
employers. “Jobs will be lost,” warned the author of an article in the Ohio
Teamster, “to non-regulated companies and operators who are going to
bypass the established firms having Teamster contracts.”43
Like their counterparts in management, Teamster officials relied upon a
large turnout of drivers to visit members of Congress. Visible in their royal
blue union windbreakers, teamsters glared at members of a congressional
committee who were supportive of deregulation. In the event members
could not travel to Washington, union officials urged members to “take pen
or typewriter in hand and let your Senators and Congressmen know how
you feel about having your livelihood kicked around by the fun loving
deregulators.” The basic message was that “if you take away our jobs now, we
will take away your jobs at election time.”44 Teamsters (and trucking com-
pany executives) never doubted the centrality of state officials in structuring
the transportation industries.
In mid-March 1980, however, truck owners sought to negotiate a con-
clusion to legislative and administrative deregulation. “The truckers are cav-
ing in,” a senior administration official wrote Eizenstat on March 19,
adding that “the ATA . . . [had] offered a deal.” Fearing both pending legis-
lation and the possibility of even more stringent action by Darius Gaskins
and his new colleagues on the ICC, top trucking executives were willing to
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accept a modest level of deregulation in return for political certainty in their
future business operations. One truck operator complained that Gaskins
and the ICC were “cutting off our tails an inch at a time,” and that it “would
be easier to lose it in one fell swoop.”45
Starting after July 1, then, authors of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980
provided for greatly eased entry into trucking routes. Rather than requiring
applicants for a new route authority to show that trucking service was
needed, now those who held that authority and objected to the application
of a newcomer would have to demonstrate that the proposed service was
“‘inconsistent with the public convenience and necessity.’” In the past, the
burden, usually insurmountable, had rested on the applicant; and in the
future, the burden, likely difficult, would rest on the incumbent. Equally,
truck operators could raise or lower prices by up to 10 percent each year
without seeking ICC approval, once again creating the zone of reasonable-
ness recommended in the Weeks committee report of 1955. Sounding like
economist Alfred Kahn, at the signing ceremony on July 1, President Carter
announced that deregulation would “help to control inflation and give us an
opportunity to use the free enterprise system.”46 Put another way, Carter and
his top officials, including Mary Schuman and Richard Neustadt, had cre-
ated one market for all truckers, replacing distinct submarkets including one
for common carriers, another for contract carriers, and yet another for pri-
vate carriers.
Senior officials at the American Trucking Associations had nonetheless
managed to secure some ambiguity for themselves in the new era of dereg-
ulation. For example, antitrust immunity for rate bureaus—provided by the
Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948—remained in effect until 1984, and could
even be extended for another six months. Not only did rate bureaus retain
their antitrust immunity, Congress in 1980 created another study commis-
sion to investigate their operations and report to Congress before the end of
that immunity. As political scientist Robyn points out, truckers believed in
the efficacy and fairness of the regulatory regime, giving them hope that
eventually “the ‘truth will out.’”47
Teamsters came away from deregulation with less than their employers.
By giving way on entry, trucking company owners and senior managers had
given away the protection of greatest concern to teamsters. In turn, teamster
leaders asked Congress and ATA officials to support legislation providing a
right of first hire in the event of layoffs; and Teamster leaders also wanted
Congress to create a $100 million fund to pay benefits to laid-off drivers.
Owners and managers objected to these protective measures. Many did not
want to be compelled to hire teamsters first, and many feared that union-
ized drivers would seek to organize their nonunion firms. Instead, teamsters
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settled for the limp provision that the secretary of labor would maintain a
list of regulated carriers with job openings, and, in some unspecified way,
assist displaced drivers in their search for new positions. Such was the lim-
ited and tentative nature of the trucker-teamster alliance, a relationship
described only a year earlier by a Wall Street Journal writer as one in which
management and labor were prepared to stand “side by side.” Exactly like
truck owners and managers who relied on the American Trucking Associa-
tions for their political weight, the overrated clout of teamster leaders such
as Frank Fitzsimmons was always an artifact of a highly regulated trans-
portation regime.48
In reality, truck managers and teamsters were not a natural alliance, and
never had been. At least since the 1950s, employers had perceived their dri-
vers as useful allies in legislative battles, but not as social and political equals.
Cartoons in ATA publications such as Transport Topics routinely imaged
drivers as unshaven, uneducated, and in need of instruction and supervision
by managers, who in turn appeared at work cleanly shaven and wearing jack-
ets and ties. Removal of the jacket in a cartoon signified getting down to
business, but not a loss of authority. Nor did illustrators show trucking com-
pany managers inside or under a truck.49
The social distance between managers and drivers was wide, and man-
agers kept it that way. Truck owners and managers never invited Teamsters
to join them at businessmen’s clubs, at meetings of the Rotary, or at their
many golf tournaments held at exclusive country clubs. Nor had truckers
included teamsters in that vast network of attorneys, members of Congress,
and ICC officials who talked an indistinguishable mix of business and pol-
itics at countless lunches and dinners hosted by officials of the American
Trucking Associations. For their part, teamsters had brought lengthy and
difficult strikes against truck operators, achieving solid pay raises. Salary
negotiations and strikes only made clear that teamsters were employees, no
more. During the last stages of negotiations about the Motor Carrier Act of
1980, moreover, ATA officials refused close and formal association with
their Teamster counterparts, worrying that hostile members of Congress
would also judge them poorly.50 In all, teamsters and truck operators had
never achieved that sense of one another as men like themselves. In so hos-
tile an environment, teamsters received a stronger dose of Carter’s newly
created “free enterprise system” than their bosses.
Deregulating the Railroads
By midsummer 1980, only the remnants of the railroad regulatory regime
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stood in the way of President Carter’s goal of deregulating the major trans-
portation industries. Unlike deregulation of trucking and airlines, where
Senator Kennedy and presidential appointees and aides, including Alfred
Kahn, Mary Schuman, Richard Neustadt, and Stuart Eizenstat, had taken
the lead, at first railroad deregulation rested in the hands of Brock Adams,
the secretary of transportation. Initially, Adams talked about innovative
ideas such as intermodal ownership of railroads and trucking companies,
ideas that politicians and experts had brought forward since the 1920s.
Even Alan Boyd, the first secretary of transportation, had sought better
integration of rail, truck, and airline firms and operations. President Carter,
however, wanted Adams to focus on deregulation, not on complicated and
difficult-to-achieve goals such as intermodalism. Regardless of his earlier
preferences, in January 1978, at the start of the battle for rail deregulation,
Adams accepted and endorsed Carter’s insistence on a “private enterprise
solution” for the plight of the railroads.51 Driven from the national agenda
in the mid-1930s by fear of the railroads and by aggressive trucker lobby-
ing, and driven out again in the early 1970s by President Nixon’s associa-
tion with the Watergate break-in, not for another decade would plans for
limited intermodal coordination rise to the top of the federal agenda.
On December 15, 1978, Adams delivered his basic plan for railroad
deregulation to President Carter. “The Federal Government,” he reported,
“has been pouring over $1 billion annually into preservation of the freight
rail system.” Return on investment hovered below 1 percent, leaving several
railroads near bankruptcy and others unable to attract additional funds or
loans. According to Adams, regulation of rates and service by the ICC were
among the major factors shaping these problems. Railroad executives, con-
tended Adams, needed “rate flexibility,” easing of merger rules, and author-
ity to abandon unprofitable routes.52 Starting with the Transportation Act
of 1920, members of Congress had recommended mergers as one of the
preferred cures for the lack of railroad profitability. During the 1950s and
1960s, railroad executives had launched their own period of merger “mania.”
As Adams knew well from the days following the Penn-Central bank-
ruptcy, however, threats of more abandoned lines were certain to provoke fear
and hostility among small-town folks, railroad employees, and some ship-
pers. Equally, the precise mechanism by which trucks would take the place of
railroads on little-served lines was a question Adams failed to ask, or answer.
In all, Adams had simply substituted the president’s faith in markets for his
own faith in politics and planning. In an overstatement unusual even for him,
Adams nonetheless characterized his proposals as “sweeping.”53
In explaining Adams’s proposals to President Carter, Stuart Eizenstat
converted them into what he labeled a “political calculus.” On March 2,
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Eizenstat (and Bill Johnston) alerted Carter to the likelihood that “the
immediate impact of rail deregulation is likely to be less service for many
communities and higher rates for many commodities.” Equally, Carter
learned that Adams’s proposal to speed up mergers “will be threatening to
many railroads as well as to some shippers and communities.” Eventually,
Eizenstat asserted, deregulation of rates and other measures would bolster
the efficiency and health of the railroad industry and lower federal expendi-
tures. The “political calculus,” as Eizenstat phrased it, “balance[d] fears of
short-term losses against hopes of long-term gains.” As the president of the
United States, Jimmy Carter made the decision that the calculus would
work, and would be worth whatever short-term hostility that he and his
administration would suffer among deregulation’s likely opponents such as
those who stood to pay higher transportation prices, lose railroad service, or
lose their jobs. On March 6, 1979, with these choices before him, Carter
penned a note to Eizenstat (and James McIntyre), directing them to “expe-
dite railroad deregulation proposals to me.” In July 1979, Carter fired Brock
Adams. In turn, Eizenstat put Steve Simmons, an assistant like Mary Schu-
man and Richard Neustadt, in charge of the railroad deregulation effort.54
On November 21, 1979, Simmons reported to Eizenstat on what he had
learned about the “calculus” of railroad deregulation. Rail executives still dis-
agreed about many of the details of deregulation. In particular, they wanted
the right to make contracts with shippers, altering their status as common
carriers; and many of them still wanted their rate bureaus to retain author-
ity to propose across-the-board rate increases. Shippers, however, worried
about rising prices and declining service once railroad officials enjoyed rate-
making freedom and the freedom to abandon service. Further, leaders of
railroad unions worried about job protection for employees in the event of
large-scale abandonments. As so often in the past, leaders of railroads and
rail unions had never really contemplated a world without some degree of
regulation. Altogether, Simmons reported, “there is no massive movement
for deregulation” (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, Simmons believed
that “if we keep pushing there is more than a 50–50 chance that by the end
of this Congress we will have a meaningful railroad deregulation bill enacted
into law.”55
Given the absence of that “massive movement,” Eizenstat had desig-
nated Simmons as the person who would “keep pushing” for railroad dereg-
ulation. Between November 1979 and April 1980, that activity was fast
paced. For example, Simmons chaired a meeting that brought together lead-
ers of the major railroads with top officials at the Department of Trans-
portation, the Office of Management and Budget, and majority and minor-
ity staff members in the U.S. Senate. In addition, members of Carter’s
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congressional liaison staff visited each member of the Senate. Now, railroad
executives joined in these efforts, but conducted their own visits to senators’
offices. In mid-March, Stuart Eizenstat spoke to Senate staff members
assembled at the White House. Simmons also directed separate meetings,
again at the White House, for large shippers such as J. C. Penney and for
the representatives of smaller shippers such as the American Farm Bureau
Federation and the National Industrial Traffic League. Further, Simmons
created five teams composed of three presidential staff members, charging
each team to visit twenty members of the Senate. As a member of the Ford
administration, John Snow had used an identical setup to lobby members of
Congress. Whether in meetings at the White House, in Senate offices, or
in public information packets distributed to newspaper editors, Eizenstat,
Simmons, and other staff members emphasized inflation, energy shortages,
and declining rail service leading to bankruptcy.56
Early in April 1980, members of the U.S. Senate approved legislation to
deregulate railroads. The vote was 91–4. The only compromise administra-
tion and rail leaders made dealt with the precise amount railroad executives
could increase rates during the next five years. That topic had animated
both Senator Russell Long and executives of electric utilities dependent on
rail for large coal shipments.57 With his clout and years of seniority, few in
the Senate wanted to antagonize Senator Long. Equally, electric company
executives represented a politically savvy and weighty component of the
often-discussed captive shipper problem.
Deregulation faced slower going in the U.S. House of Representatives.
In August 1980, the bill’s floor manager, Representative James J. Florio,
withdrew his deregulation bill from consideration. As in the Senate, the
amount by which rail executives could increase rates had excited great con-
troversy, leading to passage of an amendment by the House keeping rate
increases below those allowed by the Senate. Simmons reported to Eizen-
stat that “intense personal lobbying by utility presidents, shippers, and the
opposition of the House leadership” had led to this turn of events. On
August 8, shippers and rail executives agreed on terms that were also accept-
able to Simmons and to leaders of the Department of Transportation and
the Interstate Commerce Commission. According to Simmons, however,
“Florio flatly rejected the compromise provision.”58 Not even the momen-
tum created by Senate and presidential approval of railroad deregulation
guaranteed its ultimate passage.
Despite this setback, Simmons and other Carter appointees assembled
the intellectual and legislative devices that led House members to approve
railroad deregulation. Simmons believed that “all parties want the bill,”
which meant that Florio now stood as the only impediment. Telephone
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Representative Florio, Simmons urged Eizenstat on August 21, and tell him
to “move on . . . [his] position . . . [or] quite frankly we will have to consider
other legislative options.”59
Once Florio determined to “move,” Simmons directed another lobbying
effort aimed at members of Congress. Rather than focusing on the dangers
of inflation, no doubt recognized by all, Simmons and other Carter aides
spoke of railroad revitalization, especially in light of the fact that airline and
trucking executives already enjoyed greater rate-making authority. As
another “talking point,” Simmons urged Carter’s top officials, including
economist and former CAB chair Alfred Kahn, to tell members of Congress
that “failure to deregulate may well be the death knell for Conrail.” In one
sentence, Simmons was reminding members of Congress from the North-
east of the countless jobs and businesses lost following the Penn Central
bankruptcy. In the case of House members who would not otherwise sup-
port the revised bill, Simmons recommended that Eizenstat tell them that
“this bill is extremely important to the country and the President.” By a vote
of 337 to 20, on September 9, members of the house endorsed another
round of railroad deregulation.60
On October 14, 1980, President Carter signed the Staggers Rail Act of
1980, named after Harley O. Staggers, the retiring chair of the House com-
mittee on interstate and foreign commerce. Rate flexibility, a term promoted
by deregulation enthusiasts, was an important part of the Staggers Act. Like
their counterparts in trucking and airline firms, provisions of the Staggers
Act allowed railroad executives to lower and raise shipping rates within
greatly widened parameters. In all, the railroad idea of a “zone of reason-
ableness” first promulgated in 1949 had found a legislative home at the
hands of President Carter and his aides. Railroad executives also achieved
another of their long-term goals with the right under Staggers to abandon
unprofitable lines. Like their counterparts in trucking, moreover, authors of
the Staggers Act permitted railroad executives to negotiate long-term con-
tracts with shippers. Under rules approved by members of the ICC in May
1980, large shippers such as Ford Motor Company were already entering
into five-year contracts for most of Ford’s shipments between Ohio, Michi-
gan, and California. President Carter characterized the Staggers Act as “the
capstone of my efforts to get rid of needless and burdensome Federal regu-
lations.”61 Approval of the Staggers Act completed the program of partially
deregulating truck and rail transportation first brought to public attention
by President Eisenhower and his secretary of commerce, Sinclair Weeks. No
one commented on the irony that the railroads were the first regulated
transportation system, and one of the last deregulated.
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Conclusion
On July 16, 1980, a few weeks after approval of the Motor Carrier Act, ICC
commissioner George M. Stafford spoke before a meeting of truck opera-
tors. Described by a writer for the ATA’s Transport Topics as the “great dis-
senter,” Stafford used the speech as an opportunity to celebrate the work-
ings of the regulatory regime he had long embraced. Unlike critics who had
contended that regulation led to higher prices, Stafford told members of his
audience that American transportation had “prosper[ed] under regulation
and benefit[ed] shippers and the public alike.” Repeating a trope articulat-
ed by truckers and regulators since the mid-1950s in response to
Eisenhower and Weeks’s early deregulatory efforts, Stafford added that “we
have the finest transportation system in the world.” Stafford also used this
speech as an opportunity to warn of dramatic changes that, he believed,
would take place following ICC rulings and the recently approved Motor
Carrier Act. “I don’t hear service talked about very much anymore,” he
asserted, “all I hear about is competition.” On August 30, Commissioner
Stafford retired from the ICC. Still not persuaded that this new era of
competition would provide promised benefits to truckers and shippers,
Stafford told a reporter for Transport Topics that “the kind of regulation we
had was built up over many years with a solid foundation” and yet the now-
successful proponents of deregulation “were basing their views on a theo-
ry.”62
Starting in the early 1970s, many such as Brock Adams had also wor-
ried about the eventual triumph of persons who knew only the “theoretical
aspects” of deregulation. Adams’s preference for intermodal coordination
and his reluctance to pursue the full-scale deregulation of air, rail, and truck
promoted by Mary Schuman and Jimmy Carter were factors in his subse-
quent firing as secretary of transportation. In communications with Stuart
Eizenstat, however, President Carter expressed concern about whether air-
line deregulation would lead to a loss of service to smaller cities and towns.
“Not really sure about this,” he wrote to Eizenstat. In discussing railroad
deregulation with Carter, Eizenstat predicted short-term economic costs
and longer-term economic gains, expressing the matter to Carter as a “polit-
ical calculus.” Again, the calculus rested on faith in economists’ predictions.
Overall, the calculus of deregulation was whether elimination of the regula-
tory regime would really lower shipping prices without bringing about
widespread unemployment among transportation workers, manufacturers,
and eventually those same shippers. By 1980, truck and rail deregulation
represented the victory of President Carter and others who, frustrated and
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exhausted with the workings of the regulatory regime in a period of stagfla-
tion, were willing to try something as untested as deregulation and the sub-
sequent creation of markets for railroad and truck managers, employees, and
shippers. Officially launched by President Eisenhower and Secretary Weeks
in 1955 as a device for rescuing railroads in decline, during the 1960s the
idea of deregulation and market creation emerged in the hands of President
Johnson and aide Joseph Califano as methods for placing additional author-
ity in the president’s hands and for achieving economic fine-tuning. During
the 1970s, however, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter looked to convert
those same ideas about deregulation and the framing of transportation mar-
kets into the nation’s principal transportation policy.
During the next decade and beyond, transportation executives as well as
politicians and deregulation enthusiasts had an opportunity to build their
own body of personal experience and empirical evidence to explain the
workings of air, rail, and trucking firms. (Still present but less visible in the
decades following transportation deregulation were the guiding hands of
regulators, politicians, and judges.) Starting in 1981, truck rates declined
and many truckers went out of business, including several of the largest
firms, such as Abner Glikbarg’s Pacific Intermountain Express. Wages paid
truck drivers fell, and thousands lost their jobs. Between 1978 and the late
1980s, airline executives once again reduced airfares, especially for the grow-
ing number of leisure travelers; and with fewer constraints to overcome, rail
executives restarted a period of mergers that had been cut short by the bank-
ruptcy of Penn Central and other leading railroads. In the new era of dereg-
ulation, politicians, economists, transportation officials, and popular writers
attributed these changes in transportation firms and services to the extraor-
dinary workings of markets. Falling airfares and the success of several new
air carriers provided additional evidence that markets rather than ham-
fisted regulators encouraged safe air travel for larger numbers of Americans.
Yet another decade of railroad mergers added to the conviction that with
government officials out of the way, rail officials were at last able to work out
a method for providing low-cost service at a profit.
Price and service competition and sometimes attractive profit reports
comprised only the most talked-about components of the new deregulatory
regime. Less visible after 1980 were the remarkable changes that took place
in the organization of the transportation industries. In addition to falling
prices, deregulation also encouraged a process of devolution of price and ser-
vice authority from federal officials into the hands of transportation com-
pany executives. Like the discredited regulatory regime that had come into
being between 1935 and 1940, as we shall see, the much-celebrated market
restoration of the 1980s in transportation was in reality another creature of
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federal policy. In a partially deregulated environment, moreover, recently
empowered transportation executives and especially truckers found rate
bureaus and their conferences such as the Regular Common Carrier Con-
ference less useful. Deregulation, then, also encouraged transportation exec-
utives to begin a process of discarding the many institutions that had guided
the postwar generations. Not easily spotted by observers focused on prices,
wages, and employment, the processes of devolution and deinstitutionaliza-
tion brought changes in the organization of transportation firms and the
organization of the still-separate transportation industries. Nevertheless,
starting in 1991, federal officials offered vast sums to local agencies that
would build connections between air, rail, and truck operators, reversing the
single-minded focus on “modes” begun in 1935. By the early 1990s, how-
ever, with the processes of deinstitutionalization and devolution more than
a decade old, only rarely did transportation executives and politicians per-
ceive a need to talk about history.
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Starting in 1981, many of the predictions about the consequences of price
and service deregulation proved accurate. Just as politicians such as Edward
Kennedy and economists such as George Stigler and Hendrik Houthakker
had contended, prices charged by airlines and trucking firms declined dur-
ing the decade and more following deregulation. Contradicting the worries
of small-town residents and politicians, moreover, managers of trucking
firms, railroads, and airlines continued to provide service. Confirming the
fears of President Carter and others, however, sharp price competition also
brought economic dislocation. Whether among airlines such as Eastern and
Pan Am or among truckers such as Abner Glikbarg’s Pacific Intermountain
Express, that competition was often fearsome, leading to another round of
mergers and sometimes to the destruction of jobs, firms, and capital.1
The politics of American transportation also evolved in ways that few
had predicted during the decades of lobbying, litigating, and fevered
rhetoric about the virtues of regulation and deregulation. Long-accustomed
to political and legal action as reliable methods of protecting rates and
routes, during the mid-1980s truckers in particular went to Congress seek-
ing to reestablish limited regulation. When that effort failed, however,
beginning in the early 1990s many of those same truckers dropped mem-
bership in their rate bureaus and conferences, even including the venerable
Regular Common Carrier Conference guided decades earlier by Robert
McBride and Albert Rosenbaum.In 1994, deregulation-minded politicians,
including President William J. “Bill” Clinton, and their newfound trucking
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The American State and Transportation,
1980–1995
State action always plays a major role in constituting economies, so
that it is not useful to posit states as lying outside of economic
activity.
—Sociologist Fred Block, 1994
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industry supporters abolished state-level trucking regulations, describing
their action as federal preemption. Not content with federal preemption of
state trucking regulations, in 1995, deregulation enthusiasts abolished the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Starting in the period 1978–1980, then,
deregulation of airline, truck, and rail operations not only devolved rate
making and routing authority to transportation executives, but also fostered
a process of diminishing or dissolving federal and state agencies and dein-
stitutionalizing business relationships that in many cases had been shaped
over the course of all or most of the twentieth century.2
Nor had advocates of deregulation such as Mary Schuman and Presi-
dent Carter foreseen the emergence of firms such as CSX that managed
freight shipments from ocean to rail and truck. Executives of these firms
developed what were now called intermodal capabilities, carrying out por-
tions of the long-forgotten hopes of generations of railroad executives and
of regulators such as Joseph Eastman in the 1920s and 1930s and Allen
Boyd in the 1960s. Beginning in 1991, moreover, federal officials finally
took an active role in financing construction of intermodal connections.
Under terms of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991, a considerable portion of federal spending for highways devolved into
the hands of local politicians, who could use some of that money to bring
about physical linkages between the nation’s road network and its airports,
seaports, and railyards.
Despite the many changes that followed the deregulatory legislation of
the late 1970s, the federal government remained at the center of the Amer-
ican transportation industry. For example, in 1994, when members of Con-
gress and President Clinton abolished the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, they transferred its remaining responsibilities to the newly formed
Surface Transportation Board. After 1980, railroad officials, truck opera-
tors, airline executives, and shippers discovered, and rediscovered, that they
never could free themselves of the state’s spending or its regulatory embrace.
Nor did they wish to do so.
Among popular writers, moreover, few apparently understood or cared
that the structure of American transportation—whether as distinct modes
during the 1920s and 1930s or as an evolving-intermodal system after 1980—
had been and remained a creature of the American state. Nor did popular
writers, politicians, and economists pay much attention to such esoteric top-
ics as devolution and deinstitutionalization. Instead, after 1980 (as before)
popular writers as well as leaders of an economy and polity seeking to under-
stand the consequences of transportation deregulation looked to concrete
measures of economic well-being such as rates, wages, and employment.
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Trucking after 1980
In the trucking industry, falling rates and rising levels of unemployment
comprised the two most visible consequences of deregulation (and a
depressed economy). Between 1980 and 1983, reported two academic econ-
omists, “competitive pressures and cost-cutting efforts . . . lead to rates . . .
nearly 22% lower.” Closer to day-to-day operations than academic econo-
mists, trucking company managers described rate cutting in identical terms.
In mid-1983, truck operators in the Pennsylvania area reported that dereg-
ulation had brought dramatic declines in rates and increased layoffs. “It’s
hurting the trucking business,” an anonymous truck operator informed a
business writer, adding that “some people offer 20 to 30 percent discounts.”
As a result, he argued, “it’s become a real cut-throat situation” that had “put
some out of business and a lot of people out of work.” Writing in 1986,
Charles R. Perry, a professor of management and industrial relations at the
University of Pennsylvania’s prestigious Wharton School, characterized the
period 1980–1983 in the trucking industry as a “Great Shakeout.”3
Teamsters joined truck operators in denouncing the woeful conse-
quences of deregulation. In a letter to the editor of the business-oriented
Wall Street Journal published July 22, 1985, Gary Ewing, identified as a
member of Teamster Local 174, contended that deregulation had fostered
precisely the falling wages, lost jobs, and bankruptcies predicted several
years earlier in testimony before Congress. “Since deregulation,” asserted
Ewing, “more than . . . 100,000 Teamsters have suffered unemployment.”
Not only had deregulation led to lost jobs, Ewing asserted, “but for every
independent trucker working 70 to 100 hours per week at $6 or less an hour,
two Teamsters who work 40 hours per week are replaced.” Perry at the
Wharton School calculated a figure of 6 percent unemployment among dri-
vers in 1979, 12 percent in 1981, and 9 percent early in 1982. By 1994, how-
ever, the total number of drivers, many self-employed, had increased to 586
thousand. Nonetheless, drivers’ wages continued to decline. According to a
report in the U.S. government’s Monthly Labor Review, between 1978 and
1996 the real average hourly earning (1982 dollars) of truck drivers fell 40
percent.4
Nor did a restoration of economic growth in 1983 foster profitability
and the end of price-cutting tactics among trucking executives. The basic
factor limiting profitability was the presence of additional competitors.
After 1980, commissioners of the ICC no longer controlled entry into the
trucking business. Contrary to the predictions of economists and ICC offi-
cials, between 1980 and the early 1990s, the number of common carriers
actually declined. Even successors to Abner Glikbarg at his once-venerable
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Pacific Intermountain Express consolidated operations with another firm
and eventually shut down. During the decade and more following deregu-
lation, however, truckload operators, often with few employees and using
leased equipment, entered the trucking business.5
Competition brought by growing numbers of those truckload carriers
added to pricing pressures. Additional competition at the hands of freight
forwarders, railroads, the United Parcel Service, and private truck owners
seeking backhauls added more pricing pressure. In 1987, the acting general
manager of the Indiana Motor Truck Association estimated that the num-
ber of carriers had doubled since 1980, but that the volume of freight
shipped remained unchanged in that period. In fact, the author of one study
found that between 1977 and 1989, gross tonnage handled by less-than-
truckload carriers such as Yellow had fallen 10 percent. Flat or declining
demand and a larger number of competitors, noted a writer for Indiana
Business, “brings the money crunch home to many a trucking firm.” Dereg-
ulation was a “disaster,” the president of the National Tank Truck Carriers
told members of the Houston Traffic Club on January 9, 1990, adding that
“price is today’s killing ground.”6 By opening entry to new truckers and by
permitting managers of common, contract, and common carriers to com-
pete equally for the same business, President Carter and Mary Schuman
had created conditions for a restructuring of the trucking industry and for
creation of a unified rather than a segmented trucking market. Bankruptcies
comprised another part of that uncertain process of industry restructuring
and market creation. Starting in the early 1980s, routine reports of trucking
company bankruptcies took their place alongside equally routine reports of
price cutting. The failure rate of trucking firms in 1985, reported Nicholas
A. Glaskowsky, a professor of management and logistics at the University of
Miami in 1986, was “nearly 12 times the number of such failures in 1978.”
Neither the age nor the size of these firms, including Pacific Intermountain,
provided certain protection against the economic vicissitudes that deregula-
tion had brought. By the early 1990s, a writer for the Transportation Journal
reported, only the “big three” of the largest ten trucking firms in 1979 (con-
sisting of Roadway Express, Yellow Freight, and Consolidated Freightways)
remained in business. Falling rates and bankruptcies continued into the
1990s. In 1994, according to that writer, “it . . . [was] still not clear when the
industry will reach a stable equilibrium.”7
As drivers and (many) truck owners reeled under the effects of dereg-
ulation, federal officials launched an effort to bring additional deregula-
tion to the trucking business. Starting in the early 1980s, leaders in Pres-
ident Ronald W. Reagan’s administration coalesced with shippers (and a
few truckers) to launch an assault on trucking rates. Proponents of this
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deregulatory effort hoped to eliminate the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion as well as state-level trucking regulations. Advocates of this phase of the
process of regulatory reform described proposed federal legislation to elim-
inate state law as that of preemption. Whatever the name, like the first
deregulation effort that had stretched from 1955 to 1980, this one took
place over the course of ten years and the terms of three presidents. Once
again, deregulation was mostly a presidential initiative.
By 1983, officials of the U.S. Department of Transportation in the Rea-
gan administration had prepared legislation to eliminate state-level trucking
regulations. Another portion of the bill, if approved, would abolish truckers’
rate bureaus, which authors of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 had permit-
ted to operate on narrower grounds. According to a writer for Supermarket
News, a coalition of retailers and manufacturers “applauded the administra-
tion’s decision.” Virtually repeating the conversations that had taken place
during the Nixon administration, however, officials of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, now led by Frank Fitzsimmons’s successor,
Jackie Presser, threatened to oppose Reagan’s reelection if he endorsed addi-
tional deregulation. As had President Nixon in the early 1970s, during 1983
and 1984 President Reagan decided that Teamster support was more impor-
tant than the apparent economic benefits of another round of deregulation.8
Again like Nixon, for President Reagan electoral politics was ultimately in
the driver’s seat.
In mid-1986 a coalition made up of directors of fifteen trade associa-
tions and thirty-five corporate leaders secured the support of two members
of Congress to introduce another deregulation bill. Executives of firms that
shipped nationally such as K Mart, Proctor & Gamble, and Sears, Roebuck
& Company stood at the heart of this coalition, but its members included
directors of the Private Truck Council. In the late 1970s, leaders of that
organization had supported truck deregulation, breaking from their col-
leagues in the American Trucking Associations. By the mid-1980s, mem-
bers of the Private Truck Council were already profiting from their newly
acquired backhaul business, in the process helping to drive freight rates
downward and giving operators of traditional common carriers fits. Similar
to legislation developed three years earlier by senior officials in the Depart-
ment of Transportation, authors of this bill aimed to eliminate rate bureaus
and state-level regulations. Speaking before the House Small Business
Committee late in 1987, however, a senior executive at the American Truck-
ing Associations warned that proposals to extend the scope of federal dereg-
ulation “will not lower maintenance costs, insurance prices or taxes” and “it
will not end rate wars.”9
President George H. W. Bush had no greater luck in widening the space
for deregulated trucking. The vehicle for this particular effort was a bill
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promising billions for highway construction projects. As part of that legis-
lation, announced Samuel K. Skinner (Bush’s secretary of transportation) on
February 13, 1991, “we must also relieve the industry of . . . the economic
regulatory burden imposed on interstate trucking by many state govern-
ments.” A Fact Sheet accompanying the secretary’s press release promised
“enhance[d] productivity in the trucking industry” with savings in trans-
portation costs that “could range from $4 billion to $13 billion per year.”
Like President Eisenhower’s endorsement of Secretary Weeks’s deregula-
tion proposal in 1955, the overarching idea for postwar American presidents
was aggregate economic management, a process that presidents, their staff
members, and members of Congress sometimes described as serving con-
sumers. Predictions of the potential savings from another round of deregu-
lation ranged widely, even wildly, recalling Brock Adams’s concern that
deregulation actually rested more on economic “theory” than on the results
of a widely tested program. During 1991, however, neither the threat of a
presidential veto nor the efforts of a new coalition of deregulation-minded
business executives that now included more than one hundred trucking
company executives could persuade members of Congress to abolish state
trucking regulations.10
In 1992, leaders in the Bush administration made a final attempt to
achieve greater trucking deregulation. Members of a coalition that took the
name Americans for Safe and Competitive Trucking worked to pass this
legislation in conjunction with Andrew H. Card Jr., Bush’s new secretary of
transportation. “The ICC really is a vestige of the past,” Card told an inter-
viewer for Traffic Management in the fall of 1992; “it is old thinking.” As
before, Card and others characterized federal abolition of state trucking
regulations as preemption. Abolition of the ICC went under the more con-
temporary description of “sunsetting.” New words mattered less than the
weight of a growing number of trucking company executives in the coalition
who were now invoking images of markets. Sounding like economists and
federal officials in the 1960s and 1970s who had complained about federal
trucking regulation, the president of Schneider National, a large trucking
firm based in Green Bay, Wisconsin, told a congressional committee that
state-level trucking regulations “‘distort the marketplace and create ineffi-
ciencies that rob our industries of their competitiveness.’”11 By the early
1990s, many truckers had joined shippers and Bush administration officials
in demanding the elimination of remaining regulations.
The new deregulation drive also widened the split among members of
the trucking industry. As early as 1979 and 1980, private and truckload
operators (the contract carriers) had broken with executives of common car-
riers and ATA leaders and joined Mary Schuman in seeking to eliminate
federal trucking regulations. Now during the early 1990s, the relentless
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process of price cutting encouraged leaders of many common carriers to
quit their rate bureaus and their specialized conferences such as the Regu-
lar Common Carrier Conference (RCCC). Late in 1991, for example,
managers of the gigantic Yellow Freight System and the equally large Con-
solidated Freightways withdrew from their regional rate bureaus. Rather
than rely on rate bureau officials to develop uniform rates, managers at Yel-
low and Consolidated negotiated prices directly with shippers. Similarly,
Yellow executives joined their counterparts at Overnite Transportation
Company and several other trucking firms in withdrawing from the
RCCC. According to a report in Traffic World, however, only Overnite
(owned since 1986 by the Union Pacific Railroad—itself an idea politically
unimaginable in the 1940s, 1950s, or 1970s) had withdrawn from the
RCCC for “policy reasons”; the other withdrawals, ran the report, had
come about due to “reasons of economy.”12 Beginning in the early 1990s,
deinstitutionalization of the trucking industry was one of the unanticipated
consequences of deregulation.
Deinstitutionalization of major trucking organizations also made it eas-
ier for proderegulation truckers and politicians to eliminate state trucking
regulations and abolish the ICC. As before, proponents of additional dereg-
ulation still preferred to describe these activities with less threatening
phrases such as “sunsetting,” “preemption,” and “regulatory reform.” Mem-
bers of the regulatory reform coalition, a writer for Traffic World reported in
August 1994, included not only leaders of a railroad holding company, but
also executives of several large common carriers, a group of shippers with
more than two hundred members, and most of the larger truckload opera-
tors. This time, even leaders of the American Trucking Associations joined
the fray. Between 1955 and 1980, ATA officials had led the fight to protect
the regulatory regime. By reversing their opposition to further deregulation,
ATA officials angered smaller truckers. So hostile were some members to
relinquishing state regulation that leaders of the Oregon and Washington
state trucking associations threatened to quit. “ATA realized it was more
expedient to cut its losses and alienate some smaller members,” reported that
same Traffic World writer, “than to stay behind the curve and allow impor-
tant legislation to pass without its input.” Leaders of the Teamsters Union
still opposed deregulation, as did remaining members of the Regular Com-
mon Carrier Conference. With President Clinton arguing for even greater
deregulation of remaining rate bureau activity, and with the ATA neutral, in
August 1994 Congress and the president agreed to preempt state-level
trucking regulations. Elimination of those regulations, asserted the presi-
dent of the National Industrial Traffic League in November 1994, “is a val-
idation of the free market in trucking.” In December 1995, this latest dereg-
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ulation drive reached its culmination. President William J. “Bill” Clinton
and members of Congress united behind abolition of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, replacing it with the Surface Transportation Board, a
new agency inside the Department of Transportation.13
The ICC had survived 108 years. In the mid-1990s, comments on elim-
ination of the ICC took the form of reminiscences such as “fading into the
sunset” rather than serious analysis of the role of the federal government
and a regulatory regime that had structured transportation firms, industries,
and markets for more than a century. In the incessant ballyhoo of radio and
television talk shows and popular writers trumpeting the apparent triumph
of markets and market enthusiasts, no one remarked or perhaps cared that
with creation of the Surface Transportation Board, competitive relation-
ships among truck, rail, and airline firms had been and would remain a crea-
ture of politics and public policy.14 Like the trucking industry, after 1980,
judges, politicians, public policies, and even commissioners of the ICC and
the new Surface Transportation Board still mattered vitally in framing the
organization and operation of railroad firms.
Railroads after 1980
Following deregulation of the railroads in 1980, journalists, economists, and
other observers focused attention on rates and profitability. Writing in
1991, the executive editor of Chilton’s Distribution, a trade publication
aimed at shippers, observed that “rail rates again failed to keep pace with
industry cost increases.” Between 1983 and 1993, railroad rates increased
nearly 17 percent. Measured against inflation, however, rates had fallen
nearly 20 percent. Despite their inability to achieve substantial rate increas-
es, railroads were actually increasing loads and turning a profit. In 1990,
executives of the nation’s railroads reported a return on investment of 7.13
percent. In order to deliver such an impressive profit figure, ran one report,
“the railroads have downsized their equipment fleets, their physical plant
and their employees.” Indeed, between 1980 and 1995, railroad executives
reduced the number of freight cars in service from 1.7 million to 583,000,
a diminution of 65 percent. During that same period, the number of rail-
road employees declined from 458,000 to 216,000, a drop of 47 percent. In
1990, however, railroads also carried more than 1 trillion ton-miles of
freight, a new record, and did so with fewer employees and less equipment.
“In the short run,” contended the vice president of economics and finance
for the Association of American Railroads in 1991, “the productivity curve
ran ahead of the decline in rates.”15
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Less visible in these reports of railroad profitability was the reliance of
railroad leaders on the federal government for the legal authority to carry
out their downsizing program. Attempting to account for the railroads’
improved profit picture, in April 1982 a reporter for Barron’s National Busi-
ness and Financial Weekly listed factors such as changes in federal regulation
in 1976 and 1980, federal tax legislation approved in 1981, and a “more
favorable government attitude toward mergers.”16 Given the dependence of
railroad executives on federal officials for favorable legislation and favorable
interpretation of merger rules, after 1980 politicians and judges continued
to determine the basic frameworks governing railroad operations. Reminis-
cent of the years before 1940, shippers, railroad executives, and political
leaders negotiated seriously about mergers, rates, and railroad ownership of
trucking and steamship firms, ideas that had first surfaced in the 1920s but
had largely been forgotten. No topic excited more negotiating and more
inflamed rhetoric than rates charged members of a group calling themselves
“captive” shippers.
The right of rail executives to determine rates for shippers rested on a
case ultimately decided by judges of the U.S. Supreme Court. In April 1984,
the Court refused to hear an appeal filed by attorneys for electric utilities,
steel corporations, and other firms that shipped large quantities of coal by
rail. The question before the Court was a rule promulgated in 1981 by the
Interstate Commerce Commission determining that railroad rates were not
subject to review unless the railroad dominated a market. Earlier, members
of the federal appeals court in New Orleans had voted 8–2 to uphold the
ICC’s interpretation of railroad deregulation acts passed by Congress in
1976 and 1980. By refusing to consider the case, the Supreme Court left
standing the decision of the court of appeals.17
At first glance, the case appears another victory for federal officials,
economists, and the coalition of shippers and others assembled by Mary
Schuman, who had sought deregulation of transportation rates. Starting in
1955 with Dwight Eisenhower and Sinclair Weeks, every president and
their senior officials extending up to Jimmy Carter, Stuart Eizenstat, and
Schuman in 1980 had advocated diminution or even abolition of the regu-
latory regime that had long shaped the organization of transportation
industries, transportation markets, and the behavior of transportation exec-
utives and their union counterparts at rail, air, and trucking firms. With the
decisions of the court of appeals and the Supreme Court in hand, in 1984
advocates of deregulation had brought closure within the courts as to
whether rail officials really possessed the legal authority to set prices,
improve service, and compete for the business of shippers. Overall, here was
a situation in which creation of a market had started with congressional leg-
islation in 1976 and in 1980, and concluded several years later before the
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U.S. Supreme Court.18
Like their counterparts during the decades up to 1980, however, no
sooner had the Supreme Court ruled than unhappy shippers turned to mem-
bers of Congress in search of rate relief. “We’re going back to 1887,” asserted
Carl E. Bagge, president of the National Coal Association early in 1985,
“letting the railroads charge what the traffic will bear.” In an effort to secure
lower rates, Bagge and others formed Consumers United for Rail Equity,
whose title and acronym CURE were presumably created to associate mem-
bers with the interests of ordinary consumers in American politics. Eventu-
ally, Bagge and his group of seventy corporate members of CURE insisted
that the alleged problem of high railroad rates rested not with deregulation
and certainly not with markets. Rather, CURE members agreed that the
absence of competition—shippers served by only one railroad—had permit-
ted rail officials to raise rates unfairly. Invoking the language of Senator Rus-
sell Long during debate on the Staggers Act in 1980, Bagge and his associ-
ates carried the rhetorical day with their campaign to achieve lower rates on
the grounds of their victimized position as “captive shippers and consumers.”
Even in the 1980s, the old-time image of predatory railroads still had polit-
ical resonance. Adding to CURE’s influence on the matter of railroad rates
was the presence of Russell Long as the Senate’s longest-serving member. In
May 1985, a writer for Industry Week, a trade magazine aimed at manufac-
turers, asked, “Are Rails Headed for Re-Regulation?”19
Other shippers, equally large and savvy in transportation politics, still
preferred the substantially deregulated environment in which railroads now
operated. According to a writer for Chilton’s Distribution, in April 1985
leaders of this group included “24 very large corporations . . . all of whom
are heavy users of rail service for movements of chemicals, grain, automo-
biles, paper, oil, and steel.” In a season during which everyone professed
their devotion to competition and its benefits for consumers and themselves
alike, members of this group organized as the Pro-Comp Committee. Early
in 1985, President Reagan’s secretary of transportation, Elizabeth Dole,
strengthened the Pro-Comp position with her preemptive announcement
that the president would veto legislation that undermined the Staggers Act.
Now, Bagge and his associates in CURE faced the challenge of building a
veto-proof majority on behalf of legislation that spoke not in the generalities
of competition and markets but in more-complex-to-demonstrate language
showing that railroads serving “captive” shippers would still earn “adequate”
rates. The writer for Chilton’s Distribution reported that the dispute between
Bagge’s Cure and Pro-Comp members was between those shipping high-
value goods such as automobiles, where transportation costs made up a
small part of the final price, and those shipping low-value goods such as
coal, where transportation charges loomed much larger in determining final
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prices. “The first group of shippers is satisfied,” asserted the writer, and “the
latter is not.”20
In May 1987, the captive shippers’ dispute moved to the hearing rooms
of the U.S. Congress, reprising developments of the 1920s and 1930s. Rep-
resentative Frederick C. Boucher of coal-producing Virginia and Senator Jay
Rockefeller of coal-producing West Virginia introduced legislation requiring
railroads to reduce rates for captive shippers, a move that resembled the con-
gressional effort to mandate lower agricultural freight rates in the mid-1920s.
Echoing a long line of congressional predecessors, Senator Long once again
decried the “abusive monopolistic practices” of the railroads. For their part,
rail executives such as William H. Dempsey, president of the Association of
American Railroads, denied the very existence of captive shippers. “The fact
is,” Dempsey told senators at a hearing, “that both the railroad and the ship-
per are captive to the markets they are competing in.”21
Not only were rail executives talking about markets, they also had a mar-
ket to protect. During the mid- to late 1980s, coal shipments produced
more than 20 percent of the railroads’ gross revenue. In case senators
wavered in their enthusiasm for markets, late in October 1987 top rail exec-
utives visited them in their offices, raising the specter of what the chair of
Conrail described as “the same type of railroad bankruptcies five or seven
years out that we had in the early 1970s.”22 Only seven years into the era of
deregulation, defenders of the new, market-oriented regime were finding a
limited utility in history.
In November 1989, ICC commissioners updated rate rules for those
much-discussed captive shippers. Following a year of solid earnings and a
process described by a Washington Post reporter as “prodding from Con-
gress,” ICC officials determined that the Norfolk Southern Corporation
had achieved revenue adequacy. Previously, the ICC had held that railroads
such as the Norfolk Southern had the right to raise rates up to 4 percent
above an index of costs without incurring a process known as “ICC
scrutiny.” Now that earnings at the Norfolk Southern and several other
roads had risen to the level of revenue adequacy, they were subject to that
scrutiny in rate cases brought forward by those describing themselves as
captive shippers. Once again, faint echoes of past events could be heard, in
this case related to the profit limitations of the recapture clause enacted in
1920. Thus, in mid-1995, the president of the National Industrial Trans-
portation League, an organization of shippers, complained to members of a
House subcommittee that “the ICC has so narrowly drawn the definition of
captive shipper and adopted such ponderous, bureaucratic approaches that
only a handful of large shippers have been able to seek relief from the
monopoly practices of the railroads.”23 Even fifteen years after the era of reg-
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ulation, the head of a large group of shippers continued to invoke powerful
historical images. Equally, railroad managers serving self-styled captive
shippers still contended with federal formulations that were at once protec-
tive, complex, legalistic, susceptible to political influence, and often based
on rough historical analogies.
The politics of railroad mergers followed a similar path. As early as
1978, ICC commissioners had approved rules to expedite mergers. The new
governing idea, marketing professor Richard D. Stone reported in 1991,
was promotion of “end-to-end mergers . . . [that would provide] for greater
long-term advantages with fewer risks than parallel mergers.” In short, not
only would there be fewer railroads, but remaining roads would provide ser-
vice over larger geographic regions. This merger policy contained distant
echoes of the railroad consolidation plan of the 1920s, in which ICC offi-
cials had proposed forming twenty regional systems through parallel merg-
ers. Once again, federal officials had created the basis for a new period of
merger “mania.” During the period 1980–1985, the number of large, Class
1 railroads such as the Norfolk Southern decreased from forty to twenty-
three. In 1982, the Norfolk Southern, combining the Southern Railway and
the Norfolk & Western Railway, was itself the product of one of those
mergers. By 1995, eleven much-larger Class 1 railroads remained, and in
1999, only eight, still-larger Class 1 railroads existed.24
The tortured path by which executives of the Sante Fe and Southern
Pacific Railroads eventually merged with other rail lines illustrates the cen-
trality of state officials in framing railroad corporations and their opera-
tions. The story began in December 1983, when leaders of the Santa Fe
Southern Pacific Corporation, a holding company for two railroads, the
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific, announced plans
to merge their two rail operations. The Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corpora-
tion had combined office operations that same month, having been created
through the merger of the Southern Pacific Company and Santa Fe Indus-
tries. At the outset, moreover, the company owned pipelines, trucks, tim-
berlands, and mineral rights, and was California’s largest private landowner.
By September 1984, however, with John J. Schmidt, the chairman and chief
executive officer of the holding company scheduled to appear before the
ICC, a journalist writing for the Wall Street Journal reported the presence of
“vigorous opposition by other carriers fearing the combined power of the
two railroads in the West.”25 Nothing in the deregulation acts of 1976 and
1980 had diminished the willingness of competitors to invoke the prospect
of a return of railroad monopolies as a tactic in the politics of American
transportation.
During October 1985, government officials spoke with several voices
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regarding the anticipated effects of the proposed merger on shippers. Con-
cluding that a merger of Santa Fe and Southern Pacific operations would
lead to a “massive loss of competition,” justice department officials asked the
still-determinative members of the ICC not to approve the deal. Leaders in
the U.S. Department of Transportation endorsed the merger, however, find-
ing an adverse affect only on “geographically dispersed” portions of the com-
bined railroad operations. Anticipating objections even to that modest loss
of competition for shippers, transportation department officials suggested
“possible remedies,” including giving up tracks or permitting another rail-
road to make use of existing tracks. “The shipping public,” ran the reason-
ing, “will be assured that an effective competitor will be introduced into the
market.”26 Five years into the period of the deregulation regime, senior offi-
cials located in one part of the federal government feared monopoly pricing,
while their counterparts in another federal agency both promised to frame
markets and assured shippers that competitors would come forward.
Late in July 1986, ICC commissioners voted 4 to 1 against the merger.
Not since 1966, when the ICC blocked the merger of the Northern Pacific
and Great Northern, had commissioners failed to approve a major railroad
merger. Now, however, commissioners judged that the threat of monopoly
outweighed the apparent benefits to the railroads or shippers of combining
operations. At a news conference held shortly after commissioners
announced their decision, holding company chair and CEO Schmidt,
described by a reporter for the Los Angeles Times as “stunned and angry,”
characterized the ICC’s decision as “a horrible mistake.” Up to that point,
Schmidt and his top staff, confident of ICC approval, had refused to grant
competing railroads access to their tracks. Instead, Schmidt had ordered
similar red and yellow insignia applied to the locomotives of both railroads.
Unable to escape the rhetoric of markets in a situation framed from the out-
set by federal officials, later that day Schmidt issued a statement to the press
that “the proposed merger [would have] provided a private enterprise solu-
tion to a problem faced by both the Southern Pacific Transportation Co. and
the AT & SF.”27
Not only had ICC commissioners disapproved the merger, they ordered
executives of the holding company to sell one or both of the railroads. On
July 25, 1986, a writer for the Wall Street Journal reported “new speculation
about the possible creation of a transcontinental railroad.” According to a
report in the Los Angeles Times, on April 20, 1987, directors of the holding
company fired John Schmidt, “reportedly . . . displeased with the way the
merger was handled.” On June 30, 1987, commissioners made the divesti-
ture order final.28 Although politicians, shippers, and rail executives engaged
in unceasing talk of markets, the administrative state for railroads continued
to function.
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Despite the order to prepare a plan for sale of the railroads within ninety
days, disposal of the two roads took place over the course of seven years. As
had been true since the 1920s, ICC commissioners had the power to block
mergers, not to create them. By mid-1987, seven bidders, including an
employee group, sought to purchase the Southern Pacific. In August 1988,
commissioners approved purchase by Rio Grande Industries, which owned
the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. The combined railroads were
suddenly the fifth largest in the nation. Sounding like a merger enthusiast
of the 1960s, the president of the new firm promised “operating flexibility
and new . . . clout” in the expected competition with still-larger railroads
like the Union Pacific and with ubiquitous and price-cutting truckers.
Finally, in September 1995, members of the nearly defunct Interstate Com-
merce Commission approved sale of the Sante Fe to the Burlington North-
ern. With combined tracks running from Canada to Mexico, a Burlington
employee had earlier and characteristically described “efficiencies that will
be created . . . [that will] take traffic from the highways.”29
Not to be outdone, executives of the Union Pacific purchased the com-
bined Southern Pacific and Denver and Rio Grande line. Turning aside a
recommendation of attorneys at the U.S. Department of Justice that the
proposed merger would prove anticompetitive, in July 1996, members of the
new Surface Transportation Board approved that deal. The reasoning of
board members, according to its chair, was that “history has shown that
restructuring in the rail industry has strengthened the rail transportation
system in the form of better service and lower rates.” Sixteen years after
approval of the Staggers Act, a federal regulator was invoking the alleged
proofs of history in favor of railroad mergers. Less noticed at that moment
was the fact that over the same time span regulators and rail executives had
consolidated the nation’s western railroads into two large systems, realizing
the dreams of generations of rail leaders. Legendary owner of the Southern
Pacific, Colis Huntington, for example, had once called for a national rail
network consisting of only a few, or at best one, large rail enterprise.
Equally, politicians and regulators such as William Ripley and the entire
membership of the ICC in the early 1920s had advocated a national system
of about twenty regional rail carriers.30
In the mid-1990s, however, shippers cared less about history or discarded
plans for railroad consolidation and more about the threat of rate increases.
In September 1997, a writer for Chilton’s Distribution described many ship-
pers as “mad as hell” about having “had to swallow three anticompetitive,
megarail mergers.” One of those shippers, Fred E. Schrodt, vice president of
transportation for the large Farmland Industries, told a meeting of his coun-
terparts that it was “time to sunset” the Surface Transportation Board. In
place of the STB, Schrodt urged investigation of mergers by antitrust attor-
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neys in the justice department. In the century-long tradition of the nation’s
shippers, Schrodt and his colleagues sought a federal solution to railroad
rates always judged too high. For at least the moment, however, members of
the new Surface Transportation Board, following in the tradition of the ICC
of the 1920s, and the 1950s and 1960s, had determined to consolidate the
nation’s railroads into several large systems. Writing in August 1996, a
reporter for Purchasing astutely observed that “STB has gone against the
trend to deregulation.” The fact was, ran the reporter’s title, “Uncle Stays
Involved.”31
Construction of railroad-based intermodal systems during the 1980s
and early 1990s was equally a matter of the administrative judgment of ICC
officials and legislative judgment of members of Congress. At the outset, in
December 1982, ICC officials declared an end to the decades-old prohibi-
tion on rail ownership of trucking firms and steamship lines. This procla-
mation finally opened the door for the creation of transportation companies
similar to those advocated during the 1920s and 1930s by ICC commis-
sioner Joseh Eastman and W. W. Atterbury of the Pennsylvania Railroad.
Now changes came quickly, for by 1989, former ICC attorney and Denver
University professor of transportation law Paul Stephen Dempsey reported
that “the rail industry” had emerged as “an oligopoly” composed of “origin-to-
destination intermodal megacarriers.”32
Executives of the CSX Corporation were among the first to take advan-
tage of the ICC’s proclamation, linking their railroad network to truck and
sea operations. Created in 1980 through a merger of the Chessie System
and Seaboard Coast Line Industries, managers of the new CSX started with
a base of twenty-seven thousand miles of track. As early as November 1982,
a writer for Industry Week found CSX executives and leaders of their truck-
ing subsidiary, Chessie Motor Express, “moving at a fast pace.” In the future,
the writer predicted, CSX was one of a few railroad companies that would
emerge as a “super-transportation company” capable of carrying merchan-
dise by rail, air, barge, and truck.33
John Snow presided over construction of the intermodal network at
CSX. Following service in the Ford administration leading the deregulation
effort and a stint as a Fellow at the market-oriented American Enterprise
Institute, Snow joined CSX in 1977. With a law degree and a Ph.D. in eco-
nomics and his experience in the Ford administration, Snow brought polit-
ical and legal savvy to the politics of making CSX an intermodal competi-
tor. During the 1980s, Snow relied on Congress and the ICC to facilitate
purchase of intermodal units for CSX; and he equally relied on Congress
and the ICC in a fruitless effort to prevent executives at firms such as Nor-
folk Southern from emerging as intermodal competitors.34
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In 1983, CSX officials purchased American Commercial Lines, a barge
company. Leaders of the barge operators trade association, the Water Trans-
port Association (WTA), took up the cause against the CSX purchase. Cit-
ing the Panama Canal Act of 1912, in mid-1984 leaders of the WTA
asserted that federal law prohibited railroads from owning barges and other
water carriers. Also citing the always-present concern among shippers about
the potential for higher rates and among remaining barge operators about
lower rates, those same WTA executives urged commissioners of the ICC
to require CSX to relinquish control of American Commercial Lines. For
his part, Snow, as vice president of CSX, contended that “the barge indus-
try is too competitive to be dominated by one large entity.” In late July, ICC
commissioners ruled unanimously in favor of CSX. In January 1986, a
three-judge panel of the federal appeals court in Cincinnati affirmed the
ICC’s decision by a vote of 2 to 1.35 As with airline deregulation under
Alfred Kahn at the Civil Aeronautics Board several years earlier, the first
steps in constructing intermodal firms during the 1980s rested on an
administrative determination by ICC officials and on risk taking by Snow
and his associates at CSX.
ICC officials proved more innovative in their ruling on Snow’s purchase
of Sea-Land. In 1986, Snow directed acquisition of Sea-Land, a firm that
operated a fleet of container vessels. At that point, ICC rules did not per-
mit CSX to manage oceangoing vessels in coordination with their rail and
barge operations. In January 1987, Snow told a Wall Street Journal reporter
that “we want to . . . develop a one-stop approach to shipping.” Again, Snow
and top executives at CSX took a risk. In the Sea-Land case, moreover, in
February 1987 ICC commissioners ruled 2 to 1 that they lacked jurisdiction
and that Snow and his associates had no need for their approval. Overturn-
ing seventy-five years of precedent since the Panama Canal Act, the com-
mission majority determined that Sea-Land and CSX were not competitive
with one another. “The public will come out ahead,” added a senior com-
mission official, “because we’ll have a more efficient, less costly transporta-
tion system.”36 By the mid-1980s, ICC officials had merged administrative
discretion with the hoped-for price reductions into an official doctrine
aimed at fostering rail ownership of barge and truck companies.
Beginning in the early 1990s, moreover, rail executives such as Snow
were expressing as much optimism about the revenue potential of intermodal
service as their predecessors of the 1950s and 1960s had expressed with the
introduction of piggyback. During 1991, as trade-magazine writers trum-
peted the success of joint rail, truck, and barge operations under such titles as
“Intermodalism Continues to Make Inroads” and “Intermodal Service
Stacks Up,” Snow approved purchase of another barge line. Beginning in
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December 1991, he authorized executives of CSX’s intermodal unit, CSXI,
to launch direct rail service from the Port of Baltimore to Cincinnati. Like
similar CSXI facilities in Savannah, Georgia, and Mobile, Alabama, the
idea, reported a writer for Railway Age in August 1992, was that “ocean car-
riers . . . can streamline their inland transportation operations by allowing
a single service provider to transport the containers.” Starting in fall 1992,
CSXI executives ran trains seven days a week between California and a
350-mile area surrounding Chicago. Marketed as “Frequent Flyer” service,
trains carried double-stacked containers into their Chicago terminal, from
where CSXI ground personnel dispatched them with drivers and truck
tractors to the docks of receivers. As in the first period of intermodal
enthusiasm three decades earlier, Snow and his counterparts at other inter-
modal railroads still hoped, as one writer had it, to “‘railroad’ some business
away from the trucking industry.” In October 1992, editors of Business Week
profiled John Snow and several other executives, describing them as “Mas-
ters of the Game” even “when times are tough.” In the popular language of
markets and the equally popular image of hard-driving executives, few in
the trade or business presses recognized any direct connection between
Snow’s apparent successes with mergers and intermodal service at CSX and
decisions made at the ICC and in the nation’s courts.37 Starting in 1978,
passenger airlines also prospered and failed in an environment determined
mostly by public policy.
Airlines after 1978
Airlines were and remained more glamorous than railroads or trucks. In the
two decades following deregulation, no one prepared a scholarly history of
a trucking firm or the trucking industry as a whole. Three historians of rail-
roads published books that in whole or in part documented the industry’s
“recovery” after approval of the Staggers Act in 1980.38 Efforts to explain
the consequences of deregulation for airline customers and employees, how-
ever, engaged a larger group of the nation’s most talented scholars and jour-
nalists. Among those exceptionally talented scholars, Harvard University
business historian Richard H. K. Vietor, writing in 1994, focused on the
successful efforts of American Airlines’ president Robert L. Crandall to
reposition his firm to take advantage of business opportunities presented by
termination of the regulatory regime. Starting in June 1980 with his elec-
tion as the company’s president, reports Vietor, Crandall focused on the
“Profit Improvement Plan” that led to a reduction in the size of the fleet,
development of hub operations at the Chicago and Dallas–Fort Worth
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Airports, elimination of more than five thousand employees, and prepara-
tion of a “brilliant three-pronged marketing plan” that included the intro-
duction of AAdvantage, the nation’s first frequent flyer program. At the
next stage, between 1981 and 1985, Crandall’s innovations included pur-
chase of new, more efficient aircraft and negotiation of revised labor agree-
ments that created a two-tier wage structure and greater authority for man-
agers to move personnel from one type of job to another. With these
changes in hand, reports Vietor, Crandall and his associates “had set a
course to become the largest and most profitable domestic airline.”39 In
Vietor’s account, Robert Crandall emerges as an innovative business exec-
utive who successfully shed the “contrived” service competition of the reg-
ulatory regime and adapted his large, complex firm to the vicissitudes of a
market economy. Like accounts of John Snow at CSX, Vietor’s Crandall
appears as one of the industrial statesmen of the new airline industry. Like
accounts of the postderegulation trucking and railroad industries prepared
by journalists and economists, moreover, Vietor focuses on the conse-
quences of reducing or eliminating the regulatory hand for employee wages,
customer service, and airfares, and especially for American Airlines’ overall
profitability. Missing from Vietor’s account, however, is an analysis of the
market concentration that soon characterized the airline industry. Equally
absent from Vietor’s account was the centrality of the federal government
in permitting that concentration to take place. In the market-oriented air-
line industry, however, federal officials and federal policy were sometimes
invisible.40 Crandall’s duel with Donald C. Burr’s People Express provides a
glimpse of those invisible factors that were at the same time always consti-
tutive of industries and markets.
Starting after 1978, entrepreneurs and investors started a number of
new airlines. Sporting names such as New York Air, Midway, and Air
Florida, executives of these firms promised low fares, predictable schedules,
and minimal “frills” such as frequent flyer programs and costly meals. Peo-
ple Express was another of these recent entrants. Launching service in 1981
out of Newark Airport, executives at People Express led by Donald Burr
paid lower wages to employees. Burr also directed personnel to perform sev-
eral tasks, as for instance having pilots occasionally heft luggage and train-
ing every employee, including the chief financial officer, to work as flight
attendants. Low wages and cross-use of employees kept expenses low, and
permitted Burr to sell seats at cheaper prices than competitors. On flights
from Newark to Buffalo, New York, Burr charged $38 for a peak fare and
$25 off-peak, representing a whopping reduction from his competitor’s fare
of $99. In the market talk used regularly by journalists following deregula-
tion, moreover, passengers “paid for what they wanted,” whether it was fifty
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cents for coffee or $3 for checked luggage. Economists and business writers
described the process of selling additional services such as meals and
checked baggage as that of “unbundling” services. By whatever name, at its
peak moment of growth during 1985, Burr’s People Express served fifty
cities, including flights to smaller cities such as Hartford, larger ones such as
Miami, and even 747 service to London.41
A flamboyant figure, Donald Burr sought publicity for his airline and for
himself. Journalists returned the favor by printing Burr’s snappy quotes and
by writing laudatory descriptions of his skills and style. “Anybody who
attacks us in Newark,” a Wall Street Journal reporter quoted Burr in March
1984, “has to be a slow wit.” That same reporter quoted a banker describing
Burr as “like a steamroller the size of a 747 jumbo jet coming down at you.”
Writing in 1995, journalist Thomas Petzinger Jr. reported that “Burr had
created a stunningly large airline—and a successful one—from nothing.”
With these accounts, journalists merged market talk with more traditional
business themes that stressed the virtues of risk taking and the importance
of entrepreneurial skill.42 That Burr had earned the MBA degree at Harvard
University’s Graduate School of Business Administration apparently added
to his mystique among popular writers. Although Burr probably did not
realize it, he and his contemporaries at Air Florida and Midway had inher-
ited the daring of the “nonsked” operators who, during the 1940s and early
1950s, had promoted the first generation of “mass” air travel. Equally, Burr
carried forward the tradition of Continental Airlines’ Robert Six who, dur-
ing the 1970s, had preached the virtues of more efficient use of aircraft and
personnel.
Like Robert Six and managers of those audacious nonscheduled opera-
tors, Burr emerged as the enemy of executives at the traditional carriers. In
March 1984, People Express featured 150 departures each day from
Newark, the largest schedule of any airline in the New York City region.
Burr had also ordered thirty-five additional jets, and boasted of shortly hav-
ing “an operation in Newark as big as Delta’s in Atlanta.” In the market talk
as war metaphor often used by business leaders, Burr added that his Newark
base would prove “impregnable to invasions by carriers trying to add capac-
ity there.” Up to that point, however, People Express had served cities such
as Buffalo and Columbus, Ohio, cities characterized by a Wall Street Journal
reporter as “peripheral.” As soon as Burr added service to cities judged more
desirable, such as Pittsburgh and West Palm Beach, however, executives at
Delta and U.S. Air cut fares on competing routes and boosted the number
of flights. Again in the rhetoric of markets as warfare, an unnamed airline
executive threatened that if Burr launched service to Chicago, “‘American or
United may pull out a cannon and blast them’ in a fare war.” Even so, Burr
remained confident about plans to fly passengers from Newark to Los
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Angeles at a fare as low as $119, compared to the standard coach fare of
$433.43
Between June and November 1984, People Express executives led by
Burr launched operations from Newark to Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco,
and Denver, and direct flights from Minneapolis, Chicago, Detroit, and
Cleveland to several cities in Florida. No longer competing for passengers
against weaker airlines located in secondary cities, now Burr sought to take
business from major carriers such as United Airlines and Robert Crandall’s
American in their primary markets. Burr also purchased Denver-based
Frontier Airlines at a price of $300 million. At that point, however, Frontier
executives were engaged in a fare war against United and Continental—and
Frontier, a reporter later noted, “was losing.” Few observers understood
Burr’s decisions. In November 1986, a writer for the Los Angeles Times
invoked sports metaphors such as playing with “the big boys” and “life in the
big leagues.” Another writer thought that Burr both enjoyed the thrill of
growth and simultaneously “lacked . . . discipline.” Still another writer
observed that “People Express forgot its roots.” More likely, the effects of
United and American’s “cannon and blast” predicted earlier were already
eroding bookings and revenues at People Express, and Burr and his top
associates had conceived these moves into new markets as a short-run
device. In this interpretation, Burr was “buying time—simply grabbing pas-
sengers any way he could” pending arrival of a computer system like Robert
Crandall’s at American Airlines.44
Early in the history of People Express, Burr had decided against pur-
chasing an up-to-date computer system. Despite Burr’s initial successes in
boosting the number of flights, customers, and revenue, the absence of
modern computing at People bestowed a considerable advantage on Robert
Crandall and his managers at American. Crandall called his system yield
management; and the computer system was named Sabre. When Burr
launched service to key American hubs such as Chicago, Crandall’s top
yield manager, Barbara R. Amster, used data stored in Sabre to match Peo-
ple Express’s low fares with a few seats. She held remaining seats for busi-
ness customers who, Sabre reported, would likely make reservations closer
to the time of departure. As one example, both American and People adver-
tised $99 fares to Los Angeles. Every seat on People sold for $99. Accord-
ing to journalist Petzinger, however, “the average fare on the American
plane might be $250.” Better yet, the customer who actually paid $99 for an
American seat also received free coffee, free baggage handling, and increas-
ingly coveted AAdvantage frequent-flyer miles.45
As Burr became aware of the tremendous advantages that Sabre and
yield management techniques had bestowed on American and his other
competitors, he launched a crash program to develop a reservation system.
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Burr hired experts from the NCR Corporation and then from American
Express to construct one for him. No matter, because sophisticated pro-
grams like Sabre and Crandall’s use of it to develop a program of yield man-
agement could not be tested and implemented at People Express in only a
few weeks or months, or even in a year of trying. In the short run, the
absence of an up-to-date computer system coupled with Burr’s already anti-
quated telephone reservation system left thousands making repeat calls to
overwhelmed personnel. Those fortunate enough to have made reservations
often encountered overbooked flights, sometimes as high as 100 percent. By
late 1986, People Express had acquired a large debt and was losing money
daily. Years later, Donald J. Carty, one of Crandall’s top executives, boasted
that “we devised the fare structure that put them out of business.”46
In December 1986, Frank A. Lorenzo purchased both People Express
and Frontier for $113 million. Again, Burr had paid $300 million to pur-
chase Frontier. In turn, Lorenzo put these two new properties under the
umbrella of his Texas Air Corporation, which also encompassed Continen-
tal, Eastern, and New York Air. By early 1987, Lorenzo’s Texas Air had
emerged as one of the largest airline operations in the United States.47
Journalists explained the fast collapse of People Express with sport and
other metaphors. In November 1986, a writer for the Los Angeles Times con-
cluded that Burr and his associates had learned “the hard way about life in
the big leagues.” Switching to a metaphor drawn from popular images of
urban gang warfare, the writer added that “American, United, et al., do not
surrender turf easily.”48 Less a matter of turf control or other favored expres-
sions of the day, the story of People Express and Donald Burr was in part
one of entrepreneurial zeal not matched with a long-term business plan and
a staff possessing the substantial resources and managerial capacity to
implement that plan.
In an industry thought to be governed by fluid markets, however, popu-
lar idioms such as “turf,” “big leagues,” and “putting them out of business”
failed to describe another part of People’s demise. Like trucking, deregula-
tion of airlines had permitted enthusiasts such as Donald Burr to launch
new firms, bringing about sharp price competition and lower fares; and like
trucking and railroading, leaders of airline firms such as Robert Crandall,
Donald Carty, and Frank Lorenzo now directed the rapid consolidation of
the airline industry. Not an isolated case, the rise and collapse of People
Express was matched by the equally rapid appearance and disappearance of
other airline firms. According to the results of a study by deregulation crit-
ics Paul Stephen Dempsey and Andrew R. Goetz, between 1979 and 1988
airline executives completed fifty-one mergers and acquisitions. As exam-
ples, Robert Crandall’s American Airlines purchased AirCal, Delta bought
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Western, Northwest acquired Republic, and U.S. Air executives purchased
both Piedmont and Pacific Southwest. In 1991, Eastern Airlines, one of the
industry’s oldest carriers, entered bankruptcy, never emerging from it, fur-
ther diminishing the number of competitors. According to Dempsey and
Goetz, moreover, the fierce competition and subsequent financial losses at
the hands of innovators such as Donald Burr and Robert Crandall had also
encouraged airline executives to engage in their own form of merger
“mania.”49
As part of the merger process, executives of surviving airlines such as
those at Delta, American, and U.S. Air consolidated flight operations at key
airports. During the 1980s, Americans learned that the word “hub” meant an
airport at which one or at most two airlines served most of the passengers.
As examples of the consolidation of air travel into hubs, in 1977 Northwest
Airlines serviced 45.9 percent of the passengers at the Minneapolis/St. Paul
Airport. By 1987, Northwest executives had constructed a hub that served
81.6 percent of that airport’s passengers. “At 15 of the nation’s major air-
ports,” two economists reported in 1988, “one carrier controls more than half
the business or two control over 70 percent of the business.” Historian Vietor
concludes, moreover, that “the full development of hub operations . . . created
powerful barriers to entry by potential competitors.”50
In the evolving lexicon of postderegulation airline industry, moreover,
industry observers described these consolidated operations at one airport
not simply as a hub, but as a “fortress hub.” Writing in July 1987, a reporter
for the Wall Street Journal pointed to changes at the St. Louis airport that
had made it into one of those fortress hubs. Before 1978, he recounted, five
airlines had served most of the passengers at Lambert–St. Louis Interna-
tional Airport. Following deregulation, an additional nine airlines compet-
ing for their share of some twenty million passengers. By mid-1987, he
added, executives of Trans World Airlines “enjoy[ed] a degree of dominance
. . . that any airline would have envied prior to deregulation.” For instance,
TWA employees in St. Louis directed 317 departures each day, compared
to employees of their next largest competitor, Southwest Airlines, who
managed only 22 daily departures.51 Like their postderegulation counter-
parts in the truck and railroad industries, airline executives constructed
large, complex, coast-to-coast passenger systems, including those fortress
hubs. In retrospect, however, the period of the 1960s and 1970s under the
regulatory regime was actually the moment of greatest airline choice and
service (but not price) competition. The many academic experts such as
George Hilton and Paul MacAvoy who had studied transportation prices
before deregulation had not predicted that deregulation would also lead to
creation of these fortress hubs.
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Hilton and MacAvoy were participants in a century-long tradition of
academic experts who advocated modification of the nation’s transportation
system. Starting in the early decades of the twentieth century, university fac-
ulty, including Emory Johnson and William Ripley, had advised legislators
and ICC members about railroad rates and service. Along with other mem-
bers of that generation of academic experts, Johnson and Ripley perceived
themselves in the service of government, and often recommended greater or
lesser degrees of federal regulation as a solution to railroad problems. John-
son and Ripley were among the many architects of the administrative state.52
In the 1960s, a new generation of academic transportation experts
including Hilton and MacAvoy as well as John Snow and Alfred Kahn
accepted high-level appointments in the federal government. Members of
this generation of experts were less likely to perceive themselves as architects
of government agencies and more likely to identify as advocates for dimin-
ished government.53 Having reached adulthood under the regulatory regime,
however, economists such as Snow and Kahn had only the limited results of
unregulated airline pricing in Texas and California on which to assert the
superiority of national deregulation and creation of national markets over
the workings of regulators and attorneys serving truckers, railroaders, and
airline executives. Despite the paucity of data available to them, members of
this generation of economists, again including Snow and Kahn, nonetheless
identified their federal positions as an opportunity to convert the largely
hypothetical findings of graduate seminars and dissertation research into
administrative and legislative directives packing consequences for millions
of shippers, receivers, and consumers. Equally, at the moment that Presi-
dents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter appointed members of this genera-
tion of economists to important, policymaking positions in the federal gov-
ernment, all understood that they had embarked on new and potentially
risky efforts to alter or abolish the workings of the regulatory regime in favor
of markets that did not yet exist. In retrospect, up to 1980, the agencies of
the regulatory regime such as the CAB, the ICC, and the rate bureaus had
fostered higher wages as well as higher shipping charges and (sometimes)
higher airline ticket prices. Simultaneously, those agencies of the regulatory
regime had also fostered predictable shipping rates, frequent and comfort-
able airline service, and steady employment. Nevertheless, members of that
generation of economists and other academic experts—who often held life-
time tenure at the nation’s leading universities—possessed immense confi-
dence in their ability to predict that creation of transportation markets
would lead to improved service at lower prices for shippers, receivers, and
passengers. Ironically, their prescriptions echoed the occasional calls of an
earlier generation of experts such as Harold Moulton and Joseph Eastman,
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who had begun to contemplate the idea of efficiency through markets dur-
ing the 1930s.
After 1980, members of a new generation of academic experts (still
economists, mostly) joined their aging counterparts in debates about airline
ticket prices. As early as 1981, only three years after airline deregulation,
John R. Meyer, a senior economist at Harvard University, and Clinton V.
Oster Jr., a younger economist at Indiana University, perceived no reason to
worry about high ticket prices. “A carrier withdrawing from a market
because it cannot compete with a competitor’s low fare,” they contended,
“can easily re-enter that market should the other carrier attempt to exploit
a newly acquired market position by increasing fares above competitive lev-
els.” Contemporary economists labeled Meyer and Oster’s idea the theory
of contestable markets. Even when airlines such as Robert Crandall’s Amer-
ican dominated traffic at a hub airport, went the reasoning among propo-
nents of this idea, American executives would not raise prices too high out
of concern that a competitor would enter that hub, or reenter it.54 In 1981,
however, Meyer and Oster were making predictions, not reporting on the
concrete responses of airline executives such as Robert Crandall and Don-
ald Burr.
By the mid-1980s, accumulating evidence of rising ticket prices had
persuaded several economists that the promise of contestable markets did
not always work out in practice. Between 1977 and 1983, economist Eliza-
beth E. Bailey had served with Alfred Kahn as a member of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board that bought about administrative deregulation of airlines.
Reporting on a sample of two hundred airline markets, in 1985 Bailey and
her coauthors reported that “the contestability benchmark does not fully
hold sway in the first years after deregulation.” At that point, however, Bai-
ley judged “the degree of this market power . . . [to be] relatively small.”55
By the late 1980s, studying the consequences of deregulation for airline
ticket prices had emerged as a cottage industry among economists. In line
with the conclusion that Bailey and her colleagues had reached, still other
economists determined that the threat of additional airline competition had
not actually led to lower ticket prices. In 1989, as one example, Thomas J.
Zlatoper, an economics professor at Cleveland’s John Carroll University,
and Paul W. Bauer, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
concluded that “the airline industry is not perfectly contestable.” In 1989, as
yet a second example, Severin Borenstein, a University of Michigan econo-
mist, found that “dominance of major airports by one or two carriers . . .
appears to result in higher fares for consumers.”56
Even economist Alfred Kahn, who a decade earlier had presided over
administrative deregulation of airlines as chair of the Civil Aeronautics
THE AMERICAN STATE AND TRANSPORTATION, 1980–1995 / 235
RSB_chap9_3rd.qxd  8/28/2006  1:32 PM  Page 235
Board, now expressed surprise at the degree to which creation of airport
hubs had permitted airline executives to boost ticket prices. Writing in the
precise but sometimes opaque language of a professional economist, in 1988
Kahn noted “the diminishing disciplinary effectiveness of potential entry by
totally new firms, and the increased likelihood, in consequence, of monop-
olistic exploitation.”57 Stated plainly, what Kahn and these other economists
learned was that airline executives, including Robert Crandall at American
Airlines, had created fortress hubs, trumping earlier predictions of market
contestability.
By the late 1980s, moreover, politicians and journalists were also discov-
ering that the promise of lower prices for airline tickets through a process of
market contestability did not appear to be working. Less likely to employ
the apolitical rhetoric of professional economists, those politicians and pop-
ular writers identified the new fortress hubs with poor service and jacked-up
prices. “For the second time in less than two weeks,” reported a writer for the
Business Journal in late March 1988, “the major airlines that serve Milwau-
kee have sharply increased fares and eliminated several highly discounted
rates.” No longer content to celebrate the advantages of markets, a U.S. sen-
ator talked in frightening terms about passengers “looking down a gun bar-
rel.” Months earlier, a writer for the Wall Street Journal writer had warned
ominously about “signs of a regulatory backlash against the industry.” In
February 1989, another Wall Street Journal writer asked rhetorically whether
“it is not time for re-regulation.”58
Proponents of that “regulatory backlash” failed to develop a common
agenda and widespread support for reregulating airline prices and service.
As early as 1986, a journalist reported that “a few calls for ‘re-regulation’ can
already be heard around the nation’s capital.” Late in 1986, concerned about
delays at TWA’s St. Louis hub, Senator John C. Danforth of Missouri
sought legislation to require airlines to report late and cancelled flights. In
April 1989, three additional senators joined Danforth in writing letters to
Secretary of Transportation Skinner and Attorney General Richard “Dick”
Thornburgh. Danforth and his colleagues asked for answers to questions
about the workings of the airlines’ fortress hubs and prices charged cus-
tomers for tickets. One question was whether justice department officials
had identified a pattern of “predatory” price cuts by executives of airlines
that dominated a hub to the detriment of new entrants.59 As historian Vietor
points out, Robert Crandall had used precisely that technique in defending
business at his Chicago hub against new competition from Donald Burr’s
People Express.
During the fall of 1989, senators turned from writing letters to prepara-
tion of specific proposals for reducing prices. For instance, Danforth and
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Senator John S. McCain discussed the idea of requiring airline executives,
including Robert Crandall, to sell their computerized reservation systems.
They also discussed whether the federal government ought to limit the per-
centage of gates Crandall and his counterparts controlled at an airport. “Vis-
cerally,” McCain contended, “I’m not in favor of government intervention,
but I see a clear need in this case.” Yet another idea under consideration for
promoting greater price competition was elimination of the airlines’ fre-
quent-flyer programs, which critics characterized as “legalized kickbacks.”
According to McCain, however, elimination of frequent-flyer programs
“would be ‘political dynamite.’” Unlike the years leading up to deregulation,
moreover, airline executives now defended the absence of a federal regulatory
agency and specific federal pricing guidelines. Writing in October 1988, a
writer for the Los Angeles Times observed that the “airlines . . . will fight any
proposed legislation.”60 Reminiscent of Eisenhower and Weeks’s first efforts
in 1955 and 1956 to bring about limited deregulation of rail and trucking
firms, in the late 1980s Danforth and McCain found few in the Senate and
House interested in refashioning the airline market once again.
At first glance, proponents of deregulation and often-celebrated mar-
kets had triumphed in the field of air transportation. In reality, the absence
of overt federal action to limit the growth of fortress hubs had framed the
postderegulation airline industry. Sounding like Senator McCain and his
colleagues, Alfred Kahn found “a lamentable failure of the administration to
. . . disallow a single merger or to press for divestiture of the computerized
reservation systems.” The decision by senior officials at the departments of
transportation and justice not to intervene in the airlines’ version of merger
mania constituted a policy. By their cumulative decision to permit mergers
to go forward, authors of that policy enabled Crandall and his counterparts
to restructure their firms and eventually to reorganize the industry around a
hub and spoke system dominated by a few large carriers.61 During the
1980s, the nation’s dominant transportation policy consisted of authorizing
truck, air, and rail executives to merge operations, including a limited num-
ber of mergers between operators of different transportation “modes.”
In a brilliant book, historian Vietor asks, “[W]hat causes governmental
intervention in and withdrawal from markets?” In the transportation field,
however, government did not intervene and withdraw from markets that in
some organic fashion had sprung up of their own volition and indepen-
dently of government. Instead, whether in 1920, 1935, 1938, or again in
1978 and 1980, legislators and administrators formed the transportation
market. Put another way, for all the market talk that surrounded trans-
portation politics before and after 1980, state officials had been and
remained constitutive of those markets.
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The barrier to understanding deregulation of transportation firms in
1978 and 1980 as more than a simple withdrawal of the federal government
from markets rests upon the limits of language and with our ideologically
driven conceptualization of a market as a counterpart to an imagined state
of political nature—a place sacred in its origin and lacking institutional con-
straint. Rather than dichotomizing markets and regulation, it makes more
sense to perceive them along a continuum shaped in both cases by the lead-
ers of the American state—with regulation and deregulation representing
different types of legal and administrative strategies for organizing the activ-
ities of transportation managers and workers.62
Nor had deregulation brought an end to direct subsidies for construction
and maintenance of the transportation infrastructure. Starting in the nine-
teenth century and extending to the end of the twentieth, federal officials
financed construction and maintenance of waterways and highways, and
then airways. By any standard, those subsidies were lavish, especially for
highway building. Between 1956 and 1990, federal officials paid 90 percent
of the costs of constructing the National System of Interstate and Defense
Highways, known popularly as the Interstate system. Although in 1956
leaders of the American Trucking Associations had agreed to higher gaso-
line and diesel taxes to cover part of the immense cost of constructing the
Interstate system, once completed, that system, which by 2002 included
forty-seven thousand miles of limited-access highways, made coast-to-coast
trucking operations possible and then routine. In 1991, the federal govern-
ment spent $19.5 billion for ground transportation facilities (mostly high-
ways) and another $8.1 billion on airways and $3.1 billion on waterways. In
fact, subsidies paid on a mode-by-mode basis added to the political con-
struction of the transportation industries rather than to creation of trans-
portation companies. Starting only in 1991, as part of the Intermodal Sur-
face Transportation Efficiency Act, Congress and the president authorized
expenditure during the next six years of a portion of $153 billion in federal
transportation funds for local officials to build connections between air-
ports, seaports, truck depots, and railyards.63 Because local officials rather
than state or federal officials directed construction of those connections,
however, no one person or agency possessed the capacity or authority to
coordinate those urban-intermodal connections from one city to the next.
Context had also mattered greatly in shaping the idea of three trans-
portation industries rather than one. In the nineteenth century, railroads
emerged as the nation’s first “big” business, and rail executives suffered from
a reputation for poor treatment of shippers and riders. In 1887, Congress
created the Interstate Commerce Commission as a first step in regulating
railroads. With the Hepburn Act of 1906 and the Mann-Elkins Act of
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1910, Congress and two presidents established federal authority to deter-
mine railroad rates. Starting in 1920, Congress and President Woodrow
Wilson authorized substantial regulation of railroad rates, service, and even
profits by the Interstate Commerce Commission. A decade later, with the
onset of harsh depression days, many believed that regulation comprised
one of the paths to economic recovery. In 1935 Congress and President
Franklin Roosevelt brought truckers under their own regulatory wing at the
ICC. In 1938, those same federal officials placed airlines under the sup-
portive supervision of a new agency, the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(in 1942, the Civil Aeronautics Board). By the end of the 1930s, however,
the incipient idea of transportation companies so favored by transportation
experts such as Harold Moulton and at least rhetorically by President Roo-
sevelt had been supplanted by the reality of three bodies of governing legis-
lation, three administrative agencies, three areas of litigation, three distinct
subsidy systems, and consequently by the appearance for administrative and
legal purposes of three industries.
During the 1960s, presidents and their top aides asserted that another
round of administrative coordination would foster a “fine-tuning” of the
economy. Between 1966 and 1968, Alan Boyd, the first secretary of trans-
portation, hoped to guide improved coordination among surface and air
transportation. By the early 1970s, however, economists and journalists
were reporting arrival of “stagflation,” that unpredicted and hurtful mix of
rising prices and falling levels of employment. Up to 1974, President
Richard Nixon supported both enhanced administrative controls and
deregulation. In his plan to create a number of “super” agencies, President
Nixon sought to merge transportation and land use planning, creating more
coherent cities and more coherent transportation. With the Penn Central
bankruptcy, starting in 1970 Nixon also set in motion a search for a con-
stituency that would support deregulation. Ultimately, Nixon’s resignation
tarnished the politics of enhanced transportation coordination. Starting
with President Gerald Ford and concluding with President Jimmy Carter
and his energetic aides, the politics of deregulation superseded the politics
of administrative coordination. In the idiom of that day, deregulation was
“the only show in town.” During the period between 1920 and 1980, fed-
eral officials, including members of Congress, judges, administrators, and
especially presidents of the United States, had constituted the nation’s
transportation systems and the nation’s transportation markets.64 History
had set the frameworks within which those politicians, including their suc-
cessors of the 1980s and 1990s, worked.
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CHAPTER 2
1. Statistics drawn from U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Statis-
tics, Statistics of Railways in the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1920), xxxii; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Histor-
ical Abstract of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1975), 711, 765.
2. Statistics from Margaret Walsh, Making Connections: The Long-Distance Bus
Industry in the USA (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000), 27.
3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), II:707. The ICC did not keep statistics on
freight and passenger traffic carried by modes other than railroads until the end of the
1920s, making comparisons difficult. These numbers, however, clearly indicate the basic
trends.
4. See Brice Edwards, Motor-truck Transportation of Fruits and Vegetables: Southern
Indiana and Southern Illinois 1928 Crop (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agricul-
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5. See Paul Barrett, The Automobile and Urban Transit: The Formation of Public Pol-
icy in Chicago, 1900–1930 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983).
6. See Michael A. Bernstein, A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in
Twentieth Century America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 173. On
apolitical expertise in another context, see Bruce E. Seely, Building the American Highway
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Thomas L. Haskell, The Authority of Experts: Studies in History and Theory (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1984).
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portation?” Engineering News-Record 84 ( January 1, 1920): 19–29; ( January 8, 1920):
85–89; ( January 15, 1920): 137–44; ( January 22, 1920): 184–91; ( January 29, 1920):
234–42; Dearing and Owen, National Transportation Policy, 81–104; also George Rogers
Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815–1860 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win-
ston, 1951). On development of the Mississippi River, see Arthur Frank De Wit, The
Development of the Federal Program of Flood Control on the Mississippi River (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1930); Michael C. Robinson, The Mississippi River Commis-
sion: An American Epic (Vicksburg, MS: Mississippi River Commission, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 1989); and Martin Reuss, “Andrew A. Humphreys and the Devel-
opment of Hydraulic Engineering: Politics and Technology in the Army Corps of Engi-
neers, 1850–1950,” Technology and Culture 26 ( January 1985): 1–33.
8. This section draws upon the analysis of Miller, Inland Transportation, 429–53,
641; Harold G. Moulton, The American Transportation Problem (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1933); and U.S. National Resources Planning Board, Committee
for the Transportation Study, Transportation and National Policy (Washington, DC: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1942), 359–83, 427–55. See also William J. Hull and Robert
W. Hull, The Origin and Development of the Waterways Policy of the United States (Wash-
ington, DC: National Waterways Conference, 1967), 36. On the St. Lawrence project,
Harold G. Moulton, Charles S. Morgan, and Adah L. Lee, The St. Lawrence Navigation
and Power Project (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1929); Theo L. Hills, The St.
Lawrence Seaway (New York: Praeger, 1959); and John B. Lansing, Transportation and
Economic Policy (New York: Free Press, 1966), 356–59.
9. Miller, Inland Transportation, 645. Every president of the 1920s supported inland
waterways as an aid to farmers, but Hoover was the most “ardent proponent of improv-
ing the inland waterways system,” seeing them as capital investments that were not local
in their benefits, and thus compatible with his vision of the federal role. Hull and Hull,
Origin and Development of the Waterways Policy, 33.
10. Information is drawn from Baker, “Future of Inland Waterway Transportation?”
( January 8, 1920): 85–89; “What the Barge Lines Are Doing,” Railway Age 85 (October
24, 1928): 801–804; (November 13, 1928): 865–69; Harold A. Van Dorn, Government
Owned Corporations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), 206–26; and Dearing and
Owens, National Transportation Policy, 89–90; Marshall Edward Dimock, Developing
America’s Waterways; Administration of the Inland Waterways Corporation (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1935); Samuel Thomas Bledsoe, Government Operation of Fed-
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